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Abstract  
This thesis explores depictions of the human body in German Expressionist art and 
the ways in which they might be interpreted through Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy. 
It is inspired by Franz Marc’s claim that, in Schopenhauer’s terms, the world as will took 
precedence over the world as representation in his own day.  
Discussion begins with an assessment of Vasily Kandinsky’s development of 
abstract art in relation to Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the world as representation. Here 
attention is given to Kandinsky’s personal reading of Schopenhauer’s doctrine of vision 
and colour. Chapter 2 explores depictions of dance in Expressionism, where the body is 
considered to be an objectification of the will. Discussion is negotiated through a case 
study of the work of Emil Nolde. In addition to the body in movement, the theme of the 
naked body was also central to Expressionist ideology and practice. Hence, Chapter 3 
engages in an interpretation of Expressionist depictions of the naked body according to 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the Platonic ideas and the world as representation.  
The outbreak of war in 1914 presented the Expressionist generation with new 
challenges. Chapter 4, therefore, examines the military experiences of selected 
Expressionist artists in order to assess their affirmation or denial of the will to war. The 
final chapters of the thesis reflect upon the relationship between Expressionism and the 
emergent Nazi regime in the 1930s. Chapter 5 takes as its theme an exploration of 
‘degenerate art’ and ‘degenerate’ bodies in relation to the artist Otto Mueller and his 
depiction of gypsies, according to Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy. Finally, Chapter 6 
investigates Emil Nolde’s association with Nazism and offers a new interpretation of these 
associations according to Schopenhauer’s doctrine of free will. In conclusion, the thesis 
demonstrates that Marc’s claims were broadly valid throughout this period but not without 
exception. 
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Fig. 141: Emil Nolde, Red-Bearded Treeman, date unknown. Watercolour, pen & ink on 
Japan paper, 24.2x17.3 cm. Seebüll: Nolde Stiftung.    
Fig.142: Emil Nolde, Pentecost, 1909. Oil on canvas, 87x107cm. Berlin: Neue 
Nationalgalerie. 
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Fig. 143: Emil Nolde, The Twelve-Year-Old Christ with the Doctors, 1911. Oil on 
cardboard, 100x86cm. Seebüll: Nolde Stiftung. 
Fig. 144: Emil Nolde, The Three Magi, 1911-12. Oil on canvas, 100x86cm. Location 
unknown. 
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‘The Triumph of the Will’: The German Expressionist Body c.1905-1945 and the 
Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer 
Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with Expressionist visual art from c.1905-1945 and explores two 
claims made by the Blaue Reiter artist Franz Marc. In an essay written for the journal Pan 
in 1912, Marc claimed that, “in Schopenhauer’s terms, the world as will today takes 
precedence over the world as representation”1 (‘Mit Schopenhauer geredet, bekommt 
heute die Welt als Wille vor der Welt als Vorstellung Geltung’) [C1]. Similarly, in an 
essay written for the same journal just two weeks prior to the above, he claimed that 
“Today we seek under the veil of appearances things hidden in nature that seem to us more 
important than the discoveries of the Impressionists…”2 (‘Wir suchen heute unter dem 
Schleier des Scheines verborgene Dinge in der Natur, die uns wichtiger scheinen als die 
Entdeckungen der Impressionisten' ) [C2]. The notations C1 and C2 (literally, claim 1 and 
Claim 2) are my own, and throughout this thesis Marc’s claims shall be referred to by 
using these notations. Due to the chronology of this thesis, the validity of C1 shall be 
prioritised over C2. One reason for this is that Marc specifically refers to Schopenhauer 
in the former passage, whilst another is that by limiting the scope of our investigations 
chronologically we might be able to explore C1 in particular depth and gain new insights. 
That is to say, how specific Expressionists interacted with Schopenhauer’s thinking and 
                                                                
1Marc, F., "Die Konstruktiven Ideen der Neuen Malerei " in: Pan  Vol. 2, no. 18., 21.03.1912, pp.527-531. Marc’s 
claims are not a remark on anything specific or identifiable about artistic practice, nor are they about the specific nature 
of Expressionism (as can be deduced from the context of the full article). That said, it appears to be a general observation 
which covers all of these things and one which, as we shall prove in this thesis, has picked up the Zeitgeist of his times. 
In addition, Marc did not elaborate on these claims in an explicit manner in his writing. 
2 Marc, F. "Die Neue Malerei " in: Pan  Vol. 2, no. 16., (07.03.1912), pp.468-471.. The term ‘appearance’, when used 
by Marc, Schopenhauer and this thesis, is an alternative description to that of representation (Vorstellung) – that is to 
say, ‘appearances’ relate to sensory experiences or perceptions. The world of appearance however, is not causally 
determined by the will (or what Schopenhauer relatedly refers to as the ‘thing in itself’). Whilst sensory experiences are 
coordinated by a priori forms of time, space and causality, by contrast the will is not so determined. As we shall see 
later on in this theis, the will is groundless and uncreated being free from the dictates of time, space and causality. That 
said, definitions of the terms ‘will’ and ‘representation’ shall be given later on in this introduction. 
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how we might interpret Expressionism, its socio-political context and cultural history 
through this philosopher. 
In his essay of 07.03.1912, as an Expressionist artist, Marc looked back at the 
1890s as a period of significant development within modern art. He noted how French 
Impressionism had “consumed itself in its own fire” and how “phoenix-like 
[phönixgleich], a new swarm of ideas arose, birds with brightly coloured feathers and 
mystical beaks [mystischen Schnäbeln].”3 He also asked, “who believes himself to be 
closer to the heart of nature, the Impressionists or the modern artists of today?”4 His belief 
was that there was no pre-existing standard by which this question could be addressed - 
despite feeling that contemporary German artists were just as close to the ‘heart of nature’ 
and its ‘inner secrets’ as Manet had been.  
Marc’s metaphysical convictions were reiterated and substantiated within other 
areas of his thought as we note in the following statement in which he argues that: 
Art is metaphysical ... it will free itself from man’s purposes and desires. We will 
no longer paint the forest or the horse as they please us or appear to us, but as they 
really are, as the forest or the horse feel themselves - their absolute being which 
lives behind the appearance which we see.5 
 
In addition, he argued that he was beginning to see through the world of objects as they 
appeared to him and able to see what lay behind them. That which lay behind them was 
concealed by external appearances - “hoodwinking man with a facade which is quite 
different from what it actually covers.”6 Whilst seeking the inner well-spring of nature 
under a ‘veil of appearances’ his belief was that the new movement in art was not an 
exclusively Parisian enterprise but was rather a pan-European one. In other words, the 
                                                                
3 Ibid. 
4 Long, R.-C. W. et al., German Expressionism : Documents from the End of the Wilhelmine Empire to the Rise of 
National Socialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
5 The original German sources appear in: Marc, F. Briefe, Aufzeichnungen und Aphorismen (Berlin, 1920), vol. I, p. 
121 and Aufzeichnungen auf Bogen in Folio ohne Titel: Thesen über die ›abstrakte‹ Kunst und über ›Grenzen der Kunst‹ 
(1912 1913), Fragment; Blatt 3.  
6 Long et al. 
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metaphysical yearning he sensed in contemporary artistic developments (and which would 
inform Expressionism) had now become international.  
Given its international roots, Jason Gaiger points out that “the term Expressionism 
has a complex and troublesome history. It characterises neither a specific style nor a 
unified artistic movement and remains highly diffuse in its application.”7 Part of this 
‘troublesome history’ stems from the fact that Expressionism possesses an international 
aetiology. In fact, the term was perhaps first used by the French amateur painter Julien-
Auguste Hervé when he exhibited a number of paintings at the Salon des Indépendants 
from 1901-1914. However, it is also the case that during May 1910, the German journal 
Kunst und Künstler employed the word ‘expressionistisch’ as a contrastive word to 
‘impressionistisch’. To complicate matter further, one year later in the January 1911 
edition of London’s The Burlington Magazine, the term ‘Expressionism’ was also used by 
Arthur Clutton-Brock in order to re-name the Post-Impressionists as ‘Expressionists’.  
This international aetiology of the term Expressionism was readily accepted by the 
German art historian Max Deri in his essay ‘Cubists and Expressionism’ written for Pan 
in 1912. In it he confidently argued that German Expressionism had evolved from Italian 
Futurism and Cubism. Yet, by contrast Ernst Ludwig Kirchner’s 1913 essay ‘Chronik der 
Brücke’, disavowed the influence of Cubism, Fauvism or Futurism – which was a 
viewpoint unsupported by other Brücke artists. As a consequence, Kirchner’s ‘Chronik 
der Brücke’ underwrote a “paradoxical myth developed during the war that Expressionism 
was primarily Germanic in origin rather than part of an international modernism.”8 
                                                                
7 Gaiger, J. ‘Expressionism and the Crisis of Subjectivity’ in:  Edwards, S. and Wood, P., Art of the Avant-Gardes (New 
Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press in association with the Open University, 2004). 
8 Long, R. C. W., Rigby, I. K., and Barron, S., German Expressionism: Documents from the End of the Wilhelmine 
Empire to the Rise of National Socialism (University of California Press, 1995). p.22. 
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This raises the question as to how Expressionism as a visual phenomenon can be 
defined. In Gaiger’s opinion it can be broadly suggested that: 
Many of the artists now classified as Expressionist rejected the imitation of nature 
as art’s primary goal, employing brilliant colour and visual distortions in order to 
communicate their responses to the world around them. A pronounced anti-
naturalistic tendency was thus combined with technical radicalism and a stress on 
authenticity of feeling and expression.”9 
Alongside its ‘technical radicalism’, German Expressionism absorbed an eclectic array of 
philosophical and spiritual influences ranging from the Kabbalah, Theosophy and the 
occult. Moreover, the German Expressionsts were conversant with the works of Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.  
Schopenhauer’s philosophy was influenced by, and synthesises, the doctrines of 
Plato, Kant and Indian thought with a leaning towards Buddhism.10 Indeed, Schopenhauer 
understood Buddhism as a confirmation of his own philosophy and was aware of Tibetan 
(Mahayana) sources and possibly Therevada scripts. Yet, he read the compilations of 
Buddhism selectively, being interested in its philosophy and ethics but not in Buddhism 
as practiced in South and Central Asia.11 His major work of philosophy appears in Die 
Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (The World as Will and Representation) of 1818, and a 
second revised edition of 1844 which contained supplementary materials to the first 
edition. This major work was grounded upon his doctoral thesis Uber die vierfache Wurzel 
des Satzes vom zureichende Grunde (On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason) of 1813. Schopenhauer persuades his readers that they must read his doctoral 
thesis first in order to understand his major work. Two years later, in 1815, Schopenhauer 
                                                                
9  Gaiger, J. ‘Expressionism and the Crisis of Subjectivity ‘in: Edwards and Wood. p.13. 
10 Cross, S., Society for, A., and Comparative, P., Schopenhauer's encounter with Indian thought : representation and 
will and their Indian parallels (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2013). 
11 See Baumann, M., "Global Buddhism: Developmental Periods, Regional Histories, and a New Analytical 
Perspective," in: Journal of Global Buddhism  Vol. 2 (2015). I am grateful to Martin Baumann for his advice on this 
issue. 
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produced his book Über das Sehn und die Farben (On Vision and Colours) which as we 
shall see in chapters 1 and 3 was studied by Kandinsky and Kirchner.12  
Every work which Schopenhauer produced was a corroboration and not refutation 
of his major work. Works produced thereafter were Über den Willen in der Natur (On the 
Will in nature) of 1836, and ‘On the Foundation of Morality’ in Die beiden 
Grundprobleme der Ethik (The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics) of 1841, both of 
which will underpin our explorations of C1 and C2 in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.13 In 
Schopenhauer’s ouvre there also followed a compendium of his essays in two volumes 
called Parerga and Paralipomena of 1851, which as we shall note shortly, gained him 
some popularity after almost a lifetime of neglect by his contemporaries.  
His philosophy is founded upon Kant’s demarcation between the thing-in-itself 
(Ding an sich) (or what Schopenhauer often refers to as the will) and the world of 
appearance.14 The will (Wille) is one, not in the sense that a concept or object is one, and 
exists in all things without division. It is groundless, uncreated, aimless and ever striving. 
Furthermore, it is the ultimate cause of all suffering, devoid of knowledge, expressing 
itself in the forces of nature such as gravity. The will successively manifests itself in ever 
more sophisticated grades within the world of phenomena attaining its highest pinnacle in 
the human being.15 The will as the underlying essence of the world and as its true being 
offers us no escape, aside from aesthetic experience which in the end only proves to be 
transient, or by renunciation of the will to life which can prove to be permanent.  
                                                                
12 Schopenhauer, A., Farbenlehre: 1. Ueber das sehn und die farben. 2. Theoria colorum physiologica (Leipzig: P. 
Reclam, 1854). 
13As David Cartwright says: “There has not been a translation of Schopenhauer's Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik 
under a single cover.” For this quotation and further information see Cartwright, D. E., Historical Dictionary of 
Schopenhauer's Philosophy (Scarecrow Press, 2005).p.200. 
14 There is some contention over E.J.F. Paynes’ translation of Schopenhauer’s term (Erscheinung) into the English 
word ‘phenomenon’. See Cartwright. Ibid.p.126. 
15 Dale Jacquette,’Idealism. Schopenhauer, Schiller, and Schelling’ in: Gaut, B. and Lopes, D., The Routledge 
Companion to Aesthetics (Taylor & Francis, 2013). p.68. For a history of the Great Chain of Being, see: .Lovejoy, A., 
The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Taylor & Francis, 2017). 
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The other side of the world we live in is the world of representation (Vorstellung) 
or appearance (Erscheinung) and it is governed by what Schopenhauer calls the principle 
of sufficient reason (Satz vom Zureichenden Grund). This means that “every possible 
object is subordinate to it, that is to say, stands in a necessary relation to other objects, on 
the one hand as determined, on the other as determining.”16 In section 5 of his doctoral 
thesis, Schopenhauer defines the ‘Principle of Sufficient Reason’ as being a “common 
expression of several kinds of knowledge given a priori.”17 He chose to lay down this 
Principle in a formula - which most scholars have mistakenly attributed directly to 
Schopenhauer. Rather, the reality is that he uses Christian Wolff’s formula “as the most 
general” which states that, “nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit quam non sit (nothing is 
without a ground or reason why it is).”18  
According to Schopenhauer, the root of the ‘Principle of Sufficient Reason’ is 
actually divisible into four classes by which everything can become for us a 
representation and therefore explicable. As such, it is a Principle which he regards as 
being indubitable and in need of no defence. Thus, he says: 
…every ground or reason must be valid within one of those four possible classes 
of objects of our representation faculty; consequently, the use of this ground or 
reason assumes as given one of those possible classes together with that faculty, 
that is, with the whole world, and it keeps within these limits. But such a ground 
or reason cannot be valid outside its possible class, or even outside of all objects.19 
 
In brief, the four-fold root of this ‘Principle’ consists of i) the physical, ii) the logical, 
iii) the mathematical and iv) the moral. This means that the physical root explains all 
changes which occur in the physical world, while the logical root explains the ground of 
all truths a priori. Although the mathematical class explains geometrical theorems, and is 
                                                                
16 Schopenhauer, A. and Payne, E. F. J., The World as Will and Representation (New York: Dover Publications, 1969). 
Vol.1., p.6-7. 
17  On The Fourfold Root of The Principle of Sufficient Reason (La Salle, Ill: Open Court, 1974).,p.6. 
18 Ibid.,p.6. 
19 Ibid.,p.235. 
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quite self-evident, by contrast the class belonging to moral explanations pertains not, as 
we might assume, to morality per se but instead to an explanation of human or animal 
behaviours according to their motives. As consequence, this latter class will apply to our 
explorations of C1 in chapter 6 of this thesis where we discuss the problem of free will in 
relation to Nolde and that which may or may not have motivated him to behave in certain 
ways as opposed to others whilst living under Nazi rule. 
Of central importance, there is no causal link between the will and the world of 
representation. The world as will, according to Schopenhauer is the only true reality which 
generates and manifests the world as representation. Whilst the will is the thing in itself, 
it diverges from the world of appearances since it is the essence, the inner kernel, or the 
‘reality’ behind the ‘illusion’ of all appearances so to speak.20 For Schopenhauer, the 
thing-in-itself is accessible to us as human beings in contrast to Kant who did not believe 
that this was possible. By contrast, he says that it is accessible to us through our individual 
will as an object of experience, and that the will is identical with our body. Therefore, one 
of the central tenets which underpins Schopenhauer’s philosophy (and this thesis) is that 
the experience of our embodied will also offers us a key to the inner nature of the will as 
the thing in itself. 
Apart from his great respect for Kant, Schopenhauer also studied Plato whilst at 
the University of Göttingen in 1810 and eventually reconciled Kant’s thing-in-itself with 
Plato’s Ideas. Indeed, as Cartwright shows, Schopenhauer reconciled their two most 
paradoxical doctrines, “Plato’s theory of Ideas and Kant's thing in itself, by claiming that 
both philosophers recognized that the world revealed by the senses is merely a world of 
                                                                
20 Cartwright., p.171-72. Schopenhauer defines the thing in itself (and his place for it in the history of philosophy) as 
follows: “Thing-in-itself expresses that which exists independently of perception through any of our senses, and so that 
which really and truly is. For Democritus this was formed matter; at bottom, it was still the same for Locke; for Kant it 
was an x; for me it is will.”Schopenhauer, A. and Payne, E. F. J., Parerga and Paralipomena. Short Philosophical 
Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). Vol.2,p.90. 
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appearances and not true reality.”21 As we shall see in chapter 3 of this thesis, when we 
explore C1 and C2 in relation to Kirchner’s art, Plato's Ideas (or Forms) are eternal 
archetypes which act as paradigmatic patterns for every particular object in the 
phenomenal world - which in turn (theoretically) bridge the world as will and the world 
as representation.  
According to such a theory, every particular object retains something of the 
universal Idea within it. In fact, as we shall note in chapter 3, aesthetic contemplation 
enables us to perceive a universal in a particular. Furthermore, as Andy Hamilton shows 
in his book Aesthetics and Music, “Schopenhauer radically re-interprets Kant's account of 
aesthetic judgment as disinterested, seeing it as transcending ordinary forms of perception, 
and therefore possessing special value.”22 Thus, through aesthetic contemplation of a 
beautiful object we forget ourselves for a brief time and experience a will-less sense of 
peace. Therefore, by losing ourselves in aesthetic contemplation we obtain a temporary 
respite from the striving of the will which causes the suffering of the whole world.  
This is of relevance to chapter 4 of this thesis when we come to investigate C1 in 
relation to a group of selected artists who fought in the First World War. It is of relevance 
because Schopenhauer states that “the basis of all willing…is need, lack, and hence pain, 
and by its very nature and origin it is therefore destined to pain.”23 Indeed, in a succinct 
reminder of this notion, Thomas A. Mautner  shows that “Schopenhauer’s thoroughgoing 
pessimism was neatly condensed in his turning Welt (world) into an acronym: Weh (woe), 
Elend (misery), Leid (suffering), Tod (death).”24  
 
Despite his acknowledged pessimism, Schopenhauer had a remarkable influence 
upon later thinkers such as Thomas Mann, Richard Wagner, Sigmund Freud, and Friedrich 
                                                                
21 Cartwright.p.153. 
22 Hamilton, A., Aesthetics and Music, Continuum aesthetics (London: Continuum Press, 2007). p.76. 
23 Schopenhauer, A., The world as will and representation (New York: Dover Publications, 1969).Vol.1., p.312 
24 Mautner, T., The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy (London: Penguin, 2000).p.510. 
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Nietzsche.25 However, his reception into the canon of philosophy was seriously delayed, 
in part due to the greater successes of his contemporary G.W.F.Hegel, (and then the Young 
Hegelians who became his disciples), but also in part due to the later popularitry of  
Nietzsche’s writings.26 Yet, this is not all that there is to the matter, since Schopenhauer 
appears to have been a poor decision maker and difficult to associate with. For instance, 
we know that in the Summer of 1820, whilst at the University of Berlin, Schopenhauer 
planned a cycle of lectures which he no doubt hoped would be more popular than those of 
his rival Hegel. However, this plan failed since only a small number of students attended 
his first lecture, subsequently leading Schopenhauer (in a fit of pique) to abandon an 
academic career forever and to nurture a life-long grudge towards Hegel.27  
For nigh on 35 years after the publication of his major work in 1818, Schopenhauer 
was almost completely ignored by the intellectual world, and as Bryan Magee has shown, 
he first gained recognition in England around 1853 when the Westminster Review, (edited 
by Georg Eliot), published an unattributed article on Schopenhauer called ‘Iconoclasm in 
German Philosophy’. It was later republished in German in the Vossische Zeitung and read 
more so there than in England. Three years later in 1854, Soren Kierkegaard would write 
                                                                
25 For Mann on Schopenhauer see: Mann, Thomas, ‘Schopenhauer’, Essays of Three Decades, trans. H. T. Lowe- Porter 
(New York: A. A. Knopf, 1947). For Wagner’s comments on Schopenhauer, and his correspondence with him, see: pp. 
614-17,632,637,646,659,699,731,749,784,786 in: Wagner, R., My Life (London: Constable and Co., 1911). Freud 
claims that he read Schopenhauer late in life. See: Freud, S., An Autobiographical Study Inhibitions, Symptoms and 
Anxiety: The Question of Lay Analysis and Other Works: 1925-1926 (London: The Hogarth Press: The Institute of 
Psychoanalysis, 1986). p.59-60. However, his claims have been successfully refuted by several scholars who have 
proven that Freud not only read Schopenhauer much earlier than claimed, but also borrowed heavily from him. For 
further information, see: Askay, R., and J. Farquhar. Apprehending the Inaccessible: Freudian Psychoanalysis and 
Existential Phenomenology. Northwestern University Press, 2006.p.390 and Sulloway, F.J. Freud, Biologist of the 
Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend. Harvard University Press, 1992, p.253. Nietzsche was initially infatuated 
with Schopenhauer’s philosophy, as is evidenced by his early work The Birth of Tragedy of 1872. Nietzsche 
subsequently renounced his infatuation with both Schopenhauer and Wagner, maintaining a lasting antipathy towards 
both men, despite his intellectual debts to them.  
26 The Young Hegelian movement, consisting of Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach, Max Stirner, and Carl 
Nauwerck among others, had a significant and impact upon Karl Marx’s thinking at one stage. However, despite Marx’s 
approval of the Young Hegelians’ tactic of confronting Christianity so as to challenge the Prussian authorities, he 
eventually broke away from the group and censured their opinions in Die deutsche Ideologie  (The German Ideology). 
Marx, K. et al., Die deutsche Ideologie (1932). See also: McLellan, D., The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx ([S.l.]: 
Praeger, 1969). 
27 For a detailed account of Schopenhauer’s animosity towards Hegel see: Cartwright, D. E., Schopenhauer: A 
Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).,p.366. His undoubted envy of Hegel led him to draw in 
his notebook a caricature of Hegel which made the philosopher look like a pig. 
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in his diary that “all the literary gossips, journalists and authorlings have begun to busy 
themselves with S’ .”28  
In the aftermath of failed revolutions during 1848, a wave of pessimism overtook 
Europe and from that point on Schopenhauer began to find fertile ground for the reception 
of his work. Nevertheless, throughout most of the 1840s, Schopenhauer remained largely 
unknown, despite attracting the attention of philosopher cum judge Friedrich Ludwig 
Andreas Dorguth, whom Schopenhauer described as his ‘evangelist’. In a letter to Adam 
von Doss, dated 10.01.1855, Schopenhauer would lament that: “The primary evangelist 
[Urevangelist] Dorguth has died, aged 77, from cholera: he had received the ‘Will in 
Nature’ two days previously and had started reading and enjoying it, so his daughter tells 
me.”29 That said, the only professional philosopher to take a serious interest in 
Schopenhauer was Julius Frauenstädt who he made the legal heir to his writings in 1859. 
One of the few individuals who was able to maintain cordial relations with 
Schopenhauer consistently from July 1844, was a lawyer from Alzey called Johann 
August Becker. Schopenhauer would classify him as an ‘apostle’, and as Magee has 
noted:: 
He [Schopenhauer] distinguished, only half-jokingly, between his ‘evangelists’ 
and his ‘apostles’, the evangelists being those who propagated the gospel, the 
apostles those who embraced it but did not spread it. Becker remained always an 
apostle. According to Schopenhauer the arch‐apostle was Doss, the arch‐
evangelist Frauenstädt.30 
Ten years before his death in 1860, Schopenhauer attempted to persuade Brockhaus, 
Germany’s leading publisher, to publish Parerga and Paralipomena – which was 
summarily rejected. On the whole therefore, we can say that Schopenhauer remained 
                                                                
28 Magee, B., The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, Rev. and enl. ed. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997)., P.26. 
29 Letter from Schopenhauer to Friedrich Ludwig Andreas Dorguth, dated 10.01.1855, in: Schopenhauer, A. and 
Hübscher, A., Gesammelte Briefe (Bonn: Bouvier, 1987).  
30 Magee.,p.420. 
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outside the canon of University philosophy, often securing greater success in the public 
domain through independent readers. Yet, by the 1870s, Magee has argued that 
Schopenhauer “came to be seen by academic philosophers generally as one of the 
outstanding philosophers of recent times, but his established reputation with them never 
overtook that of Hegel.”31 Then by 1890, William Wallace, Professor of Moral Philosophy 
at Oxford, had published a biography of Schopenhauer, and then, in the same decade, we 
find that American philosophers Josiah Royce and George Santayana began to engage 
with his work more closely.32  
A few years earlier, German philosopher Eduard von Hartmann, author of 
Philosophy of the Unconscious: Speculative results according to the Inductive Method of 
Physical Science,33 came to acknowledge Schopenhauer’s work, as did the Indologist Paul 
Deussen, professor of philosophy at Kiel, who in 1911 created the Schopenhauer Society 
(Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft) which still exists today.34 In fact, we find that  one year later 
in 1912 Deussen, as a former friend of Nietzsche, had begun to edit a journal known as 
the Schopenhauer Yearbook (Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch). We also find, among a handful of 
interested German scholars one Hans Vaihinger, author of The Philosophy of As If: A 
System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind, coming under the 
influence of Schopenhauer.35  
                                                                
31 Ibid.,p.427. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Hartmann, E. v. and Coupland, W. C., Philosophy of the Unconscious: Speculative results according to the inductive 
method of physical science (London; New York: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.; Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931). Cf. 
Hartmann, E. v., Philosophie des Unbewussten: Versuch einer Weltanschauung (Berlin: Carl Duncker's Verlag (C. 
Heymons), 1869). 
34 For a detailed analysis of Schopehauer’s reception in Germany see; Weiner, T., Die Philosophie Arthur 
Schopenhauers und ihre Rezeption (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 2000). Also see: Sorg, B., Zur literarischen Schopenhauer-
Rezeption im 19. Jahrhundert (Heidelberg: Winter, 1975). 
35 Vaihinger, H., "The Philosophy of As If: A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind," 
in:   (2014). 
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The French reception of Schopenhauer’s philosophy was often complex and 
fraught with Germanophobia from the 1850s onwards. Following the Franco-Prussian 
War of 1870-1871, for many in France even the music of Wagner symbolised Germany’s 
domination of their culture. Indeed, Léon Daudet’s book, Hors du joug allemande: 
mesures d'après guerre of 1915 reflects a widely held opinion that their culture had been 
overrun by Germany. In it Daudet claimed that, “the devotion to Wagner is costly because 
he denationalizes the French in the manner of a Kant or a Hegel or a Schopenhauer.”36 
However, an exception to this opinion is held by Foucher de Careil who, in his book Hegel 
et Schopenhauer: Études sur la philosophie allemande moderne depuis Kant jusqu’à nos 
jours (1862), offers us a rare and affirmative account of Schopenhauer’s philosophy from 
a French perspective - although it should be treated with caution.37  
One note of caution stems from David Asher, a German-Jewish scholar who began 
his correspondence with Schopenhauer by letter from 16.06.1855 until the philosopher’s 
death in 1860. Asher warned his readers of a certain discrepancy in de Careil’s account in 
his book, Arthur Schopenhauer New Material by Him and about Him by Dr David Asher 
(1871), where he points out that de Careil had implied how a face-to-face meeting had 
taken place between Schopenhauer and himself. De Careil had claimed that, “I have seen 
how he (Schopenhauer) was excited by the thought that the philosophical commentary on 
his doctrine of the will is found in the rightly proclaimed book of Bichat about life and 
death.”38 
Asher was convinced that the above account was fictitious, arguing that much of 
the supposed meeting between Schopenhauer and de Careil could be found verbatim in 
                                                                
36 Daudet, L., Hord du Joug Allemand (1915).p.85 
37 The mutual suspicion between France and Germany would continue into the advent of the Expressionist era as will 
be discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis. 
38 Asher, D. and Farrelly, D. J., Arthur Schopenhauer: New Material by Him and about Him (2015).p.81 
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the philosopher’s own writing. Indeed, Asher states that, “this fictional dressing up of a 
quoted passage in the shape of a conversation seems customary in France and belongs to 
the excusable untruths with which this unfortunate nation lets itself be beguiled during 
wartime.”39 Ultimately, Asher felt that de Careil, while rendering the philosophers work 
honestly enough, drew the inaccurate conclusion that Schopenhauer had few disciples. 
Asher refuted this conclusion by stating that “…there is no city in Germany where 
Schopenhauer does not have followers who quietly contribute to the dissemination of his 
philosophy...”40 
The major portion of Schopenhauer’s philosophy was destined for The World as 
Will and Representation, which appears in two volumes and has a basic pattern in terms 
of format. In each volume there are four subtitled ‘books’ which alternate between the 
world as representation and the world as will. Book 1 explores the world as representation; 
Book 2 the world as will; Book 3 the world as representation; Book 4 the world as will. 
During the first four chapters of this thesis I mirror that alternating pattern, oscillating 
between the world as representation and the world as will. However, the final two chapters 
of this thesis interpret the Expressionist body through two of Schopenhauer’s ethical 
works, these being his essay On the Basis of Morality (Über die Grundlage der Moral) 
(1839) and his essay On the Freedom of the Human Will, (Über die Freiheit des 
menschlichen Willens) (1839) - which are mutually reinforcing.41 Both essays were 
originally contained in The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics42 (1841), and deal with 
morality in a more concentrated sense. Consequently, these latter two essays ought to be 
                                                                
39 Ibid.p.82 
40 Ibid.p.83 
41 Schopenhauer, A., Payne, E. F. J., and Cartwright, D. E., On the Basis of Morality (Berghahn Books, 1995); 
Schopenhauer, A., Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, behandelt in zwei akademischen Preisschriften. I.  Über die 
Freiheit des menschlichen Willens ... II. Über das Fundament der Moral, etc (Frankfurt am Main: Hermannsche 
Buchhandlung, 1841). 
41 Zöller, G. n., Arthur Schopenhauer: Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1999). 
42 Schopenhauer, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, behandelt in zwei akademischen Preisschriften. I.  Über die 
Freiheit des menschlichen Willens ... II. Über das Fundament der Moral, etc. 
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regarded as sequels to the ethical side of his philosophy, as found in book 4 of his major 
work. They can therefore be regarded as appropriate tools with which to explore the final 
two chapters of this thesis.  
To put Schopenhauer’s major work into greater detail, the four-part pattern in 
Volume 1 of Schopenhauer’s opens with the subtitle, ‘First Book The World as 
Representation First Aspect: The Representation subject to the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason: The Object of Experience and of Science’.43 It is followed by the ‘Second Book: 
The World as Will First Aspect: The Objectification of the Will’,44 then the ‘Third Book: 
The World as Representation Second Aspect: The Representation Independent of the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason: The Platonic Idea: The Object of Art’.45 Finally, we have 
the ‘Fourth Book: The World as Will Second Aspect: With the Attainment of Self-
Knowledge, Affirmation and Denial of the Will-to-Live’.46 The 1818 edition of The World 
as Will and Representation, known in this thesis as Volume 1, was followed by a second 
edition in 1844, referred to in this thesis as The World as Will and Representation47 
Volume 2, and contains supplements to Volume 1. 
In terms of methodology, Chapter 1 of this thesis adopts the ‘First Book: The 
World as Representation First Aspect’. According to my adoption of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, I introduce Kandinsky’s approach to the world as representation, which means 
that chapter 1 is called ‘Vasily Kandinsky and the World as Representation’.48 The 
chapter also defines Schopenhauer’s use of the term representation (Vorstellung), and my 
                                                                
43 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.1-91. 
44 Ibid., p.93-165. 
45 Ibid., p.167-267. 
46 Ibid., p.269-412. 
47 The World as Will and Representation (Indian Hills (Col.): Falcon's Wing Press, 1958). Vol.2. 
48 For a detailed discussion of Schopenhauer’s methodology see: Guyer, Paul. ‘Schopenhauer, Kant, and the Methods 
of Philosophy in: Janaway, C. and Online Cambridge Collections, The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Also: Bart Vandenabeeles’ ‘Background: Schopenhauer’s 
Methodological Presuppositions’ in: Vandenabeele, B., A Companion to Schopenhauer (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2012). 
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adoption of it, in relation to the world of objects in Expressionist art. More importantly, 
this chapter tests Marc’s claims, particularly C2, in relation to Kandinsky’s move away 
from the world of objects as intuitive representations and towards abstraction. It thus paves 
the way for the German Expressionist body per se as a locus for disinterring that which is 
the content of our representations. Ultimately, Chapter 1 concludes that Marc’s claims 
were appropriate generalisations when applied to the visual arts, but they do not 
necessarily apply to the critical language of the age. 
While we are investigating Marc’s claims on Schopenhauer’s terms, we shall 
consider intuitive representations of perception through a method which he refers to as 
dianoiology.49 In order to understand this we need to accept that for Schopenhauer, 
philosophy has for its object experience in general and must therefore find secure 
empirical foundations. As a result, that which ought to be the topic of philosophy he says 
“should be the medium wherein experience in general presents itself, together with the 
form and nature of that medium. This is the representation, the mental picture, knowledge, 
and thus the intellect.”50 On this basis, he argues that philosophy is compelled to begin by 
investigating - and validating the boundaries of - the faculty of knowledge, together with 
its laws and forms. This division of philosophy he defines as a ‘philosophia prima’ which 
in turn is subdivided as follows: 
…into a consideration of primary representations, i.e. representations of 
intuitive perception, and this part may be called dianoiology or theory of 
the understanding; and into a consideration of secondary representations, 
i.e. abstract representations, together with the order of their manipulation, 
and thus logic or the theory of reason [Vernunft].51  
 
 
                                                                
49 Dianoiology refers to theories of understanding. Consequently, by engaging with Schopenhauer’s methodology, 
Chapter 1 investigates the limits of the faculty of knowledge in relation to both Marc’s claims and Kandinsky’s 
understanding of art.  
50 Schopenhauer and Payne. Vol.2, p.18. 
51 Ibid. 
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However, as he explains in chapter 17, volume 2 of his major work, such a philosophical 
method can never arise out of pure abstract concepts. This methodological approach is 
important, not only for our investigations of C1 and C2, on Schopenhauer’s terms in 
general, but more narrowly for our own investigations into Kandinsky’s artistic practice 
and thinking in chapter 1. That is to say, by adopting Schopenhauer’s methodology our 
investigations will pursue C1 and C2 as metaphysical claims in a more specific sense by, 
on the one hand acquainting us with the empirical world of nature, and on the other by 
conceiving of it as did Schopenhauer, “as a phenomenon which is given but somehow 
conditioned and in which an essence or entity manifests itself, such entity being different 
from the phenomenon itself and accordingly would be the thing-in-itself.”52 
As we have just noted, by ‘the thing-in-itself’ (alternately described by him as the 
will), Schopenhauer means the ultimate reality which lies behind the veil of appearances. 
And it is this reality which Marc and Kandinsky claimed to have been searching for 
through their art. As we shall find in chapter 1, both Kandinsky and Schopenhauer 
attempted to unite inner and outer experience in order to obtain insights into the whole 
phenomenon of nature. Thus, according to Schopenhauer, a thinker can uncover the whole 
phenomenon of nature in such a way that it renders “its meaning and connection-
comparable to the reading of hitherto mysterious characters of an unknown writing.”53 
Consequently, we shall attempt to advance, (as perhaps did Marc and Kandinsky), “from 
the phenomenal appearance to that which appears, to that which is hidden behind the 
phenomenon”54 in pursuit of C1 and C2. As shall be noted in chapter 2 of this thesis, 
according to Schopenhauer, his recommended procedure reveals to us that that ‘which is 
hidden behind the phenomenon’ is our will. 
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Consequently, we shall apply this procedure to Marc’s claims. However, because 
Schopenhauer regarded himself as Kant’s successor, one of the limitations to the 
methodology of this chapter, and the thesis overall, is the absence of comparisons made 
between Schopenhauer’s philosophical method and Kant’s. This is justifiable on the 
grounds that this thesis is primarily orientated towards an art historical readership. I have 
therefore chosen to neglect much of the Kantian in favour of the Nietzschean. The reason 
for this is that Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy was known by the Expressionists, and that 
for Nietzsche, Schopenhauer was of fundamental importance.  
One of the most important questions for philosophers such as Schopenhauer, and 
artists such as Kandinsky, was to ask what it is that lies behind the world of appearances. 
In other words, is the world as representation all that there is to life, or is there a 
metaphysical reality which underpins this world? Indeed, Kandinsky’s book, On the 
Spiritual in Art (Über das Geistige in der Kunst) of 1912, addresses such issues and it can 
be found translated in Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo’s Kandinsky: Complete 
Writings on Art (1994).55 In this latter work, the artist’s essays are presented 
chronologically allowing the reader to navigate the complex evolution of Kandinsky’s 
ideas. This is significant beacause it brings to light his theories on abstract art and his 
conviction that abstraction could reveal the metaphysical substrate of representation. 
In line with this, Kenneth Berry’s article, ‘The Paradox of Kandinsky’s Abstract 
Representation’56 (2005) examines aspects of the artist’s journey into abstraction. The 
conceptual definitions of ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’, are explored in relation to the phrase 
‘abstract representation’. This is important since turn of the century artists began to 
question the value of the object as a means to expression. David Morgan’s article ‘The 
                                                                
55 Kandinsky, W., Lindsay, K. C., and Vergo, P., Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art, New ed. ed. (New York: Da 
Capo Press, 1994). p.114-221. 
56 Berry, K., "The Paradox of Kandinsky's Abstract Representation," in: Journal of Aesthetic Education  Vol. 39, no. 1 
(2005). 
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Idea of Abstraction in German Theories of the Ornament from Kant to Kandinsky’57 
(1992), also goes some way towards addressing this, as does Peg Weiss’ article 
‘Kandinsky and the Symbolist Heritage’.  58 
Although Chapter 1 must count as a significant contribution towards Expressionist 
scholarship, there are certain limitations to its scope. Two immediately spring to mind. 
The first is that Kandinsky’s case could be regarded as an exception, since the majority of 
Expressionist artists were happy to depict the world of objects and were not driven towards 
abstraction as strongly as he was. However, I felt it necessary to engage Kandinsky’s art 
in this way since his art leans progressively upon conceptual representations with such 
force that it puts Marc’s claims to the test in a more vivid manner. This way provides a 
methodological platform upon which to set the significance of the human body as an 
object according to Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The second is a limitation of the time 
frame to around 1905 to 1918. I felt it necessary to focus upon this time frame in order to 
concentrate upon the newly arising tensions between an emergent abstract art and the body 
as an object. 
In terms of methodology, Chapter 2 engages Schopenhauer’s ‘Second Book: The 
World as Will First Aspect’, and is titled ‘Expressionist Art, Dance and the Embodied 
Will’. As with Schopenhauer, rather than pursue scientific methodologies in order to 
penetrate into the substance of Marc’s claims, this chapter apprehends the inner reality of 
the world of appearances through the phenomenology of the human body.59 Through the 
                                                                
57 Morgan, D., "The Idea of Abstraction in German Theories of the Ornament from Kant to Kandinsky," in: The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism  Vol. 50, no. 3 (1992). 
58 Weiss, P., "Kandinsky and the Symbolist Heritage," in: Art Journal  Vol. 45, no. 2 (1985). 
59 The body could be considered as a narrow gateway through which we might grasp the inner nature of appearances 
and other beings. However, as Daniel Came suggests, there is a weakness to this notion since it may be counter-argued 
that Schopenhauer’s phenomenological approach “can never be evidence of anything beyond itself.” Daniel Came, 
‘Schopenhauer on the Metaphysics of Art and Philosophy’ in: Vandenabeele. (2012) p.239. Even so, it does not 
exsanguinate Schopenhauer’s philosophy of its interpretative or historical value by which we can examine Marc’s 
claims. If we do not accept this then it is possible that ,“in the end one may be in the ridiculous position of deploring a 
necessary truth.” Ayer, A. J., Philosophical Essays (London: Macmillan, 1954). p.195. 
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medium of the human body we shall discover that the content of our representations is, 
according to Schopenhauer, the will. We may argue therefore, that depictions of dance in 
Expressionist art both generate and illustrate Schopenhauer’s argument that the body is a 
manifestation of the will. On the basis of Schopenhauer’s definition of the term will, C1 
is subsequently tested through Expressionist images of dance as produced by Die Brücke 
and Der Blaue Reiter artists. 
Despite Kandinsky’s early move towards abstraction, the human body as an object 
of art remained a focal point for artists such as Emil Nolde. For this artist, the human body 
in dance captivated his artistic imagination, as we learn from his autobiography Mein 
Leben (1979).60 This captivation is also explored in the book Emil Nolde in Berlin: Dance, 
Theatre, Cabaret (2007)61 and Two Dancers within the Blaue Reiter Circle (2002).62 The 
latter looks at the relationship between Russian dancer Alexander Sakharov and his wife 
Clotilde Derp, along with their links to the Blaue Reiter group. In addition, any interest in 
the human body dancing as a manifestation of the will, should pursue the complexities of 
movement as found in Rudolf von Laban’s book The Mastery of Movement on the Stage 
(1960).63  
Although this chapter on the human body dancing appears wide ranging, there are 
shortcomings to it, especially since its compass is restricted to the outbreak of the First 
World War. Furthermore, it is arguably less complete for not incorporating a discussion 
of Ernst Ludwig Kirchner’s life-long interest in dance - most conspicuous during the 
Weimar era. Yet, this approach was deemed necessary in order to act as a counter balance 
to the first chapter which concentrates on the representation as an object of experience. 
                                                                
60 Nolde, E., Mein Leben, Neuaufl. ed. (Köln: DuMont, 1979). 
61 Reuther, M. et al., Nolde in Berlin: Tanz, Theater, Cabaret (Dance, Theatre, Cabaret) (Köln, Seebüll: DuMont, 2007). 
62 Peter, F.-M. and Stamm, R., Die Sacharoffs: zwei Tänzer aus dem Umkreis des Blauen Reiters (Two Dancers within 
the Blaue Reiter Circle) (Köln: Wienand, 2002). This is a bilingual book. 
63 Laban, R. v. and Ullmann, L., The Mastery of Movement on the Stage, Second ed. Revised and enlarged by Lisa 
Ullmann. ed. (London1960). 
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Through this approach, it becomes possible to demonstrate that whilst Kandinsky began 
to establish the abstract representation as an object for experience, other artists pursued 
the concrete reality of the human body in their art, which we may interpret as an 
objectification of the will. 
In terms of methodology, Chapter 3 ‘Kirchner, the Expressionist Nude and the 
Platonic Idea’, recruits Schopenhauer’s ‘Third Book: The World as Representation 
Second Aspect’. It adopts Schopenhauer’s epistemological methodology, as in the law of 
homogeneity (das Gesetz der Homogeneitat) and the law of specification (das Gesetz der 
Specifikation). As David E. Cartwright shows in the Historical Dictionary of 
Schopenhauer’s Philosophy (2005), “the law of specification seeks to distinguish for each 
other the species subsumed under a wider genus, and to distinguish from each other the 
things falling within a species.”64 By contrast, the law of homogoneity “…instructs us to 
unite kinds of things into species, then into wider genera, and lastly into the highest unity 
that covers everything. Consequently, this law always seeks unity in diversity, or the one 
in the many.”65 Although Schopenhauer did not elaborate on this latter law, it continued 
to be an unbroken attempt on his part to secure all-inclusive accounts of human 
experience. In this chapter, we more often engage Schopenhauer’s law of homogeneity as 
one which pertains to the Platonic Idea of the human body. 
In order to explore what the body is in itself, and to test Marc’s belief that the 
world as will dominated the world as representation, Chapter 3 introduces Schopenhauer's 
theory of the Platonic Ideas. Following a definition of Schopenhauer’s use of the Platonic 
Ideas (Platonische Ideen) this chapter is placed within the historical context of 
Nacktkultur. As Karl Eric Toepfer points out, German Nacktkultur (literally ‘nudist 
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65 Ibid. p.54. 
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culture’) “refers to a network of private clubs that promoted nudism as a way of linking 
the modern body more closely to nature, giving it a freer presence in the great outdoors.”66 
Nacktkultur, as we note in chapter 3 of this thesis, was a practice whereby the general 
public and artists sought a way of reconnecting with nature. Rendering oneself naked 
became a social and aesthetic statement designed to re-assert the individual practitioner’s 
will in opposition to the wearing of clothing which was considered ugly.67 In addition, 
Toepfer has found that: 
 Nackkultur was a constellation of subcultures, each of them pursuing values that 
 were not always or even usually common to the constellation as a whole. Indeed, 
 one might even say that, for each subculture, the naked body functioned as a 
 sign of ideological difference rather than as a universal identifier in relation to the 
 alienating pressures of modernity.68  
 
With this subculture in mind, chapter 3 shows how knowledge of the Ideas might be gained 
through Schopenhauer’s doctrine of aesthetic contemplation of nudes in nature. Through 
that doctrine, this chapter shall argue that some spectators of Kirchner’s nudes may 
experience deliverance from their servitude to the will. Yet, several objections to the 
Platonic Ideas, and their applicability to Kirchner’s art, shall be raised together with a 
criticism of their use by Schopenhauer within his own philosophy. On that basis, this 
chapter shall conclude that neither Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the Ideas per se, nor their 
application to Kirchner’s nudes, make for a convincing possibility despite the necessity of 
the discussion. In addition, it will be suggested that C1 can be refuted through 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the Ideas at one level, just as C2 can be equally supported at 
another.  
                                                                
66 Toepfer, K. E., Empire of Ecstasy: Nudity and Movement in German Body Culture, 1910-1935 (Berkeley, Calif. ; 
London: University of California Press, 1997). p.30. 
67Schönemann,  Friedrich 1906 ‘Zurück zur Natur!’ in:  "Kraft und Schönheit : Zeitschr. für vernünft. Leibeszucht," in: 
Kraft und Schönheit : Zeitschr. für vernünft. Leibeszucht   (1901). v.6 p.307 
68 ; ibid.,p.31 
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Although we are utilising Schopenhauer’s philosophy, most commonly the 
relationship between Expressionist visual art and philosophy has been made through 
Nietzsche. Students of Nietzsche understand that Schopenhauer features heavily in many 
of his works such as The Birth of Tragedy (1872), both as his philosophical mentor and 
later in life as his bête noire.69 Although Nietzsche vilified Plato, it appears that Kirchner 
appreciated the Greek philosopher, since the artist owned a copy of Plato’s essay The 
Symposium (2001), which as a work of philosophy, offers us a valuable insight into the 
origins of the Platonic Ideas as representation. 70 With respect to these two philosophers 
Mark Anderson’s Plato and Nietzsche: Their Philosophical Art (2014), is an apposite 
guide to both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer’s approaches to art.71   
Of critical importance, this chapter engages with Kirchner’s letters as documentary 
evidence, which enable us to interpret his self-defined contribution to the history of art. 
However, this self-definition has been exposed as contradictory, for example in Donald 
E. Gordon’s catalogue raisonné which, despite its datedness, remains indispensable to any 
understanding of Kirchner’s art.72 These contradictions have been examined further by 
Christian Weikop in ‘Ernst Ludwig Kirchner as His Own Critic: The Artist’s Statements 
as Stratagems of Self-Promotion’73 (2012). Yet, what comes across in Weikop’s essay is 
a jaundiced view of Kirchner’s failings, and a negative view of Kirchner as a “spin 
doctor,” which tends to overshadow what might have been a more objective enquiry.74  
                                                                
69 Nietzsche, F., Geuss, R., and Speirs, R., Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
70 Plato and Lamb, W. R. M., Plato. 3. 3 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press [u.a.], 2001). 
71 Anderson, M., Plato and Nietzsche: Their Philosophical Art (Bloomsbury Academic, 2014). 
72 For the dating of Kirchner’s letters and some biographical data I am indebted to: Kirchner, E. L., Delfs, H., and 
Kornfeld, E. W., Der gesamte Briefwechsel: die absolute Wahrheit, so wie ich sie fühle (Zürich: Scheidegger und Spiess, 
2010). 
73 Weikop, C., "Ernst Ludwig Kirchner as His Own Critic: The Artist's Statements as Stratagems of Self-Promotion," 
in: Forum for Modern Language Studies Vol. 48, no. 4 (2012). 
74 Ibid., p.406. 
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In Chapter 4 we depart from Kirchner and the world of ideal beauty by 
concentrating upon the First World War. In terms of methodology, this chapter recruits 
Schopenhauer’s ‘Fourth Book: The World as Will Second Aspect’, and is called ‘The 
Expressionist at War: Affirmation or Denial of the Will?’ Contrary to Kant’s excessively 
abstract methodology, Schopenhauer’s own was nearer to British empiricists such as John 
Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Thus, in the spirit of Schopenhauer’s empirical 
methodology, we shall explore the texts and images of Beckmann, Marc and August 
Macke by using two methods that might help us interpret their attitudes towards the war. 
Firstly, through their personal readings of Schopenhauer and secondly, through 
contemporary military practices. In essence, their attitudes towards the war shall be probed 
so as to examine the extent to which they affirmed or denied the will to war.75  
For all those involved with the war, including Expressionist artists, there was an 
opportunity to renounce the will to live in order to obtain a salvific release from servitude 
to the will. However, the evidence gained from research shows that neither they nor any 
other Expressionist artist followed Schopenhauer’s advice, which was to renounce the will 
to live and follow an ascetic path through the human life-cycle. Given this evidence, C1 
can be fully vindicated and Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the affirmation of the will made 
historically relevant. However, the conclusions of this research could be regarded as frail. 
This is because an empirical analysis of just a few artists compares unfavourably to an all- 
embracing survey of what every artist experienced during the war. Whilst this is true, we 
possess the strength of concision and specificity, appropriate to C1 and C2, through an 
analysis of that which Marc, Beckmann and Macke felt about the war through their reading 
                                                                
75 As defined by their texts and art, this chapter is also about the effects of war service upon the artists as phenomena 
of the embodied will.  
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of Schopenhauer. Therefore, what this chapter lacks in empirical breadth it makes up for 
in focus. 
In terms of documentary evidence, an analysis of Beckmann’s letters from the 
Western Front, in Briefe Im Kriege76(1955), reveal the thoughts of an artist at war. The 
same can be said of Marc’s letters to his wife in August Macke, Franz Marc: 
Briefwechsel77 (1964). However, analysis is tempered by the fact that both artists were 
corresponding to their female partners, and one wonders whether there is not at times a 
‘deceitful’ air of bravado woven into the fabric of his narrative. Moreover, when we come 
to a work such as Suzannah Biernoff’s Portraits of Violence: War and the Aesthetics of 
Disfigurement78 (2017), we also wonder how an artist of Marc’s alleged sensitivities could 
have affirmed the will to war in the face of great bodily disfigurements engendered by 
war. Although Biernoff’s book is concerned with Allied casualties and disfigured bodies, 
the philosophical and medical approach she takes is illuminating and undoubtedly 
contributes to a validation of C1. 
In spite of the illuminating interplay between the Expressionist body and war, as 
filtered through Marc’s claims and Schopenhauer’s philosophy, there are methodological 
imperfections to this thesis. One such imperfection might be attributed to an historical 
hiatus between the first four chapters and the latter two chapters which omits the Weimar 
era altogether. Certainly, the Weimar era was of great significance, and I could have 
argued that the phenomenon of Lustmord,79 prevalent during this era, bridged that hiatus 
and vindicated C1. Indeed, at that time, distressing imagery of sexual murder stood out as 
                                                                
76 Beckmann, M., Briefe im Kriege (München: A. Langen : G. Müller, 1955). 
77 Macke, A., August Macke, Franz Marc, Briefwechsel : August Macke - Franz Marc, Lisbeth Macke - Maria Marc 
1910 bis 1914 ; Franz Marc - Lisbeth Macke 3.8.1914 bis 5.2.1916 ; Lisbeth Macke - Maria Marc 6.8.1914 bis 14.3.1916 
(Köln: DuMont Schauberg, 1964). 
78 Biernoff, S., Portraits of Violence: War and the Aesthetics of Disfigurement (University of Michigan Press, 2017). 
79 Lustmord was a form of sexual homicide prevalent during the Weimar era. Often motivated by sadistic pleasure and 
a warped sense of public notoriety.  
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a compelling indicator of moral dissolution and social decay. As Wayne Anderson argues 
in his book German Artists and Hitler’s Mind: Avant-Garde Art in a Turbulent Era (2007), 
some scholars such as himself, “think of Lustmord as an extreme type of Expressionism, 
a fanatical way of expressing something about one’s private self.”80 Therefore, the 
aesthetic theme of my research could have considered the combined topic of Lustmord, 
Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy, and his metaphysics of sexual love. However, the 
potential justification for such a strategy proved inadequate in view of two major 
considerations. From a methodological point of view, I had to make a crucial choice in 
terms of both historical procedure and philosophical theory. In the first instance, I felt that 
the common consensus between scholars that German Expressionism had ‘died’ at the end 
of the First World War was largely correct. Yet, German Expressionism was forcibly 
‘resurrected’ through the political momentum of National Socialism, and I therefore argue 
that the most significant impact upon the human body came about not only as a result of 
war, but also as a result of National Socialism. In the second instance, the fate of the 
German Expressionist body, and the greater significance of National Socialism compared 
to Weimarism, could be more effectively examined by employing Schopenhauer’s 
doctrines on morality and free will within this particular time-frame.  
Immediately after the war, once-supportive critics of Expressionism who had 
believed in its revolutionary potential to transform society, perceived that it had not 
fulfilled its potential at all, rather they now believed that it had lapsed into a mere style of 
art. By 1919-20, as we learn from an October 1920 speech given by Worringer to the 
Goethe Society in Munich, he too had begun to feel that Expressionism had not realised 
its promise of metaphysical renewal in society. One year later, in 1921 Iwan Goll’s article 
                                                                
80 Andersen, W., German Artists and Hitler's Mind: Avant-garde Art in a Turbulent Era (Editions Fabriart, 2007). 
p.27. 
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‘Expressionism Is Dying’ (written for the periodical Zenit), expressed disillusionment not 
only with the politics of his time, but also with the demise of Expressionism.81 However, 
as we shall learn in chapter 6 of this thesis, during the 1930s Expressionism became a 
talking point once more when Marxist scholars debated the renewed import of 
Expressionism. As Washton Long et al. argue: 
The controversy over Expressionism has been interpreted as the left’s debate on 
the nature of modernism as it attempted to form a ‘popular front’ against fascism. 
Expressionism - understood as Germany's modern movement - came under attack 
from those convinced by Soviet ideology that a revolutionary art should be linked 
to realism and classicism.82 
 
Yet, as will become clear in chapter 6 of this thesis, not every fascist was necessarily an 
anti-modernist, which for a time led to the ‘resurrection’ of Expressionism.’ Indeed, as 
Jonathan George Petropoulos has revealed, amongst the Nazis, Reichsführer-SS Himmler 
“was not always a resolute anti-modernist. ”83 In addition, SS leader Count Klaus Baudissin, 
the director of the Folkwang Museum in Essen “was not a straightforward figure and at 
times expressed admiration for certain kinds of German Expressionism.”84 Moreover, as we 
shall see in chapter 6 of this thesis, the forcible resurrection of Expressionism for Nazi 
purposes was initially lauded by none other than Joseph Goebbels. In the first instance, he 
supported Berlin’s NSD-Studentenbund which actively opposed the Nazi volkisch 
program.85 In another instance, as Petropoulos has found: 
The propaganda minister also endorsed other pro-modernist groups during the 
period stretching to the autumn of 1935. An exhibition society called Der Norden, 
which frequently organized shows at the Ferdinand Möller Gallery in Berlin, and 
the art journal Kunst der Nation, which openly advocated Expressionism, were 
two such groups. Even the RkdbK published a monthly journal called Die 
Kunstkammer, which included illustrations of abstract works.86 
 
                                                                
81 Goll, I. 'Der Expressionismus stirbt' in: Micic, L., "Zenit: internacionalna revija za umetnosti-kulturu," in: Zenit : 
internacionalna revija za umetnosti-kulturu.   (1921). 1, no. 8 (October,1921): 8-9. 
82 Long et al. p.312. 
83 Petropoulos, J., Artists under Hitler: Collaboration and Survival in Nazi Germany (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 2014). p.162. 
84 Ibid.,p.165. 
85 NSD stands for the Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (National Socialist German Students' League). 
86 Petropoulos, J. G., Art as Politics in the Third Reich (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). p.24. 
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If we take the above context into account, not just as a political issue but also as a moral 
issue, then Chapter 5 ‘Degenerate Art, Degenerate Bodies - Otto Mueller and the Gypsies’, 
will interpret its findings according to Schopenhauer’s essay On the Basis of Morality. 
Along with Schopenhauer, I shall proceed with the belief that the bedrock of ethics is 
discernible through empiricism. Thus, Chapter 5 begins by stating some empirical facts, 
these being that following the war Germany faced many upheavals through revolution, 
war reparations, and economic depression. Following the collapse of the Weimar 
Republic, such upheavals formed the basis by which the Nazi dictatorship exploited the 
human body for political purposes in both art and society. Consequently, this chapter 
approaches the problem of the German Expressionist body as a political palimpsest under 
National Socialism. It therefore takes the work of Mueller for a case study in relation to 
his paintings of the gypsy people. 
Initially, Chapter 5 explores what the concept ‘degenerate’ means through its 
intellectual origins. Following this, we explore Nazi concepts of race in relation to what 
they described and displayed as ‘degenerate’ art in the Munich Entartete Kunst exhibition 
of 1937. In this exhibition, the public were ‘educated’ by the Nazis as to what ‘degenerate’ 
bodies and ‘degenerate’ art looked like; amongst the many works on display were those 
of gypsies produced by Mueller. Although there is no extant evidence that Mueller read 
Schopenhauer, this chapter interprets and concludes its findings according to 
Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy. 
The conclusion of Chapter 5 is that C1, when extended into Germany’s future and 
beyond Marc’s death stands for a paradox. Indeed, research shows that C1 appears to be 
both supportable and refutable according to the political trajectory of nascent Nazism. 
Therefore, through Schopenhauer’s philosophy, it will be shown on the one hand that the 
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embodied individual, as mere phenomenal appearance of the will, exists only in our 
representations. Whilst on the other hand, it will be shown that the plurality of embodied 
individuals, once described by Nazi ideology as a ‘science of racial types’ (Rassenkunde), 
could only find their true meaning in the will per se - through which we all share our most 
real being. As a result, Chapter 5 will conclude that if ‘individuation is mere phenomenon 
or appearance’, then C1 may be vindicated metaphysically but not aesthetically. 
Many Expressionist artists were caught up in the vilification of an art at variance 
with such an ideology. This is explored in Stephanie Barron’s tome, Degenerate Art: The 
Fate of the Avant-Garde in Nazi Germany (1991).87 Similarly, Olaf Peters et al. have 
contributed to the debates surrounding art under Nazism in their book Degenerate Art: 
The Attack on Modern Art in Nazi Germany 1937 (2014).88 However, the latter book lacks 
the rigorous attention to detail as found in the former, which offers a room by room 
inventory of works shown in the infamous Entartete Kunst exhibition, where much of 
Germany’s modernist art was displayed with moralising censure. This moralising censure 
is contextualised by Guenter Lewy’s article, who offers us an insight into Heinrich 
Himmler’s strategy for dealing with the gypsy people in ‘Himmler and the Racially Pure 
Gypsies’89 (1999). This he does by revealing how the freedom of the travelling gypsy was 
undermined.  
Although Chapter 5 helps us interpret notions of racial difference according to 
Schopenhauer’s moral and ‘evolutionary’ theories, at first sight it appears weak in terms 
of an overt relationship to the world as will and the world as representation. Yet, if an 
application of Schopenhauer’s moral theory appears unconvincing in this regard, let us 
                                                                
87 Barron, S. and Guenther, P. W., Degenerate Art: The Fate of the Avant-Garde in Nazi Germany (Los Angeles, Calif. 
New York: Los Angeles County Museum of Art. Harry N. Abrams, 1991). 
88 Peters, O. et al., Degenerate Art: The Attack on Modern Art in Nazi Germany, 1937 (Munich: Prestel, 2014). 
89 Lewy, G., "Himmler and the 'Racially Pure Gypsies'," in: Journal of Contemporary History  Vol. 34, no. 2 (1999); 
Barron and Guenther. 
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remember that moral choices formed by totalitarian states always influence the ontology 
of its constituent peoples. As a result, only the most robust frondeur can disenthrall their 
will and representations from the powers of totalitarianism.  
The issue of freedom under totalitarianism leads us to Chapter 6, ‘Nolde, Nazism 
and the Fable of Free Will’, which is grounded upon Schopenhauer’s essay On the 
Freedom of the Human Will. By adopting Schopenhauer’s philosophy of determinism, it 
becomes possible to explore some phenomenological aspects of Nolde’s life under 
Nazism. In doing so, this chapter re-investigates Nolde’s life under Nazism in a new light. 
This re-investigation begins by asserting that the work of historians such as Bernhard 
Fulda, Aya Soika, and Peter Vergo disregards free will in relation to Nolde as a moral and 
ontological problem. Of crucial importance to this problem, we shall question to what 
extent Nolde or any human being, could be described as free and responsible for their 
actions. We shall also question and expose the incongruity behind Schopenhauer’s 
account of moral responsibility and how it can be applied to human beings.  
We can learn something about the impact of Nazism upon Nolde’s free will 
through documentary evidence such Hans Fehr’s book Emil Nolde. Ein Buch der 
Freundschaft (1957).90 We also have Nolde’s written work, known collectively as Mein 
Leben, which is the title given to four volumes of his autobiographies. The first volume 
Das eigene Leben  (1974)91 was first published in 1931, and the second volume, Jahre der 
Kämpfe92 was first published in 1934. Yet, there is a perceived drawback to these 
autobiographies, since as Fulda rightly shows after the war, “…the stewards of Nolde’s 
legacy set out to sanitize his public image. Among the first actions of the Foundation was 
                                                                
90 Fehr, H. and Smargiassi, G., Emil Nolde. Ein Buch der Freundschaft (Köln1957). Fehr was a close friend and 
confidante of Nolde’s. 
91 Nolde, E. and Seebull, A., Das eigene Leben: die Zeit der Jugend 1867-1902, 4 ed. (Köln: DuMont Schauberg, 1974). 
92 Nolde, E., Jahre der Kämpfe (Berlin: Rembrandt-Verlag, 1934). 
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the publication of a new edition of Nolde’s Jahre der Kämpfe in 1957, cleansed of its 
worst anti-Semitic passages.”93 
Although we are not obliged to trust self-promotion or the bias of friendship in the 
above memoires, equally we are not obliged to trust the accounts of scholars such as Fulda 
and Soika either. Despite producing essays such as ‘Emil Nolde and the National Socialist 
Dictatorship’ (2104),94 which are often well written in terms of dates and biography, 
neither author is ever concerned with the problems of free will for Nolde. It therefore 
remains to be seen whether in 2018, Fulda’s planned publication of a work titled Emil 
Nolde and National Socialism: The Construction of Artistic ‘Genius’ in the Twentieth 
Century95 addresses these inadequacies.  
Chapter 6 in this thesis perhaps reveals a comparatively minor engagement with 
Nolde’s art. Weighted towards the theoretical at the expense of the practical, the chapter 
may appear to be an operose existential analysis more than anything else, pervaded by an 
air of, as the French would say, chacun à son gout. Yet, this operose chapter questions the 
very possibility of freedom for Nolde through Schopenhauer’s philosophy - a topic 
neglected by previous scholars. As a result, this analysis touches not only upon one of the 
most pressing concerns for an individual living under Nazism, but by an unspoken 
inference it foreshadows the fate of our own generation. Its theoretical bias therefore, is 
arguably a compelling vindication of C1 through Schopenhauer’s philosophy and 
historical circumstance. 
                                                                
93 Rüger, J. and Wachsmann, N., Rewriting German History: New Perspectives on Modern Germany (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire, England; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). p.185. 
94 Krämer, F., Nolde, E., and Städtische Galerie im Städelschen Kunstinstitut Frankfurt am Main, Emil Nolde: 
Retrospective (Munich Humlebæk [Denmark]: Prestel; Louisiana Museum of Modern Art, 2014). 
95 Fulda aims to build upon his work done on the mass media, politics and public opinion. Given his previous endeavours, 
one is doubly surprised that no mention of mass indoctrination found its way into his first essays on Nolde. 
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To date, little sustained research has been applied to links between Expressionist 
visual art and Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Of what little there is we have Mark A. 
Cheetham’s The Rhetoric of Purity: Essentialist Theory and the Advent of Abstract 
Painting (1994) 96 - one of the few books that explores direct links between Schopenhauer 
and artists such as Piet Mondrian, Paul Klee and Vasily Kandinsky. We also have Barbara 
Buenger’s book, Max Beckmann: Self-Portrait in Words: Collected Writings and 
Statements, 1903-1950 (1997)97; Marsha Morton’s essay ‘Painted sounds: Music in the 
Art of Max Beckmann’(2009)98, and Robert Zimmer’s Zeitfahrt, Leidensfahrt, 
Erlösungsfahrt. Max Beckmanns Abfahrt als metaphysische Meditation im Geiste 
Schopenhauers (Journey through Time, Journey through Suffering, Journey through 
Redemption. Max Beckmann’s Departure as a Metaphysical Spiritual Meditation) 
(2005).99 As a result, a scholarly lacuna exists between German Expressionist visual art 
and Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Therefore, by establishing such links, this thesis offers 
new insights and new interpretations for the benefit of art history and philosophy alike.  
This thesis reflects the “unfolding of a single thought”100 which permeated 
Schopenhauer’s major work The World as Will and Representation (1818).101 Although 
he does not make explicit what that ‘single thought’ is, for Rudolf Malter it implies that 
“the world is the self-knowledge of the will.”102 Similarly, John Atwell believes that the 
                                                                
96 Cheetham, M. A., The Rhetoric of Purity: Essentialist Theory and the Advent of Abstract Painting (Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). 
97 Beckmann, M. and Buenger, B. C., Max Beckmann: Self-Portrait in Words: Collected Writings and Statements, 1903-
1950. (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
98 Marsha Morton ‘Painted sounds’: Music in the Art of Max Beckmann’ in: Morton, M., Of Truths Impossible To Put 
In Words: Max Beckmann Contextualized (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009). 
99 See: Zimmer Robert, ‘Zeitfahrt, Leidensfahrt, Erlösungsfahrt. Max Beckmanns Abfahrt als metaphysische Meditation 
im Geiste Schopenhauers’ in: Baum, G. n. and Birnbacher, D., Schopenhauer und die Künste (Göttingen: Wallstein, 
2005). pp. 141-154. Whilst the editors have touched on the ‘arts’ in relation to Schopenhauer, they have also included 
an essay by Thomas Röske about the Symbolist painter Max Klinger which is called ‘Der Zeichner als verneinender 
Künstler. Max Klinger und Arthur Schopenhauer’. See pp.118-136. 
100 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.286. See also ibid., Vol. 1.p.xiii. 
101 Ibid., This work was published in December 1818 but also bears a publication date for 1819 
102 Malter, R., Der eine Gedanke: Hinführung zur Philosophie Arthur Schopenhauers (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1988); Janaway and Online Cambridge Collections. Translated by Janaway from Malter, p.4. 
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‘single thought’ reflects how “the double-sided world is the striving of the will to become 
fully conscious of itself so that, recoiling in horror at its inner, self-divisive nature, it may 
annul itself and thereby its self-affirmation, and then reach salvation.”103 By contrast, my 
interpretation of this ‘single thought’ parallels that of Marc, who claimed that in his day 
the world as will took precedence over the world as representation.104 Consequently, the 
unifying thought behind this thesis explores the extent to which the will is almighty 
(allmächtig) and predominant in the life and art of Expressionism.105 This exploration is 
therefore divided into six chapters for the purpose of communicating an organic whole. 
Each chapter of this organic whole supports the other and presupposes its neighbour, and 
as a system of thought, attempts to mirror the architectonic structure of Schopenhauer’s 
major work. 
It is important to note that the first five words in the title of this thesis have been 
borrowed from Leni Riefenstahl's 1934 film Triumph des Willens.106 In referencing this 
now historic and controversial film, the intention is not to imply the spirit of National 
Socialism but instead how the concept of ‘the will’ attained the status of what Foucault 
might call a ‘metanarrative’ under different guises during the early twentieth century. In 
National Socialist thinking it adopted a kind of ‘monolithic’ and ‘mythic status’ in 
bolstering the political legitimacy of the regime, and yet, in the field of the visual arts it 
                                                                
103 Atwell, J. E., Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995). p.31. Atwell adds that: “In several places Schopenhauer does use der einzige Gedanke (the 
single thought), der eine Gedanke (the one thought), and mein Hauptgedanke (my main thought), and he frequently 
states what may be considered the single thought; but he never puts the two together in an explicit fashion, that is, he 
never says, ‘See, here is the single thought, and it goes thus and so’ ” ibid., p.188. fn,1. See also: Taylor, T. G., "Platonic 
Ideas, Aesthetic Experience, and the Resolution of Schopenhauer's Great Contradiction," in: International Studies in 
Philosophy  Vol. 19, no. 3 (1987). p.43-53. 
104 Schopenhauer says that “the master is the will, the servant the intellect, for in the last instance the will is always in 
command, and therefore constitutes the real core, the being-in-itself, of man.” Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as 
Will and Representation. Vol.2, p.208. See also p.136. For more information on this topic see: Hannan, B., The Riddle 
of the World: A Reconsideration of Schopenhauer's Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2009). p.13. Also: Janaway, 
C., Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator (Clarendon Press, 1998). p.60. 
105 There are many instances where Schopenhauer takes the view that the will is allmächtig as in: Schopenhauer, A. and 
Hübscher, A., Manuscript Remains in Four Volumes. (Oxford: Berg, 1988). Vol.3. 
106 Riefenstahl gave to Hitler the collected works of philosopher J.G .Fichte which consisted of eight volumes bound in 
vellum and gold leafed paper edges. She signed the inner cover of volume 1 with the words to “my dear Führer.” See: 
Ryback, T. W., Hitler's Private Library: The Books that Shaped his Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008). p.100. 
- 53 - 
 
can be understood and employed in a much more nuanced way. As a result, our 
understanding of how German Expressionist painters in the early 20th century found 
themselves conflicted by the forces of modernity, might be empowered by 
Schopenhauer’s concept of ‘the will’, through which we can reinterpret the nature of 
German modernism. For our purposes today, nearly a hundred years on, Schopenhauer’s 
concept may reignite our thinking about German Expressionism by exploring the ways in 
which ‘the will’, as defined by Schopenhauer, could have literally ‘triumphed’ through 
some of the most radical and exciting forms of creative expression to have emerged during 
the 20th century.  
That said, ‘the triumph of the will’ in a strictly philosophical sense - and in a sense 
which offsets any misconstrual that the title of this thesis implies a ‘triumph’ of Hitlerism 
- can be understood through its polar opposite – a denial of the will.  Therefore, let us hear 
Schopenhauer who says that: 
The doctrine of original sin (affirmation of the will) and of salvation (denial of the 
will) is really the great truth which constitutes the kernel of 
Christianity…Accordingly, we should interpret Jesus Christ always in the 
universal, as the symbol or personification of the denial of the will-to-live, but not 
in the individual, whether according to his mythical history in the Gospels, or 
according to the probably true history lying at the root thereof.107 
 
Yet, it may always be problematic for some to come to terms with Schopenhauer’s use of 
the concept ‘will’ – one which can all too easily be conflated with Riefenstahl’s film and 
Nazism. Therefore, with regards to this concept, perhaps a full explanation from 
Schopenhauer might help when he argues that:  
…no word could exist to describe the concept of this genus. I therefore name the 
genus after its most important species, the direct knowledge of which lies nearest 
to us, and leads to the indirect knowledge of all the others. But anyone who is 
incapable of carrying out the required extension of the concept will remain 
involved in a permanent misunderstanding. For by the word will, he will always 
understand only that species of it hitherto exclusively described by the term, that 
is to say, the will guided by knowledge, strictly according to motives, indeed only 
                                                                
107 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.,p.405. 
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to abstract motives, thus manifesting itself under the guidance of the faculty of 
reason.108  
 
In this thesis, we too shall also distinguish between the innermost essence of the 
phenomenon of the world as representation and then by analogy transfer it to every other 
‘weaker’ less distinct phenomena pertaining to the same essence. By doing so, we extend 
the concept of will beyond the common interpretation of ‘the will as being guided by 















                                                                
108 Ibid.,p.111. 
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Note on Russian Translated Names 
A number of artists referred to and discussed in this text were of Russian origin. 
Consequently, their names were originally transliterated according to the German system. 
Whilst this system still pertains in German academic literature, French and Anglo-
American literature has employed different approaches. For the purposes of this thesis 
therefore the Library of Congress system has been adopted. The adjectival suffix ‘ии’ is 
transliterated ‘y’, as in Kandinsky (as opposed to ‘ii’). The syllable ‘кс’ is rendered as ‘x’, 
as in Alexei (as opposed to ‘ks’). The Cyrillic ‘в’ is rendered ‘v’ as in Verevkina (as 
opposed to the German ‘w’ or the archaic tendency of using of ‘ff’); The Cyrillic ‘х’ is 
rendered ‘kh’ as in Sakharov (as opposed to the German ‘ch’); The Cyrillic ‘ч’ is rendered 
‘ch’ (as opposed to the Germanic ‘tsch’); and the Cyrillic ‘я’ is rendered ‘ya’ as in 
Yavlensky (as opposed to the Germanic ‘ja’). In relation to Russian the nomenclature 
‘von’ which is sometimes used in the German tradition in relation to Russian names is not 
employed. This brings the spelling of proper nouns into line with more standard spellings 
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The world is my representation: this is a truth valid with reference to every 
living and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into reflective abstract 
consciousness. If he really does so, philosophical discernment has dawned on 
him. It then becomes clear and certain to him that he does not know a sun and 
an earth, but only an eye that sees  a  sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the 
world around him is there only as representation, in other words, only in 
reference to another thing, namely that which represents, and this is himself.109 
 
For Schopenhauer, everything that is knowable, the entire world, is an object in 
relation to the human subject, the perception of a perceiver, a representation.110 On that 
basis, we shall consider Kandinsky’s art only in so far as it can be considered in terms 
of the world as representation - that is to say we shall proceed with the understanding 
that a representation is a mental picture in the mind. We shall consider his art up until 
the year 1914 and inform our discussion through Schopenhauer’s ‘First Book: The World 
as Representation First Aspect’. As shall become clear by the second chapter of this thesis, 
by using this methodology it means that what we are abstracting from in this chapter is 
the will. The will alone is entirely one side of our bifurcated world, just as the other side 
of our world is entirely representation, but “a reality that is neither of these two, but an 
object in itself (into which also Kant’s thing-in-itself has unfortunately degenerated in 
his hands), is the phantom of a dream, and its acceptance is an ignis fatuus in 
philosophy.”111 
In this chapter we shall begin by defining what a representation is according to 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. In doing so, we will explore the difference between intuitive 
representations and abstract representations as they relate to Kandinsky’s art - on 
Schopenhauer’s terms. Following this, we shall investigate Kandinsky’s reading of 
                                                                
109 Ibid.Vol.1, p.3. Cf. The World as Will and Representation.Vol,2.p.3. 
110 The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.3. 
111 Ibid., p.4. 
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Schopenhauer’s work On Vision and Colours – particularly in relation to Kandinsky’s use 
of the colour white in a manner which may uphold C2. We shall then proceed by 
examining the attitudes of Kandinsky towards human anatomy and his reasons for them. 
These attitudes suggest that Kandinsky was more attracted to the metaphysical rather than 
the physical, both as an artist and thinker. This possibility arguably undermines C1 since 
he was led away from the embodiedness of willing towards ever greater abstraction.  
Our discussion is then led on to a study of Kandinsky’s imputed theosophical 
leanings and what might be described as a metaphysics of abstract representation. On that 
basis, this chapter looks again at the suggested origins of Kandinsky’s first abstract 
pictures and his interest in science. In the final instance, we explore possible parallels 
between Kandinsky’s reading of Schopenhauer and their respective thoughts on the 
development of children’s visual faculties. 
Overall, we can assert that it is probably the case that Kandinsky was influenced 
by Schopenhauer to some degree and that his work can be interpreted through the latter’s 
philosophy.  
 
1.1 Representation, Intuitive Perception (Anschauung), and Abstract Representation112  
 
The problem of representation which we are exploring was of major importance 
to Kandinsky and his generation. By the time Kandinsky had moved to Munich in 1896, 
the Jugendstil movement was establishing itself under the influence of Hermann Obrist. 
Whilst it did so, Obrist’s creative partner August Endell saw that there was a conjunction 
between Jugendstil decoration and the development of non-representational art. As Peg 
Weiss states, shortly after Kandinsky’s move to Munich, Endell predicted that there would 
                                                                
112 Intuition (Anschauung), refers to immediate experience which grounds the formation of abstract concepts through 
the faculty of reason. Most often it refers to our grasp of empirical objects, and as such intuition here is to be regarded 
as intellectual and therefore an operation of the faculty of understanding. In terms of translation, as Cartwright has 
shown, “E. F. J. Payne generally translated the term ‘Anschauung’ as perception or as ‘intuitive perception’.” 
Cartwright., p.88. 
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in future be “…an art with forms that mean nothing and represent nothing and remind one 
of nothing, yet that will be able to move our souls so deeply, so strongly, as before only 
music has been able to do with tones.”113 In addition, Weiss also reveals how Adolf Hölzel 
at the time was making what he termed abstract ornaments.114 Therefore, we may infer 
that Kandinsky reflected upon the future of abstraction and ‘conventional’ representations 
within this aesthetic milieu. 
Along with Kandinsky, Marc recognised that ‘conventional’ representations 
(Vorstellungen) in art showed no sign of disappearing, even though such representations 
were rapidly becoming ciphers of the past.115 In Marc’s opinion, old ideas and creations 
lived on in a world of appearances (Scheinleben), whilst the avant-garde were faced with 
a Herculean task of driving them away. Furthermore, Marc avouched that:  
Schopenhauer extolled the victory of the will over representation (Vorstellung). In 
our hands this has been transformed into the victory of knowledge over 
representation. The good European created this precise way of thinking that stands 
this side of representation, material and custom, a familiarity with the 
absolute…116 
 
Since the concept of ‘representation’ is of significance to our evaluation of C1 and C2, let 
us define what a representation is according to Schopenhauer. From the second edition of 
The World as Will and Representation, we receive a concise enough definition, a 
representation is “a very complicated physiological occurrence in an animal’s brain, 
whose result is the consciousness of a picture at that very spot.”117 Furthermore, the whole 
form of our body is made known to us only through knowledge and representation - not 
through mere feeling - and only in our brain do our bodies become known to us as an 
                                                                
113 Weiss, P., "Kandinsky and the 'Jugendstil' Arts and Crafts Movement," in: The Burlington Magazine  Vol. 117, no. 
866 (1975). p.270. See also: Roessler, A., "Das Abstrakte Ornament mit gleichzeitiger Verwendung simultaner 
Farbenkontraste," in: Wiener Abendpost   (1863). Supplement to Nr. 228, 6th October 1903, n.p. 
114 Weiss, "Kandinsky and the 'Jugendstil' Arts and Crafts Movement." p.270. 
115 Marc, F. and Lankheit, K., Schriften (Köln: DuMont, 1978). p.144. 
116 Ibid., Aphorism 40, p.197. 
117 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.2, p.191. 
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extended living thing.118 Therefore, if Kandinsky as an artist had a representational picture 
in his mind, then this representation was not a figment of his imagination, since perceptual 
objects as intuitive representations existed outside of his head. This means that for all 
individuals, objects exist in the outer world and are not mere figments of the imagination.  
Nor are they results of changes in our sensory apparatus or even sensory representations 
that are non-mediated. Neither are sensations perceptual objects, even though sensations 
give rise to perceptual objects through the faculty of understanding (der Verstand).  
The understanding is one of three cognitive faculties, (sensibility and reason being 
the others), and is “the immediate, non-reflective and non-conceptual cognition of the 
relation of cause to effect.”119 Schopenhauer suggested that our cognisance of the outer 
world, consisting of intuitive representations, is the construction of an unconscious and 
instantaneous application of the law of causality to our sensations. Therefore, the 
understanding assigns a cause to our sensations so that every cause is attributed to a spatial 
location. Through the understanding, Schopenhauer says that the human subject ‘knows’ 
but is known by none and is the conditional supporter of the world and all that appears 
in it.120 On that basis, we could innocently interpret this notion to mean that every 
experience requires “an experiencer.”121 In other words, there can be no object without 
a correlative subject. Schopenhauer’s belief is that whatever exists, exists for the subject, 
and because of this the body is an object for the subject and therefore a representation. 
The body is also an object amidst other objects and subservient to the laws of nature which 
                                                                
118 The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.20. 
119 Cartwright., p.175. See also: Hilgers, T., Aesthetic Disinterestedness: Art, Experience, and the Self (Taylor & Francis, 
2016). p.40. 
120 When the word ‘subject’ is being used in this thesis it refers to the human individual, not as in art history which refers 
to a topic or theme of a picture. When the word ‘object’ is used in this thesis, it refers to any object external to the 
individual and of an empirical nature. 
121  Janaway, C., Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). p.118. Cf.Atwell.,p.36. 
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pertain to all objects. Therefore, as an object, the body sits inside the forms of knowledge 
which co-ordinate time, space and plurality.122  
The world as representation consists of two indivisible components, that of 
subject and object. If one of these components disappeared then the world as 
representation would disappear, since subject and object have a reciprocal 
relationship to each other. These two components create an essential totality, and 
this totality constitutes the world as representation.123 If this is taken away, then all 
that is left is the purely metaphysical thing-in-itself - which in the second chapter we 
shall argue is the will.124 
The fundamental difference among our representations is between those of 
intuitive and abstract representations. The latter consist of concepts and belong only to 
human beings, while intuitive representations embrace all that is visible, all of external 
experience, and every condition for the world’s existence.125 All intuitive perception 
(Anschauung) is independent of experience, which entails that “the properties of space 
and time, as they are known in a priori perception or intuition, are valid for all possible 
experience as laws.”126 Since Schopenhauer argues that experience necessarily accords with 
these laws, we shall consider Kandinsky’s abstract and intuitive representations on these 
terms. 
In this chapter, the phrase ‘abstract representation’ is being used in 
Schopenhauer’s sense, which refers to conceptual constructs in the brain, whilst the phrase 
‘intuitive perception’ is being used in his sense of apprehending external objects. When 
we apply Schopenhauer’s thinking to Kandinsky’s perception of the world, we find that it 
                                                                
122 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.5. Cf.  On The Fourfold Root of The Principle of 
Sufficient Reason. p.121. 
123 The World as Will and Representation.Vol.2, p.18. 
124 Ibid., p.18. 
125 The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.16. 
126 Ibid., p.7. 
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must have been subject to the laws of causality and the conditions of matter – and in 
chapter 6 of this thesis such laws shall figure in our explorations of Nolde’s free will. 
Therefore, no individual can acquire a perception unless an effect is received through their 
body. As a result, every change undergone by an individual’s body is known instantly as 
a feeling, and because such feelings are often traceable to a cause the perception of an 
object is made intelligible to the individual through this process.127 
The above description is not, Schopenhauer argues, the conclusion of abstract 
thought, but is immediate, absolutely necessary and certain. The above process of 
perception he calls the cognitive method used by the pure understanding, which is 
necessary for perception to occur. This occurs through the faculty of understanding (the 
brain) which converts sensation into perception immediately, so that what the hand or 
eye experiences per se is merely raw sensory data. In the process, therefore the 
understanding passes from effects to their causes by uniting “space and time in the 
representation of matter. This world as representation exists only through the 
understanding, and only for the understanding.”128  
 
1.2 Kandinsky, Colour and his reading of Schopenhauer 
 
 
Schopenhauer explains how the understanding creates perception in the first 
chapter of his essay On Vision and Colours,129 and also in section §21of his essay On 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason.130 Kandinsky owned a copy of On Vision and 
Colours131 and in this copy he has pencil-marked the text with perpendicular strokes or 
question marks in the margins. These ‘glosses’ reveal that Kandinsky appears to have 
                                                                
127 Ibid., p.11-12. 
128 Ibid., p.12. 
129 Schopenhauer, A., Runge, P. O., and Stahl, G., On Vision and Colors; Color Sphere (Princeton Architectural Press, 
2012).  
130 See also: Schopenhauer and Payne. Section § 21. 
131 Kandinsky read this essay in Schopenhauer's Sämmtliche Werke (collected Works) of 1854. Kirchner too had an 
interest in ‘On Vision and Colours’ as explained in Chapter 3. 
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been thinking about the physiology of representation and colour. It also perhaps reveals 
a greater interest in the world as representation, as opposed to that of the will - which at 
this stage of our investigations might suggest that, through Kandinsky at least, C1 could 
be refuted. Furthermore, it could indicate that Kandinsky was probing the formation of 
brain generated appearances through his reading of Schopenhauer, and thus validating 
C2. 
What these ‘glosses’ may reveal is that Kandinsky was probably interested in the 
activity of the retina, intuitive perception and children’s visual development. From the 
second chapter of On Vision and Colours, Kandinsky has paid special attention to the 
philosopher’s disquisition on light and the colour white.132 He has placed a question mark 
against a specific area of Schopenhauer’s text where he suggests that white could be 
regarded as diffused light, and the passage which says, “…if we want to express the effect 
through the cause, then Goethe’s explanation of white appearing in the physical way, as 
perfect turbidity, is appropriate and correct. Bodies that do not react on the eye at all under 
the influence of light are black.”133 We can relate this ‘explanation of white’ to 
Kandinsky’s art, as in The White Sound of 1908 (fig. 1) which was exhibited in the Berlin 
Secession, and Hagen in 1909. The image, which has a woodcut made from it, is quite 
abstract, with at least three human figures, two of which appear to have white halos. 
                                                                
132 In a letter to Ernst Otto Lindner of 01.05.1852, Schopenhauer said that the treatise on vision and colours was not 
essential reading yet good to read alongside his other works. As Janaway argues, although Schopenhauer was ambivalent 
towards On Vision and Colours, the work is important from the standpoint of idealism and his philosophical progress. 
Janaway highlights too that the work introduces “Schopenhauer’s use of the term ‘urphenomenon’, a concept that would 
play a vital role in his ethics and in his statement of philosophical methodology.” Schopenhauer, A., Cartwright, D. E., 
and Janaway, C., On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Cambridge [u.a.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2012).p.xliii, fn.52. Cartwright and Janaway suggest that Schopenhauer may have developed the concept of  
urphänomen from Goethe’s On the Theory of Colours of 1810 since Goethe contended that light and dark were 
urphänomene for colours. However, Cartwright and Janaway add that “Schopenhauer found the phenomena of lightness 
and darkness not to be urphenomena, because they could be accounted for by states or modifications of the eye, and 
thus, by physical phenomena.” In section 21 of On the Basis of Morals, Schopenhauer does ascribe compassion to the 
concept of ‘urphenomenon’, as something which is irreducible to other phenomenon. See also: Cartwright. p.247. (We 
shall investigate Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy in Chapter 5). 
133 Schopenhauer, Runge, and Stahl.p.60. Cf. Schopenhauer, A., Arthur Schopenhauers Sämmtliche Werke 6, 6 (Leipzig: 
Reclam, 1854). p.37. 
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However, the halos, and a large area of off-white created in an undefinable shape, are 
ironically the only whites in an otherwise red, pink, yellow, green and blue composition. 
We also have St.George I of 1911 (fig. 2), where Will Grohmann has indicated 
that Kandinsky “escapes the problem of space by use of a great amount of white, which is 
at once mystical and so transparent that it seems to be trying to let us glimpse the finiteness 
of unlimited space.”134 Grohmann adds that, with Picture with White Form (fig. 3) of 1913 
and Composition VII (fig. 4) of 1913, “it is hard to find where these pictures begin or end. 
They are excisions from the whole of the world, from the creative process which has no 
beginning or end…events do not happen, they are there, and Kandinsky comes across 
them.”135 
Kandinsky ‘discovered’ the use of white during the hot summer of 1911, when 
nature literally appeared to him white. He recalled that “suddenly, all nature seemed to me 
white; white (great silence - full of possibilities) displayed itself everywhere and expanded 
visibly.”136 Later, he would recall this feeling after observing how white had played a vital 
part in his pictures. Since that time, he had found that there were immeasurable 
possibilities for the use of white as a primordial colour. Previously, he had regarded the 
presence of white in large masses as requisite for mere linear emphasis, whilst being 
troubled by the wild properties of its inner strength. The discovery of which he said, “was 
of enormous importance for me.”137 
The importance of white can be seen in Kandinsky’s early woodcuts and the 
painting White Sound, which in their imagery and technique parallel Stefan George’s early 
                                                                
134 Grohmann, W., Wassily Kandinsky: Life and Work (London: Thames and Hudson, 1959). p.151. 
135 Ibid., p.151. 
136 Kandinsky,V. Cologne Lecture ‘Kandinsky über seine Entwicklung.’ Johannes Eichner, Kandinsky und Gabriele 
Münter, von Ursprüngen Moderner Kunst’ (Munich), 1957 in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo. p.397-98. 
137 Kandinsky, V. Cologne Lecture ‘Kandinsky über seine Entwicklung.’ Johannes Eichner, ‘Kandinsky und Gabriele 
Münter, von Ursprüngen Moderner Kunst’ (Munich), 1957 in: ibid., p.397-98. 
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poems, especially White Song.138 Indeed, Weiss suggests that the woodcuts and painting 
“…represent both a thematic and a stylistic convergence of the ‘lyric,’ the ‘graphic,’ and 
the ‘painterly’- and a major step in the transformation from Symbolism to abstraction.”139 
By contrast, Kandinsky asserts that the colour black, as the opposite of white, “has an 
inner sound of nothingness bereft of possibilities, a dead nothingness as if the sun had 
become extinct, an eternal silence without future, without hope.”140 This reinforces the 
fact that the colour white was of importance to Kandinsky’s creativity, as does his 
argument that the colour white, when isolated,  evokes an emotion, an ‘inner sound’.141 
Kandinsky’s concept of ‘inner sound’ stands for the intrinsic meaning of objects, 
words, colours and movements.142 However, we should not be misled into suspecting that 
there is some sort of correspondence between Kandinsky’s concept of an ‘inner sound’ 
and Schopenhauer’s reference to the content of the world as representation - which the 
latter describes as relating to its “innermost being, its kernel, the thing-in-itself.”143 Indeed, 
according to Schopenhauer, the ‘inner’ kernel of all genuine knowledge arises only from 
perception, or the fruit of perception, and every genuine thought takes place through 
pictures or images.144  
Despite an apparent similarity, Kandinsky’s ‘inner sound’ cannot stand for the 
‘innermost being’ of representation since sound pertains to phenomena and not essence. 
The only way in which it might stand for the ‘innermost essence’, as far as Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy is concerned, would be in the case of musical sound where he states that music 
is a direct objectification and reproduction of the will. Therefore, music is not a mere copy 
                                                                
138 See: Weiss, P. and Kandinsky, W., Kandinsky in Munich: The Formative Jugendstil Years (Princeton; Guildford: 
Princeton University Press, 1979). pp. 93, 180, 198, and passim. 
139 Weiss, "Kandinsky and the Symbolist Heritage." p.139. 
140 On the Spiritual in Art [Über das Geistige in der Kunst: Insbesondere in der Malerei] 2d ed., (Munich), 1912 in: 
Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo. p.185. 
141 Reflections on Abstract Art ["Reflexions sur l'art abstrait"] Cahiers d'Art (Paris), 1, nos. 7-8 ( 1935) in: ibid., p.767. 
142 Cardullo, R. J., "Wassily Kandinsky’s The Yellow Sound as a Total Work of Art," in: Neohelicon   (2017). No page 
number given. 
143 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.30-31.  
144 The World as Will and Representation.Vol.2, p.72. 
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of the Platonic Ideas, (we shall examine the latter in chapter 3), as we find in other arts, 
but it is “a copy of the will itself.”145 By comparison, Kandinsky’s concept of ‘inner sound’ 
is too broad and too sensual, missing out on Schopenhauer’s distinct belief that music 
“surpasses even that of the world of perception itself.”146 
For his description of the world of perception Schopenhauer employs an artistic 
simile for the process. When an artist (or any human being) has sensory experiences, 
intuitive perceptions are the work of the faculty of understanding (the brain). The 
perceptions of the senses provide materials for the brain to work with which means that 
“the understanding is the artist forming the work, whereas the senses are merely the 
assistants who hand up the materials.”147 This material explanation is ‘mundane’, 
tangible and entirely of this world, yet by comparison Kandinsky held ‘extra-mundane’ 
beliefs which are antithetical to Schopenhauer’s, who denies that there is an independent 
‘extra-mundane’ world of the spirit. He also denies that the mind causes the external 
world of objects to appear, as with idealism, since causality only applies between objects. 
He argues that philosophies of materialism and idealism, which ground themselves upon 
the notion of causality, are incorrect. As a result: 
The whole world of objects is and remains representation,and is for this 
reason wholly and forever conditioned by the subject; in other words, it has 
transcendental ideality. But it is not on that account falsehood or illusion; it 
presents itself as what it is, as representation, and indeed as a series of 
representations, whose common bond is the principle of sufficient reason.148 
 
Having stated this, Schopenhauer asks two fundamental questions which have a bearing 
upon our investigations. He asks, “What is this  world of perception besides being my 
                                                                
145 The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.257. 
146 Ibid., p.256. 
147 On The Fourfold Root of The Principle of Sufficient Reason. p.114. 
148 The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.15. Transcendental Idealism, (Transzendentaler Idealismus), can be 
defined as follows by Cartwright who states that: “This is Immanuel Kant’s theory that we only experience or have 
knowledge of the appearances of things and not things in themselves. Schopenhauer ascribed to Kant’s distinction 
between appearances and things in themselves, and he agreed with Kant, but for different reasons. Our experiences of 
empirical reality are conditioned by the a priori forms of space, time, and causality, but he maintained that the essence 
expressed in all appearances, the thing in itself, is will.” See: Cartwright.,p.174. 
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representation? Is that of which  I am conscious only as representation just the same as 
my own body,  of which I am doubly conscious, on the one hand as representation, on 
the other as will?”149 This is important, because for Schopenhauer the body is the 
starting-point for our perception of the world. It is also important to us, because we are 
going to consider the body as an object, as something knowable throughout this thesis 
since it is both will and representation. 
According to Schopenhauer, contrary to reductive philosophies such as Cartesian 
dualism, the body is a single thing revealed to us in a double way. Since this is the case, 
we may claim that Kandinsky, as an embodied being, experienced himself as an object in 
space and time, thus standing in an a priori causal relationship with other objects in the 
world. Like everyone else, Kandinsky had an intuitive perception of his body just as he 
did of other objects in the world. In the same way that he received sensory data concerning 
other external objects in the world, so he received sensory data about his own body. 
Therefore, Kandinsky’s body was for him an object of representation. However, in 
contrast to other objects in the world, Kandinsky possessed a particular knowledge of his 
body, as one experienced from within. He experienced his body from within as a 
phenomenal object for self-consciousness, which at the same time was a manifestation of 
the will. Indeed, Schopenhauer argues that this is the double manner in which we 
understand our bodies as both will and as objects of representation - from without and 
from within. Therefore, let us propose that the double manner in which we understand our 
bodies as human beings permits us to enter into the metaphysical substrate of the 




                                                                
149 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation., p.18. 
150 We shall explore this ‘double manner’ in greater depth in Chapter 2. 
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1.3 Kandinsky, Schopenhauer and the Body 
 
 
The body was an aesthetic problem for Kandinsky from early on in his career. His 
aesthetic problems with the body began in 1897 after he became an art student at the school 
of Slovenian painter Anton Ažbe. Kandinsky recollected that the discipline of life 
drawing classes under Ažbe imposed a constraint upon his freedom which turned him into 
a temporary ‘slave’ by “studying from the model.”151 Although Ažbe’s life classes were 
well attended, Kandinsky could not help but notice how students were “trying to represent 
exactly the anatomy, structure, and character of these people who were of no concern to 
them.”152 In their careful attention to detail, Kandinsky believed that they spent very little 
time thinking about art.153 On the one hand, he found the  play of lines in the nude models 
interesting, while on the other sometimes repulsive. In addition, through many of the 
models’ postures, he claimed that he had to force himself to reproduce them. As a result, 
he was in almost continual conflict with himself, and it was only when he had left the life 
classes that he felt free again to paint or draw as he wished.154  
In spite of all of this, he did follow two anatomy courses conscientiously, in the 
second of which he reluctantly “breathed the corpse-ridden air.”155 He was disinclined to 
study anatomy after hearing of a direct relationship between anatomy and art, saying that, 
“It even offended me - in the same way that I had taken offense at being taught that a tree 
trunk must always be depicted as joined to the ground.”156 Although he felt creatively 
isolated due to these issues, he found that a human head, even a very ugly one, could be 
                                                                
151 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Reminiscences/Three Pictures ["Rückblicke"; "Komposition 4"; "Komposition 6"; "Bild mit 
weissem Rand''] Kandinsky, 1901-1913 (Berlin), 1913 in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo. p.373. 
152 Ibid., p.374. 
153 Ibid., p.374. 
154 Ibid., p.374. 
155 Ibid., p.374-75. 
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beautiful.157 Consequently, he could stand in front of ‘ugly’ models and admire them, 
comparing them with the ingenuity of  the natural world.158  
Some years later, in a letter of 1910, Kandinsky described the influence of Hugo 
von Habermann and Franz von Lenbach as those “who doggedly pursued the 
asymmetrical structure of anatomy.”159 Although he acknowledged Professor Siegfried 
Mollier’s lectures on anatomy which were most popular, it comes as no surprise that in a 
lecture of 1914 (delivered by proxy in Cologne) Kandinsky referred to the human body as 
an object which often displeased him.160 He recalled that: 
I saw with displeasure in other people’s pictures elongations that contradicted the 
structure of the body, or anatomical distortions, and knew well that this would not 
and could not be for me the solution to the question of representation. Thus, objects 
began gradually to dissolve more and more in my pictures. This can be seen in 
nearly all the pictures of 1910. 161 
 
In his notes for this Cologne lecture, Kandinsky describes his slow emancipation from 
artistic prejudices. Through Sketch for Composition II of 1910 (fig. 5), he points to the 
liberated use of colour without concern for perspective. Yet, in the context of this painting, 
and the human body as a representation, he said that he always found it unpleasant, even 
distasteful “to allow the figures to remain within the bounds of physiological laws and at 
the same time indulge in compositional distortions.”162 It therefore appeared to him, that 
if one physical area was destroyed out of pictorial necessity, then other physical areas 
could receive the same treatment also.  
Although Kandinsky claimed that he always found it unpleasant to allow ‘figures 
to remain within the bounds of physiological laws’, there is evidence to contradict this. 
                                                                
157 Ibid., p.375. 
158 Ibid., p.375. 
159 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Letters from Munich’ ["Pis'mo iz Miunkhena"] Apollon (St. Petersburg), 1909-1910, in: ibid., 
p.70. 
160 The lecture was designed to mark an exhibition of his work at the Deutsches Theater in Cologne. 
161 Kandinsky, W., Lindsay, K. C., and Vergo, P., Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art (London: Faber and Faber, 
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For instance, Kochel - Lady standing by the Forest’s Edge of 1902 (fig. 6), an oil on 
canvasboard, is a competent representation of the female form. Executed in an 
Impressionist style, and painted with bold brushstrokes, the figure looks out at the viewer 
from a background of dense forest. Similarly, his Portrait of Gabriele Münter of 1905 
(fig. 7) is an oil on canvas painted in Dresden, showing Münter’s pale face set against a 
deep blue background. He captures her expression with great competence, her eyes and 
mouth expressing a petulant personality. Neither of these works have been created by one 
who was defeated, or truly displeased by a representation of the human body, nor is the 
latter painting a ‘Saumalerei’ (mess), as he claimed in a letter to Münter of 1905.163 
However, if we accept that the body is a manifestation of the will, then it may be that 
Kandinsky’s distaste for the body refutes C1 since he moves away from it in favour of 
abstraction or near abstraction. Indeed, we may also consider the fact that in comparison 
to Die Brücke artists, he and many of the Der Blaue Reiter group preferred to contemplate 
the world of ‘spirit’ rather than that of the body.164 That said, in chapter 3 of this thesis, 
we explore Kirchner ‘s depiction of the nude and how contemplation of a nude may (in 
theory) lead us to metaphysical knowledge.  
From Schopenhauer’s point of view, the manifestation of the body assumes the 
world of representation, in as much as the body as object is in the world. Yet the 
representation equally assumes the body, since it results from “the function of an organ of 
the body” 165 - the brain. This organ has arisen from the will, and through it the will is able 
to recognise itself in an individual’s self-consciousness.166 On this basis, Schopenhauer 
                                                                
163 Letter from Kandinsky to Münter dated 18.09.1905. See: Roethel, H. K., Benjamin, J. K., and Kandinsky, W., 
Kandinsky: Catalogue Raisonné of the Oil Paintings. Vol. 1, 1900-1915 (London: Sotheby, 1982). p.152. 
164 This comparison offers fertile ground for future research into the validity of C1 and C2 in relation to the amount of 
emphasis Die Brücke and Der Blaue Reiter could be said to have placed upon metaphysics versus the empirical 
respectively. 
165 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.2, p.276 
166 Ibid., p.300.  
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asserts that, as the truly metaphysical, the will “is not like the intellect, a function of the 
body, but the body is its function; therefore, ordine rerum it is prior to that body, as it is 
the metaphysical substratum of that body, the in-itself of that body’s phenomenal 
appearance.”167 
Even though the body displeased Kandinsky, when faced with criticism he could 
use a metaphysics of the body as a metaphor for artistic resilience. He recalled how he and 
his fellow Expressionists at one point “…stood with both feet implanted in the spirit of 
the awakening art, and lived in this spirit with soul and body.”168 Indeed, as Betsy F. 
Moeller-Sally points out, scholars have virtually neglected the more physical aspects of 
Kandinsky’s art, preferring to discuss his abstract representations instead.169 She alerts 
readers to Philippe Sers’s extensive study of Kandinsky’s philosophy of the abstract 
which, “contains an entry for ‘hear’, but not for ‘body, ‘love’ or sexuality’.”170 However, 
she perhaps overstates her case, since Rose-Carol Washton Long and Valery Turchin do 
attend to earthly themes such as the erotic, particularly in the context of Kandinsky’s 
cultural environment - Turchin studying eroticism in relation to Kandinsky’s depictions 
of women. These two scholars conclude that it would be erroneous to assume that a lack 
of conspicuous eroticism in Kandinsky’s art meant that there was none at all.171  
Washton Long and Moeller-Sally’s arguments are not certainties, but there is some 
empirical evidence which might support their physical views of Kandinsly’s art as in the 
painting Nude of 1911 (fig. 8), a watercolour on thin cardboard, which was exhibited in 
the Moderner Bund in Zurich, during July 1912. As one might expect from his comments, 
Kandinsky did not paint nudes often, but he did create a larger oil painting of the same 
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title on 11.03.1911. In this image, we can see that the female body is still recognisable as 
an object derived from intuitive perception, but only through the simple delineation of 
form by line and colour, indicating that the tendency towards abstraction has begun. In 
spite of the nakedness of the body in question, it does not really equate to eroticism. 
Indeed, although an erotic and earthy reading of Kandinsky’s art is often at variance with 
the evidence, Moeller-Sally remains convinced that Kandinsky did employ the erotic. Her 
conviction was that Kandinsky was “representing the making of art in terms of making 
love” and that his art was veiled by “…processes he sometimes described as ‘clothing’ 
(Einkleidung) and ‘fitting a gown’ (Zurichtung eines Gewandes).”172  
This still sounds far-fetched, yet there is another slender piece of evidence which 
might suggest that Kandinsky was obliquely interested in the erotic nature of the body. 
For this we return to the works of Schopenhauer owned by Kandinsky, which included a 
chronological overview of the philosopher’s life. In the overview Kandinsky has marked 
off with pencil the year for 1860, which contains a translation by Maillard entitled 
‘Metaphysique de l’amour’ (Metaphysics of Sexual Love). This appeared in the January 
issue of Revue Germanique and was taken from the German text of Schopenhauer’s major 
work.173 However, since this evidence verges upon the ephemeral, perhaps Kandinsky’s 
sketchbooks may offer us better insights into his studies of the body.  
The critical response to these sketches has been less than enthusiastic, with his 
drawings being described as diligent but not above the average. Indeed, Grohmann sees 
Kandinsky’s female bodies as “stylized female figures, which in their exaggeration have 
the effect of parodies on the line drawings of the Munich Jugend.”174 That said, we might 
                                                                
172 Ibid., p.54. 
173 For the English translation of Schopenhauer’s ‘The Metaphysics of Sexual Love’ see Chapter xliv in: Schopenhauer 
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Ideas and C1 in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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point to Kandinsky’s Child and Dog of 1904 (fig. 9), which is an obvious intuitive 
representation, and contrary to Grohmann’s estimation of Kandinsky’s abilities, 
comparatively well executed. The composition uses loose brush strokes after the manner 
of Impressionism, whilst drawing upon empirical perception. There is though, a 
discrepancy of relations between the stature of the dog, and stature of the child, which 
destabilises and unsettles the composition. This might lead us to assume that Kandinsky 
held relational anatomy in disdain, as something merely mechanical, because in a diary 
entry of c.1908, Münter recalled how Kandinsky had been asked why he did not exhibit 
nudes such as these. He is said to have replied, “That would be as if I were successful as 
a circus cyclist – however, I am not a juggler (Kunstradler), but a painter.”175 
The role of the human body in Kandinsky’s art appears conservative, in 
comparison to his abstractions, but it did play a significant role in his St.George figures. 
The significance lies in the fact that Kandinsky thought of himself as a Christian Knight.176 
This can be seen in the 1912 Blaue Reiter almanac cover (fig. 10) which is largely derived 
from German and Russian folk images. Based on his glass painting of St. George II of 
1911 (fig. 11), and influenced by Bavarian versions of the saint, it is arguably a reversed 
mirror image of Hans von Marées’ St. George of 1881 (fig. 12).177 Given the spiritual 
associations of the saint, Kandinsky’s projection of the ‘Christian Knight’ onto his own 
art was one way in which he used both intuitive and semi-abstract representations, as a 
result of what he called an ‘inner necessity’. Consequently, Kandinsky could use 
associated ideas from the abstract and the ‘real’ whatever the given demands of a specific 
work were.178   
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Another depiction which uses both ‘real’ and abstract representations is Lady in 
Moscow of early 1912 (fig. 13), a watercolour executed in gouache and pencil.179 The 
intuitive representation of the female body is clear here, and not abstracted from 
perception, she stands in the centre of the image looking out at the viewer and is set against 
a background of distorted perspective. Indeed, Margaret Olin has found both intuitive and 
abstract representations which means that: 
Each object in the picture exists for itself, a sign of direct perception as pure in its 
own way as are the splotches that represent thought forms. The pink flower in the 
lady’s hand tells the same message in ‘reality’ as the pink splotch tells in 
abstraction. The two forms equate the two styles.180  
 
 
1.4 Kandinsky, Theosophy and the Metaphysics of Abstract Representations 
 
The image mentioned by Olin above has been linked to Kandinsky’s theosophical 
interests and Annie Besant’s theosophy.181 This is an important topic since Kandinsky, as 
a man of his times, would have been aware of the vogue for occult theory and practice in 
Germany. Indeed, as Corina Treitel points out, Berlin alone had around six hundred 
mediums practising in 1900 and “contained ten thousand spiritualists, four hundred 
mediums, and between fifteen and twenty spiritualist clubs.”182 In addition, by 1923 
Munich had become a centre for occultism and an official for the Catholic Church would 
note with concern how “more than ten thousand families had reportedly held séances.”183 
And so it was in this cultural context that Kandinsky nurtured his sense of mysticism and 
a short lived fascination with Theosophy. In fact, in his essay ‘Whither the New Art?’ of 
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1911, Kandinsky presents an argument for a correspondence between abstraction and 
Theosophy. In this essay he states that:  
A general interest in abstraction is being reborn, both in the superficial form of the 
movement towards the spiritual, and in the forms of occultism, spiritualism, 
monism, the ‘new’ Christianity, Theosophy, and religion in its broadest sense. 
Circles, societies, journals, lectures, symposia dedicated to the problems of the 
abstract are growing up like mushrooms.184 
 
Out of this occult milieu Besant and fellow Theosophist C. W. Leadbeater co-authored a 
book called Thought- Forms185 and Kandinsky may well have known this work. It is said 
that this book, together with Leadbeater’s Man Visible and Invisible186 of 1902, led to 
Rudolf Steiner’s occult colour theory. Moreover, as Sixten Ringbom reveals, these writers 
refer to the human body in an occult manner. They refer to “the seven bodies of man” in 
the physical, the astral, the mental, and “the four highest bodies of a spiritual character.”187 
Earlier, Steiner had become the editor for the complete works of Schopenhauer on behalf 
of the publisher Ludwig Leistner. The first three volumes appeared in 1894, with Steiner 
contributing both an introduction and a biographical sketch of Schopenhauer.188 
Subsequently, links have been made between Steiner’s philosophy and Schopenhauer’s - 
it being observed that: 
Rudolf Steiner built on Schopenhauer’s thought by contrasting the idea of a 
dualistic, active, egoistic individual will with the non-dualistic but receptive rather 
than passive will, thereby beginning his long quest of advocating the cultivation 
of spiritual, intuitive, artistic meditation, and creativity, which were to balance the 
destructive effects of the egoistic will.189 
 
Steiner’s work was read by Kandinsky and other Expressionist artists, such as Marc and 
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Alexei Javlensky, who valued its cultivation of spiritual, intuitive, and artistic values.190 
We know that Kandinsky owned a copy of Steiner’s Theosophie and copies of his Lucifer-
Gnosis191 in which there are several annotations by the artist in the margins. We also know 
that Kandinsky first heard Steiner’s lectures in 1908 whilst in Berlin.192 However, Vergo 
and Lindsay are cautious about the Steiner connection and suggest that, “although 
Kandinsky appreciated Steiner’s methodology and the ways in which occult 
experimentation coincided with his own interests in dematerialization, he maintained a 
sceptical distance: he was a painter, not a theurgist.”193 More cautious still, Nina Kandinsky 
dismissed her husband’s links to Steiner and the burgeoning Anthroposophical Society.194 
Nevertheless, Kandinsky at a metaphysical level, certainly believed that: 
…as long as the soul remains joined to the body, it can as a rule only receive 
vibrations via the medium of the senses, which form a bridge from the immaterial 
to the material (in the case of the artist) and from the material to the immaterial (in 
the case of the spectator).195 
 
Ringbom suggests that Kandinsky’s liberation of form and colour from intuitive 
representations parallel Steiner’s conceptions of free-floating tones and colours.196 That is 
because Steiner’s astral realm of the spirit signified the possible “representation of such 
realities.”197 In addition, the colour illustrations used in Steiner’s theosophical books might 
be considered as the very first abstract representations, created nearly ten years prior to 
Kandinsky’s alleged first abstract watercolour of 1910. Ringbom thinks that this coincides 
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with Kandinsky’s belief that artists should neglect the corporeal appearance of matter in 
preference to the extra-sensory reality of the spirit.198 This belief was important to 
Kandinsky who felt that art had the capacity to engender spiritual redemption. As a 
consequence, his attempt to journey beyond phenomenal appearances into the realm of the 
metaphysical validates C2. Yet, as a form of redemption, his beliefs and practices as an 
artist invalidate C1, since he tended to disregard the appearance of matter in favour of 
spiritualised / dematerialised representations. 
For such redemption to occur, Kandinsky believed that the metaphysical relationship 
between emotion, sensation, and art was of vital importance.199 In his opinion, the 
vibrations of an artist’s soul must attain a material form of expression accessible to 
spectators. This form stands for the external component of an art work inseparable from 
its content.200 But, contrary to Kandinsky and Theosophists, Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
does not endorse a spiritual world existing independently of all objects. Nor does it endorse 
such a world from which objects might be derived, or which might be manifested through 
an artist’s vibrating soul. Unlike Theosophy, his doctrine starts with the simple division of 
object and subject as the first comprehensive and fundamental form of the world as 
representation.201  
Schopenhauer’s doctrine does not make him a materialist, although we can infer 
through him that Kandinsky was correct to eschew materialism. By this Schopenhauer 
means that: 
…the fundamental absurdity of materialism consists in the fact that it starts from the 
objective; it takes an objective something as the ultimate ground of explanation, 
whether this be matter in the abstract simply as it is thought, or after it has entered 
into the form and is empirically given, and hence substance….202  
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Moreover, according to Schopenhauer, materialism (in science especially) at no time 
targets the innermost nature of the world or proceeds past the world as representation. 
Consequently, it never informs us of anything beyond the fact that one representation is 
related to another.203 In addition, whilst materialists argue that the human subject 
‘emerges’ from the world of objective matter, conversely idealists argue that the object-
world ‘emerges’ from the human subject. To prove his point, Schopenhauer cites Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte, as a leading exponent of idealism, who “overlooked the fact that with 
the subject (let him give it whatever title he likes) he posited the object, since no 
subject is thinkable without object.”204 
In contrast to both materialism and idealism, Schopenhauer’s procedure is quite 
different, since it does not begin with either the object or the subject “but from the 
representation, as the first fact  of consciousness.”205 Therefore, since we are exploring C1 
and C2 on Schopenhauer’s terms, and due to the relativity of the world as representation, 
we must seek out the inner nature of the world elsewhere, on another path than that of 
representation.206 However, Kandinsky, in his art at least, stayed on the path of 
representation by seeking out abstract representations (concepts), hoping that this would 
communicate the metaphysical substrate of the world.  
The story behind the development of his abstract representations begins with a 
recollection of ‘an unexpected spectacle’ that confronted him at dusk in his studio. He 
reports that he: 
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…suddenly saw an indescribably beautiful picture, pervaded by an inner glow. At 
first, I stopped short and then quickly approached this mysterious picture, on which 
I could discern only forms and colors and whose content was incomprehensible. 
At once, I discovered the key to the puzzle: it was a picture I had painted, standing 
on its side against the wall.207  
 
The following day he attempted to re-create the crepuscular impression by daylight. Half 
succeeding he recognized objects, yet the element of dusk was missing. From that point 
on he said that: 
Now I could see clearly that objects harmed my pictures. A terrifying abyss of all 
kinds of questions, a wealth of responsibilities stretched before me. And most 
important of all: What is to replace the missing object? The danger of ornament 
revealed itself clearly to me; the dead semblance of stylized forms I found merely 
repugnant.208 
 
It was only after years of patient study that he found the answers through pure abstraction. 
Feeling that ornament in art was a danger, that creativity could not be arrived at by rational 
logic but instead by inner feeling, he maintained that every form which he used arrived 
spontaneously of itself, fully fledged before his eyes so that he merely had to replicate 
it.209 As a result, his capacity for engrossing himself in the inner life of his art and his soul, 
increased to such an extent that he often neglected external events.210  
This story is rivalled by another which he told, to the art dealer Karl Nierendorf in 
a 1937 interview, who asked how he had arrived at the idea of abstract painting. In this 
story, he told Nierendorf that at twenty years of age he was sent by Moscow University to 
Vologda in north eastern Russia for ethnographic research. There he said, “I saw 
farmhouses completely covered with painting – nonrepresentational - inside.”211 
Following this he observed Russian icon painting with fresh eyes, acquiring an eye for the 
abstract element of painting.212 Later in 1906, he saw Henri Matisse’s early paintings for 
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the first time, and asked himself whether he could not just simplify or distort given objects 
but omit them completely. From that point on he converted to abstract art via 
Expressionism, experimentation, doubt, hope, and discovery.213  
Four years later, Kandinsky would remark upon an exhibition held at the Moderne 
Galerie Thannhauser, which had displayed a few works by Matisse. In his opinion, only 
Matisse was bold enough to venture beyond the ‘accidental forms of nature’ by 
eliminating inessentials and substituting them with his own forms.214 As part of 
Kandinsky’s move towards abstract representations, it was important therefore “for the 
artist to free himself from dependence on nature and the representation of visual 
objects.”215 In addition, as Kenneth Berry suggests, Kandinsky was inspired by Gauguin’s 
belief that drawing was a process of abstracting from nature by memory. In turn, Gauguin 
had been inspired by the abridged delineations and flattened configurations of Puvis de 
Chavannes.216 Furthermore, both Kandinsky and Marc had arguably pursued aesthetic 
liberation from intuitive representations under the inspiration of Neo-Idealist and 
Romantic art.217   
The pursuit of aesthetic liberation from intuitive representations and a tendency 
towards abstraction arguably made Kandinsky’s work uncertain to viewers. That is to 
say, Kandinsky’s abstract intentions were often not retrievable by spectators. Indeed, by 
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1919, in an article called ‘Art of this Moment’, and written for the journal Der neue 
Merkur, German art critic Wilhelm Hausenstein would describe abstract art as an “esoteric 
formalism too related to decoration, incomprehensible, with no collective impact.”218 If 
this is the case, then Schopenhauer by contrast assures us that objects of perception 
arising from the external world offer us a greater guarantee of certainty and impact. 
That which has arisen from perception and remains true to it is he says, “like the 
genuine work of art, can never be false, nor can it be refuted through any passing of 
time for it gives us not opinion, but the thing itself.”219 However, when it comes to 
using abstract knowledge, arising through the faculty of reason (Vernunft), then doubt 
and error can appear. As a result, even if the representation of perception does 
generate illusions, the error of an abstract representation can hold sway for thousands 
of years.220  
To support his belief, Schopenhauer likens abstract representations that borrow 
from perception to the borrowed light of the moon from the sun. This borrowed light 
involves the faculty of reason whose formation of concepts is its only glory – a loaned 
glory. Therefore, because abstract concepts are derived from perception, they are less 
reliable than immediate perceptions which can be tested. Yet, trustworthy abstract 
knowledge can expand the range of our capabilities, and it is this “abstract reflex of 
everything intuitive in the non-perceptive conception of reason”221 which differentiates 
man from animal. 
The great adventure of Kandinsky was his journey into the ‘abstract reflex of 
everything intuitive’. However, his journey was sometimes accompanied by vocal 
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travelling companions – some of them being the most notable critics of his era. Among 
the critics who had reacted against the new art of the avant-garde was Carl Vinnen, who 
in 1911 edited a polemic called, Ein Protest deutscher Künstler (A Protest of German 
Artists), which argued that the excessive introduction of foreign art had led to the 
devaluation of German art. To Vinnen, it was clear that, in view of the ‘invasion of French 
art’ in particular, “a people is only driven to great heights by artists of its own flesh and 
blood.”222 
One riposte to this objection came from Wilhelm Worringer, an early apologist for 
Expressionism. He replied to Vinnen in his essay ‘The Historical Development of Modern 
Art’, which was taken from an anthology titled, The Struggle for Art: The Answer to the 
Protest of German Artists of 1911.223 He understood that Vinnen’s protest was not about 
guarding against the influences of classical impressionism, as in Édouard Manet, Claude 
Monet and Pierre-Auguste Renoir, but rather against the younger Parisians who took after 
Paul Cézanne, Vincent van Gogh and Matisse. Around this time, Worringer’s 1908 
doctoral thesis, Abstraction and Empathy,224 became a beacon for the Expressionists and 
a factor in bridging the gap between abstract and representational art. Jay A. Clarke 
proposes that Expressionists employed Worringer’s work to vindicate their penchant for 
abstraction and mysticism, so as to rationalise them as particularly German.225 But not 
every Expressionist used Worringer’s argument in this way, and as David Morgan has 
argued, by 1912 Kandinsky showed no interest “in restricting the artist's pictorial 
vocabulary to the rigid geometrical patterns of ancient ornament, in which Worringer 
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discerned an abstract ‘urge to form.'”226 Therefore, when Kandinsky published On the 
Spiritual in Art in 1912, he “followed Roessler in insisting on a careful distinction between 
ornament in the past and the place for a new visual form which owed nothing to visual 
appearances.”227  
If abstraction involved a departure from ‘visual appearances’, then as Berry has 
argued, “creative analogical thinking as evinced in Kandinsky’s art, often involves 
breaking free of a clichéd representation.”228 Should this be the case then, since we are 
exploring the validity of C1 and C2,  we might  need to become aware of a possible tension 
between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ forms of abstract art - especially when using phrases such as 
‘abstract representation’.229 That is to say, there is a tension between Kandinsky’s early 
abstraction, where figuration and recognisable objects are retained (‘weak’) and his later 
geometric abstraction which removes the object and figuration almost entirely (‘strong’). 
Although, both ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ forms are abstract, Kandinsky’s move towards 
‘strong’ abstract representation was undoubtedly an attempt to avoid ‘mere design’. If this 
is so, then as Hamilton has argued, the following may apply where three components can 
be discerned in a work of art: 
(1) The two-dimensional array of coloured marks on the surface of the canvas (2) 
The representation of abstract volumes, spatially related to each other (the pictorial 
form) (3) The subject-matter of these volumes. Where (2) is present, the painting 
is only weakly abstract. It is (3), and not (2), that formalists such as Bell declare 
irrelevant to aesthetic or artistic value.230 
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Yet, it becomes quite a different matter to extend this and suggest that Kandinsky’s 
abstract representations, by breaking free of ‘clichéd representations’, subsequently led to 
greater aesthetic expression or the “aesthetic enrichment of society.”231  
Despite this caveat, as Thomas M. Messer  has argued, the pivotal role which 
Kandinsky’s art has taken on in our appreciation of modern art has arisen from the fact 
that he “brought to bear on his art an instinctive awareness of what constituted the central 
aesthetic issues of his era.”232 For Berry, Kandinsky’s abstract representations mirror 
cultural change, and the capacity to transform society by acquiring pictorial counterparts 
for an expressive language.233 This view resonates with Jerome Ashmore, who agrees that 
Kandinsky construed early twentieth century art as a quest for an internal determination 
which pledged an approaching spiritual revival without guaranteeing it.234 The 
apprehension of this spiritual revival entails that Kandinsky’s paintings are to be 
understood as symbolic images which permit a free association of ideas and a Kantian 
delight in the free use of an aesthetic imagination. However, this claim is contestable as 
we shall see. 
The first point to note is how Berry has claimed that since Kandinsky’s paintings 
are images in their own right, “their self-referential visual imagery and meta-symbolic 
language point…to their being autonomous, or autotelic works of art: having their aim or 
object inherent in itself.”235 The second point to note is how Berry has claimed that the 
pictorial effect of Kandinsky’s mature abstract art depends  upon the fact that such works 
are self-contained creations - possessing their own intrinsic organisation and qualities - 
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“without need of associative references of any kind.”236 This may be so, yet we might 
contest his belief that “in the Kantian sense, Kandinsky’s pictures allow for a free play of 
poetic associations.”237  
On the one hand, we may agree with Berry’s assertion that “for Kant, aesthetic 
pleasure or aesthetic ‘delight’ relates to the free play of the imagination - on some object, 
including the ‘aesthetic object’ of the work of art.”238 Indeed, we may also agree with 
Berry’s other assertion that “Immanuel Kant felt that ‘artistic beauty is a beautiful 
representation of a thing,’ and that it is the special task of genius to make beautiful 
representations…”239 Yet, on the other hand for Berry to argue that, post-1910, 
“Kandinsky gave visible expression to this idea of Kant - in his ‘abstract 
representations’”240 is open to dispute. This is because Berry appears to be suggesting 
firstly that Kandinsky’s abstractions are beautiful representations ‘of a thing’- an object - 
which clearly they are not. Secondly, apart from his subjective assumption that Kandinsky 
was a ‘genius’, Berry’s supposition that ‘Kandinsky’s pictures allow for a free play of 
poetic associations’ implies that they permit the spectator freedom to choose their mode 
of attention as in the case with natural beauty. However, it could be argued that, because 
Kandinsky’s abstract art is ‘fabricated’ by the artist, this entails that such ‘fabrication’ pre-
determines the ground of the artwork’s reception. If this is the case, then there is no 
freedom in the Kantian sense as referred to by Berry.  
In contrast to Berry’s position, Hamilton offers us a more convincing argument when 
stating that “artworks imply a clear, unambiguous focus of attention, and are intended to 
be experienced from a certain point or points in order to obtain their full effect.”241 He 
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rightly goes on to suggest that, “in nature, unlike art, there is no determinate aesthetic 
object; appreciators of nature have the freedom to decide on the frame or focus of 
attention.”242 Although this opinion is as he says often disputed, it does convey a more 
persuasive account of how spectators might be free to choose what they focus their 
attention upon. By comparison, Kandinsky’s abstract works, I suggest, do not offer the 
same freedom, despite their lack of depicted objects.  
This suggestion might be supported by Hamilton’s belief that in an artwork, and I 
would argue any abstract artwork, “viewers have freedom to focus on different parts of 
the artwork, but they cannot construct its boundaries or its primary focus.”243 As a result, 
this position can be contrasted with the ‘indeterminacy’ of nature where “the boundary 
between the object of appreciation and its environment is decided by the viewer.”244 In 
essence, such an aesthetic experience would therefore be unavailable to viewers of 
Kandinsky’s work as a whole whether abstract or not.245 
With the above in mind, we are led to consider the possibility that an aesthetic 
experience of Kandinsky’s abstract representations may sometimes require the empirical 
for it to make any sense - and as a consequence a certain tension resides within his work. 
Indeed, as Berry implies, Kandinsky’s paintings of the 1910s rely on the intuition of form 
and empirical representation, which suggests that it “is this reciprocal tension between 
abstract and concrete, universal and particular, that gives unique definition to Kandinsky’s 
‘abstract representation’.”246 However, Kandinsky wished to liberate himself from the 
concrete object as an intuitive representation in order to achieve pure expression through 
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pictorial means alone.247 Indeed, in his essay for The Blaue Reiter Almanac of 1912, 
Kandinsky stated that: 
The combination of the abstract with the representational, the choice between the 
infinite number of abstract forms and those forms built out of representational 
material - i.e., the choice between the individual means within each sphere - is and 
remains entirely according to the inner wishes of the artist.248  
 
Kandinsky was convinced that the abstract would surface when the spirit of the age was 
ripe. He argued that the goal of The Blaue Reiter Almanac was to arouse a capacity for 
experiencing spirituality, in both material and abstract phenomena, which would be 
essential to the future of art.249 By spirituality, Kandinsky implied not only aesthetics but 
an inner feeling of religious foreboding. As Rose-Carol Washton Long argues, 
Kandinsky’s essay On the Spiritual in Art, and his magnetic attraction towards abstraction, 
was in part due to a messianic vision. That is to say, while “… he equated 
representationalism with the materialistic values that he felt dominated his age, abstraction 
seemed to offer a way to express anti-materialistic or spiritual values.”250  
When we interpret Kandinsky’s anti-materialistic (or spiritual abstractions) 
according to Schopenhauer then it is has a feminine quality. This is because “reason is 
feminine in nature; it can give only after it has received. Of itself alone, it has nothing but 
the empty forms of its operation.”251 According to Schopenhauer, to know something 
through reason is to possess the power of forming judgements grounded upon that which 
arrives from outside of them, and by necessity they must be demonstrably true. However, 
this is something which we cannot vouch for in Kandinsky’s art, because much of it relies 
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upon idiosyncratic concepts which are often demonstrably not true or universally 
applicable. But, we can legitimately assert that some abstract knowledge, which is based 
upon direct perception, is demonstrably true and that “rational knowledge (Wissen) is 
therefore abstract consciousness, fixing in concepts of reason what is known generally in 
another way.” 252 
Schopenhauer’s proposal that ‘reason is feminine in nature’ might be interpreted 
(or misinterpreted) in two ways. On the one hand, his proposal that reason ‘has nothing 
but the empty forms of its operation’ could be viewed as misogynistic, as a pejorative jibe 
aimed at ‘empty headed’ women. However, this is not the case since he ascribes some of 
the most powerful capacities to reason – as in “metalogical truth, the principles of identity, 
of contradiction, of the excluded middle, and of sufficient reason of knowledge.”253 
Perhaps a better interpretation might entail that Schopenhauer’s ‘feminisation’ of reason 
is a sexual metaphor, whereby the faculty of reason is akin to the womb, and the 
fertilisation of it pertains to the masculine principle of planting the seeds of sensory 
experience within it in order that abstract concepts may be born. From this union therefore, 
we obtain not only empirical evidence but abstract concepts.  
That said, this is not the only possible way to think about Kandinsky’s, abstraction 
and Schopenhauer’s ‘feminisation’ of reason. Without referring to Schopenhauer, scholars 
such as Bibiana K. Obler have argued that the rise  of abstract art during the early twentieth 
century is “generally described as an apotheosis of masculinity, made possible by the 
repression of the decorative (read femininity)” and how Kandinsky “infamously described 
painting as a conquest of virgin canvas with ‘imperious brush’...”254 Viewed in this way, 
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Schopenhauer’s ‘feminisation’ of reason becomes inverted, rendering it masculine rather 
than feminine.  
In a similar vein, feminist art historians such as Obler believe that Kandinsky 
concealed a debt to the applied arts - the alleged realm of the feminine - and sustained a 
gender inflected dynamic vis-à-vis abstraction.255 Yet, as Obler points out, this inflection 
was ameliorated in 1913, when Kandinsky reacted with irritation to art critics who had 
derided successful female artists such as Münter for being ‘masculine’.256 By contrast, 
Kandinsky denied an association between artistic quality and masculinity by vouching for 
Münter’s  natural ability. It is therefore in this sense that by “championing her femininity, 
Kandinsky’s intent was avowedly feminist.”257 
Femininity has often been associated with feeling and masculinity with rationality, 
yet for Schopenhauer abstraction really belongs to the faculty of reason whilst the opposite 
of it is feeling (Gefühl) - which we may argue Kandinsky aspired to through his spiritual 
values.258 According to Schopenhauer, the concept of feeling possesses only a negative 
content allowing us to stipulate that there is something in consciousness which does not 
contain abstractions.259 The problem with the concept of feeling is that it is wide ranging, 
containing incongruous elements from religious feeling, sensual pleasure, moral feeling, 
bodily feeling, feeling for colours, musical sounds and harmonies, etc.260 All that these 
have in common therefore is that they are not abstract concepts belonging to reason and 
belong to both sexes. Nevertheless, if we can hypothesise that Kandinsky reconciled a 
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gender inflected dialectic vis-à-vis abstraction, then perhaps feminist historians such as 
Obler have a point when claiming that:  
His ambition was to show that women are different from while also equal to men. 
In the context of a backlash against feminism (and against the elimination of 
distinctions between the fine and applied arts), both Kandinsky and Simmel sought 
an alternative to re-establishing hierarchies between the sexes (and the arts) even 
as they maintained that differences existed261 
 
The opposite of rational knowledge is feeling (Gefühl), which Kandinsky was aspiring to 
- given his anti-materialistic and spiritual values. Yet, the concept of feeling, according to 
Schopenhauer, possesses only a negative content, allowing us to stipulate that 
consciousness does not contain abstractions.262 The problem with the concept of feeling is 
that it is wide ranging, containing incongruous elements from religious feeling, sensual 
pleasure, moral feeling, bodily feeling, feeling for colours, musical sounds and harmonies, 
etc. 263 All that these concepts have in common therefore is that they are not abstract 
concepts belonging to reason.  
Kandinsky’s goal of delivering abstract feeling through art became problematic 
after he realised that it could alienate his public. He understood that if he wished art to 
express a spirituality with fewer intuitive representations, then it had to be accessible to 
the wider public.264 One method was to communicate his thoughts through colour, but 
colour and line alone proved inadequate for abstract purposes. What was needed in a 
composition was a balance between the intuitive and the abstract in order to gain clarity 
of meaning.265 
Washton Long believes that we can see this by comparing a preparatory oil study 
for Composition VII of 1913 (already mentioned) with Peter Behrens’ abstract Sketch for 
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a Tapestry appearing in the journal Dekorative Kunst. IIl of 1900 (fig. 14). Because the 
latter image was executed in the manner of Jugendstil she thinks it becomes clear why 
Kandinsky tried to avoid abstract representations based solely upon ‘mere design’ or 
decorative ornamentation. He himself had argued that: 
If, even today, we were to begin to dissolve completely the tie that binds us to 
nature, to direct our energies toward forcible emancipation and content ourselves 
exclusively with the combination of pure color and independent form, we would 
create works having the appearance of geometrical ornament, which would-to put 
it crudely-be like a tie or a carpet.266  
 
That said, Washton Long’s argument is that Behrens’ work is two-dimensional and 
“contains no ready key to a mood.”267 Her view concurs with that of Magdalena 
Dabrowski, who argues that around the 1910s neither Kandinsky nor the spectators of his 
work were adequately prepared for abstraction based only upon colour and form. 
Therefore, his compositions relied upon abstractions drawn from covert motifs, the 
dissolution of colour and eventual devaluation of figuration.  
This can be seen in Compositions V of 1911 (fig. 15) and Composition VI of 1913 
(fig. 16).268 The former is an oil on canvas, which was shown in the Sturm Album of 1913 
and exhibited widely, most notably in the Modern Galerie Tannhauser Munich. There is a 
discernible figure which appears to be walking symbolically out of the painting at the 
bottom right, as if to declare the evacuation of the human body and the intuitively 
perceived object. Composition VI is an oil on canvas completed on 05.03.1913 and is 
based upon an earlier glass-painting Deluge (for Composition VI) of 1911 (fig. 17).269 
Composition VI featured in Der Sturm’s first German autumn salon of 1913 in Berlin and 
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bears no resemblance to intuitive perception being completely abstract and devoid of the 
human body. 
Kandinsky differed from many other avant-garde artists by using preparatory 
sketches in order to derive abstractions from covert motifs. He differed too from later 
Conceptual artists of the 1960s whose preparatory work was often a miniature of the final 
production. By comparison, Kandinsky’s works are at their most abstract in their final 
production, being progressively abstracted from perceptual reality during the process of 
creation. Indeed, viewers might recognise some intuitively perceived objects, from which 
the abstraction was originally taken by studying his preparatory works.270 
Preparatory watercolour sketches for the Improvisations series of paintings of 
1911-1913, show that he moved away from the intuitively perceivable by suppressing 
objects so that only an allusion to them remains. The Improvisations have been abstracted 
from perception to such an extent that identifying them is challenging.271 For the Viennese 
art historian Hans Tietze such art signified how “the new style dematerializes the 
conception of the world.”272 The dematerialisation of the world of objects led Kandinsky 
to remark that the philosophy of the future would study the spirit of phenomena with 
special attention.273 He believed that in the future, mankind would feel the spirit of things, 
albeit unconsciously, “just as people in general today still experience the external aspect 
of phenomena unconsciously, which explains the public’s delight in representational 
art.”274 He felt convinced that initially at least, mankind would need to receive the spirit 
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within material phenomena before receiving the spirit within the abstract.275 Through this 
incremental process humanity would come to enjoy abstract art conceptualised under the 
signature of the ‘spirit.276  
Kandinsky was not alone in yearning for the signs and wonders of the spirit in art. 
As Mary Dezember argues, we find Kandinsky was in similar company with Charles 
Baudelaire, Guillaume Apollinaire, and Rainer Maria Rilke, who depended upon powerful 
aesthetic imagery to set the soul ‘vibrating’.277 The concept of ‘vibrating’ souls tallied 
with Kandinsky’s interest in musical harmony as a means of reviving the spirit within 
visual art.278 Musical harmony underwent a radical transformation almost in synchrony 
with Kandinsky’s exploration of abstract representations, and in 1907 a concert was given 
by Arnold Schoenberg who had begun to abandon the tonal system in favour of atonality. 
This was as much of a paradigm shift as was Kandinsky’s move away from depicting 
intuitively perceived objects. On 01.01.1911, Kandinsky and Marc attended a Schoenberg 
concert which was noted by Marc in a letter to August Macke: 
Can you imagine a kind of music in which tonality (and therefore the 
observance of any key) is completely removed? While listening to this 
music I had to keep thinking about Kandinsky’s great composition which 
also allows no trace of key […] and also of Kandinsky’s ‘leaping spots’, 
which each stand for a note that is struck (a kind of white screen between 
the spots of colour!).279   
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Vergo has proposed that Schoenberg’s musical theory captured Kandinsky’s imagination 
to a greater extent than did his music - most notably in a brief article written by the 
musician for the above concert program. As Vergo has shown, Schoenberg’s polemic 
against the ‘prohibition’ of parallel octaves and fifths by academic music teachers 
mirrored Kandinsky’s own beliefs concerning academic ‘rules’ taught in art schools. 
Schoenberg’s comments on dissonance impressed the painter leading him to suggest that 
dissonances “differ from consonances only in degree; they are nothing other than more 
distant consonances, whose analysis presents the ear with greater difficulties, because of 
their remoteness but which, once analysis has brought them nearer, have just as much 
chance of becoming consonances as the more immediate overtones.”280  
As a consequence of the above, Kandinsky could validate his dissonant pictorial 
compositions by referring to theories such as Schoenberg’s. Indeed, Vergo argues that 
there is a correspondence between abstraction and atonality because “Kandinsky evidently 
regarded this argument as a model worthy of emulation in his own attempts to formulate 
a theoretical justification for the abandonment of representation in painting.”281 Therefore, 
(in theory) the dissolution of tonality in Schoenberg’s atonal music was comparable to 
Kandinsky’s dissolution of the object in his pictorial compositions.282  
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For musicians such as Paul Bekker, a violinist with the Berlin Philharmonic, 
Schoenberg’s atonal music indicated that: 
The music of the nineteenth century, as it developed from the classical art, was 
shaped by the urge towards representation, a corporealization of the process of 
feeling. But here lies the chasm. Schönberg’s music does not illustrate, it does not 
represent. It lives in a strange, unknown dimension of feeling, in which the 
corporeal, the firm outline of the artistic object, no longer exists.283  
 
However, Alan Lessem takes a contrary position and argues that the idea of a chasm 
disconnecting Schoenberg from the nineteenth century is an overstatement, since for the 
19th century “representation was already an intellectual problem.”284  
The intellectual problem for Kandinsky and Schoenberg was that abstract concepts 
form a specific class of their own, having their life only in the human mind, and differ 
from the representations of perception as so far discussed. They cannot be demonstrated 
in experience or “brought before the eyes or the imagination like objects of perception. 
They can only be conceived, not perceived, and only the effects that man produces through 
them are objects of experience proper.”285 At their best, Schopenhauer argues, abstract 
concepts are brought about by the process of cognitive reflection which repeats the 
original world of perception creating a singular copy out of an heterogeneous material. 
Concepts he therefore suggests, can be termed “representations of representations.”286 
They are conceivable but not perceivable, being inclusive of both representations from 
perception and abstract representations.287 This is so because the concept is a 
representation of a representation, or in other words a copy of a copy, whose complete 
nature exists only in relation to another representation.288 The essential value of abstract 
concepts lies in their communicability, their retention, and their fixed state. However, 
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Schopenhauer concludes that “for art the concept always remains unproductive; in art 
it can guide only technique; its province is science.”289  
 
1.5 The Origins of the ‘First’ Abstract Paintings and the Critical Language of the Age 
 
The above discussion brings us on to some critical concepts surrounding 
Kandinsky’s technique in art and attributions of dates to his first abstract works. Hans 
K. Roethel and Jean K. Benjamin have made it known that Vasily Dmitrievich Bobrov 
possessed some photographs of Kandinsky’s work.290 On the back of one of these 
photographs is an inscription which reads thus: “Picture with a Circle/first non-
objective/1911/Collection Kandinsky.”  291  
Although Kandinsky’s signature is evidently at the lower left-hand side of this 
photograph, Roethel and Benjamin offer what they believe to be additional provenance in 
the form of a letter to J. B. Neumann dated to 1935. In it Kandinsky thanked him for 
sending photographs of his paintings left behind in Moscow when he left in 1921, but 
noted that his “first abstract painting” (Painting with a Circle) was not amongst them. He 
asked Neuman to try to locate a photograph of this work, stating “it really is the very first 
abstract painting in the world because in those days there was no other artist who painted 
abstract pictures. Therefore, it is an ‘historic painting’.”292 
Roethel and Benjamin are persuaded that Kandinsky painted the said image in 
1911 whilst living in Munich, taking it to Russia in 1912, then subsequently leaving it in 
Moscow, and not seeing it again until the latter part of 1914 when he relocated to Russia 
at the beginning of the First World War. They inform us that Picture with a Circle (fig. 
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18) was shown in a Moscow exhibition called ‘The Year 1915’ during April of that year 
and suggest that this painting may be derived from a picture called Murnau - The Garden 
II of 1910 (fig. 19). 293 On this basis, Roethel and Benjamin attempt to persuade us that 
the later painting of 1911 ought to be called abstract since it did not require an object.294  
Peter Vergo by contrast, argues that the origins of abstraction in Kandinsky’s pre-
1914 works are more problematic than Roethel and Benjamin suggest. Although 
Kandinsky employed the term bez-predmetnyi (literally ‘without objects’) to describe 
Edouard Manet’s pioneering abstractions, in his criticism of Roethel and Benjamin Vergo 
argues that: 
… to suggest that a picture should be termed ‘non-objective’ because it derives not 
from nature, but from another picture that might be termed ‘abstract’ reveals a 
complete misunderstanding of the distinction Kandinsky drew between the two 
terms in his famous response to Hilla Rebay (letter of 16 December 1936; 
translated and discussed in Rudenstine, 1976, pp. 274ff.).295 
 
In this letter to Rebay, Kandinsky responded to how the terms ‘abstract’ and ‘non-
objective’ had been defined by her in the introductory essay for a 1936 catalogue titled 
Solomon R. Guggenheim Collection of Non-Objective Paintings.296 The difference 
between the two terms, as Kandinsky understood it, was that “ ‘abstract’ means an 
abstraction from the object, while ‘non-objectivity’ describes an art which requires no 
object and therefore uses none.”297 He added that his first ‘abstract’ painting was in 
Moscow, and that this work could be described as ‘non-objective’ because its content had 
nothing to do with objects. At the time of its production he was unable to proceed along 
these lines any further since he was a pioneer without a precedent to follow. Thereafter, 
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in the following years he reverted to the depiction of objects, so that in some of his 
paintings suggestions of objects remained observable.298 
In another letter to her dated to 16.01.1937, Kandinsky reiterated the above but in 
a slightly different manner – and one which is congruent with Schopenhauer’s philosophy. 
Again, working with Rebay’s distinctions, Kandinsky said that her definition of ‘abstract’ 
referred to an art which ‘abstracted’ its content in some way from an empirical object. By 
contrast he said, ‘non-objective’ art produces its own content without this being drawn 
from the world of empirical perception. Since this was the case, he was at a loss as to how 
Rebay could describe his paintings in the Guggenheim collection as ‘abstract’ because 
there were several of his paintings, even those pre-dating the war, which did not ‘abstract’ 
from the world of objects.299 He argued that his first non-objective painting was executed 
in 1911and held at that time by the People’s Museum in Moscow. For Rudenstine, at the 
time of her writing in 1976, the assertion was problematic since this painting had never 
been found, which made Kandinsky’s testimony impracticable to work with. 
Whilst quibbles and ambiguities over dating Kandinsky’s work may be valuable, 
some critics have struggled to find any worth to his abstract representations. For example, 
as Berry argues, Clement Greenberg was quite critical about Kandinsky’s abstract works 
- Greenberg regarding it as an error for Kandinsky to have made a radical break with art 
history. This was so, Berry suggests, because “Greenberg wanted modernist abstraction, 
in spite of its innovations, to maintain a classical continuity with the art of the past.”300 
However, Kandinsky did not view his career in this way and explained that such an 
implied break had never been his intention.301 Instead, Kandinsky perceived his art to be 
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organically contiguous with earlier phases in art history, and that abstraction was a 
necessary emancipation from irrelevances attached to the object.  
In contrast, A.F. Page considers Kandinsky’s earliest abstractions to be 
convincing, genuine and unselfconsciously expressive, compared to the later works which 
were indicative of intellectualism rather than spontaneous creative impulse.302 Yet, as 
convinced as Page might be with regards to Kandinsky’s abstractions, Schopenhauer 
suggests that “although abstract rational knowledge is the reflex of the representation 
from perception, and is founded thereon, it is by no means  so congruent with it that it 
could everywhere take its place; on the contrary, it never corresponds wholly to this 
representation.”303 Therefore, given Schopenhauer’s assertion, we may argue that 
Kandinsky’s abstraction is subjective and could never be congruent with intuitive 
representations grounded upon objective perception.  
Unlike Kandinsky, Schopenhauer was convinced that perception and not 
abstraction ought to be the bed rock for all evidence. This is because the immediate (or 
mediate reference) of perception equates to absolute truth which can yield the most 
valuable insights. To put this into context, Schopenhauer says that a fundamental 
difference between Kant's method and his is that the latter begins from indirect, reflected 
knowledge (concepts), whilst Schopenhauer begins from direct intuitive knowledge 
(perception). In order to highlight his point, Schopenhauer uses a simile which states that 
Kant “is comparable to a person who measures the height of a tower from its shadow; but 
I am like one who applies the measuring rod directly to the tower itself.”304 Thus, for Kant 
philosophy is a science of concepts, but for Schopenhauer it is a science in concepts, 
arising from knowledge of perception, “the only source of all evidence, and set down and 
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fixed in universal concepts.”305 By contrast, Schopenhauer argues that Kant therefore 
“skips over this whole world of perception which surrounds us, and which is so 
multifarious and rich in significance, and he sticks to the forms of abstract thinking.”306 
The shortest and least convoluted route to this truth, Schopenhauer believes, is 
through perception. This is so he says, because it is the safest route to truth since 
every facilitation through abstraction renders us vulnerable to deception.307 
Indeed, Kandinsky was not so unselfcritical or naïve as to believe that he could 
escape charges of being an abstract deceiver, and in all probability, he has marked a 
passage in Schopenhauer’s book with this spectre in mind. This passage concerns a letter 
from Schopenhauer to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe of 1815 which refers to the act of 
self-criticism. It says that: 
Every work has its origin in one single happy insight, and this grants the delight 
of conception; the birth, however, the execution, is for me at least not without pain: 
for then I stand before my own spirit: as a merciless judge before a prisoner who 
lies on the rack, and requires him to answer, until there is nothing more left to 
ask.308  
 
Apart from being his own judge, Kandinsky had to face public criticism. As Riccardo 
Marchi tells us, many early Berlin critics such as Oskar Bie could not accept Kandinsky’s 
abstract art. When writing for the Berliner Börsencourier, Bie responded with aggression 
towards Kandinsky’s theoretical writing, construing this to be symptomatic of an 
unwarranted intellectualism and the miscarriage of his art.309  
In reaction to this problem, Herwarth Walden’s solution was to publish Bie’s 
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review in Der Sturm as an exemplar of an unimaginative mind. Walden argued that “these 
art critics look going from picture to picture instead of moving from their experience 
(Erlebnis) to the work of art.”310 From his perspective, too many critics were rooted in 
representational seeing – approving works drawn from intuitive perception only, and 
disapproving of works such as Picture with Black Arch of 1912 (fig. 20). This has no overt 
resemblance to intuitive perception or the human body. However, not everyone has agreed 
with Kandinsky’s early critics since W. Januszczak’s experience is that this abstract 
painting, with three distinct colours, does retain a vestige of intuitive representation “by 
an inflected line that recalls the douga, the characteristic yoke of the Russian troika.”311 
In order to deconstruct a predilection for representational seeing, Walden 
suggested that most contemporary viewers were too proud of their eyes and that they had 
not yet learned how to see properly. They demanded that the artwork reproduce their own 
optical impressions which were not even their own. 312 To be proud of one’s eyes was to 
adhere to the art of former times - which by implication was to be backward and imitative. 
Arguing against such ‘conservative’ viewing habits, Walden declared that, “every 
conventional form … is a scaffold for a collapsing building or a corset for a sagging body. 
Art is presentation, and not representation. To enjoy a precious fruit the skin has to be 
sacrificed.”313 Therefore, the skin of representation had to be sacrificed in order to reveal 
what the artist, with his “innermost senses, the expression of his being,”314 had achieved. 
The affective life of the will had to be the artist’s instrument where every external 
impression became an expression of their inner life. The artist was to be a conduit for 
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visions and “inner apparitions.”315 As a result, what Walden was attempting to promote 
was a paradigm shift that would destabilise contemporary viewing habits and the world as 
representation. In doing so his critical language is full of paradox, since on the one hand 
he was affirming the affectivity of the will, and thus C1, whilst simultaneously 
foregrounding what he wanted less of – the world as intuitive representation, and thereby 
undermining C1.  
A notable contributor to these complex debates over representation was Paul 
Fechter who, after receiving his doctorate in 1906, worked as an editor for the newspaper 
Dresden Neuesten Nachrichten. By 1911, he could be found working for the Vossische 
Zeitung and making his acquaintance with Die Brücke members in Berlin. Three years 
later, his book Der Expressionismus316 was an early and significant exploration of both 
Expressionism and Impressionism. In this book, Fechter describes the turn away from the 
world as representation through contemporary views on Impressionism, Post-
Impressionism and Expressionism. In Fechter’s opinion, the reaction against 
Impressionist naturalism was correct insofar as the latter was aimed at the unremitting use 
of nature. By contrast, the abandonment of nature was the clarion call of the Expressionists 
which was fully justified. But its combination with the call ‘back to the picture’ (Zurück 
zum Bild) was contaminated to the core, and thus inevitably led to the ills of decorative 
painting. The turning away from the representation of external appearances became truly 
meaningful only when the life changes it implied had been fully realized down to the last 
consequences.317 
Following an undue emphasis on representation and the pictorial, the abandonment 
of nature could only lead back to genuine art “after it responded to the directive back to 
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emotion!”318 Through an emphasis on emotive feelings Expressionists ironically gave rise 
to those feelings’ most intensively concentrated representations. Consequently, for 
Fechter the new German art became “a matter in essence of solving a visual task of 
understanding, expressed in Schopenhauerian terms.”319 Since Expressionism was 
allegedly more about achieving feeling, it was no longer sufficient to know the world as 
representation but instead to experience (and develop) the will so that it became a living 
factor in the “destiny of the soul”320 – thus validating C1. Not content with demanding the 
dissolution of colour into representational objects, as had been the case with 
Impressionism, Expressionism Fechter argued laid claim instead to the world as 
representational appearance - not just as appearance or as symbolic value - but as an 
expressive medium of the will – thus validating C1.  Therefore, Fechter’s critical language 
- as had Walden’s - paradoxically affirmed and denies C1. On the one hand, Fechter’s call 
‘back to emotion’ affirmed C1, whilst on the other the pursuit of ‘feelings’ most 
concentrated representations’ indicates a contradictory, perhaps inescapable need for 
representation, as did his comment that Expressionism had ‘laid claim to the world as 
representational appearance’. 
As did Fechter, Hermann Bahr in his 1916 essay Expressionismus was convinced 
that whoever saw a painting by leading Expressionists or Futurists, would have to agree 
that in spite of sectarian strife amongst these groups, they were all united in turning away 
from Impressionism.321 While Impressionism always wanted to attain a simulacrum of 
representational reality, in Bahr’s opinion Expressionists violated reality, appearances and 
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the empire of the senses.322 This violation of representation caused ‘general indignation’ 
because all that had gone before in terms of aesthetic value was being denied in the process 
of trying new things. Therefore, the world as representation, the world of seeing, was 
being violated through the Expressionists’ experimentation upon the visual.  
Contemporary viewers, for the main part, could not accept anything other than the 
authentication and imitation of the natural world as representation. As a result of 
Expressionist art resisting the natural world of representation, Bahr reported how 
contemporary viewers felt that this:  
…could never be art, while the Expressionist claims exactly this to be art, to be his 
art. And when the viewer heatedly retorts that the painter should paint only what 
we see, the Expressionist assures him: we too paint only what we see! But they are 
unable to agree. They are unable to agree on seeing. When they speak about seeing, 
they each mean something different. What is seeing?323 
 
Bahr’s comment implies that Expressionist art was not just about the affective world, the 
world as will, but by necessity and just as often, about the world as representation, as one 
of ‘seeing’, thus undermining the credibility of C1. However, Bahr had ‘form’ which was 
not forgotten by one wry observer who brought this ‘form’ to light for his readers in a 
1917 edition of Kunst und Künstler. That observer was Karl Scheffler, who sardonically 
asked: 
And yet did Bahr once, by his own admission, battle for Impressionism ‘as if 
fighting for his own life’? He therefore fought for thoughtlessness, soullessness 
and empty imitation? How should the reader now take it seriously, when he fights 
for Expressionism!324 
 
Scheffler felt that there was never a real struggle in Bahr or a deep belief in what he was 
saying about art at all. He went further and argued that Bahr never truly experienced the 
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pictures of the great Impressionists or learned the art of seeing. For that reason, although 
Bahr had the capacity to dazzle readers, his book could not convince on a lasting basis.325 
Indeed, it is true that Bahr frequently referred to the ‘eye’ and ‘seeing’ as he attempted to 
‘dazzle’ his readers about the processes of the creative act through the language of vision 
as opposed to feeling. Thus, we may say that Bahr’s visual language betrayed 
Expressionism’s indebtedness to the world as visual representation, not just to the 
affectivity of the world as will.  
This concern with visual representation, and the dialectical play between classical 
modes of ‘outer seeing’ versus the Expressionist’s art of ‘inner seeing’, ran into conflict 
with an art-going public who were used to seeing things very differently.326 On this Bahr 
was confident that: 
Someone who has never become conscious of his own seeing is in any case 
inclined to think of the eye as a window into which the world looks. Add to that 
our being educated in classical art, an art always looking out sucking in the world. 
Impressionism is only the last word of classical art; it completes and fulfils it in its 
entirety by intensifying the outer seeing to the utmost and thereby excluding the 
inner seeing as much as possible.327 
 
Although Bahr derided ‘classical art’ as a conservative mode of ‘outer seeing’, one of 
mere corporeal perception, let us recall that for Schopenhauer perception is the primary 
source of all evidence.328 However, for him empirical perception does not have the last 
word on human experience, since even scientific explanations must stop at an unknown 
occult quality – which in turn seems to mirror the ‘spirit’ of C2. Scientific knowledge 
always leaves the inner nature of inorganic matter unexplained just as it does with that of 
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human beings.329 Consequently, it is through this inadequacy that art and philosophy take 
up their true calling and venture into those areas where science cannot go. Therefore, the 
task of philosophy, and we may argue art, is to explain the material world on metaphysical 
terms. 
 
1.6 Kandinsky, Science and Philosophy 
 
 
Whilst British and French empiricists have by definition displayed an antipathy 
towards a spiritualised metaphysic - and thus refuted the above calling - French 
phenomenologists have embraced it. In relation to Kandinsky’s art, French 
phenomenologists Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion perceive that he reconciles the 
metaphysical gap between the invisible and the visible. Contrary to hard-line empiricists, 
some phenomenologists hold that external life is illusory compared to that of interior life 
which is deemed to be more ‘real’. For them our true reality is invisible, and our 
subjectivity is the reality which constitutes the content of art – an art which seeks to 
express that abstract content. 330  
According to Crétien van Campen there is a common ground between the 
phenomenology of abstract art and psychology. He has remarked upon how a number of 
scholars have found strong parallels between early abstract art and the illustrations used 
by experimental Gestalt psychologists during the early 20th century.331 In addition, he has 
found common ground between Kandinsky’s attempts to extract aesthetic laws from visual 
experiments and Theodor Lipps’ Raumästhetik und geometrisch-optische Täuschungen 
(1897) (Space Aesthetics and Geometrical-Optical Illusions). As a result, Van Campen 
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argues that “Kandinsky and Lipps considered aesthetic experiences to be the product of 
‘visual balances’ that arise from energy fields in the human mind.”332 
Van Campen also surmises that Kandinsky’s philosophy was coterminous with the 
emergent Gestalt theories of Max Wertheimer, going so far as to suggest that from around 
1911-12 onwards Kandinsky could be viewed as a pioneer of Gestalt methods for 
understanding perception.333 Van Campen is not alone, since Nicoletta Misler also argues 
that for Kandinsky, psychology was the foremost science involved concurrently with the 
“science of the soul (or of the spirit - cf. the Russian dusha/dukh) and with the science of 
perception, a conviction that guided his study of how the work of art influenced human 
perception.”334  
We also know that Kandinsky read Wilhelm Wundt’s psycho-physiology. This 
was a matter of importance at the time and discussed by Russian psychologist Georgy 
Ivanovich Chelpanov.335 Furthermore, Misler argues that Kandinsky’s fascination with 
psychology might be the reason why he founded one of the most significant and early 
divisions within the RAKhN - the Physico-Psychological Department in 1921.336 Indeed, 
Misler adds that for a time Kandinsky pondered the biological sciences as a model for 
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aesthetic creativity. This was reinforced in 1921 by Nikolai Uspensky’s lecture on the 
‘Role of the Positive Sciences in the Study of the General Paths of Artistic Creativity’.337  
Whether or not we agree with such psychological attributions to Kandinsky, the 
model for aesthetic creativity behind the Compositions series was his internal response to 
external events. This method contained perceptions which resulted from Kandinsky’s 
internal world and impressions which he gathered from the external world of appearances. 
Since the internal factor was one of metaphysical ‘vibrations’ he hoped that this would 
literally strike a chord within the spectator of his works, rather than any manifest intuitive 
representation per se.  338  
In order to attain this, as already noted, Kandinsky repudiated ornamental art 
which may have been inspired by Alois Riegl’s principle of Kunstwollen.339 In what may 
be construed as a validation of C2, Kandinsky reframed this principle into one of ‘inner 
necessity’ which impelled the production of an artwork without concern for external 
appearances, concerning itself instead with inner meaning and concepts.340 As his 
generation moved into the 20th century, Kandinsky sensed that the previous century was 
one which had become more and more remote from this type of inner meaning. He 
concluded that the fin de siècle was to be one of the major turning points in spiritual 
history, where the irreconcilable was to be reconciled. He felt that the dialectical poles of 
analysis and synthesis, when reconciled would lead to what he called ‘the Great 
Synthesis’. It was in this way that the new art of the twentieth century would come into 
existence. He believed that ‘the Great Synthesis’ of the fin de siècle was born from inner 
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necessity and the beginning of the ‘Great Spiritual’.341 As a result, he felt that it was the 
19th century’s emphasis on material appearances which caused the deterioration of 
mankind’s inner creative powers - and those powers’ near disappearance.342 
Kandinsky was probably motivated to think this way through the developments of 
material science. Although art and science have engaged spirituality with their own 
tensions and antagonisms, caution is needed if we attempt to confer the same tensions 
upon his experimental art. This view may be supported by David W. Galenson, who 
observes that “the empirical and visual source of Kandinsky’s belief in the validity of 
abstract art points to his experimental nature as an artist.”343  
 
1.7 Kandinsky and Schopenhauer on Children’s Visual Development 
 
 
Despite Kandinsky basing much of his later art on the premises of abstract 
experimentation, he did not lose sight of the empirical altogether. Intuitive perception was 
still of interest to him, as we can see from his ‘glosses’ in Schopenhauer’s essay On Vision 
and Colours. In chapter 2, simply called ‘On Vision’, Kandinsky has paid attention to the 
nature of intuitive perception in relation to the development of children’s visual faculties. 
Here Schopenhauer explains that the faculty of vision can register delicate and diverse 
external impressions but on its own can only produce sensations. These initially become 
intuitive perceptions through the operation of the understanding. Thus, if an individual 
were to stand before a beautiful landscape and they were for an instant deprived of the 
faculty of understanding, “then nothing of that vista would remain but the sensation of a 
manifold stimulation of his retina similar to the many color blobs on the palette of a painter 
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- which is, so to speak, the raw material from which, just a moment ago, his understanding 
created that intuitive perception.”344  
Kandinsky has then marked a section of Schopenhauer’s text which runs as 
follows: “During the first weeks of its life, a child can use all its senses, but it does not 
perceive intuitively; it does not understand, therefore it stares curiously at the world.”345 
In addition, Kandinsky has read Schopenhauer’s work on perception, which describes how 
every object impacts upon the sensory organs differently. The effects of this impact can 
always be traced back to an object as its cause: 
Therefore, a child learning intuitive perception compares the different kinds of 
impressions it receives from the same object. It touches what it sees, it examines 
what it touches, follows the sound to the source from which it originates, brings to 
its aid smell and taste, and finally takes distance and illumination into account for 
the eye.346 
 
This is significant because we can relate Kandinsky’s reading of Schopenhauer to his 
thoughts on children’s art.347 Firstly, let us compare Schopenhauer’s statement above with 
Kandinsky’s statement below and note the similarities:  
A child, for whom every object is new, experiences the world in this way: it sees 
light, is attracted by it, wants to grasp it, burns its finger in the process, and thus 
learns fear and respect for the flame. And then it learns that light has not only an 
unfriendly, but also a friendly side: banishing darkness and prolonging the day, 
warming and cooking, delighting the eye.348 
 
There are remarkable similarities between the texts, especially those concerning a child’s 
approach to objects, their acquisition of perception, and their experimental attitude. 
Through the language of form and colour the intuitive perceptions of children took on a 
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behaviours act as an affirmation of the will.  
348 ‘On the Spiritual in Art and Painting.’ in:  p.157. 
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metaphysical importance for Kandinsky, who believed that an artist’s internal necessity 
possessed three ‘mystical sources’ or ‘three mystical necessities’. The second of these 
‘necessities’ was that every artist, as a child of their time, had to express what is peculiar 
to their own time in terms of style and inner value.349 As a consequence, his belief was 
that children’s drawing in particular had a salutary effect upon unbiased spectators.350  
Of the child’s intuitive perception he was convinced that “the practical-purposive 
element is foreign to the child, since it regards every object with unaccustomed eyes and 
still possesses an undimmed capacity for taking in the object itself.”351 The ‘practical-
purposive’ is made familiar to the child through trial and error so that through “every 
child’s drawing without exception is revealed the inner sound of the object itself.”352 
Adults, usually teachers, attempt to compel the child towards the ‘practical-purposive’, 
and through this unenlightened viewpoint they undermine a child’s drawing.353 Instead of 
this, Kandinsky wished to emphasise the positive aspect of children’s art in terms of their 
compositional characteristics.354 Therefore, a vast unconscious potential in children’s art 
exists which can express itself over and above an adult’s art.355  
Since the artist resembles the child he can manifest the ‘inner sound’ of things as 
perhaps in Schoenberg’s Self-Portrait of 1911 (fig. 21).356 For Kandinsky, paintings such 
as this arose from that which he termed the ‘great realism’, in art attainable by depicting 
the shell of an object with completeness and directness, thereby separating the object from 
any practical meanings in order to reveal its ‘inner sounds’. In line with this, Kandinsky 
                                                                
349 ‘On the Spiritual in Art and Painting ‘ in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art., 
p.173. 
350 Wassily Kandinsky,’ On the Question of Form’ in: Kandinsky, W., Marc, F., and Lankheit, K., The Documents of 
20th Century Art: The 'Blaue Reiter' Almanac, New documentary ed. (London: Thames and Hudson, 1974). p.174. 
351 Vasily Kandinsky, ‘The Blaue Reiter Almanac [Der Blaue Reiter] (Munich), 1912,’ in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and 
Vergo, Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art. p.250. 
352 Ibid., p.251. 
353 Ibid., p.251. 
354 Kandinsky, Marc, and Lankheit.p.175. 
355 Ibid., p.176. 
356 Ibid., p.176. 
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opted for what he called the ‘great realism’, as experienced in children’s drawings. He 
believed that both ‘the great abstraction’ and ‘the great realism’ have always been present 
in art and characterised by a continuous balancing act. This balancing act aimed at 
achieving an ideal through a complete equilibrium.357 During his day, it appeared as if the 
ideal no longer mattered, thus creating an imbalance between the two poles of abstraction 
and realism. As a result, he argued that “art has apparently put an end to the welcome 
complementation of the abstract by means of the objective and vice versa.”358 The ‘great 
realism’ he also thought, had scarcely manifested itself as the impetus to objectify the 
content of a picture through a simple ‘inartistic’ depiction of objects.359  
While the ‘great realism’ should be simple, child-like and direct, by contrast the 
‘great abstraction’ consists of “the apparent wish to exclude completely the objective 
(real) element and to embody the content of the work of art in ‘non-material’ forms.”360 
This reduces the life of the object within a picture to a bare minimum, so as to reveal the 
‘inner sound’ of the picture in question.361 Therefore, while realism intensifies the ‘inner 
sound’ of the picture by excluding the abstract, abstraction by antithesis intensifies the 
‘inner sound’ by exclusion of the real. 
The above sounds like a game of aesthetic dialectics and Berry has pointed to the 
‘games’ which Kandinsky played with spectators in terms of representation. This may be 
seen in horse rider images such as Lyrical of 1911 (fig. 22) which is partially influenced 
by children’s drawings where detail is denuded in favour of the essential. Subsequently, 
“for a while, Kandinsky indulged in a kind of game with the spectator, where, by a kind 
of ‘fuzzy logic’, actual objects are suggested by a more or less vague process of 
                                                                
357 Vasily Kandinsky. ‘On the Question of Form’, The Blaue Reiter Almanac[Der Blaue Reiter] (Munich), 1912, in: 
Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art. p.242. 
358 Ibid., p.242. 
359 Ibid., p.243. 
360 Ibid., p.244. 
361 Ibid., p.244. 
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representation.”362 However, Kandinsky’s logic, when referring to notions of ‘realism’, 
was not meant in the sense of social realism, or fidelity to intuitive representation, rather 
what was intended was the depiction of a subject with naïve distinctness. In the Almanac, 
children’s drawings were published as “…realists because they represent the object 
without regard for practical necessities, art, and other extraneous considerations.”363  
Kandinsky’s recognition of the innate spontaneity of children’s art is evident 
during the years of 1908-09, particularly under the influence of fellow Russian artists. As 
Vergo comments, “…in Kandinsky’s ‘fairy-tale’ paintings, the affinity with the children’s 
book illustrations of his compatriot Ivan Bilibin (who, like Kandinsky, studied in Munich) 
is unmistakable - for example, in a work such as Buntes Leben …remarkable because of 
its comparatively late date (1907).”364 Buntes Leben, otherwise known as Motley Life (fig. 
23), is a tempera and gouache on canvas, which was exhibited at the Salon d’Automne in 
Paris 1907 and at Angers in the same year. In what is a very dark setting, a throng of 
people, clearly identifiable as people not as abstractions, are set against the Kremlin which 
rests on a hill. The building is painted in lighter tones as if to contrast a more enlightened 
viewpoint in comparison to the earthly gathering below it. These images, Vergo feels, 
therefore provide us with insights into the abstract works of 1910-16 “in which the artist 
disguises, principally by his use of colour, certain of the motifs from his earlier paintings 
(churches with onion domes, crinolined figures, walled city on hill, etc.).”365 
Kandinsky’s respect for the perceptual capacities of children also resonates with 
another passage he has marked in his copy of Schopenhauer’s work. This passage relates 
                                                                
362 Berry, "The Paradox of Kandinsky's Abstract Representation." p.101. 
363 Olin. p.156. Kandinsky praised Henri Rousseau’s images as the champions of naïve ‘realism’ since they mirrored 
the clarity and spontaneity of children’s art. 
364 Vergo, P., "Kandinsky - Munich, Haus der Kunst," in: The Burlington Magazine  Vol. 119, no. 887 (1977). p.141. 
Bilibin was an illustrator and set designer involved with Mir Iskusstva. He studied with Anton Ažbe, as did Kandinsky, 
from 1898, and with Ilya Repin in St. Petersburg. 
365 Ibid.,p.141. 
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to the philosopher’s theory of empirical observation which describes how things can go 
wrong when sensory data is received by the brain. About this Schopenhauer asserts that: 
Long after intuitive perception has been mastered, a very remarkable situation can 
occur which furnishes, as it were, proof of all that has been said. Even after we 
have practiced the processing and arranging of sense data in accordance with the 
laws of understanding learned in childhood for many years, these data can be 
disarranged through a change in the position of our sense organs.366 
 
There are two cases when this occurs, as in looking cross-eyed or when we cross the 
middle and index fingers. In these cases, we see and feel one object as double. As a result, 
the understanding (the brain) behaves appropriately enough yet acquires nothing but false 
information. Consequently, “the rays of light traveling from the same point to the eye no 
longer impinge on both retinas at mutually corresponding spots, and the outer sides of 
both fingers touch the opposite surfaces of the same ball, which could never be with the 
natural position of the fingers.”367  Therefore, what we experience is double vision and 
double touch as an illusory appearance which cannot be taken away because the brain 
assumes the normal position of the sensory organs. 
Schopenhauer’s argument concerning touch and vision is not unique. Nor should 
it be assumed that Schopenhauer’s argument had a unique influence upon Kandinsky’s 
‘childlike’ development of abstract art as with Improvisation No. 30 (Canons) of 1913 
(fig. 24), and Improvisation No. 19 of 1911 (fig. 25). Indeed, Kandinsky was as much a 
child of his time as was Schopenhauer and as Olin points out, “True to the perceptual 
theory of his time, he does not try to argue that colors are things. To make reference to 
touch through line is to make reference to the real without necessarily making reference 
to any specific ‘real’ object.”368 This can be found in Improvisation No.19, an oil on 
canvas, which tends towards incorporeality and abstraction through a black outline. There 
                                                                
366 Schopenhauer, Runge, and Stahl.p.53. Cf. Schopenhauer, Arthur Schopenhauers Sämmtliche Werke 6, 6. p.28. 
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is a child-like vivacity to the luscious swathes of blue which contrast with the oranges and 
yellows of the figures on the left.369  
Although he demonstrated a tendency towards incorporeality and abstraction, the 
intuitive perception of objects was still of importance to Kandinsky. This notion may be 
supported by his response to a questionnaire set by the avant-garde review Gaceta de Arte. 
In it Kandinsky proposed that the move away from the object does not mean a flight from 
nature in general.370 This means that art need not depend upon nature since it is a 
constituent of nature. Thus, “it can dispense with the mediation of nature provided it can 
put itself directly in relation with nature’s totality. So-called abstract art is subject to the 
same laws.”371  
The more abstract the form of a painting became, the more purity he felt that it 
gained. Therefore, a picture’s corporeal component could be discarded in favour of pure 
abstract forms, or corporeal forms could be distilled into abstractions.372 Yet, ever prudent, 
Kandinsky erred on the side of caution, and argued that the label ‘abstract’ was harmful, 
and misleading if taken too literally.373 Indeed, he would remark upon how Parisian 
abstract painters and sculptors had attempted to create an alternative concept to that of 
‘abstract’, as in ‘art-nonfiguratif’, an equivalent to the German term ‘gegenstandslose 
Kunst’. However, he felt convinced that the negative parts of such words, as in non and 
los, were regrettable since they negated the sense of an ‘object’ and therefore “put nothing 
                                                                
369 It was not exhibited until the 1950s. 
370 Wassily Kandinsky ’ Reply to Gaceta de Arte Gaceta de Arte, Revista internacional de cultura (Tenerife), 1936 in: 
Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art. 
Iibid., p.791. 




373 Reflections on Abstract Art ["Reflexions sur l'art abstrait"] Cahiers d'Art (Paris), 1, nos. 7-8 ( 1931) in: ibid., p.757. 
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else in its place.”374 And so it was, at the time of writing, he arrived at the following 
conclusion:  
For a long time now, people have been trying (as I, too, did before the war) to 
replace ‘abstract’ with ‘absolute’. In fact, scarcely an improvement. In my view, 
the best name would be ‘real art’, because this kind of art puts a new artistic world, 
spiritual in nature, alongside the external world. A world that can be brought about 
only through art. A real world. The old term ‘abstract art’ has, however, by now 
become firmly entrenched.375 
 
Conclusion 
Having stated the above let us conclude our discussion concerning the ‘sacrosanct 
phenomena’ of Kandinsky’s art. Let us argue that if we are to interpret Kandinsky’s 
abstract art according to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, then it is impossible to understand 
the real inner nature of things as Kandinsky had hoped to do by staying on the path of 
representational knowledge.376 Schopenhauer argues that this is so because such 
“knowledge always comes to things from without, and must therefore remain eternally 
outside them.”377 If this is the case, then our exploration of C1 entails that we must ask a 
key question. That question being what is the world of perception besides being 
representation - whether abstract or otherwise? This we cannot discern through mere 
abstractions – something more concrete than these must anchor our investigations. 
Let us therefore anchor our investigations on Schopenhauer’s terms by asking once 
more,  “is that of which I am conscious only as representation just the same as my own 
body, of which I am doubly conscious, on the one hand as representation, on the other as 
will?”378 Since we are following Schopenhauer’s thinking, and exploring C1 and C2 in 
detail, we, like Schopenhauer, “want to know the significance of those representations; 
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we ask whether this world is nothing more than representation.”379 In order to explore 
this we need to investigate the other side of the world - which is that of the will. If 
we follow Schopenhauer, then the approach which Kandinsky took may be regarded 
as inappropriate for approaching claims such as C2. Indeed, we may say that, 
Kandinsky’s theory and practice as an artist undermines C1, due to its predominant 
focus upon representations, no matter how otherworldly his intentions were. This 
view is supported by the fact that the critical language and impetus of the age as 
we have noted, although articulating a need to express more emotion, paradoxically 
referred more often to that which critics and artists wanted less of, which was the 
world as intuitive representation. Therefore, this critical irony demands that C1 
cannot be vindicated in full. 
In spite of this, Schopenhauer’s line of questioning sometimes parallels 
Kandinsky’s metaphysical enquires. Kandinsky too wanted to know if there was 
something more to human experience than phenomenal appearance and what that 
‘something more’ was. However, Schopenhauer makes it clear that this ‘something 
more’ must be entirely different from the world as representation, abstract or 
otherwise, and from the principle of sufficient reason. This means that Kandinsky, 
and like-minded Expressionist artists, could not reach this ‘something more’ through the 
forms of the principle of sufficient reason or abstract representation.  
This ‘something more’ has to be foreign to the world and its laws of representation. 
It cannot be found by any external route because this route only delivers ‘images and 
names’, nor can it be found on the route of abstractions since they are open to innumerable 
deceptions. As a result, Schopenhauer can state that, “we are like a man who goes round 
a castle, looking in vain for an entrance, and sometimes sketching the facades. Yet, this 
                                                                
379 Ibid., p.98. 
- 117 - 
 
is the path that all philosophers before me have followed.”380 Consequently, we need to 
find that knowledge which takes us on the path to the inner nature of the world, to find 
what Schopenhauer called the will and the thing-in-itself which differs entirely from 
representation.381  
Schopenhauer uses an apt analogy to describe his theory of the ‘thing-in-itself’ and 
how it differs from the world as representation as follows: 
Just as a magic lantern shows many different pictures, but it is only one and the 
same flame that makes them all visible, so in all the many different phenomena 
which together fill the world or supplant one another as successive events, it is 
only the one will that appears, and everything is its visibility, its objectivity; it 
remains unmoved in the midst of this change. It alone is the thing-in-itself; every 
object is phenomenon, to speak Kant’s language, or appearance.382  
 
Whilst being himself rooted in the world of appearance, we should also conclude that 
Kandinsky was an artist who expressed a spiritualised vision of the world as 
representation. Yet, the knowledge he had was still “given entirely through the medium 
of a body, and the affections of this body are, as we have shown, the starting-point for the 
understanding in its perception of this world.”383 Indeed, as the next chapter explains, the 
body is tangible willing, objectivity of will, an object like other objects, and manifests 
itself through the principle of sufficient reason in “the knowing consciousness.”384  
Thus, the ‘medium of the body’, as depicted in Expressionist art, must lead us 
into the world as will in the next chapter. “Therefore, what becomes known, what 
becomes representation, is the will; and this representation is what we call the body.”385 
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In relation to Expressionist art, the previous chapter examined features of the world 
as representation according to its general form through facets of Schopenhauer’s ‘First 
Book: The World as Representation First Aspect’. Among other matters, the previous 
chapter showed that abstract representations, as mere concepts, have meaning and content 
only in relation to perception. Subsequently, in this chapter we shall examine 
Expressionist art, according to elements of Schopenhauer’s ‘Second Book: The World as 
Will First Aspect: The Objectification of the Will’. This is being done in order to test C1 
and C2 and to obtain a knowledge of the content of perception through a specific aspect 
of Expressionist art - the human body dancing. Consequently, this chapter counterbalances 
the previous one by suggesting that the human body is an objectification of the will - not 
just a representation. 
Our objective in this chapter is to get to know the embodied will intimately, as the 
most real of things, through the Expressionist body. We can achieve this by thinking about 
what goes on within our own bodies when it performs an action and then comparing this 
activity with another person’s body - whether a dancer or not - and come to understand 
something of another body’s inner nature through such a comparison. In addition, by 
comparing what goes on in our bodies to the material world as a whole, we can gain 
insights into the inner nature of that world. On this topic, Schopenhauer says that if we 
compare that which goes on within our own bodies when it performs activities born of 
motives, along with inner changes governed by external factors, then we can acquire an 
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insight into the manner by which inanimate bodies change through causal influences and 
therefore understand their inner nature.386  
Although this analogical inference might help us explore the validity of C1 and C2 
it is a vulnerable inference as we shall note later on in this chapter. However, if as 
Schopenhauer says, the medium of the body is a manifestation of the will, then let us 
question this assumption. In the first instance let us ask, how is the relationship between 
the body and the will to be interpreted through Expressionist depictions of dance?387 
Secondly, why should we trust Schopenhauer’s analogical argument which moves from 
the body to the will? Thirdly, how could it really be said that we come to know the 
meaning of our bodies as representation and that this means we ‘know’ the body as will?  
This chapter begins with the work of Emil Nolde and refers also to the work of 
Die Brücke artists Erich Heckel, Kirchner and Max Pechstein. Not only does this chapter 
show that Nolde had a strong interest in dance but that his imagery of dance perhaps 
‘speaks to us directly’ about that which lies behind the veil of appearances.388 However, 
before proceeding any further, let us define what is meant by the term will (Wille). David 
Cartwright provides a detailed definition as follows: 
… the world is ultimately the will, since Schopenhauer viewed the will as the 
essence of the world, the ultimate substrate, the agent in unconscious functions of 
organisms, the common stuff of all being, and as that which is known empirically 
or a posteriori. The will is, he said, a true ens realissimum, the most real being.389  
 
The world as representation mirrors the will, and the will is one, not in the sense of a 
concept or object being one, but as something whole and undifferentiated. The will is 
‘devoid of knowledge’ and strives aimlessly and blindly within every human being and 
                                                                
386 The World as Will and Representation., p.125. 
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every force of nature. When manifesting itself as phenomenon the will has ‘many grades’ 
from the most basic forces of nature such as gravity, to the highest in the form of human 
beings.390 Furthermore, the will is not subjugated by the principle of sufficient reason, 
since this applies only to the world as representation. Therefore, the will is not subordinate 
to any laws of necessity as are its phenomena and as a result is completely free.  
This form of freedom is called transcendental, which means that “the will has 
aseity ... an independence from anything else, and the will is as it expresses itself.”391 For 
theologians aseity means that: 
…in a straightforward sense, God is not dependent on anyone or anything 
for his existence. According to stronger interpretations of aseity, God is 
completely independent of everything else, including his properties. This 
view supports a doctrine of divine simplicity according to which God is 
not distinct from his properties.392  
  
By contrast, since Schopenhauer was an atheist, aseity meant for him an underived or 
independent existence where no deity was involved. It was his belief that humans do not 
possess aseity at any level, since they are not completely independent of an infinite series 
of causes and effects which brings them into being. He therefore applied the term aseity 
to the ontological status of the will alone. To this will Schopenhauer attributes 
responsibility for the trials and tribulations of the whole world. He says that the will is 
something so terrible that if redemption is to be obtained from our existence as humans, 
                                                                
390 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.149 and p.111. 
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then the will to live and the will to life must be denied.393 As we shall see, these two 
definitions are important since they help frame the rest of this chapter and much of the 
remaining thesis. However, it must be made clear that it is not the case that the artists 
whom we discuss in this chapter were necessarily influenced by Schopenhauer. That said, 
it must also be made clear that Schopenhauer’s philosophy does provide a ground for 
artistic analysis regardless of whether the artists in question were influenced by or 
acquainted with his philosophy or not. 
 
2.1 Nolde and the Embodied Will in Dance 
 
With the above assertions in mind, and as we begin to discuss the medium of the body in 
relation to the will, it must be noted that the starting point of philosophical perception for 
Schopenhauer “is the action or effect on animal bodies.”394 His formative insights into 
‘the action or effect on animal bodies’ may have developed during his time as a medical 
student at the University of Göttingen from 1809 where dancing was on the curriculum. 
In addition, his insight into bodily movement may have arisen later on in life through his 
girlfriend Caroline Richter (later Medon), who arrived in Berlin at the age of seventeen to 
work at the Berlin Opera as a dancer and chorus girl. 
Nolde also took an interest in dance from early in life. He recalled that, once every 
year an Italian hurdy-gurdy man visited his district who danced while turning a barrel-
organ which had a picture of a reclining lady on it, semi-naked, only half-covered by a 
blue robe. As children they stood in front of it, and the more the hurdy-gurdy man played, 
the more beautiful the picture became to him. From then on Nolde believed, “that’s what 
art should look like…!”395 Then, in 1888, while a student in Karlsruhe at the 
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Kunstgewerbeschule, Nolde was given dancing ‘lessons’ by his landlady’s daughter.396 
Several years later in July 1894, Nolde found himself teaching drawing at the Industrie 
und Gewerbemuseum in St Gallen, Switzerland. Once again, the motion of the body in 
dance captured his imagination, especially a dance in the Swiss Loetschen Valley he had 
attended during his holidays. He recalled that in the evening, young people danced to the 
melody of a mouth organ played by a young man, while the dairywomen wore no corsets, 
“so one’s hand held softly the full form of the dancer, and the lovely feel to the fingertips 
was unhindered. We danced merrily on, while our happiness increased.”397 
If one considers this comment from Schopenhauer’s perspective, then Nolde was 
ultimately experiencing the will to life manifesting itself through the dancing body. Yet, 
it is vital to note that E.F.J. Payne has perhaps mistranslated Schopenhauer’s German 
phrase Wille zum Leben to mean the ‘will to live’. As Christopher Janaway shows, the 
translation is misleading because it omits the reproductive drive to life through sexual 
behaviours, which is prominent in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. It is misleading, because 
it encourages an incorrect presupposition that Schopenhauer means “a conscious desire to 
live, whereas Wille zum Leben primarily operates to originate and shape the organism prior 
to any question of its having desires.”398 
At another level, Nietzsche too found Schopenhauer’s concept of the will 
misleading, arguing that the concept was: 
                                                                
396 Ibid., p.35. 
397 Ibid., p.57. 
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shall retain Payne’s interpretation of Wille zum Leben when appropriate, particulary in Chapter 4 of this thesis, since it 
conveys a sense of surivival. Yet, when appropriate I will also employ Janaway’s interpretation since I believe that the 
two defintions are two sides of the same coin). 
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…an unjustified generalization, that this will does not exist at all. That instead of 
grasping the idea of the development of one definite will into many forms, one has 
eliminated the character of the will by subtracting from it its content, its ‘whither?’ 
- this is in the highest degree the case with Schopenhauer: what he calls ‘will’ is a 
mere empty word.399 
 
Nietzsche expands on this objection by saying that “it is even less a question of a ‘will to 
live’; for life is merely a special case of the will to power; - it is quite arbitrary to assert 
that everything strives to enter into this form of the will to power.”400 
Although Nolde probably never read Nietzsche or Schopenhauer, he certainly 
possessed knowledge of the will to life through the dancing body since he took pleasure 
in dance as an expression of art and life.401 If we interpret this will to life on 
Schopenhauer’s terms, then we can infer that Nolde’s knowledge of dance ‘given entirely 
through the medium of a body’, was the starting-point for his perception of the world. 402 
Schopenhauer argues that this is so for each individual because, for each individual as the 
knowing subject, the body is a representation just like any other representation and an 
object among objects.403 Consequently, the body’s movements and actions are known to 
every individual in the same manner as the changes seen in other objects for perception. 
As a result, “they would be equally strange and incomprehensible to him, if their meaning 
were not unravelled for him in an entirely different way.”404 
                                                                
399 Nietzsche, F. W., Kaufmann, W. A., and Hollingdale, R. J., The Will to Power (New York: Random House, 1967). 
p.369. 
400 Ibid., p.369 
401 Nolde, Mein Leben. p.177. 
402 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.99. 
403 Atwell defines the concept ‘knowing subject’ as follows: “The world as representation has two components: the 
knowing subject and the known object. Being mutually implicatory, there is no object without a subject and no subject 
without an object, that is, no representation without a representer and no representer without a representation. 
Schopenhauer therefore denies that objects exist apart from being known (by the subject) and he denies that the subject 
exists apart from knowing (objects). He contends that normal perceptual objects have only a relative or conditioned 
existence, for they are relative to or conditioned by the knowing subject. They have, as objects, no existence absolutely 
or unconditionally, that is, in themselves. Normal perceptual objects are objects only relative to the knowing subject, 
and they are qualified in three ways - temporally, spatially, and causally in virtue of the knowing subject’s modes of 
knowing objects.” Atwell. p.11. See also in Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Representation Vol.1 p.28, 30-1, 99, 
103, 150, 162, 169, 257, 331, 462 and Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.2. p.4-5, 15, 177, 194-
5, 245, 275, 500. 
404 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.99. 
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If this were not so, then we would see our behaviours follow upon motives as if 
they were foreign objects under the sway of natural law. Schopenhauer argues that even 
though we could describe the manifestations of their body as forces, qualities, or character 
we would be none the wiser. Yet this is not so, he argues, because “the answer to the riddle 
is given to the subject of knowledge appearing as individual, and this answer is given in 
the word will.”405 As we shall see, in complete contrast to Kandinsky’s often abstract 
representations, it is only through the ‘concrete’ medium of the body that the Expressionist 
artist could find the key to his (or her) own phenomenon. Only through this medium could 
they discover the significance of their inner being, their actions, and movements.406  
When we interpret these matters according to Schopenhauer, then in theory Nolde 
had begun to explore the inner mechanism of his own being, his actions, his movements, 
and those movements of the dancers which he observed – which in a sense would support 
C2 since he may have been ‘tuning’ in to that which lies behind the world of appearance.407 
As early as 1908, he had already spent many nights sitting in the communal dance hall of 
Weissig near Dresden, painting and drawing assiduously, although in later times it was 
more the individual dance which he particularly enjoyed depicting. His first experience of 
this type of dance may have been with that of Australian-born Saharet, whom he 
remembered for “her wild and whirling turns” where “ her black tuft of hair worked loose 
as she became a fantastical primitive being.”408 He also remembered a trip to La Scala in 
Milan where “a horde of grotesque dancing girls whirled around wildly, dripping with 
                                                                
405 Ibid., p.100. 
406 Ibid., p.100. This is because the body is both will and representation simultaneously. Because of this, Schopenhauer 
infers that through the inner knowledge of that specific representation (the body), this is the only route we have into 
knowledge of the inner mechanism of the will which itself is the content and substratum of the world as representation.  
407 All human beings do this as an aspect of everyday self-consciousness. However, no claim is being made here that 
Nolde applied any rigorous philosophical analysis to the ‘inner mechanism’ of his bodily movements. 
408 Nolde, Mein Leben. p.177. Her birth name appears to have been either Clarissa Campbell or Clarice Campbell. 
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sweat,”409 and to Paris where he saw Loie Fuller give her shimmering serpentine dances, 
in green and silver, wearing a broadly pleated robe in phosphorescent colours.410  
Fuller was an American dancer and choreographer with no formal training. She 
first came to prominence in February 1892 when she performed her Serpentine Dance in 
New York. Shortly afterwards she left New York for Paris, where she became the house 
artiste at the Folies-Bergère. Here she became famous for highly innovative and 
expressive ‘trademark’ dances such as the Danse du feu, captured in the famous poster 
designs by Jules Chéret (fig. 26). These dances were characterised by the use of a long, 
diaphanous veil that she twirled around her head and body as she danced. Occasionally, 
her veils were dyed with phosphorescent salts so that they refracted the light as she danced, 
creating shimmering rainbow effects to give form to routines such as The Butterfly (1892), 
Clouds (1893), and Fire Dance (1895). 
The visual spectacle of Fuller’s dance routines attracted the attention of many 
French avant-garde artists and designers of the time such as Toulouse Lautrec, Émile 
Gallé, Raoul Francois Larche, and Francois Rupert Carabin. At the same time her routines 
captivated German artists such as Bernhardt Hoetger and Karl Theodor Eichler. In early 
1910, perhaps under the inspiration of Fuller’s dances, Nolde made five small woodcuts 
for a catalogue of his graphic works, among which he probably depicted Fuller as the 
dancer, as in the images Fire Dancer of 1910 (fig. 27) and a Dancing Girl with Wafting 
Cap-Sleeves. 
When we interpret Nolde’s dancing bodies through Schopenhauer’s philosophy, 
then the artist and dancer are creating an identity between the will and the world as 
representation, through the embodied movements of the dancer – a topic which shall 
                                                                
409 Reuther et al. p.102. 
410 Ibid., p.107. 
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preoccupy us when we discuss the case of Sakharov later in this chapter. For 
Schopenhauer this identity entails that, “to the subject of knowing, who appears as an 
individual only through his identity with the body, this body is given in two entirely 
different ways.”411 Firstly, it is given as representation for perception like any other object 
under the laws of the principle of sufficient reason. Secondly, it is given as immediate 
knowledge ‘and is denoted by the word will.’ Therefore, “every true act of his will is also 
at once and inevitably a movement of his body; he cannot actually will the act without at 
the same time being aware that it appears as a movement of the body.”412 As a result, acts 
of will and acts of the body are identical but are not linked by processes of cause and 
effect.  
Since acts of will and acts of the body are identical, we can read out of Nolde’s 
dancing bodies the possibility that the actions of the body denote the act of the will 
objectified.413 If the ‘action of the body’ in dance is the objectification of the will as 
depicted by artists, then: 
…we shall see that this applies to every movement of the body, not merely to 
movement following on motives, but also to involuntary movement following on 
mere stimuli; indeed, that the whole body is nothing but the objectified will, i.e., 
will that has become representation.414 
 
Therefore, Nolde not only observed and depicted dancers in his art, but he would by 
necessity have become aware of his own bodily movements during the creative act. 
Indeed, Nolde described his creative interaction with dancers to his friend Hans Fehr in 
the following way. He said that “I draw the movement in such a way that I capture a 
                                                                
411 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.100. 
412 Ibid., p.100. 
413 Ibid., p.100. 
414 Ibid., p.100. 
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moment and then don't look again at the object. If I look again, it has long since taken up 
a different attitude.”415  
When we interpret this practice through Schopenhauer, Nolde was capturing the 
dancer’s bodily movements as objectified willing. If this is the case, then the objectified 
will in bodily movement can be considered as both voluntary and involuntary. On this 
John Atwell proposes that: 
When the body moves by way of a physical cause or stimulus, it moves in a passive 
sense: It is moved (by something else), and its movement is said to be involuntary 
(unwillkürlich). But when the body moves by way of a motive, it moves in the 
active sense: It moves, and its movement is then said to be voluntary 
(willkürlich).416 
 
During the historical period we are exploring, voluntary and involuntary bodily 
movements were implicated in Germany’s Willenskultur (literally a ‘culture of the will’). 
In the early 20th century, there was a growing concern that modernity and modernisation 
were causing a loss of personal will-power (abulia) through the effects of urbanisation 
and industrialisation. These concerns were mirrored by contemporary physicians who 
believed that the everyday folk of modern Germany were becoming suggestible and weak 
through an overstimulated nervous system. Therefore, a strong will (ein starker Wille) 
became such an imperative for the modern German that Martin Fassbender, in his essay 
Wollen, eine königliche Kunst (Willing, a Kingly Art) would write that “the goal of will 
cultivation (Willensbildung) is, through conscious and thorough discipline and regulation 
of all external actions and inner sensations, to provide a counterweight to the involuntary 
influences exerted by the environment and the body upon the mind.”  417  
                                                                
415 Reuther et al. p.105. 
416 Atwell. p.93. 
417 Martin Fassbender, Wollen, eine konigliche Kunst: Alte und neue Anschauungen uber Ziele und Methoden der 
Willensbildung. Berlin: Walther, 1911, p.190. Quoted in: Cowan, M. J., Cult of the Will: Nervousness and German 
Modernity (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008). p.86. 
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Nolde’s watercolour Girl Dancing (fig. 28) of 1910, may illustrate this relationship 
between Willensbildung, the body and art. In this watercolour the body of the dancer is 
clearly captured in motion with strong contour lines registering the dynamic interplay 
between the dancer’s clothing and her moving limbs. Her movement is decisively 
voluntary and as such reflects the embodied will in action. Her bodily movements were 
also caused by whatever personal motives she had to dance in this particular way. 
However, we must note that Schopenhauer deliberately opposes the orthodox notion that 
volitions (acts of will) cause bodily movements.418 Furthermore, as Atwell reminds us, 
only in thought are willing and acting dissimilar, since in point of fact they are identical.419 
Therefore, according to Schopenhauer’s philosophy we can infer that there is no bodily 
relationship between Nolde’s decision to paint, or a dancer to dance, as in one of cause 
and effect, since willing and acting should be regarded as one thing.  
In Schopenhauer’s opinion, the unity of willing and acting means that “… the will 
is knowledge a priori of the body, and that the body is knowledge a posteriori of the 
will.”420 Both Nolde and Ada acquired some of this knowledge through attending masked 
balls. He personally retained a fond memory of a masked ball they went to in Karlsruhe 
just before his marriage. He recalled that for Ada, a costume was quickly improvised, and 
an individual masked as a police dog became her enthusiastic courtier and dancer. 
Thereafter, the masked ball became a small episode in his art.421 Yet, whilst Nolde felt 
that masked balls and dances originated out of an archaic need he also felt that they had 
degenerated into urbanised versions full of social hypocrisy. 
                                                                
418 Atwell. p.87. 
419 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.100-101. 
420 Ibid., p.100. 
421 Nolde, Mein Leben. p.165.  
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During 1910-11, his sensitivity to that social hypocrisy was reinforced after 
experiencing Berlin’s night life. Despite his cynicism, the German dance scene and its 
seedy night life did offer itself up as an urban ‘dispensary’ for his creative imagination. 
An example of this occurred in mid-November 1911 when French dancer Adorée Villany 
appeared on the dance scene giving a number of performances at Munich’s Comic 
Theatre. Her routine involved dancing scantily clad or completely naked. On 18 
November she was arrested by the police and charged under Paragraph 183 of the German 
Criminal Code which could impose a two year prison sentence for being a public nuisance 
through indecent behaviour.422 As Andrew Dickinson points out, both she and her 
manager were subsequently charged under Paragraph 33 of the Industrial Code for 
proffering, without police approval, a public dance performance that had no redeeming 
aesthetic value.423 Similar accusations were aimed at the dancer Mata Hari (Margarete van 
Zelle) when “…the public seemed to regard her style of dancing, with its emphasis on 
‘exotic’, Oriental effects, as the product of a courtesan personality whose chief objective 
was to bewitch wealthy, influential male spectators.”424 
Given such risqué dancing on the German dance scene, Karl Toeffer has argued 
that at the time there was a tense relationship between innocence and modernity - one 
filled with complexity and ambiguity. He finds that the context for this was: 
…German tendencies to link innocence with conditions of maturity and evolution 
rather than to a ‘lost’, childlike state of perception. This ambition to present 
modernity as a condition of innocence depended on the situating of the body within 
elaborate philosophical frameworks, a persuasive metaphysical rhetoric.425 
 
                                                                
422 Dickinson, E. R., "Must we dance naked?: Art, Beauty, and Law in Munich and Paris, 1911-1913," in: Journal of 
the History of Sexuality  Vol. 20, no. 1 (2011). p.95-6. 
423 Ibid., p.96. 
424 Toepfer. p.25. 
425 Ibid., p.4. 
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Arguably ‘a persuasive metaphysical rhetoric’ surrounds Nolde’s The Dance Round the 
Golden Calf of 1910 (fig. 29), in which the impulses of an archaic reality are endowed 
with a living sensuality through rapid brushwork.426 Here colour and form are no longer 
limited to a purely obedient description of the artist’s representation, but rather each 
(arguably) manifests the inner will to life of both artist and dancer. Arguably, this image 
is overtly wilful due to the latter’s lax handling of paint. Indeed, Andrew Graham Dixon 
argues that “at his sloppiest and most calculatingly ‘primitive’, for example in the pictures 
he painted of African masks in Berlin’s ethnographic museum in 1911, Nolde can be quite 
spectacularly dreadful.”427 
Nolde’s ‘calculatingly ‘primitive’ interest in dance meant that he and Ada in 1911 
would visit Émile Jaques-Dalcroze’s Educational Institute for Music and Rhythm 
(Bildungsanstalt für Musik und Rhythmus) in Hellerau near Dresden several times.428 
Whilst in Hellarau he and Ada saw Expressionist dancer Mary Wigman as an upcoming 
dancer. They followed her until she became the great creative force of ‘New Dance’ 
(Neuer Tanz), which repudiated classical ballet and dancing en pointe. Wigman’s 
friendship towards the Nolde’s was maintained in the following decade despite their 
infrequent meetings, with Nolde commenting that the friendship: 
…was increased when she danced on the stage and I in excitement drew her with 
my colours. Her gifted pupil, the little Palucca, struck the gong and I painted her 
like that, until later she also performed her jumps while dancing, almost released 
from gravity. The dancers gave inspiration to my pictures, and in return they 
probably gave inspiration to the dancers.429  
 
                                                                
426 Donald E. Gordon has interpreted this painting as typifying “Nietzschean ambivalence in meaning, a typically 
Expressionist contradiction in content.” See this cited, and more on the topic of Nietzschean ambivalence and 
contradiction, in: Gordon, D, “Content by Contradiction,” Art in America (December, 1982), Mather, F. J., Sherman, 
F. F., and Publishing, E., "Art in America," (Westport, Conn: F.F. Sherman, 1939). p.81. 
427 Dixon, A. G., "Degenerate and Proud," The Independent, 19/12/1995. The concept of the ‘primitive’ will be explored 
in relation to Kirchner’s art in the following chapter of this thesis. 
428 Jacques Dalcroze is remembered as a teacher and theoretician of Eurhythmics, a system of rhythmical body 
movements expressing the same time values as the accompanying music. His work came to broader attention following 
the publication of Der Rhythmus: Ein Jahrbuch in Jena in 1911. At around this time many avant-garde artists and 
dancers became interested in his methods and during 1913. Nijinsky studied with him in preparation for designing the 
choreography for Diaghilev’s production of the ballet Sacre du printemps. 
429 Nolde, Mein Leben. p.208. 
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As Michael Cowan suggests, Jaques-Dalcroze’s experimentation with rhythmic 
calisthenics and the ‘Méthode Jaques-Dalcroze’ was “intended not to train musicians or 
dancers but rather to educate the will through dance.”430 Arguing from the perspective of 
Willenskultur, and in a comment which validates C1, Cowan believes that Jaques-
Dalcroze’s dance ‘pieces’ were supposed “…to act as tableaux vivants, spurring visitors 
to overcome their passive, intellectual relation to the spectacle before them and experience 
the will building power of performative rituals in their own bodies.”431 
Cowan is careful though and argues that it would be wrong to suggest that every 
aspect of Germany’s dance reformation was inspired by the need to ‘re-educate the will’. 
As an example, he cites the later Weimar dance schools under the influence of philosopher 
Ludwig Klages, who attempted to “revitalize the vital forces of the body against the 
hegemony of what they saw as an all too rationalist power of will and spirit (Geist).”432 
Cowan also argues that the re-imagination of the will through dance involved a paradox. 
That paradox arose through the “…project of using bodily performance to solidify the rein 
of spirit - what the expressionist poet and dance critic Ernst Blass would aptly describe as 
an effort to ‘surpass the body with the body’ (mit dem Leib den Leib überschreiten ).”433 
There is evidence to suggest that Nolde inspired Wigman to ‘surpass the body with 
the body’ and to seek out Rudolf von Laban the eminent dance teacher of the period. 
Concerning this Wigman recollected that: 
… we had a visit from the painter Emil Nolde and his wife, in front of whom I had 
occasionally improvised, and one day Nolde, who was otherwise a very taciturn 
man, suddenly said: ‘You know, I met a man in Munich who moves exactly like 
you. His name is Rudolf von Laban’. I became a pupil of Laban's and worked with 
him for seven years both as a pupil and as his assistant.434 
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432 Ibid., p.173. 
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Often Laban’s philosophy is reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s own, especially since he was 
convinced that “the motions of bodies and sounds seen and heard on the stage stir 
the imagination, and awaken the will to look with open eyes into that vaguely 
discernible world, the world of human values.”435 From Laban’s perspective both 
dancing and painting were permeated by movement as all creative endeavours are. 
As a result, it was his belief that rather than relying exclusively upon conscious 
rationalisations, “the actor or dancer, using movement as a means of expression, 
will rely more on the feel of the movement than on a conscious analysis of it.”436 
During the long winter months of 1910-11, Nolde continued to use ‘movement as 
a means of expression’ by immersing himself in Berlin’s dance halls, cabarets and 
theatres. By sitting on the front row of Max Reinhardt’s Deutsches Theater (fig. 30) he 
found inspiration for such expression, producing hundreds of drawings and watercolours. 
He recalled that often in the near darkness of the theatre he was constantly drawing the 
performers on the stage, “their movements, their passion, their colours.”437  
He expressed movement and passion in Dancing Girl (Light Blue) of 1911 (fig. 
31), where the purity of the means expressed by the light blue suggests an ethereal 
connection to reality. The dancer wears a trance-like expression implying an abandonment 
to the dictates of the will which in turn illustrates how the body can be agitated through 
excessive movements of the will. Thus, we might note how Schopenhauer states that: 
The identity of the body and the will further shows itself, among other things, in 
the fact that every vehement and excessive movement of the will, in other words, 
every emotion, agitates the body and its inner workings directly and immediately, 
and disturbs the course of its vital functions.438 
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437 Nolde, Mein Leben. p.222. 
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- 133 - 
 
Not only can the motion of dance agitate ‘the body and its inner workings’ but the creative 
act of painting can do so too. In an agitated state is not unusual for painters to rework, 
crop, paint over or even destroy some of their canvases - and Nolde was no exception here. 
In fact, through the vehement urges of his will, Dance II of 1911(fig. 32), has suffered 
from severe cropping. Such a literal destruction necessitates movements of the body and 
resolutions of the will to be carried out through time in a performed deed. Indeed, Nolde 
recognised these vehement urges towards his pictures, and in a statement which upholds 
C1, confessed that, “I had a dangerous, rash urge to destroy them … I cut up a large dance 
picture, they danced no longer....”439  
Although aggression is not commonly associated with Expressionism, discussion 
of it does appear in the literature as with Ludwig Meidner’s 1914 article, ‘An Introduction 
to Painting the Metropolis’ written for Kunst und Künstler. On the theme of applied 
aggression in painting he instructs aspiring artists as follows: “In the focal point area use 
a small brush and paint short, violent lines. They must all hit the mark!”440 A similar spirit 
of aggression can also be found in Hermann Bahr’s 1916 essay Expressionismus, where 
he argued that, in the new generation of Expressionists, “the spirit vehemently proclaims 
itself again” [in der heraufkommenden Jugend mit Heftigkeit der Geist wieder meldet].441 
He also remarked that what “Expressionism gives us is the symbol of the unknown in us, 
in which we trust to save us, the symbol of the imprisoned spirit which wants to break out 
of its dungeon [aus dem Kerker brechen], the symbol of alarm of all frightened souls.442 
In addition, Wayne Andersen contributes to those who believe that the spirit of 
                                                                
439 Nolde, Mein Leben. p.208. Nolde also said that: “Being an artist is a compulsive struggle with God and Nature, it is 
a battle in desire and passion with matter, with people and with one’s self, to make sure that one doesn’t lose oneself or 
be burnt alive, for it seethes deeply inside one [tiefst in ihm brodelt es] like the heat at the centre of our Earth."ibid.,p.100. 
440 Meidner, Ludwig, ‘Anleitung zum Malen von Grosstadtbildern’, from ‘Das Neue Programm’, Kunst und Künstler 
12, no. 5 (1914): 312-14; English translation by Victor H. Meisel in:  Miesel, V. H., Voices of German Expressionism 
(Prentice-Hall, 1970)., p.113.   
441 Bahr, H., Expressionismus (München: Delphin-Verlag, 1920)..p.93. 
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Expressionism vehemently announced itself in claiming that “Expressionism swarms with 
aggressive and often erotic emotion…”443 and that Die Brücke “drew upon elemental 
passions of fear, love, and hatred, with color, line, and shapes exploited for aggressive 
expressiveness.”444 This he contrasts with Impressionist tendencies which lacked a 
vehement will for “passionate love, fear, and hatred”445 preferring instead  to depict the 
pleasures of the leisured classes. 
 
Whether in its ‘vehement and excessive movement’ or not, Schopenhauer says that 
the will is something which we have in common with the whole of nature where 
everything overflows with it.446 However, Nietzsche took issue with Schopenhauer’s 
concept of an undifferentiated will flowing through all of nature. In Beyond Good and Evil 
Nietzsche argued that: 
...Schopenhauer would have us believe that the will is the only thing that is really 
familiar, familiar through and through, familiar without pluses or minuses. But I 
have always thought that, here too, Schopenhauer was only doing what 
philosophers always tend to do: adopting and exaggerating a popular prejudice.447  
 
In contrast to this popular prejudice, Nietzsche conceived of willing as “something 
complicated, something unified only in a word.”448 This ‘single word’ he felt contained the 
uncritical prejudice which renders naïve many an incautious philosopher and artist. Instead, 
Nietzsche proposed that “in every act of willing there is, to begin with, a plurality of 
feelings.”449 They are he says: 
…accompanied by a feeling of the muscles that comes into play through a sort of 
habit as soon as we ‘will’, even without our putting ‘arms and legs’ into motion. 




446 Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.1, p.599. 
447 Nietzsche, F., Horstmann, R. P., and Norman, J., Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the 
Future (Cambridge University Press, 2002). p.18. 
448 Ibid., p.18. 
449 Ibid., p.18. On the will and affective movements see: Pethick, S, Affectivity and Philosophy after Spinoza and 
Nietzsche: Making Knowledge the Most Powerful Affect. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. p.78. Also for the 
phenomenological aspects of willing and bodily movement see Gemes, K., and S. May, Nietzsche on Freedom and 
Autonomy. OUP Oxford, 2009. p.249. 
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Just as feeling – and indeed many feelings – must be recognized as ingredients of 
the will, thought must be as well.450 
 
Nolde took an opportunity to embrace a ‘plurality of feelings’ when he left Germany in 
the spring of 1913 by joining the Kulz-Leber anthropological expedition which made for 
the Colonies of the South Sea Islands.451 He committed himself to producing art works 
throughout his sojourn and in his watercolour South Sea Dancer of 1915 (fig. 33) he 
captured the pulse of a ‘native’ dancing with a sumptuous instinct for colour based on 
emotion. Through colour we may perhaps experience the radiating energies of the 
‘native’s’ embodied will, if we take a Schopenhauerian view, depicted in vibrant shades 
of purple, magenta and orange juxtaposed against the dark brown of the dancer’s face.  
Nolde’s memoires record a specific ‘native’ dance of 1914 which he witnessed in 
Mandalay, Burma. He recalled that one night, under the palm trees, a dancer performed 
grotesque whirling dances in a wild and fiery way until she collapsed into a barely visible 
heap. The female dancer had tied her feet tightly together with stiff silk so that only her 
upper body and arms could move in the dance – all of which he found fascinating.452 
The wild and wonderful movements witnessed by Nolde suggest a symbiotic 
relationship between the body and the will as one which is unified. About this unity 
Schopenhauer argues that: 
My body and my will are one; or, what as representation of perception, I call my 
body, I call my will in so far as I am conscious of it in an entirely different way 
comparable with no other; or, my body is the objectivity of my will; or, apart from 
the fact that my body is my representation, it is still my will, and so on.453 
 
 
                                                                
450 Ibid., p.18. 
451 As will be discussed later on in this thesis, after six months in the South Sea Islands war was declared in Europe 
entailing the return of the expedition to Germany, passing through Burma and Java as it did so. Early twentieth century 
Europeans often referred to the culture and peoples of undeveloped nations as being ‘primitive’. In chapter 3 of this 
thesis aspects of the ‘primitive’ will be discussed in relation to Kirchner’s work. Similarly, in chapters 5 and 6 we shall 
examine the fate of Expressionist artworks which had embraced the ‘primitive’ and subsequently came to be described 
by the Nazis as ‘degenerate’. In each case, the discussion of the ‘primitive’ in Expressionism will form a part of our 
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452 Nolde, Mein Leben. p.290. 
453 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.103. 
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2.2 The Dancing Body, Knowledge and Schopenhauer’s Analogical Inference 
 
 
As shall be explained shortly in this chapter, it was Schopenhauer’s conviction that 
we can know the inner nature of all appearances by comparing the inner life of our bodies 
(as manifestations of the will) with the rest of nature – and in theory validating C2. 
However, it might be pointed out that in the previous chapter of this thesis, it could be said 
that the German Expressionist body, was merely another representation of the knowing 
subject, just like any other object pertaining to the world of perception.454 Yet, 
Schopenhauer believes that an individual’s consciousness is able to discern the 
representation of their own body from others which may be similar to it, and that the body 
manifests itself to consciousness in a different way which can be signified by the word 
will.455 Therefore, it is this bifurcated knowledge of our body which informs us about the 
body, its actions, its movements ensuing upon motivations and sufferings via external 
impressions. That is to say, “about what it is, not as representation, but as something over 
and above this, and hence what it is in itself.”456  
Schopenhauer argues that while we know the ‘in itself’ of our bodies as objects, 
by contrast we do not possess the same immediate knowledge of other objects. He 
therefore proposes that as knowing subjects we are individuated by this unique 
relationship to our bodies, which were it not so, then our body as object would be for us a 
representation just like any other representation457 - in that case we could not probe C1 or 
C2 any further since we would be obliged to stop our enquiries at the world as 
representation so far as our bodies are concerned. He also thinks that an individual is not 
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to dub Schopenhauer the philosopher of the body. To a greater extent than anyone before his time, and even since then, 
he makes the body-that is, one's own body (der eigene Leib)-the primary focus and indispensable condition of all 
philosophical inquiry.”Atwell. p.81. 
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only conscious of their body as a particular representation but at the same time as the will 
albeit in a different way. Consequently, Schopenhauer says that “…if he abstracts from 
that special relation, from that twofold and completely heterogeneous knowledge of one 
and the same thing, then that one thing, the body, is a representation like all others.”458 - 
In order to understand this, Schopenhauer argues that when an individual considers 
their body, they have to assume that they obtain knowledge of it as both will and 
representation simultaneously, “…not by a difference of this object from all others, but 
only by a difference between the relation of his knowledge to this one object and its 
relation to all others.”459 However, some individuals could assume that only their body as 
an object is real and that all other objects are mere phantoms. Should this be the case then 
such an individual presumes that their body is the only real thing in the world. As a result, 
if that individual denies a reality to all external phenomena, then their standpoint belongs 
to theoretical egoism which interprets every phenomenon outside of their own will as 
fictitious. That being the case “a man regards and treats only his own person as a real 
person, and all others as mere phantoms.460  
Although many Expressionist artists possessed an overweening self-regard, (this 
topic of egoism being of great importance to chapters 4 and 5), none could be strictly 
labelled as theoretical egoists.461 Yet, their sense of self-regard and showmanship often 
matched that of dancers and cabaret performers around Germany. We know that from 
1908, Kirchner, Erich Heckel and Max Pechstein increased their visits to dance venues 
and circus acts in Hamburg, Dresden and Berlin. Heckel’s drawing The Rehearsal of 1910 
(fig. 34), shows a dancer rehearsing in his own studio, although it is not known if the 
                                                                
458 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation., p.103. 
459 Ibid., p.104. 
460 Ibid., p.104. 
461 Concerning the term ‘theoretical egoism’, Schopenhauer argues that: “…the perceived object must be something in 
itself, and not merely something for others; for otherwise it would be positively only representation, and we should have 
an absolute idealism that in the end would become theoretical egoism, in which all reality disappears, and the world 
becomes a mere subjective phantasm.” The World as Will and Representation. Vol.2, p.193. 
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performer was Sidi Riha his girlfriend, or not.462 However, it is possible that Riha was the 
model for his woodcut The Dance of 1905, (fig. 35), which depicts a nude dancer in an 
early form of Nackttanz (Naked Dance).463 
Almost nothing is known about Sidi Riha and her dancing, although there is a 
woodcut programme cover for Pantomime by W.S. Guttmann of 1912 (fig. 36), in which 
she dances. This has been attributed to Heckel, along with a poster woodcut for The Merry 
Puck Sidi Riha, also dated to 1912 (fig. 37). The letters between the couple of that time 
are now lost, yet there is a postcard addressed to her from Kirchner dated 19.06.1911.464 
It seems that (on the whole) she probably did not perform very often, despite performing 
with Valeska Gert early in 1916 as a dance student.465 Whilst a dance student Riha would 
have encountered a degree of Eastern exoticism in cabaret replete with snake charmers, 
jugglers and acrobats that also reinforced a sense of ‘primitivism’ in Die Brücke’s work. 
Indeed, Jill Lloyd has suggested that, “this mixed style recurs in contemporary cabaret 
subjects by Heckel such as Dancers, where the repeated movements are inspired by the 
dance routine in part, but the frieze-like effect is reminiscent of the Palau carvings and, in 
this case, Egyptian stone reliefs.”466  
Amongst these ‘exotic’ influences, we find that in 1909 the Dresdener Illustrierte 
Neueste published an illustration and brief account of the popular dance form known as 
the Apache dance.467 The Apache dance was originally a Parisian phenomenon, where the 
                                                                
462 For more information on Riha see: Jiminez, J. B., Dictionary of Artists' Models (Taylor & Francis, 2013). p.273. 
463 Toepffer argues that Nackttanz registered the “modern relations between dancer, the body, and the gaze” and that 
“nudity symbolically equated modernity with the assertion of a more naked identity.” See: Toepfer. p.22. 
464 The postcard is addressed as follows: "Fräulein Sidi Riha / Danseuse / Berlin-Charlottenburg / Leibnizstr. 41. See: 
Annemarie Dube-Heynig, E.L.Kirchner, Postkarten und Briefe an Erich Heckel, Köln 1984, Nr.69, S.182. 
465 See Valeska Gert’s memoires. For comprehensive information on Gert and the contemporary dance scene in 
Germany see: Peter, F.-M. and Schlöndorff, V., Valeska Gert Tänzerin, Schauspielerin, Kabarettistin, eine 
dokumentarische Biographie (Berlin: Frölich & Kaufmann, 1985). 
466 Lloyd, J., German Expressionism: Primitivism and Modernity (New Haven, Conn. ; London: Yale University Press, 
1991). p.95. The carved and painted house beams, taken from the South Pacific island of Palau and displayed at the 
Dresden Ethnographic Museum from 1907, were a source of aesthetic inspiration for Die Brücke artists. Ibid., p.29. 
467 Ibid., p.90. 
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‘society’ of the underworld of the capital city were known as ‘Apaches’. The Apache 
dance was the dance of the Apache with his lover which brought to life the earthy feelings 
of the underworld gangster, achieved through “its rhythmical movement of every limb.”468 
Another Parisian phenomenon was the demi-monde Stasia Napierkowska, who as an 
‘exotic’ dancer performed at the Berlin Wintergarten in January 1912 - a venue frequented 
by Heckel and Kirchner. One year later, Napierkowska (fig. 38) was arrested in New York 
for dancing in a lewd and indecent manner. Following her arrest, she concluded: “What a 
narrow-minded people they are - how utterly impervious to any beautiful impression.”469  
By contrast, Kirchner was far from being ‘narrow minded’ towards dance 
maintaining an interest which endured beyond the Great War. He painted The Russian 
Dancer Mela in 1911 (fig. 39), capturing his performer in mid-flight. She stares assertively 
at the viewer fixing our gaze upon her own. Her right arm is bent into a V shape while her 
right-hand points upwards. Her left arm is extended outward as if to keep her balance 
while she moves across the dance floor. Her green dress swirls around in an anti-clockwise 
direction capturing the movement of her body, while her left leg suggests that she is en 
pointe. As she does this, her right leg mirrors her right arm with her inwardly turned knee 
suggesting contrapuntal motion.  
With images such as this in mind, we need a key to unlock the inner nature of the 
human body as a representation in order to test C1 and C2. Armed with ‘the double 
knowledge’ of our bodies as mentioned above, Schopenhauer is confident that we may 
extend the application of this knowledge, since it offers us a “key to the inner being of 
every phenomenon in nature.”470 Therefore, we could in theory establish an analogical 
inference between our own bodies and all other objects in the world. In addition, we could 
                                                                
468 Nietzsche, Geuss, and Speirs. p.21. 
469 "Paris Dancer Dislikes US. Napierkowska, Soured by Her Arrest, Makes Some Warm Remarks". New York Times 
(Paris). April 27, 1913. Retrieved 2008-12-12. 
470 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.105. 
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theoretically assume that these objects are representations and consistent with our own 
bodies as representations.  
In an observation which perhaps helps us interpret the nature of C2, Schopenhauer 
says that, if we put aside the existence of all other objects as the subject’s representation, 
then “what still remains over must be, according to its inner nature, the same as what in 
ourselves we call will.”471 However, Schopenhauer’s analogical argument may be 
considered weak, since we are being asked by him to extrapolate from only one item (our 
bodies) to innumerable other items. Indeed, it is not necessarily an irrecusable or 
irrefrangible argument as Robert L. Wicks shows when he states that: 
A strong argument from analogy would run in the other direction: since after 
having experienced, say, 20,000 examples of some item, each of which has 15 
salient qualities, if we were to encounter another item that has 14 of those qualities, 
we could infer by analogy that the 15th quality is likely to be present as well.472  
 
Yet, if the quality of analogical reasoning was really vulnerable, then the whole edifice 
of empirical psychology ought to be fatally weak and built upon sand. However, it may 
be argued that the success of manipulative strategies, as used in the advertising business 
and politics which has been based upon studying human behaviours, ought to suggest that 
reasoning by analogy often proves successful. Even so, this does not prove that on 
Schopenhauer’s terms, other objects as representations for us possess an identical inner 
nature to our own. Thus, as Wicks points out: 
Schopenhauer might be understood to be assuming, rather unconvincingly, that we 
cannot imagine any other kind of inner nature than what we experience in 
ourselves as “will,” and so whatever the inner nature of the other representations 
happens to be, since all representations qua representation are the same, it has to 
be roughly the same as our own.473  
 
                                                                
471 Ibid., p.105. According to Schopenhauer, when we examine the reality of our bodies and its behaviours, then besides 
it being our representation, we discover nought else in it but the will and so thus its reality exhausted. 
472 Wicks.,p.63. 
473 Ibid.,p.64. 
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In addition, a major problem with Schopenhauer’s argument by analogy is that he cannot 
find any object beyond the human body for which an enquirer might say that they possess 
the same double knowledge of it as we do of our own bodies. If this is so, then as Dale 
Jacquette argues, the analogical inference offers us at best “doubtful grounds for his 
transcendental metaphysics of thing-in-itself as will.”474  
 If Schopenhauer’s argument still fails to convince then perhaps his inference 
could support the traditional solution to the problem of other minds – with relevance to 
individuals who appear to us as objects of representation? The solution to this problem 
being that if other human beings are similar to us, share similar experiences to us and 
behave in similar ways to us under similar circumstances, then some of us might assume 
that these beings must be similar to us in some sort of way. Indeed, A.J. Ayer for example 
goes so far as to argue that even if we could not literally share the experiences of another 
person then “it by no means follows that I cannot have good reasons to believe in their 
existence.”475 Therefore, using ‘ordinary language’ it is the case that some individuals 
might assert that other human beings possess an interior life that is similar to their own. 
Yet by contrast, objectors such as Gilbert Ryle state that “even if a person did enjoy a 
privileged illumination in the ascription of mental-conduct concepts to his own 
performances, his supposed analogical argument to the mental processes of others would 
be completely fallacious.”476 Furthermore, he asserts that “the observed appearances and 
actions of people differ very markedly, so the imputation to them of inner processes 
closely matching one another would be actually contrary to the evidence.”477  
Given the above contentions, there are many good reasons why we could continue 
an exploration of Schopenhauer’s tendentious inference, but let us conclude that unless a 
                                                                
474 Jacquette, D., "Schopenhauer's Proof that Thing-in-ltself is Will," in: Kantian rev. Kantian Review  Vol. 12, no. 02 
(2007). p.93. 
475 Ayer. p.199. 
476 Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind (Taylor & Francis, 2009).p.41 
477 Ibid.p.41 
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committed position is taken then perhaps by endlessly “parodying the soaring of a mind,” 
(in our case Schopenhauer’s analogical mind), we might lose our “direction in the mazes 
of metaphysical conjecture.”478 As a result, let us suspend our incredulity and suggest that 
Schopenhauer’s analogical inference is worth pursuing - if only to examine Marc’s claims 
on the former’s terms - otherwise these claims run the risk of falling “into anti-climax as 
the dead Bird of Paradise falls to the ground.”479 In this respect, Alexander Sakharov 
makes for an interesting case study.  
 
2.3 Alexander Sakharov and Der Blaue Reiter 
 
 
Sakharov (fig. 40) began his career by studying painting at the Académie des 
Beaux-Arts in Paris under William Adolphe-Bouguereau. He also studied in a private art 
school created by Rodolphe Julian known as the Académie Julian.480 There André Derain, 
Matisse, Paul Gauguin, Paula Modersohn-Becker, and Käthe Kollwitz also studied. 
Throughout this period of c.1903-4, Sakharov reflected his art school training in numerous 
choreographic sketches made on paper. He made frequent visits to the Louvre and was 
permanently inspired by its Classical sources, but parted company with the Académie 
Julian in 1905 in order to relocate in Munich. When in Munich he began studying 
at a private art school organised by the Slovenian painter Ažbe, which Kandinsky also 
attended. 
The milieu of Munich in which Sakharov, Kandinsky and many other artists lived 
needs to be briefly contextualised. During the 1880s it was noted for its academy and for 
being the most significant city of the arts. It was a city which was graced by the presence 
of creative luminaries such as the Symbolist poet Stefan George, and Rainer Maria Rilke. 
                                                                
478 Williams, K., Jonathan Swift and The Age of Compromise (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1958).p.135. 
479 Ibid.p.135. 
480 Nothing of Sakharov’s work survives except for a few drawings such as Self-Portrait of 1908; see fig. 40. 
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In fact, Thomas Mann’s novella Gladius Dei opens with a glowing reference to Munich 
as an intellectual paradise. The city quickly became known as the ‘Athens on the Isar’ and 
the ‘Florence of the North’, by drawing in a large number of intellectuals and artists from 
around Europe. At the time of Kandinsky’s arrival in 1896, Munich’s Golden Age had 
brought forth the first secession of 1892 and had seen the emergence of the Jugendstil 
movement.481 Munich was also the location of Germany’s first efficacious challenge to 
Willhelime culture and the city’s annual salon. As Joan Weinstein has pointed out, in 
contrast to their Berlin counterparts,“ the Munich secession very quickly achieved parity 
with the official Art Association (Kunstgenossenschaft), receiving state and royal 
patronage, honors and influence.”482 However, Munich began to lose its pre-eminence to 
Berlin at the turn of the twentieth century and by 1901 public discussion was focused on 
Munich’s demise as an artistic centre, having witnessed the migration of key figures such 
as Lovis Corinth and Max Slevogt to Berlin.483 
During the course of time Munich became the intellectual home of many 
philosophers. In 1894, Theodor Lipps, a psychologist now remembered for his theory of 
aesthetics and Einfühlung (empathy), had arrived at the University of Munich and by 1895 
had created the Akademischer Verein für Psychologie (Academic Society for 
Psychology).484 Characterised by exchanges of vigorous thinking, the club inspired 
Alexander Pfänder’s doctoral thesis Phänomenologie des Wollens: eine psychologische 
Analyse485 (Phenomenology of Willing) of 1900. Indeed, many members eventually took 
                                                                
481 By 1898, the city had hosted the Kraft und Arbeitsmaschinen-Ausstellung. Among other significant events, in 1902 
the Anthropologisch-Prähistorisches Sammlung des Staates was formed and by 1903 the Deutsches Museum von 
Meisterwerken der Naturwissenschaft und Technik had been founded. One year later, in 1904 Heinrich Thannhauser’s 
art gallery opened. 
482 Weinstein, J. and Chicago, U. o., The End of Expressionism: Art and the November Revolution in Germany, 1918-
1919 (University of Chicago Press, 1990). p.13. 
483 Ibid.,p.14. 
484Lipps’ account of psychology can be found in: Lipps, T., Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens (Bonn: M. Cohen, 1883). 
He also developed a theory of optical illusions as in: Raumäesthetik und geometrisch-optische Täuschungen (Leipzig: 
J. A. Barth, 1897). 
485 Pfänder, A., Phänomenologie des Wollens : eine psychologische Analyse (Leipzig: J.A. Barth, 1900). 
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inspiration from Edmund Husserl’s book Logische Untersuchungen (Logical 
Investigations).486 Volume 1 of the latter was the result of work done between 1900-1901, 
whilst volume 2 encapsulated his thoughts of 1913 -1921. This work was critical of Lipps’ 
own and as a result members moved away from their ‘discipleship’ towards the latter 
philosopher and towards the work of Husserl. .487 The Munich Society developed a new 
way of doing philosophy which became known as phenomenology and a new school of 
philosophy which is now called the Munich Circle of phenomenologists.  
In the same year as Kandinsky’s arrival, the city’s intellectual life was enriched 
through the foundation of the satirical journal Simplicissimus and the magazine Jugend 
Münchner illustrierte Wochenschrift für Kunst und Leben.488 Three years after his arrival 
Munich saw the birth of Die Insel, an art magazine which was edited by Rudolf Alexander 
Schröder, Otto Julius Bierbaum, and Alfred Walter Heymel. By 1901, Kandinsky had 
challenged both the Academy and the Munich Secession by founding the artists’ group 
Phalanx, becoming its president in 1902. The first exhibition was held in August 1901, for 
which he designed a poster - (Plakat für die erste Ausstellung der ‘Phalanx’) after the 
manner of Jugendstil - which depicted Greek soldiers advancing from right to left of the 
picture with thrusting spears in a phalanx. The militant title of the Munich group was a 
deliberate choice, one born out of a bellicose spirit which aimed to circumvent private 
galleries and in order to set up their own exhibition spaces. The group, which displayed 
work by French Post-Impressionists and Neo-Impressionists, was liquidated in 1904 due 
to poor public support. 
                                                                
486 Husserl, E. and Holenstein, E., Logische Untersuchungen (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). Husserl, E. and 
Moran, D., Logical Investigations, [2nd ed.]. ed. (London: Routledge, 2001).For a discussion as  to how Pfänder’s 
phenomenology diverged from Husserl’s see: Natanson, M., Essays in Phenomenology (Springer Netherlands, 2013). 
p.138. 
487 Hopkins, B. and Crowell, S., The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (Taylor & 
Francis, 2015).,p.76. 
488 The name Simplicissimus was taken from a leading character who appears in Hans Jakob Christoffel von 
Grimmelshausen’s 1668 novel Der Abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch. Jugend Münchner illustrierte Wochenschrift 
für Kunst und Leben promoted the art of Jugendstil and was founded by art historian Julius Meier-Graefe.   
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By 1904, the conservative art and literary magazine Süddeutsche Monatshefte had 
also begun publishing and actively criticised the avant-garde. In the same year, as we have 
already noted in this chapter in the case of Villany, prior to the First World War Munich’s 
cultural spectrum was fertile enough for it to foster an ‘exotic’ dance scene. In 1904, the 
same year as the creation of Süddeutsche Monatshefte, a dancer by the name of 
‘Madaleine’ would perform under hypnosis, and as Karl Toepfer has shown, “although 
she had no dance training at all, she moved as if ‘a magical command had released her 
body from earthly laws, gravitational powers’ and created an apparition ‘without will’ yet 
strangely compelling…”489 Then in 1907, a city-based opera group intended to make 
Richard Strauss’s Salome execute the ‘Dance of the Seven Veils’ whilst naked – all part 
of Munich’s erotic dance culture.490 In addition, an equivalent  subversive culture was 
reflected in the satirical cabaret of Frank Wedekind's ‘Elf Scharfrichter’ (The Elf 
Executioner) which deployed a Nietzschean style critique of bourgeois society.491  
In 1909 Kandinsky became president of Munich’s Neue Künstlervereinigung 
München (NKV) (New Artists’ Union), which exhibited both Expressionist and 
Impressionist art together with that of artists from Matisse’s circle. Kandinsky resigned 
from the NKV 1911 after the NKV declined to show one of his abstract works - 
Composition V, which he hoped to show at their third exhibition in December of that year. 
This resignation acted as a catalyst for the formation of Der Blaue Reiter with Marc who 
had recently joined the NKV. 
Whilst in Munich, Sakharov developed friendships with Kandinsky, Marianne 
Verevkina, Alexei von Yavlensky, Vladimir Bekhteev, and Alexander Mogilevsky.492 In 
                                                                
489 Toepfer.p.64. 
490 Ibid.,p.75, The police prohibited this intention 
491 Lloyd.p.96. 
492 Verevkina had read Schopenhauer's Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit in 1893 and Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy 
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1909, four years after his arrival, Sakharov also became a member of the NKV out of 
which sprang the Blaue Reiter group.493 Many years later in 1937, Sakharov’s great friend 
Yavlensky recalled that, “In those days we were always together, and he visited us almost 
every day. We discussed his entire training together. I always watched how he danced. He 
also knew and understood my art very well.”494 Clotilde von Derp,495 Sakharov’s wife, 
also recalled that “Yavlensky enjoyed putting make-up on me. He painted a red 
circle on my forehead and a heavy brown line down the length of my nose. I 
resembled one of his famous heads.”496 Indeed, Yavlensky often painted Sakharov 
throughout 1909, as in White Feather (fig. 41), and Portrait Study Sakharov (fig. 42). 
However, Marianna Verevkina depicted Sakharov with much greater frequency. If we 
interpret such depictions through Schopenhauer’s philosophy then, as we shall see 
later on in this chapter, she perhaps captured what turns out to be the embodiment 
of an androgynous phenomenon of the will. 
Like Verevkina and Yavlensky, the other artists whom Sakharov befriended were 
fascinated by the way he moved his body, and the fact that his choreographic routines 
synthesised classical Greek motifs with Jugendstil, which can be seen in numerous 
photographs of 1910 (fig. 43). On his debut at the Royal Odeon on 02.06.1910, Sakharov 
performed his Greek style dance routine accompanied by the music of Thomas 
                                                                
and in French by Gabrielle Dufour-Kowalska (Lettres à un inconnu. Aux sources de l'expressionisme). The whole 
manuscript of her diaries can be consulted in the Museum's archive in Ascona. 
493 Sakharov was not a member of the Blaue Reiter. 
494 Pieroni-Jawlensky, L., Jawlensky, A., and Aleksej von Jawlensky Archive, Alexej von Jawlensky: Catalogue 
Raisonné of the Oil Paintings: Volume 1: 1890-1914 (Sotheby's Publications, 1991). p.30. 
495 Derp married Sakharov in September 1919 and the ceremonial witness was the artist Verevkina. Whilst Derp was 
schooled in both painting and music it is said that: "She was one of the typical representatives of the early form 
of German Ausdruckstanz—predating Laban and Wigman. To her contemporaries, it seemed as if her soul 
became visible in her young body.” See: Peter, Frank-Manuel, Rainer Stamm, Paula Modersohn-Becker Museum, 
Deutsches Tanzarchiv Köln , and Museum Villa Stuck. Peter and Stamm.p.75. In addition, Marc, Kandinsky and 
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496 Ibid., p.9. 
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Alexandrovich de Hartmann and from then on Sakharov became known as a reformer of 
dance.497 It was said at the time that: 
The reformers want to free dance of the constraints forced upon it by a 
dressage mentality, they want to return it to its original purpose: to teach 
people to express what moves them, their suffering and joy, their passion 
and pain, in their movement and facial expressions.498 
 
If one looks at Verevkina’s drawings of Sakharov the reformer from a Schopenhauerian 
perspective, then arguably they express the external manifestation of the will as an 
embodied action. Her graphic line insinuates the structure of his body and its 
movements through time as an example of embodied willing. In the image, this is 
achieved through the transference of his weight from one foot to the other which 
is mirrored by his hand gestures. Each gesture, and each part of the body, manifests 
an aspect of Sakharov’s inner life, or in other words his will to action. As 
manifestations of the will, both Verevkina as an artist, and Sakharov as a dancer, 
necessarily engaged in voluntary and involuntary bodily movements through a 
chain of causal necessity prompted by sensory impressions. Such sensory 
impressions also involved a nexus of memorised impressions in order to create their 
aesthetic end-products. 
As a dance theorist, Laban believed that bodily action was a result of an inner 
excitement of the nervous system. It was his opinion that “this excitement results in the 
voluntary or involuntary inner effort or impulse to move.”499 He also argued that any 
freedom of choice in bodily movement is not always consciously or voluntarily executed 
- these choices being often automatic “without any contribution of conscious willing.”500 
By contrast, Schopenhauer’s opinion is that the ‘being-in-itself of our own body’, as what 
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it is besides an object of perception for representation, i.e. the will, manifests itself initially 
in voluntary movements of the body, as individual but perceptible acts of the will. Such 
movements emerge directly and concurrently with these acts of will, being identical with 
them, and are differentiated from them “only by the form of perceptibility into which they 
have passed, that is to say, in which they have become representation.”501 In addition, 
Schopenhauer states that “the act of will itself is in self-consciousness,” which means that 
“the business of self-consciousness is the act of will alone, together with its absolute 
mastery over the limbs of the body.”502 This, through the lens of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, is evident in the self-conscious poses made by the dancer in Yavlensky’s 
Alexander Sakharov Dancing of 1912 (fig. 44). 
Whether we consider self-conscious poses or not, acts of the will are always 
grounded in motives outside of them. Such motives only condition that which is willed in 
specific moments of time.503 Consequently, the inner nature of our willing cannot be 
interpreted from motives alone since they “are merely the occasion on which my will 
shows itself.”504 The will per se lies outside the dominion of motivational laws which 
means that only the will’s phenomena in time is subordinated to such laws. Therefore, 
Schopenhauer concludes that: 
Only on the presupposition of my empirical character is the motive a sufficient 
ground of explanation of my conduct. But if I abstract from my character, and then 
ask why in general I will this and not that, no answer is possible, because only the 
appearance or phenomenon of the will is subject to the principle of sufficient 
reason, not the will itself, which in this respect may be called groundless.505  
                                                                
501 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.2, p.105. 
502 Schopenhauer, A. and Kolenda, K., Essay on the Freedom of the Will (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2005). 
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504 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.106. 
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our essential character remains free. As did Kant, he discriminated between the intelligible and empirical character (der 
empirische Charakter), the latter of which is the manifestation of our essential intelligible character. By contrast, the 
empirical character is dominated by the principle of sufficient reason and is determined by causality. Through self-
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It therefore follows, he says, that if every act of our bodies is an appearance of the will in 
action, whereby the whole of our will and character expresses itself through motives, then 
we must assume that the appearance of the will must be the essential condition of our 
actions. This is so because the will in appearance is conditional upon that which exists 
directly through it, otherwise the will’s appearance would be accidental. This condition is 
‘the whole body itself’, and since this is the case Schopenhauer suggests that: 
… this body itself must be phenomenon of the will, and must be related to my will 
as a whole, that is to say, to my intelligible character, the phenomenon of which in 
time is my empirical character, in the same way as the particular action of the body 
is to the particular act of the will.506 
 
As such the entire will becomes visible as a representation and object of perception, which 
in turn might vindicate the possibility that C2 might (on Schopenhauer’s terms) be a search 
for that will.507 On this basis, it may be possible to perceive something of Sakharov’s 
embodied empirical character in Verevkina’s and Yavlensky’s art. Verevkina’s The 
Dancer Sakharov of 1909 (fig. 45), showing the dancer in action, does capture something 
of his effeminate movements and his androgynous empirical character’.508 This 
androgynous character, in various poses offers us a glimpse into Sakharov’s state of mind 
through Verevkina’s rhythmic lines, which capture the outward features of the dancer’s 
inner self.509 Every captured movement of his body could be interpreted as a particular act 
of the will in its empirical form and an object of movement in the world as representation. 
Notions such as these were therefore important to a dance teacher like Laban, who 
considered bodily action to mean that “character, an atmosphere, a state of mind, or a 
                                                                
knowledge of our empirical character we can develop what Schopenhauer calls an ‘acquired character’ (der erworbene 
Charakter). See also:Cartwright.p.25-26. 
506Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. 
507 The World as Will and Representation.,Vol.1, p.107. 
508 That is to say his observable character. 
509 On Sakharov, Friedrich Markus Huebner wrote that: “From all the pores of this hermaphrodite figure there flashes 
the expression of a happy, desired, elevated release from the confines of the individual self.” See: Friedrich Markus 
Huebner: ‘Alexander Sakharov’ in: "Phöbus Monatsschrift für Aesthetik und Kritik des Theaters," in:   (1914). Phöbus 
Vol. 1, 1914 part 3, pp.101-104. 
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situation cannot be effectively shown on the stage without movement, and its inherent 
expressiveness.”510 
Verevkina and Yavlensky were not the only people who observed 
Sakharov’s ‘inherent expressiveness’ in action. The art historian Karl With and 
Russian-Jewish sculptor Moissey Kogan for example, both watched Sakharov 
perform in Hagen along with other cultural elites. At that time in terms of 
physiology, Sakharov was remembered as “…just standing there for a while in 
spellbound immobile repose, until his body, as if slowly awakening, would begin 
to move, to stir and turn and his arms would lift and unfold in gestures of dance -
like trance.”511 However, physiological explanations such as these for Schopenhauer 
would not detract from the fact that at a metaphysical level, the existence of the body and 
its functionality is merely “the objectivity of the will.”512  
By establishing the body as ‘the objectivity of the will’ Schopenhauer 
foreshadowed Darwin evolutionary theory, whereby teeth, throat and intestines are the 
objectification of hunger.513 The same applies to the genitals which objectify sexual 
instincts, just as the whole human organism in its overall form objectifies the general 
human will. The individually tailored will, as in the individual’s character, reflects the 
individual’s somatic form which is in every way characteristic of them and “full of 
expression.”514 We can pick up on some of these characteristic objectifications in relation 
to Expressionist art and Sakharov as a dancer. Firstly, let us take Schopenhauer’s point 
that the genitals are objectified sexual instinct. This is important, because many critics 
                                                                
510 Laban and Ullmann. p.2. 
511 Rainer Stamm ‘Alexander Sacharoff- Dance and the Fine Arts’ in: Peter and Stamm. p.34. 
512 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.108. 
513 For a near contemporary account of Schopenhauer in relation to Darwinism see: Asher, D., "Schopenhauer and 
Darwinism," in: The Journal of Anthropology  Vol. 1, no. 3 (1871). pp. 312-332. 
514 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.108. 
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were unsettled by Sakharov’s effeminate movements , his cross-dressing and 
Jewish homosexuality. One contemporary declared that:  
If dancing artists like Sakharov become the rule, then we will come to a phase 
of disgusting dancing men and to a male dance cult of the kind that came to 
play a role in the Roman Empire as a degenerate development. [...] hence, 
this Slav, Sacharoff, precipitates, despite his extraordinary technique,  a 
feeling of virtual discomfort, even a feeling of aversion.515 
 
The contemporary journal Simplicissimus also published a satirical cartoon which 
lampooned Sakharov’s ‘degenerate’ effeminacy and his use of Greek motifs as in Olaf 
Gulbransson’s cartoon An Object Lesson of 1910 (fig. 46).516 The main problem for 
Sakharov’s critics being that neither his physiology nor costume allowed for a 
congruent sexual identification which in turn increased an aura of sexual 
ambiguity.517 This sense of sexual incongruity was depicted by Yavlensky in his 1909 
Portrait of Dancer Sakharov (fig. 47), where the dancer, dressed in vivid red, leers 
demonically with coal black eyes at the spectator. The face is powdered white, which 
contrasts dramatically with the sitter’s jet-black hair, and the effect is so startling, 
that if anything could unsettle the will, or representational equilibrium of the 
spectator, then Yavlensky’s brilliant handling of his subject expedited that.  
A sexually incongruous and ‘degenerate nature’ of Sakharov’s type earned the 
scorn of many Körperkultur enthusiasts who promoted the ideals of a manly body and a 
Germanic will of steel. In the contemporary journal Die Schönheit an article titled 
                                                                
515 Frank Manuel-Peter ‘The ‘neue Münchener Derpsichore. Clotilde von Derp –The originator of Ausducktanz?’ in: 
Peter and Stamm. p.121. 
516 Gerhard Amundsen compared Sakharov’s art of dancing to the Greeks’, arguing that in his dancing the spiritual and 
physical were indivisible. Amundsen knew that Sakharov was originally planning to become a painter and sculptor, and 
suggested that, in the same way that he used to employ colours and lines or forms in stone to achieve an effect, he used 
his body and its movement. Sakharov combined everyday movements, such as running and carrying, with expressive 
movements which in in turn conveyed spirituality through gesture. This included the resting positions of the body which 
denoted petrified movement which were of especial value for his dances. See: Amundsen, Gerhard: ‘Alexander 
Sacharoff und sein Tanz’ in: Koch, A. and Verlagsanstalt Alexander Koch, "Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration," 
(Darmstadt: A. Koch, 1897).  
517 The sex drive will be of significance to the next chapter of this thesis where we interpret an element of Die Brücke’s 
artistic practice through Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of sexual love. 
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‘Körperschönheit’ (Bodily Beauty) of 1909 put it that, “just as the soul of a violin player 
is expressed in his music, one can recognize a swift gait as the expression of a resolute 
character, while a slothful gait reveals weakness of the will (Willensschwäche).”518 What 
was required at the turn of the century was a strong willed, resolute, heterosexual 
population which would promote the well-being of the Volk. Four years earlier in 1905, 
an article titled ‘Willensschwäche-Lebensglück’ (Weakness of the Will-Happiness in 
Life), argued that “the secret of all success lies in the ability to concentrate our thoughts 
into an unshakable will. [. . .] The present times, - and to an even greater extent the future, 
demand a strong-willed generation capable of decisive action.”519 As a consequence, those 
with ‘unnatural affections’ and an effeminate will had to be somehow exorcised from the 
body of the Volk. If this was the case, then the pursuit of ‘an unshakable will’ would 
therefore justify C1.  
Examples of the effeminate will can be seen in the ink drawings by the artist Dora 
Brandenburg-Polster showing Sakharov dancing the Pavane Royale from The Baroque 
Bacchus (fig. 48, a-d) - a suite of dances staged for the Munich Press Ball in January 1913. 
The effeminate will can also be seen in Verevkina’s 1909 Portrait of Alexander Sakharov 
where his Jewish features are emphasised, in which Shulamith Behr argues that Verevkina 
“gives reign to the flexibility of the ‘female gaze’ in embodying the eroticism of gendered 
and racial difference.”520 Moreover, Behr adds that Verevkina’s personal encounter with 
the dancer possibly matched the artist’s own longings for the emancipation of the body 
from controlling norms on gender identity.521 It is therefore possible to infer that both 
Sakharov and Vervekina exploited modernity’s self-reflexivity of the body in pursuit of 
                                                                
518 Cowan. p.150. 
519 Ibid., p.116. 
520 Behr, Shulamith. ‘Veiling Venus: Gender and Painterly Abstraction in early German Modernism’ in : Scott, K. and 
Arscott, C., Manifestations of Venus: Art and Sexuality (Manchester University Press, 2000). p.208. 
521 Ibid., p.208. 
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a liberation from such norms.522 Indeed, this example of early modern exploitation might 
resonate with Anthony Giddens’ belief that the body, during late modernity, becomes 
progressively invested with the reflexive organisation of social life.523 
The self-reflexivity of the body, or conversely ‘reflexive embodiment’ as Nick 
Crossley terms it, is one which “refers to the capacity and tendency to perceive, emote 
about, reflect and act upon one's own body; to practices of body modification and 
maintenance; and to ‘body image’.”524 Similarly, Michael Pagis argues that embodied self-
reflexivity is “a process based predominantly on feeling the body, in which the relation 
with oneself unfolds through a corporeal medium by way of practices that increase 
awareness of sensations, such as meditation, yoga, and dance.”525 In each case, when a 
dancer looks in the mirror at themselves during rehearsal for example, they are both the 
subject who sees and the object which is seen. Since this is the case they can modify their 
performance and self-image on these terms. 
Arguably, this form of self-reflexivity may be applicable to the early phases of 
German modernism since it encouraged Sakharov, and other artists across the media, to 
reframe the expression of their modernity through the re-imagination of the body. Such 
a re-imagination meant that:  
…the dancer’s representational body not only moulds social space but is also, in 
turn, moulded by it. The theatre artist lives only within the world; he is continually 
forced to carry out adjustments between his will and what he imagines the public's 
                                                                
522 This position might be interpreted through Anthony Giddens’ work on modernity and self-identity as follows: “The 
reflexivity of the self, in conjunction with the influence of abstract systems, pervasively affects the body as well as 
psychic processes. The body is less and less an extrinsic 'given', functioning outside the internally referential systems of 
modernity, but becomes itself reflexively mobilized. What might appear as a wholesale movement towards the 
narcissistic cultivation of bodily appearance is in fact an expression of a concern lying much deeper actively to 
‘construct’ and control the body. Here there is an integral connection between bodily development and lifestyle -
manifest, for example, in the pursuit of specific bodily regimes.” See: Giddens, Anthony.Giddens, A., Modernity and 
Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Blackwell, 1991). 
p.7. Although Giddens is most often referring to late-modernity in his work, it can be argued that such a self-reflexivity 
of the body had its grounding in earlier phases of modernity. It simply did not appear ex nihilo. 
523 Ibid. p.98. 
524 Crossley, N., Reflexive Embodiment In Contemporary Society : The Body in Late Modern Society (Buckingham, 
UNITED STATES: McGraw-Hill Education, 2004)., p.1. 
525 Pagis, M., "Embodied Self-reflexivity," in: Social Psychology Quarterly  Vol. 72, no. 3 (2009). p.266. 
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level of acceptance to be.526 
 
Whilst Sakharov’s theatrical transvestitism and representational body threw off 
traditional norms, for some critics he perhaps lacked ‘sincerity’. As Patrizia Veroli 
argues, Sakharov’s “concept of representation and of self-representation was not distant 
from the ‘insincerity’ of Dorian Gray, the main character of Oscar Wilde’s celebrated 
story, as a desire to show a multiple personality and to make identity coincide with 
artifice.”527 
The desire to make ‘identity coincide with artifice’ could be interpreted as an 
abstract deliberation, and Schopenhauer thinks that from abstract deliberations we can 
obtain an insight into what we all know in the concrete - which is the experience of having 
feelings. According to Schopenhauer, this knowledge shows us that the inner nature of 
our own phenomenon, manifesting itself to us as representation through our actions and 
the permanent foundation of them in our body, is our will. Therefore, this insight will 
furnish a person with a key to discovering the innermost being of nature. This is so because 
we can transfer this insight to every phenomenon given to us, not as with our own 
phenomenon, which is simultaneously given as direct and indirect knowledge, but through 





In this chapter we examined depictions of dance in Expressionist art through 
Schopenhauer’s ‘Second Book: The World as Will First Aspect: The Objectification of 
the Will’. The methodology of the chapter was designed to test C1 and C2 and to acquire 
knowledge about the content of our representations. Through this methodology, we may 
                                                                
526 Patrizia Veroli ‘The Mirror and the Hieroglyph. Alexander Sacharoff and Dance Modernism’ in: Peter and Stamm. 
p.170. 
527 Ibid., p.170. 
528 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation., p.109. 
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now assert that the starting point of perception for all of us is the action or effect on the 
body. We can also assert that Nolde was capturing an objectification of the will in a 
dancer’s bodily movement. Since this was so, we argued that “the action of the body is 
nothing but the act of will objectified, i.e., translated into perception.”529 As a result, it 
was suggested that through a comparison with what goes on within our own bodies, as it 
performs an action, we can obtain an insight into the changes which other bodies undergo 
and their ‘inner nature’.530 This inference is possible Schopenhauer says, because the body 
is the only object which we know intimately as both representation and will. 
However, it was concluded that Schopenhauer’s analogical inference was a weak 
argument and could only be useable for the sake of methodological coherence. This 
compromise weakened our interpretations of C2, since we cannot be utterly certain that 
Schopenhauer’s analogy is justifiable. Although we argued that Schopenhauer’s 
analogical inference was vulnerable, it was deemed worth pursuing for the sake of 
philosophical coherence. This was so, despite his assertion that “I must recognize the 
inscrutable forces that manifest themselves in all the bodies of nature as identical in kind 
with what in me is the will, and as differing from it only in degree.”531  
By exploring the relationship between the dancing body and the will, it was argued 
that C1 was a legitimate claim when set against works such as Nolde’s The Dance Round 
the Golden Calf of 1910 (fig. 29), since in theory it appears to manifest the will to life of 
both artist and dancer. We also found that the contemporary goal of will cultivation 
(Willensbildung) was designed to offset the debilitating effects of abulia and contributed 
towards a validation of C1. On this basis, the practice of will cultivation, as objectified by 
                                                                
529 Ibid., p100. 
530 Ibid., p.125. 
531 Ibid., p126. According to Schopenhauer, when we examine the reality of our bodies and its behaviours, then besides 
it being our representation, we discover nought else in it but the will and so thus its reality exhausted. 
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the example of Jaques-Dalcroze’s rhythmic calisthenics in Hellerau, illustrated the role of 
dance in expressing the human will. Whilst visiting Jaques-Dalcroze’s Educational 
Institute for Music and Rhythm, Nolde and his wife became acquainted with Wigman as 
an upcoming dancer whose career they closely followed. In addition to the above, we 
discovered another example which served to validate C1 through the vehement urges of 
Nolde’s ‘creative’ will that almost destroyed Dance II of 1911 (fig. 32) by severe 
cropping. Although such aggression is not commonly associated with Expressionism, in 
this chapter we briefly outlined the opinions of those who have thought in this way.  
The findings of the above seem to resonate with Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s 
phenomenological approach which states that “the dancer is not moving through a form; 
a form is moving through him. The dancer is not doing movement; movement is doing 
him,”532 which appears to uphold the notion that something other than that which is 
represented manifests itself through the dancer, which Schopenhauer would describe as 
the will. The findings of this chapter also appear to resonate with Susanne K. Langer’s 
observation, who without referring to Schopenhauer, suggests that in a dancer, “the 
conscious will that seems to motivate or animate him may be imagined to lie beyond his 
person, which figures as a mere receptacle or even momentary concentration of it…”533  
Our observations differ from Roger Copeland’s who, as Kristin Boyce shows, 
argued how “dance has suffered the effects of a deeply entrenched Cartesian dualism: 
because its medium is the human body, dance has been conceived (and often conceived 
itself) as ‘mired’ in the body, feeling and subjectivity - more suited to serve as a 
therapeutic antidote to the ‘abstractions and deceptions' of reason than as a medium of 
                                                                
532 Sheets-Johnstone, M., "On Movement and Objects in Motion: The Phenomenology of the Visible in Dance," in: 
Journal of Aesthetic Education  Vol. 13, no. 2 (1979). p.43. 
533 Langer, S. K., Feeling and form: A Theory of Art developed from Philosophy in a New Key (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1953).p.183. 
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thought.”534 In contrast to Copeland and Boye’s cognitive approach, our explorations of 
the will as a manifestation of the body as it related to C1 and C2, led us to discuss the case 
of Sakharov who lived his life, not as Körperkultur enthusiasts would have him live by 
cultivating a heterosexual body and Germanic will of steel, but with ‘unnatural affections’ 
and an effeminate will which had to be somehow exorcised from the body of the Volk. If 
this was the case, then the pursuit of an unshakable Teutonic will of steel would therefore 
justify C1.  
However, perhaps few of the above findings are likely to secure a consensus of 
opinion amongst scholars, especially where Schopenhauer’s analogical inference has been 
applied to C2. A consensus theory of truth entails that we may assign a predicate to an 
object, such as ‘the body is a manifestation of the will’, if and only if everyone who enters 
into a discourse with us would assign an identical predicate to the same object.535 For 
Jürgen Habermas, a consensus theory of truth relies upon a community of discourse, where 
an attainment of “mutual understanding [Verständigung] is a normative concept.”536 
Therefore, the veracity of the conclusions which this chapter has drawn from C1 and C2 
as propositions must be contingent upon the assent of such a community. Although this is 
arguably a truism, the problem will always remain that “there are always only a few 





                                                                
534 Boyce. K. ‘The thinking body: Dance, Philosophy and Modernism’ in:Bunker, J., Pakes, A., and Rowell, B., Thinking 
through Dance: The Philosophy of Dance through Performance and Practices (Binsted: Dance Books, 2013). p.258. 
535 Habermas , J. ‘The Christian Gauss Lectures’ in: Habermas, J. r. and Fultner, B., On the Pragmatics of Social 
Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action (Cambridge: Polity, 2001).p.89. 
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537 Ibid. 
- 158 - 
 




In this chapter we begin with a discussion on the traditional reliance upon 
Nietzsche’s philosophy as a means for interpreting Die Brücke’s work. It will be suggested 
that it is time a new strategy was adopted through Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Having 
stated this, we then briefly explore Schopenhauer’s reception of Plato and Kirchner’s 
interest in philosophy on the basis of the latter’s personal library. However, it is not being 
argued that Kirchner was necessarily influenced by Schopenhauer, although it is probably 
the case that the artist may well have read the philosopher’s work On Vision and Colours. 
That said, what is being argued is that the latter’s philosophy provides a basis for artistic 
interpretation, irrespective of whether Kirchner was influenced by or acquainted with that 
philosophy. 
As was pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, we are working upon the 
assumption that a Platonic Idea stands for an eternal archetype of a particular thing and 
that this concept might help us interpret the status of C1. If this is so, then we may be able 
to explore Kirchner’s depictions of the nude as putative Ideas which are independent of 
time, space and causality. Although the Ideas are abstract, we shall anchor our discussion 
of Kirchner’s nudes in terms of art history, by showing how he was influenced by Matisse 
and Munch – in spite of Kirchner’s denial of such influences. What cannot be denied, it 
will be argued, is the fact that Kirchner wrote about his ability to engage in aesthetic 
contemplation and his appreciation of beautiful bodies. His aesthetic appreciation 
embraced Indian art and an imaginative engagement with the Orient, and as we will note 
in this chapter, for Schopenhauer the imagination was a co-traveller with ‘genius’. The 
concept of ‘genius’, it will be argued, is problematic as is the Platonic Idea in 
Schopenhauer’s philosophical system. Yet, what may be even more problematic is the 
- 159 - 
 
allegation that Kirchner engaged in sexual activity with his child models. This accusation 
in turn leads us on to expose the latent contradictions between disinterested aesthetic 
contemplation and sexual desire, for an artist such as Kirchner. 
 
3.1Kirchner, Die Brücke and the reliance upon Nietzsche. 
 
Kirchner was one of the most prolific of Die Brücke artists in the years before the 
First World War. Although he is chiefly noted for his Berlin ‘street scenes’ (a reflection 
on the theme of the corruptive forces of modern life), a large proportion of his work was 
taken up with studies of the naked body, either in the studio or in nature. Traditionally, 
social historians of art have explored the significance of these works through the lens of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, seeing them as a means for critically reflecting upon modernity 
as Kirchner experienced it.538 According to this account, the Berlin ‘street scenes’ may be 
interpreted as a critique of the sham and ‘artificiality’ of modern urban life vested in those 
processes of ‘commodification’ which had first been identified by Baudelaire in his essay 
‘The Painter of Modern Life’ of 1863. This was symbolised for him at the time, and for 
the artistic avant-garde in the years thereafter, by the figure of the prostitute.539  
By contrast, those related but sometimes divergent fields of art-historical 
scholarship, conventionally called ‘the social histories of art’ which proceed from a 
historical materialist point of view, explains the many representations of naked figures in 
Kirchner’s art as a celebration of the ‘authenticity’, ‘honesty’ and moral integrity to be 
found in nature; hence these works are explained as a celebration of forces which stood as 
a binary opposite, a corrective and solution, to the corruption and artificiality of urban 
                                                                
538 See: Simmons, S. (2000), “Ernst Kirchner's Streetwalkers: Art, Luxury, and Immorality in Berlin, 1913-16, The Art 
Bulletin, Vol. 82, No. 1 (March,2000), pp. 117-148. 
539 Baudelaire, C. ‘Le peintre de la vie moderne’, serialised in Le Figaro, 26 November and 29 November, also 13. 
December 1863.  
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culture. In nature, one could act spontaneously and assert one’s individuality, whilst the 
urban context was seen to induce a terminal conformity to ‘the herd’. Lloyd and Gill Perry 
exemplify this reading of Kirchner’s work particularly well. They see Kirchner as a 
participant in a contemporary ‘cult of Nietzsche’, and hence as an artist whose nudes may 
be seen as expressing an ‘authenticity’ that could be deployed as a counter-sign to the 
‘artificial’ culture of the urban bourgeoisie.540  
At first sight, we might agree with these historians, since Kirchner possessed 
several of Nietzsche’s works in his library and evidently read them. We know that 
Kirchner owned Thus Spake Zarathustra, The Will to Power, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the 
Idols, Dionysian Dithyrambs, and Nietzsche Letters, the latter being edited by Alfred 
Baeumler.541 In 1923, Kirchner would recall how years earlier, in 1904, Heckel’s eyes 
shone when he came to him for the first time to draw nudes and how he declaimed aloud 
from Zarathustra.542 Indeed, the Zarathustra connection was applied by Botho Graef to 
Kirchner’s work, who recalled how Nietzsche had boasted that he would show readers the 
meaning of the world. It was these words, Graef believed, which might equally be applied 
to Kirchner.543 Similarly, Vergo’s conviction is that, just as Schopenhauer’s thought is 
ubiquitous in Kandinsky’s writing, so is Nietzsche’s in Kirchner’s.544 However, in reality 
Kirchner only mentions Nietzsche, or his works three times in his letters, but there is one 
letter to Hans Gewecke of 1913 where Kirchner does refer to Zarathustra, then Ecce 
                                                                
540 See: Lloyd, J (1991), German Expressionism: Primitivism and Modernity, New Haven: Yale University Press. Also: 
Lloyd, J. & Moeller, M. (Eds.) (2003), Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: The Dresden and Berlin Years, London: Royal Academy 
of Arts and Perry, G. (1993), “Primitivism and the 'Modern'”, in: Harrison, C., Frascina, F. & Perry, G. (1993), 
Primitivism, Cubism, Abstraction: The Early Twentieth Century, London: Yale University Press, 1993, pp. 3-85. 
541 Nietzsche-Briefe. Baeumler, Alfred. Nietzsche in seinen Briefen. Illustriert. Leinwand, Ausgabe Kröner. For an 
account of Baeumler’s relationship to Nietzsche’s work see: Whyte, M., "The Uses and Abuses of Nietzsche in the 
Third Reich: Alfred Baeumler's 'Heroic Realism'," in: Journal of Contemporary History  Vol. 43, no. 2 (2008). 
542 Kirchner diary entry, 06 .03.1923. Published in: Kirchner, E. L. and Grisebach, L., E. L. Kirchners Davoser 
Tagebuch: eine Darstellung des Malers und eine Sammlung seiner Schriften ([Köln]: M. DuMont Schauberg, 1968). 
p.78. 
543 Original document appears in: The Museum of Modern Art Archives, Curt Valentin Papers. Carbon copy of a 
typewritten document, 4 pages, not dated consisting of a free translation of no. 3324, prepared by Alyse Gregory 
544 Vergo, P., "Ernst Ludwig Kirchner by Donald E. Gordon " review of Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, Donald E. Gordonin: 
The Burlington Magazine  Vol. 113, no. 823 (1971). p.616. 
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Homo specifically, and also the will to power, the will to create.545 Finally, in a letter to 
Helene Spengler of 1917, Kirchner asserts that the Zarathustra should belong to the stock 
of every library. 546  
If he really did read Zarathustra, then he must have recalled the passage where the 
prophet announces, “What is great about human beings is that they are a bridge and not a 
purpose: what is lovable about human beings is that they are a crossing over and a going 
under.”547 This passage, according to Georg Reinhart, inspired a 1905 woodcut by 
Kirchner, the central motif of which was a bridge (fig. 49).548  Moreover, Lloyd too 
perceives the inspirational influence of Zarathustra on Kirchner through this quote: 
…and one morning he rose with the dawn, stepped before the sun, and spoke to it 
thus: Great Star! What would your happiness be, if you had not those for whom 
you shine! You have come up here to my cave for ten years: you would have grown 
weary of your light and of this journey, without me, my eagle and my serpent.549 
 
She suggests that this passage represents a major convergence between Die Brücke and 
the nudist movement.550 Yet, as Christopher Short argues, her assertion is unjustified 
because the passage Lloyd has quoted from in Thus Spake Zarathustra has no connection 
to sun worship specifically, or a cult of the body in general.551 Instead, Short perceives 
                                                                
545 Kirchner to Hans Gewecke, 24.09.1913. Original in Sketchbook No. 35 in the Kirchner Museum Davos. Written by 
Erna, presumably dictated, it breaks off in the middle. It is known that Kirchner sometimes wrote letters in his 
sketchbook and tore out the pages and sent them. However, there are also drafts of letters in the sketchbooks which were 
not sent. It is not known if Gewecke received this letter. Published in: Kirchner, E. L. and Presler, G., Ernst Ludwig 
Kirchner : die Skizzenbücher : "Ekstase des ersten Sehens" : Monographie und Werkverzeichnis (Karlsruhe: Engelhardt 
& Bauer, 1996). Hans Gewecke (1906-1991), was an artist and pupil of Kirchner at the MUIM-Institut which was 
founded in Berlin 1911 by Kirchner and Pechstein. Gewecke was the NSDAP Reichstag Deputy involved in persecution 
of Jews. See also: Spielmann, H. and Schleswig-Holsteinisches Landesmuseum, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner auf Fehmarn 
(Schleswig: Schleswig-Holsteinisches Landesmuseum, Schloß Gottorf, 1997).  
546 Kirchner to Helene Spengler, 14.10.1917. Original in private collection. Letter written in a strange hand but signed 
by Kirchner. Extracts published in: Grisebach, L., Maler des Expressionismus im Briefwechsel mit Eberhard Grisebach. 
(Herausgegeben und mit einem Nachwort versehen von Lothar Grisebach.) [With reproductions, including portraits.] 
(Hamburg1962). p.72.See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 1, p. 199-200. Helene Spengler was the wife of Dr. 
Lucius Spengler (1858 -1923), director of the Schatzalp Sanatorium in Davos, and Kirchner’s doctor.  
547 Nietzsche, F. W., Caro, A. d., and Pippin, R., Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). p.7. Nietzsche uses the word ‘bridge’ as a metaphor regularly in this book as on: 
p.8, p.25, p.77, p.109, p.110, p.150, p.158, p.162, p.175. 
548 Reinhardt, G., Die frühe "Brücke": Beiträge zur Geschichte und zum Werk der Dresdner Künstlergruppe "Brücke" 
der Jahre 1905 bis 1908 (Berlin: Brüder Hartmann, 1978). See also: Lloyd. p.246. n.32. Reinhart was a merchant, an 
art collector and patron of art in Winterthur. 
549 See equivalent translation in: Nietzsche, Caro, and Pippin. p.3. 
550 Lloyd.p.246. n.32. 
551 Christopher Short, Friedrich Nietzsche and German Expressionist Art, PhD Thesis, Volume I: Text. Department of 
Art History and Theory University of Essex 1993, p.2. 
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Nietzsche to be speaking in a purely philosophical manner that “articulates in concise form 
Kantʼs ‘Copernican revolution’, in which the perceiving subject becomes the centre of the 
universe; and Nietzsche speaks this to the ‘subject’ of Copernicus universe, the sun.”552  
Lloyd is not alone in emphasising the dependence of Die Brücke artists such as 
Kirchner upon the writings of Nietzsche. Twohig, for example, suggests that “many of 
their (i.e. Die Brücke's) vitalistic celebrations of nudes playing and dancing together in 
interiors and in the open air were made while listening to each other reading from 
Nietzschean texts.”553 Short, however, whilst agreeing with Twohig about the dramatised 
readings of Nietzsche's works, points out that the execution of their art works under the 
conditions of hearing Nietzsche, is an unfounded one because, although Twohig refers to 
Reinhardtʼs Die frühe Brücke554 for evidence, this source does little to affirm her claims. 
As a result, Twohig misrepresents matters in order to express more convincingly the 
‘impact’ of Nietzsche.555 
In this chapter, during our investigations into C1 in particular, we will also seek to 
qualify this traditional reliance upon Nietzsche as a means of understanding Kirchner’s 
works - and specifically those representing the naked body from c.1904-1918. Whilst 
agreeing that Nietzschean sources were clearly important to the artists of Die Brücke, we 
Schopenhauer’s views in particular.  
 
                                                                
552 Ibid., p.2. Schopenhauer considered that Kant's ultimate achievement was to make distinct the phenomenon of 
appearance from the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich). Therefore, as Sebastian Gardener has said, “…the Copernican 
revolution consists in explaining the objects of cognition idealistically, in terms of our mode of cognition…” See: 
Sebastian Gardner, ‘Schopenhauer, Will, and the Unconscious’ in: Janaway and Online Cambridge Collections. p. 389. 
For Schopenhauer Kant’s distinction was “based on the proof that between things and us there always stands the 
intellect, and that on this account they cannot be known according to what they may be in themselves.” See: 
Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.417-418.  Jacquette adds that: “Kant's slogan 
that reason without intuition (sense experience) is empty, and intuition without concepts (innate forms of intuition or 
categories of pure understanding) is blind, summarizes the (Copernican) revolutionary synthesis of rationalism and 
empiricism.” See: Jacquette, D.  ‘Schopenhauer's metaphysics of appearance and Will in the philosophy of art’ in; 
Jacquette, D., Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts, [Reprint with corrections] ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). End note, 3, p.33. 
553 Sarah O'Brien Twohig, ‘Dix and Nietzsche’ in:Dix, O. et al., Otto Dix: 1891-1969 (London: Tate Gallery, 1992). 
p.42 
554,Reinhardt, G., Die frühe 'Brücke': Beiträge Zur Geschichte und Zum Werk der Dresdner Künstlergruppe 'Brücke' 
der Jahre 1905 bis 1908 (Berlin: Brücke-Museum, 1977). 
555 Short, Friedrich Nietzsche and German Expressionist Art. p.4. 
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3.2 Kirchner, Schopenhauer and the Platonic Idea 
 
We are referring Kirchner’s nudes to Schopenhauer’s philosophy so as to explore 
the ways in which we might interpret Kirchner’s depictions as an expression of the 
Platonic Ideas through a specific application of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Evidence for 
Kirchner’s interest in philosophy may be ascertained through the contents of his personal 
library.556 Out of his own library, Kirchner would have become acquainted with 
Schopenhauer through the numerous quotations and references made about the 
philosopher in Nietzsche’s work, a number of which have been identified above.557 
Although many of Nietzsche’s references to Schopenhauer take a negative or disparaging 
tone, Nietzsche once confessed that his essay, Schopenhauer als Erzieher (Schopenhauer 
as Educator) of 1874 “bears my innermost history, my becoming inscribed within it.”558  
Kirchner’s own introduction to Schopenhauer’s philosophy might stem from a 
visit to the 8th Munich Phalanx exhibition in 1904, to which he often referred. As 
Christoph Krekel and Heide Skowranek remark, this experience probably influenced the 
stylistic development of the artist and signals his first engagement with colour theory.559 
They argue that there are many references to theoretical works in Kirchner’s writings, and 
that he appears to have studied Goethe, Michel Eugène Chevreul, Paul Victor Jules 
Signac, and Friedrich Wilhelm Ostwald among others.560 This is corroborated by a letter 
                                                                
556 Gordon, D. E. and Kirchner, E. L., Ernst Ludwig Kirchner (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968). 
p.18. For the complete holdings in Kirchner’s library, including Nietzsche, see Kirchner, E. L. et al., E.L. Kirchner 
Dokumente: Fotos, Schriften, Briefe (Das Museum, 1980). p.353-62. 
557 It could be the case that Kirchner was a man given to display and that his personal library was an unread ornament 
to his ego. On the issue of Kirchner and self-promotion see: Weikop. 
558 Nietzsche, F. W. and Large, D., Ecce Homo: How To Become What You Are (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). p.53. Schopenhauer’s essay On Schopenhauer as Educator can be found in the English translation of 
Nietzsche, F., Breazeale, D., and Hollingdale, R. J., Nietzsche: Untimely Meditations (Cambridge University Press, 
1997). p.125-195. 
559 Kirchner first began to study art theory after being admitted to the Davos Sanatorium around 1918. Only from the 
1920s onwards, after creating the pseudonym of Louis de Marsalle, did he promote his personal theories and criticisms 
in magazines such as Genius and Der Cicerone. See: L. de Marsalle. "Uber Kirchners Graphik," Genius 3 (1921): 215-
63, and L. de Marsalle, "Uber die plastischen Arbeiten von E. L. Kirchner," Der Cicerone 17, no. 14 (1925): 695-701. 
Although Krekel et al. suggest that Kirchner became acquainted with Schopenhauer’s colour theory through the 8th 
Phalanx Exhibition of 1904, we must regard this supposition with some scepticism. 
560 Kirchner, E. L. et al., 'No One Else Has These Colors: Kirchner's Painting' (Ostfildern, Germany: Hatje Cantz, 
2012).p.84. 
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sent from Kirchner to Curt Valentin of 1937, where he wrote about an exhibition of French 
neo-Impressionists which he had visited.561 He commented that he found their drawing 
weak, and after studying the colour theory which was based on optics, he came to the 
opposite conclusion, namely not to use complementary colours but rather to allow the eye 
to produce the complement, in accordance with Goethe’s theory.562  
Kirchner’s interest in optics promised to take a new turn following his provisional 
discharge from military service in November 1915. Later, after being admitted on 15 
September 1917 to the Bellevue Sanatorium of Kreuzlingen in Switzerland, Kirchner was 
alerted to Schopenhauer’s early work On Vision and Colours. In a letter to Eberhard 
Griesbach from 1919 he states that: 
I recently read by chance that Schopenhauer wrote a theory of colors; do you know 
it? I would now like to read it. It is perhaps not good to occupy oneself with such 
theoretical matters, but it fills the idle period and yet vanishes into thin air while 
working.563 
Schopenhauer’s text mentioned by Kirchner pays homage to Goethe’s work Theory of 
Colours564 of 1810 after discussing his own ideas with Goethe between 1813 and 1814. 
Although Schopenhauer’s work had since become outdated, we can assume, along with 
Krekel and Skowranek, that Kirchner’s interest in this work was an academic one 
regarding the history of colour.565 Indeed, judging from the above letter Kirchner perhaps 
leaned more towards the practical than the theoretical. One particular leaning was towards 
                                                                
561 Kirchner to Curt Valentin, 17.04.1937. Original in The Museum of Modern Art Archives, Curt Valentin Papers, 
manuscript letter, 12 sides. Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.3, p. 1986-1988. Valentin was an art dealer, an employee 
of the Galerie Buchholz in Berlin, and in 1937 emigrated to New York, as founder of the Buchholz Gallery. 
562 Original in The Museum of Modern Art Archives, Curt Valentin Papers, manuscript letter, 12 sides. 
563 Kirchner to Eberhard Griesbach, 01.01.1919. Original in private collection. Manuscript letter, 4 sides. See: Kirchner, 
Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.1, p. 325-326. One wonders just how seriously Kirchner might have taken Schopenhauer’s 
theoretical work since he says that such as work merely ‘fills the idle period and yet vanishes into thin air while working’. 
This could imply that theoretical works meant little or nothing to him whilst working or just as likely that he prioritised 
practice over theory. 
564 Goethe, J. W. v. and Eastlake, C. L. S., Goethe's Theory of Colours, [1st ed.], new impression with index. ed. 
(London: Cass, 1967). 
565 Kirchner et al. p.89. 
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that of depicting the naked body, and Schopenhauer’s philosophy of will and 
representation offers a new way of interpreting these depictions.  
To begin with, let us note how Schopenhauer says that the act of every individual 
has a purposive aim but willing as such has no purposive aim. Every embodied individual, 
every natural phenomenon is determined by a cause with regard to its appearance in space 
and time, yet “the force manifesting itself in this phenomenon has in general no cause, for 
such a force is a stage of appearance of the thing-in-itself, of the groundless will.”566 He 
goes on to add that, “the sole self-knowledge of the will as a whole is the representation 
as a whole, the whole world of perception. It is the objectivity, the revelation, the mirror 
of the will.”567 In this chapter, we shall explore ‘the mirror of the will’ by studying 
Kirchner’s images of the naked body executed in the period c. 1905-1914.568 In order to 
achieve this, and to test C1 in particular, it is necessary to introduce Schopenhauer’s theory 
of the Platonic Ideas due to their significance within his work.  
Their significance is due to the fact that Schopenhauer stratified the world of art 
upon the kind of Idea each art communicates. Just as the will objectifies itself throughout 
nature, from the lowest forms of natural forces such as gravity to its highest form in man, 
the ‘lower’ arts communicate Ideas which concern the natural forces of nature, whilst the 
‘higher’ arts express Ideas of humanity at the highest objectification of the will.569 Thus, 
his stratification of the arts entails that the ‘lowest’ art in his hierarchy is architecture since 
it conveys the Ideas of natural forces such as gravity and rigidity. Next, in ascending order 
                                                                
566 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.165. 
567 Ibid.,Vol.1, p.165. 
568 I lean quite heavily on Donald E. Gordon’s catalogue raisonné in this chapter since it remains the most comprehensive 
source of information on Kirchner’s work at this time.  
569 Schopenhauer states that: “…man is more beautiful than all other objects, and the revelation of his inner nature is 
the highest aim of art. Human form and human expression are the most important objects of plastic art, just as human 
conduct is the most important object of poetry.” Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, 
p.210. 
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we find horticulture, historical painting and sculpture, nudes and rhetorical art, allegorical 
art, poetry, tragedy, and at the summit of his hierarchy, music. 
The relationship expressed between the body as it is ‘in itself’, and the theory of 
the Platonic Ideas, is one which refers to various grades of the will’s objectification, a 
theme discussed in the third book of Schopenhauer’s major work. This third book is 
subtitled ‘The World as Representation Second Aspect: The Representation Independent 
of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: The Platonic Idea: The Object of Art’.570 
Schopenhauer’s frontispiece to this third book employs a quotation from Plato’s Timaeus 
which asks, “What is that which eternally is, which has no origin? And what is that which 
arises and passes away, but in truth never is?”571 Whilst Schopenhauer had his own reasons 
for quoting Plato, let us endeavour to answer these questions in relation to Kirchner’s 
depictions of the nude and attempt to interpret them as manifestations of a Platonic Idea.  
Schopenhauer had a high regard for “Plato the divine” who “aims throughout 
at unity and at ascertaining the depth of things; for him all things are only letters in 
which he reads the divine Ideas.572 Yet, Schopenhauer does not agree with Plato’s 
assertion in the Republic and Parmenides that a table and chair express the Ideas of a table 
and a chair. On the contrary, Schopenhauer argues that “they express the Ideas already 
expressed in their mere material as such.”573 In addition, whilst he enlarges on the Platonic 
Idea as a perceptible reality discoverable by the mind through aesthetic experience he has 
to admit that a conflict exists between his own interpretation of the Ideas and Plato’s. He 
says that: 
[Plato] teaches (Republic, X [601], p. 288) that the object which art aims at 
expressing, the prototype of painting and poetry, is not the Idea, but the individual 
thing. The whole of our discussion so far maintains the very opposite, and Plato’s 
                                                                
570 Ibid. p.168. 
571Ibid., p.167. 
572 Schopenhauer and Hübscher. p.12. 
573 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. 
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opinion is the less likely to lead us astray, as it is the source of one of the greatest 
and best-known errors of that great man, namely of his disdain and rejection of art, 
especially of poetry.574           
 
We shall follow Schopenhauer’s discussion in this chapter, and by applying his philosophy 
examine individuated nude bodies in Kirchner’s art insofar as they relate to their eternal 
prototypes as Platonic Ideas. 
3.3 The Nude as Idea Independent of Time, Space and Causality 
 
 
Regardless of whether Kirchner’s nudes relate to their eternal prototypes or not, 
his earliest attempts at depicting nudes may have been a communal one. This is because 
Die Brücke artists were dissatisfied with academic approaches to life drawing in their 
Technical High School. As a result, they decided to organise their own life classes, 
allowing only a quarter-hour for each pose, thereby prompting the artist to capture it 
quickly. Evidence for this comes from a letter to Dr. Eberhard Grisebach, where Kirchner 
recalled that early on in their Brücke careers, several times a week members of the group 
came to his studio to paint nudes.575 However, there is evidence of another kind in a letter 
to Graef of 21.09.1916, where Kirchner reveals that he had difficulties in depicting the 
human body and how “through the medium of a friend I futilely drew anatomy and many 
nudes in my own studio and in the evening at evening school.”576 
Among his early works Kirchner produced Nude on Patterned Bed Cover in 1904 
(fig. 50), which was probably based upon Félix Edouard Vallotton’s woodcut Laziness of 
                                                                
574 Ibid.Vol.1, p.212. See also: Janaway, ‘Knowledge and tranquillity: Schopenhauer on the value of art’ in: Jacquette, 
Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts. p.43. 
575 Dated to 08.01.1918. Original document in a private collection. Manuscript letter in another hand, 4 pages. Fragment 
without an ending or signature. Kirchner was writing about the history of Die Brücke - he does not give clear dates for 
the events he writes about. See also: Selz, Peter. “E. L. Kirchner's “Chronik der Brücke.” College Art Journal 10, no. 1 
(1950): 50-54. Grisebach was an art historian, philosopher, and head of the Jena Art Society. He acted as a patron and 
supporter of Kirchner. 
576 Kirchner to Botho Graef 21.09.1916. Original in private collection. Manuscript letter, 3 sides. Published in: 
Grisebach. p.53. See: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.1, p.144-145. Graef was an archaeologist, art historian, friend 
of Kirchner, and belonged to the George circle. 
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1896 (fig. 51). Of this nude, Gordon observes that “the sinuous rhythms used by Kirchner 
in outlining the figure create that same fin de siècle air of sensuous self-indulgence that is 
expressed in this Valotton.”577 Indeed, during the Autumn and Winter of 1905-1906, 
Kirchner’s approach to the nude was influenced by two exhibitions in Dresden, firstly the 
November 1905 exhibition of Vincent van Gogh’s works and secondly, the February 1906 
exhibition of Edvard Munch’s work held at the Sächsischer Kunstverein (Saxon Art 
Association.).578 Although Gordon points out that during 1906 Kirchner’s style continued 
to be influenced by post-Impressionist sources in part, he adds that throughout 1909 and 
1910 Kirchner’s whole graphic style was “as pervasively and subtly conditioned by 
Matisse’s prints as it was earlier by Munch’s.”579  
Whilst Kirchner’s 1906 woodcut Nude among Sunflowers (fig. 52) may have been 
conditioned by Munch’s symbolism there is an element of Art Nouveau influence in the 
nude’s curvilinear line.580 In addition, as Gordon has argued, “Matisse’s 1906 lithograph 
Half Length Nude, Eyes Cast Down (fig. 53) is alone the most probable progenitor for a 
long series of Kirchner lithographs of female nudes in the course of the year 1909, 
executed almost wholly in line.”581 Indeed, Kirchner’s Girl Washing Her Breasts of 1909 
(fig.54), expresses something of Matisse’s ‘vitalism’ whose sinuous economy of line 
would become the signature style of Die Brücke’s Dresden period lithography.  
                                                                
577 Gordon, D. E., "Kirchner in Dresden," in: The Art Bulletin  Vol. 48, no. 3/4 (1966). p.338. See also: Meier-Graefe, 
J., Felix Vallotor biographie de cet artiste avec la partie la plus importante de son oeuvre (Berlin ; Paris: J.A. Stargardt-
E. Lagot, 1898). p.83. 
578 The Munch exhibition was reviewed by Richard Stiller in: "Sächsischen Kunstverein," Dresdener Anzeiger, 53 
(February 24, 1906), 4; Similarly, note Paul Fechter in: “Im Sächsischen Kunstverein” Dresdener neueste Nachrichten, 
51 (23.2. 1906). There are two books by Schopenhauer in Munch’s library, as in Parerga und Paralipomena. Kleine 
philosophische Schriften, Leipzig, Reclam Verlag, 1895 and Sämmtliche Werke III, Leipzig, Reclams Universal 
Bibliothek, Nr 2801-2805, [s.n] 
579 Gordon. p.349. 
580 Ibid., p.340. 
581 Ibid., p.349. 
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If a Matissian ‘vitalism’ could be attributed to Girl Washing Her Breasts, then it 
might be interpreted through Schopenhauer’s vitalist philosophy.582 However, as Leslie 
White points out, ‘vitalism’ is an imprecise term with each theoretician of it developing 
their own methodology. Schopenhauer’s ‘vitalism’ for instance arose from the striving 
will, while Thomas Carlyle’s arose from the dynamism of a changing world, and 
Bergson’s version of it highlighted the concept of élan vital. More importantly, White 
argues that: 
Broadly put, when a rational orientation to the world ceased to be adequate, when 
rationalism devolved into a falsification of reality’s authentic energy, major 
vitalists came into existence and posited as the true reality a primitive, universal 
force of which everything in that reality is an objectification.583 
 
In line with this, Axel Pérez Trujillo believes that the search for a ‘primitive, universal 
force’ accelerated from the early 1800s onwards, thereby undermining a mechanised 
model of the world. By that he means to tell us that “philosophies of the ‘machine of life’ 
characteristic of the age of Descartes gave way to the more dynamic idea of ‘vital 
properties’ or vitalism”.584 However, the shift away from the concept of ‘machine life’ 
may have begun earlier through the work of the French physician Xavier Bichat (1771-
1802) and subsequently pursued by Schopenhauer who discerned a metaphysical solution 
                                                                
582 There is no evidence that Matisse ever read Schopenhauer, no trace of the philosopher in the list of books in Matisse 
Atelier (Nice) made in 1943 (see Archives at Paul Getty Center, Special Collections, 850855A, Folder 10). Nor is there 
evidence for that matter in his personal papers, correspondence or agendas about what he was reading. Although there 
exists, in the library of Georges Duthuit (the husband of his daughter), Schopenhauer’s Le Fondement de la morale and 
Le Monde comme volonté et comme representation, it would be mere speculation to propose that Matisse could have 
borrowed these books from him. That said, if there is any plausible link to be found it would be early in the 20th century 
when Matisse, along with Prichard and Duthuit, attended a series of Bergson’s conferences. But again, this does not 
allow any speculation about Matisse reading Schopenhauer. However, we do know that Matisse, when discussing the 
nature of fleeting impressions and delicate sensations as found in Monet and Sisley, uses the Bergsonian term durée in 
his Notes d’un peinture. (I am grateful to Wanda de Guébriant at the Archives Matisse for her kind assistance in these 
matters). 
583 White, L., ""Uproar in the Echo": Browning's Vitalist Beginnings," in: Browning Institute Studies  Vol. 15 
(1987).p..91. 
584 The Strange Case of 19th Century Vitalism, El extraño caso del vitalismo del siglo XIX, Axel Pérez Trujillo, 
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Recibido: 15/09/2011, Aprobado: 20/12/2011. p.65. 
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to the problems of anatomy and thereby created “a provocative hybrid of the medical and 
philosophical perspectives.”585 
Although ‘vitalism’ has often been associated with a philosophy of science, 
Richard A. Lofthouse has argued that references to a vital unifying force as one which 
sustains the Universe played a significant part in early twentieth century art and culture. 
Through his study of Otto Dix and Max Beckmann, Stanley Spencer and Jacob Epstein, 
Lofthouse argues that from c.1900 onwards, the artists of this period faced a far more 
inchoate world in which positivism and secularisation were challenged. 
On the basis of ‘vitalism’, Schopenhauer was able to introduce  a unitary concept 
of nature which was congruent at a Platonic level.586 If nature is commensurable with a 
Platonic model then how does Schopenhauer define a Platonic Idea? His definition is that: 
…by Idea I understand every definite and fixed grade of the will’s objectification, 
in so far as it is thing-in-itself and is therefore foreign to plurality. These grades 
are certainly related to individual things as their eternal forms, or as their 
prototypes.587 
 
While Plato proposed that an eternal Form or Idea could be an archetypal Man or Woman, 
through which all individual men or women are particularised types which they imitate, 
Schopenhauer by contrast refers the archetypal Man or Woman to particular grades of the 
will’s objectification. His doctrine of the Ideas also explains natural forces, natural species 
and those aspects of the world left unexplained by science. Additionally, we must note 
that although the Ideas are manifestations of the will, contrary to Plato they are not 
constitutive of fundamental reality since they are only objectifications of the will. Ideas 
are objects of thought and are situated within the most elementary form of representation, 
as between subject and object. The Ideas are not the thing-in-itself per se, nor are they 
                                                                
585Ibid., p.69. 
586 Schopenhauer, A. et al., The World as Will and Representation. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010).p. xxvi. 
587 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.130. 
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plural.588 
As the most elementary form of representations, the Ideas in Kirchner’s work 
would not vindicate C1, even though they are the most adequate objectivity of the will 
since they are not the will per se. However, we may regard a Kirchner nude as an example 
of the Idea of a human being, whereby the individual phenomenon of a particular human 
has no ‘real’ existence but only a relative one compared to the Idea of the human being - 
which alone possesses true being. Consequently, in order to know what the nude is in 
itself, independent of time, space and causality, a different type of knowledge from 
sensory knowledge would be needed.589 Therefore, we must establish what this different 
type of knowledge is.  
Schopenhauer agrees with Kant that the forms of knowledge in time, space and 
causality are merely the ‘arrangement of our intellect’, by which the truly existing unity 
of the Idea manifests itself to us as plurality. When we apprehend paintings such as Three 
Nudes under Trees of 1913 (fig. 55) through this ‘arrangement’, then this form of 
knowledge is called immanent in contrast to knowledge of things as they truly are, which 
is called transcendental knowledge.590 By taking his cue from Kant, Schopenhauer 
observes that we acquire this knowledge in the abstract, but that it may also appear 
intuitively in atypical cases.591 However, the Idea and thing-in-itself for Schopenhauer are 
not the same, since Schopenhauer states that: 
…on the contrary, for us the Idea is only the immediate, and therefore 
adequate, objectivity of the thing-in-itself, which itself, however, is the will 
- the will insofar as it is not yet objectified, has not yet become 
representation.592  
 
                                                                
588 Cartwright. p.134. 
589 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.173. 
590 The concepts of immanent and transcendental knowledge were also broached in relation to Kandinsky’s art in 
Chapter 1. As did Kant, Schopenhauer asserts that his philosophy remains within the realm of experience, hence the 
term immanent. 
591Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.173. 
592 Ibid., p.174. 
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For Kant, the thing-in-itself was free from all forms of knowledge per se, yet according to 
Schopenhauer, Kant’s error was to avoid the concept of ‘being object for a subject’ since 
this is the most universal form of all representations. By contrast, Plato’s Idea is a known 
object, a representation, and therefore distinguishes it from the thing-in-itself.  
From Schopenhauer’s position, the Idea has been divested of the subordinate forms 
of phenomenon pertaining to the principle of sufficient reason while retaining the most 
universal form of representation by ‘being object for a subject’. It is the principle of 
sufficient reason which multiplies the universal Ideas into particular things and gives us 
the appearance of diversity. We might perceive this scenario in Kirchner’s Bathers 
Throwing Reeds of 1909 (fig. 56) which portrays naked bodies as particular things. 
Therefore, we may conceive of how “… the principle of sufficient reason is again the form 
into which the Idea enters, since the Idea comes into the knowledge of the subject as 
individual.”593 
 
3.4 Kirchner, Nudity and Historical Context 
 
 
That the Ideas depicted by Kirchner, entered the principle of sufficient reason must 
imply that his painted images belong to art history somehow. Rather than being 
disembodied images deracinated from other creative styles his nudes were developed and 
located within an historical context. For example, the Fauvist influence on Kirchner’s 
development was enhanced in September 1908 when he visited the Emil Richter Salon in 
Dresden. There the work of French Fauve artists Albert Marquet, Maurice de Vlaminck, 
Pierre-Narcisse Guérin, Achille-Émile Othon Friesz, Cornelis van Dongen, and Jean Puy 
was on display. As a consequence, it is likely that Kirchner’s late 1908 Nude in Tub Seen 
from Above 594 (fig. 57) was derived from Marquet’s drawing Nude (not dated) (fig. 58), 
                                                                
593 Ibid., p.175. 
594 Now lost.  
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thus demonstrating an assimilation of Fauvist practices. In particular, Marquet and Van 
Dongen’s work acted as the immediate grounds for the greatest transformation of style up 
to that point in Kirchner’s development.595 From this it can also be inferred that Van 
Dongen’s work, as exhibited at Richter’s exhibition, inspired Kirchner’s Dancer with Bent 
Back, of 1910 (fig. 59).596 
Although Kirchner received formal training in draughtsmanship at Chemnitz and 
Munich, he “learned that exact representation could not be achieved through objective 
faithfulness to nature.”597 In fact Kirchner wrote, “I was astonished; there was after all a 
form which could exactly represent something, a man, a movement etc, and yet which 
differed from the objective natural form.”598 This led him to examine the drawings of the 
old masters, and to question whether it was possible to create an art which would be 
comprehensible to all, without producing an ‘ideal’ likeness to nature, by using a symbolic 
language of forms.  
 The woodcut Seated Nude seen from the Back of 1906 (fig. 60), reveals how he 
began to evolve his idiosyncratic representations of form between 1906-1909; Gordon 
suggesting that this nude “is a most successful graphic embodiment of a late Impressionist 
concern for the optical effects of light and shadow.”599 However, it was not until Kirchner 
painted Three Nudes in the Forest in 1908 that he achieved a more distinctive form of 
expression, and as Gordon concludes, through its strident colours the painting may be 
regarded as the first Fauvist painting  produced in Germany, and  as such is a prelude to 
Kirchner’s Moritzburg nudes which would appear in later years.600 Two years later in 
                                                                
595 Gordon. p.347. 
596 Ibid., p.347. 
597 Gordon and Kirchner. p.19. 
598 Original in Max Beckmann Archive. Manuscript document, 12 sides. Fragments of an autobiography. Published in: 
Hagemann, C. et al., Kirchner, Schmidt-Rottluff, Nolde, Nay - : Briefe an den Sammler und Mäzen Carl Hagemann 
1906-1940 : Briefe von Hermann Blumenthal ... [et al.] (Ostfildern: H. Cantz, 2004). No page number given. 
599 Gordon and Kirchner. p.19 
600 Ibid., p.53 
- 174 - 
 
1910, Kirchner agreed with Heckel and Pechstein that they would work together at the 
lakes around Moritzburg near Dresden, one of the aesthetic playgrounds for Die Brücke 
throughout the summers of 1909 to 1911. This is confirmed in a letter of 1910, sent to 
Gustave Schiefler, in which Kirchner states that there was nothing more charming than 
nudes in the open air.601 Subsequently, this attraction for contemplating nudes in the open 
air lasted throughout his life, especially with ‘ideal’ models Nina Hard and Lotte Rohner-
Kraft.602    
This contemplation of the ideal body for Kirchner, and many others at the time, 
took place within the context of Germany’s Nacktkultur movement. Nacktkultur mirrored 
the self-reflexivity of the modern individual as its practitioners sought a way of 
reconnecting with nature in the open air.603 To render oneself naked could be seen as a 
social statement designed to re-assert the individual’s will in opposition to the norm for 
wearing clothes, which was deemed artificial.604 The concept of Nacktkultur was reputedly 
invented by Heinrich Pudor in 1903, although it could also be said that Nacktkultur 
materialised earlier during the 1870s as one of a number of social reform movements, 
including vegetarianism and alternative therapies.605 The hope in each case was to initiate 
                                                                
601 Kirchner to Gustave Schiefler, dated 19.07.1910. Original in the Universitäts- und Staatsbibliothek Hamburg. 
Manuscript letter, 2 sides. Published in:  Kirchner, E. L., Schiefler, G., and Henze, W., Briefwechsel, 1910-1935/1938: 
mit Briefen von und an Luise Schiefler und Erna Kirchner sowie weiteren Dokumenten aus Schieflers-Korrespondenz-
Ablage (Stuttgart: Belser, 1990). See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.1, p.44. Schiefler, was the District Court 
Director in Hamburg, an art collector, author of essays on art history and catalogues of graphic works by Illies, 
Liebermann, Munch, Nolde, and Kirchner. 
602 Nina Hard and Lotte Kraft-Rohner posed naked for Kirchner at different times. There are several photographs, 
drawings etc. in the collection of E. W. Kornfeld. One may find the photographs in the catalogue by Roland Scotti / 
Kirchner Museum Davos (2005): Das fotografische Werk. See for example: Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, photographs of 
Lotte Kraft-Rohner, unknown woman, Erna Kirchner, 1929, cat. 336q, p. 208; cat. 336s, p. 213; cat. 3360, p. 212. The 
catalogue contains a series of photographs from the same day. Nina Hard visited Kirchner and Erna Schilling in the 
summer of 1921 in Davos and stayed with them for several months. Hard was a dancer and actress. Rohner-Kraft was 
a violinist, friend of Erna Kirchner, and wife of the painter Hans Rohner (1898-1972). 
603 Self-reflexivity should be understood as a self-conscious re-negotiation of the individual’s body with modern society. 
As Ross Chad argues, Germans were persuaded by the nudist movements to “lose their feelings of bodily shame.” See: 
Ross, C., Naked Germany: Health, Race and the Nation (Berg, 2005). p.127. 
604Schönemann, F., "Zurück zur Natur!," in: Kraft und Schönheit  Vol. 6 (1901). 
605 Pudor pioneered nudism in Germany, was a nationalist and held some anti-Semitic views. Something of a polymath 
he studied art history and philosophy when at the University of Leipzig from 1886-87. Whilst at the University of 
Heidelberg he completed a dissertation on Schopenhauer’s philosophy of music in 1889. See: Messing, S. Schubert in 
the European Imagination. University of Rochester Press, 2006. p.124. 
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a therapeutic intervention against the perils of modernity and stimulate a regeneration of 
the body.606 
The vision for a comprehensive regeneration of the body was reflected in Pudor’s 
chapter ‘The Will to Life’ as featured in his work Nacktkultur. Here, Pudor shows that he 
had read Schopenhauer’s ‘theory of the will’, although for the purposes of Nacktkultur he 
found the philosopher too pessimistic. Even so, Pudor believed that the strength of the 
individual’s will could prolong their life and he remarked that:  
…are not all the sages of the world of all times united in saying that not only 
belief, but also the will, can move mountains? I remember Kant’s essay ‘The 
power of feeling’, also Schopenhauer’s ‘The world as will and representation’. 
What a shame, that Schopenhauer was a pessimist and that he didn’t use his theory 
of the will to prolong human life.607 
 
The desire to employ the will to affirm and prolong life took place through regional 
networks which were privately run for both sexes.608 These networks gained in popularity 
during the Weimar period, being a diverse phenomenon often reflecting internal and 
political rivalries. Far from being anti-intellectual, it spawned a considerable philosophical 
discourse that ascribed deep metaphysical significance to the human body.609 Indeed, Karl 
Toepfer suggests that “Nacktkultur consistently presented itself as a sign of modernity and 
an aspect of modernism rather than as a reaction against both.”610 Therefore, within this 
context, Kirchner and his fellow Die Brücke artists expressed not only an aspect of 
German modernity but their own brand of modernism through depictions of the naked 
body.  
                                                                
606 Wahr, K., "Nacktheit und Sittlichkeit," in: Deutsch-Hellas erste ill. Reform-Zeitschr. zur Gesundung d. gesamten 
nationalen Lebens; zugl. Organ d. Buttenstedt'schen Empfingunsphilosophie  Vol. 2 (1907), no. 6. Vol.2, p.6. 
607 Pudor, Heinrich : Die Probleme des Lebens und der Zeugungi n: Pudor, H., Nackt-Kultur Bdchen. 3 (Berlin-Steglitz: 
Pudor, 1907). Die Nackt-Kultur v. 3, p.13. 
608 “Membership in the more than two hundred German nudist clubs seems to have appealed equally to men and women. 
The documentation and imagery of Freikörperkultur nudity was prodigious, perhaps because human nudity had such a 
complicated impact on perception that it was impossible to have enough documentation or ‘explanation’ of it.” Toepfer. 
p.30. 
609 Ibid., p.31. 
610 Ibid., p.31. 
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The individual models, who posed naked for Kirchner and his fellow artists, may 
be regarded as indirect objectifications of the will, or the thing-in-itself. Therefore, 
standing between particular things such as nudes and the will:  
…the Idea still stands as the only direct objectivity of the will, since it has not 
assumed any other form peculiar to knowledge as such, except that of the 
representation in general, i.e., that of being object for a subject. Therefore, it alone 
is the most adequate objectivity possible of the will or of the thing-in-itself; indeed, 
it is even the whole thing-in-itself, only under the form of the representation.611 
 
If particular nudes in Kirchner’s art can be theorised as Ideas, then they were ‘the most 
adequate objectivity possible of the will’. In addition, since these Ideas were a form of 
representational knowledge, and ‘the whole thing-in-itself only under the form of the 
representation’, as Ideas they refute C1 given their overt absence of will. Thus, when we 
interpret this possibility through Schopenhauer’s theory, that which Kirchner theoretically 
apprehended in a particular naked body was an attempt by nature to aspire to a perfection 
of the universal Idea ‘as the only direct objectivity of the will’. Yet, for knowledge of a 
universal Idea to occur through contemplation of the naked body, it is necessary that a 
change takes place in the viewing subject (the viewer of the nude, whether artist or others).  
 
3.5 Aesthetic Contemplation of the Nude 
 
 
With regards to the above assertion, and according to Schopenhauer, “such a 
change is analogous and corresponds to that great change of the whole nature of the object, 
and by virtue of it the subject, in so far as it knows an Idea, is no longer individual.”612 
Since knowledge is ordinarily in the service of the will, and all knowledge governed by 
the principle of sufficient reason remains locked in servitude to the will, an artist must 
apprehend the Idea of the nude according to a different kind of knowledge. The issue 
                                                                
611 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.175. 
612 Ibid., p.176. 
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becomes problematic when considering what value Kirchner’s nude images, or any other 
art, would possess if it only served as knowledge for the will of the artist or viewer.  
If we apply this problem to Kirchner’s Two Nudes in a Landscape of c.1908-10 
(fig. 61), then how viewers gaze at the nudes involved may be limited to distracting 
thoughts ranging from the sexual to the facture of the work. Therefore, a viewer’s quality 
of mind is measured by how they look at the external world, how deeply or superficially. 
Indeed, this belief led Schopenhauer to adduce that “the ordinary European’s gaze is often 
almost like the animal’s, and he would never suspect the invisible in the visible, if he were 
not told about it by others.” 613  
When looking at paintings such as Kirchner’s Nude before Green Sofa of 1908 
(fig. 62), then how can we make the appropriate transitional change and begin to ‘suspect 
the invisible in the visible’? Schopenhauer’s answer is that: 
…the transition that is possible but to be regarded only as an exception, from the 
common knowledge of particular things to knowledge of the Idea takes place 
suddenly since knowledge tears itself free from the service of the will precisely by 
the subject’s ceasing to be merely individual and being now a pure will-less subject 
of knowledge.  
 
In theory, such a transition made by the subject of knowledge (Subjekt des Erkennens) 614 
could begin with aesthetic contemplation of a nude. During contemplation, the subject 
(the artist or viewer) ceases to follow relationships according to the principle of sufficient 
                                                                
613 Schopenhauer and Hübscher.Vol.1, p.4. 
614 Janaway notes that: “Payne renders Subjekt des Erkennens as ‘subject of knowledge’. Schopenhauer also calls the 
subject of cognition ‘the representing I’ (das vorstellende Ich); Payne translates this phrase as ‘the ego that represents’ 
(FR 208/H. 1, 141), marking a contrast to the represented I or the I as object. In general, Schopenhauer restricts the use 
of the term ‘I’ to the intellectualist function of self.” See: Janaway and Online Cambridge Collections. p.41. 
Schopenhauer himself states that: “From what has been said, the subject of knowing can never be known or become 
object or representation.” See: Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason [in English; German (translation)].  La Salle, Ill: Open Court, 1974. p.210. On Schopenhauer’s 
declaration that ‘The world is my representation’, Janaway argues that “it is nothing but the totality of representations 
that appear to the subject. But the ‘subject of knowledge’ to which the world as representation appears is merely an 
‘indivisible point’. It cannot be encountered in experience, just as the eye ‘sees everything except itself’. Nevertheless, 
it is a ‘centre of all existence’ and determines the limits of the world. For the world is my representation, and the Idea 
of a world without a representing subject is a contradiction in terms.” See: The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer. 
p.445. 
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reason and instead becomes fully absorbed with the contemplated object.615 By ceasing to 
follow the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, which are in servitude to the will, 
the artist or viewers of a painted nude, or any other beautiful object in nature, theoretically 
do not let abstract thoughts distract them from the contemplated object. In doing so they 
become completely absorbed in perception, filling their consciousness with calm 
contemplation of the object. Thus, theoretically, the viewing subjects lose themselves in 
the contemplated object forgetting their individuality and the demands of their will. As a 
result, they: 
…continue to exist only as pure subject, as clear mirror of the object, so that it is 
as though the object alone existed without anyone to perceive it, and thus we are 
no longer able to separate the perceiver from the perception, but the two have 
become one, since the entire consciousness is filled and occupied by a single image 
of perception.616 
 
Therefore, the nude in Kirchner’s above-mentioned work as an object has stepped out of 
all relation to that which is external to it, and the viewing subject in turn has stepped out 
of relations to their will. The effect upon the artist and viewer in theory repudiates C1, 
since the viewer and artist, by engaging in aesthetic contemplation cease to be purely 
individual. This means that, having lost themselves in aesthetic contemplation they 
become a “pure will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge.”617 Through this form 
of contemplation, particular naked bodies as objects have as a consequence become the 
Idea of their species, just as the perceiving individual in turn develops into the pure subject 
of knowing.618 
What this means is that individuals, not engaging in aesthetic contemplation, know 
only particular things, whereas the pure subject of knowledge, through aesthetic 
                                                                
615 Schopenhauer states that “…as regards the objective element of such aesthetic intuitive perception, the (Platonic) 
Idea, this may be described as that which we should have before us if time, this formal and subjective condition of our 
knowledge, were withdrawn, like the glass from the kaleidoscope.” Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.2, p.420. 
616 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.178. 
617 Ibid., p.179. 
618 Ibid. 
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contemplation, rises into knowledge of the eternal Ideas. The individual as a phenomenon 
of the will is bound to the principle of sufficient reason, “therefore all knowledge which 
relates itself to this, also follows the principle of sufficient reason, and no other knowledge 
than this is fit to be of any use to the will; it always has relations to the object.”619  
If all this is possible, then in order to make such an epistemic transition to the 
Platonic Ideas, through contemplating Two Reclining Nudes of 1909 (fig. 63) for example, 
the specific process required of Kirchner and his viewers of it would be as follows: 
First of all, a knowing individual raises himself in the manner described to the pure 
subject of knowing, and at the same time raises the contemplated object to the 
Idea; the world as representation then stands out whole and pure, and the complete 
objectification of the will takes place, for only the Idea is the adequate objectivity 
of the will.620 
 
The viewer can only obtain true knowledge of the world as representation when subject 
and object penetrate each other completely. That is to say, when the Idea becomes ‘visible’ 
neither the subject nor the object can be discerned in it, since the Idea as the most adequate 
objectification of the will, the actual world as representation, emerges only when “subject 
and object reciprocally fill and penetrate each other completely.”621  
If Kirchner wished to portray and experience a nude in a state of objective aesthetic 
contemplation, then we may ask what the purpose of this state might be according to 
Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer’s answer is that the purpose behind aesthetic contemplation 
is to silence the will and, for a while at least, to enter into a better consciousness.622 An 
individual would want this silence because all willing implies deficiency (Bedürfnis) or 
                                                                
619 Ibid. 
620 Ibid. Since the ‘world as representation stands out whole and pure’, unadulterated by the will, this process appears 
to refute C1. 
621 Ibid., p.180. 
622 Janaway illustrates this as follows: “What is the ‘better consciousness’ better than? It is better than empirical, spatio-
temporal consciousness, to which it is fundamentally opposed. The world of empirical consciousness is associated with 
‘a wrong direction from which virtue and asceticism are the return journey,’ which is why Plato ‘calls the entire life of 
the sage a long dying, i.e. a breaking away from such a world.’ This better consciousness is a super-sensuous and extra-
temporal consciousness (pp. 43-44), which has moral or religious significance, but it is also aroused when something 
affects us aesthetically, and in art it expresses itself as genius. Art, whether in a still life painting or in a tragedy, enables 
the better consciousness, and does so by revealing some “Platonic Idea” (p. 43). The better consciousness is connected 
‘indissolubly’ with Ideas (p. 83).” See: Janaway Knowledge and Tranquility: Schopenhauer on the Value of Art, in: 
Jacquette, Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts. p.40-41. See also: Vandenabeele, Bart. A Companion to 
Schopenhauer [in English]. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. p.72. 
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lack, which is only brought to an end by satisfactions which are temporary. Therefore, an 
achieved object of willing cannot satisfy for long, since it merely postpones distress until 
another day.623 
If an external or internal cause takes an individual out of this vicious circle of 
willing then it “snatches knowledge from the thraldom of the will.”624 Thus, when freed 
from the subjection to the will we are able to perceive objects such as nudes with a degree 
of objectivity - as pure representations. This process runs contrary to treating things as 
interesting objects which engage us with a greater degree of subjectivity. Consequently, 
according to Schopenhauer, through this process we find peace and “we celebrate the 
Sabbath of the penal servitude of willing; the wheel of Ixion stands still.”625 As a result, 
this process in theory leads to knowledge of the Idea when individuals are able to forget 
themselves and their will. In which case the experience of the Ideas effectively undermines 
C1, since the world as representation stands out clearly and alone. 
This experience occurs via a thorough absorption with a beautiful object of 
contemplation whilst in a state of perception which purportedly stands outside of spatio-
temporal relations. However, this experience pertains only to those whose ‘inward 
disposition’ has a greater degree of knowing compared to willing.626 That Kirchner 
possessed such a disposition may be gathered from a letter to Grisebach of 1918, in which 
he comments how “as a boy I lived in aesthetic contemplation (Anschauung) and drew 
what was visible…”627 He continued to develop an ability for aesthetic contemplation 
throughout his career, assimilating creative influences along the way as in Nude Group II 
of 1907 (fig. 64), which was displayed in the September 1908 Brücke exhibition.26 This 
                                                                
623 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.196. 
624 Ibid. 
625 Ibid. 
626 Ibid., p.197. 
627 Kirchner to Dr. Eberhard Grisebach, 28.01.918. Original document in a private collection. Manuscript letter in 
another hand, 4 pages. Fragment without an ending or signature. See: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.1, p.240-242. 
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was his first representation of multiple figures to issue from the imagination as opposed 
to perceptual reality.628 By early 1909, his assimilation of Fauvism had developed further 
through his visits to other exhibitions. The influence of these would last for many years, 
the most lasting arising from the January Matisse exhibition at Paul Cassirer’s Berlin 
Gallery with its “fine drawings of nudes.”629 
3.6 The Influences of Matisse, Munch and the Beautiful 
 
 
Among the exhibits in Berlin were Matisse’s Reclining Nude I (Aurora) a bronze 
sculpture of 1907 (fig. 65), and his painting Blue Nude of 1907 (fig. 66). However, in a 
letter to Frédéric Bauer of 1934, Kirchner denied any such influence on the grounds that, 
“as Matisse was completely unknown in Germany in 1904-06, there can be no thought of 
his influence, just as little as with Munch.”630 Furthermore, in a 1919 letter to Helene 
Spengler from Frauenkirch, Kirchner objected to being described as a ‘pupil’ of 
Matisse.631 Kirchner added that he would have liked to hang his early work next to some 
of Matisse’s, just to see how people reached this odd conclusion.632 Yet, Gordon argues 
that: 
Matisse’s Fauve style was requisite to Kirchner’s, in sum, but from its first 
maturity in early 1909 Kirchner’s Fauve style was clearly the more radical in 
distortion. Kirchner’s fascination with Matisse’s anatomical distortions of the 
female figure was to endure for a considerable period after his original contact 
with the French sources.633 
 
                                                                
628 Gordon and Kirchner. p.53. 
629 Anonymous, "Von Ausstellungen-Berlin," Die Kunst für Alle, 11 (published February 11), 1909, 272. The Matisse 
exhibition was apparently installed before Christmas, 1908; cf. Barr, 1951, os108. 
630 Kirchner to Frédéric Bauer, dated 23.02.1934. Original in Kirchner Museum, Davos. Manuscript letter, 4 pages. 
Published in: Kirchner, E. L., Bauer, F., and Delfs, H., Kirchner und Dr. Bauer: Briefe von Ernst Ludwig Kirchner an 
Dr. Frédéric Bauer; mit einer Dokumentation der Sammlung Bauer (Davos2004). Kirchner, EL, Briefe an Dr. Frédéric 
Bauer, Magazin V, 2004, no. 78. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.3, p. 1770-1771. 
631 It is not known which criticism he is referring to. 
632 Kirchner to Helene Spengler, 04.03.1919. Original in private collection. Manuscript letter, 2 sides. See also: Kirchner, 
Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol 1, p. 353-354. 
633 Gordon. p.348. 
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Kirchner’s denial of Matisse’s influence on his own work appears ten years later in a letter 
to Spengler of 1919 when he wrote that, “Today I received some Matisse reproductions. 
What they are supposed to have in common with my works is quite unclear to me.”634 
Despite Kirchner’s protestations of 1919, Gordon does not take the artist at his word and 
has related the upper body as found in Kirchner’s woodcut Nude Girl Reclining of 1910, 
to the Matisse sculpture Reclining Nude I, and suggests that similar features have been 
appropriated from Matisse’s painting Blue Nude and then translated into Kirchner’s 
woodcut Recumbent Nude Woman of 1910 (fig. 67). Gordon feels convinced that “the 
crossed legs, spread buttocks and strongly arched spinal column of the Recumbent Nude 
Woman may be seen to derive ultimately from another Matisse source, the Seated Nude 
woodcut of early 1906.”635 He also suggests that Girl under Japanese Umbrella of 1909 
(fig. 68) parallels Matisse’s Woman with Hat and Portrait of a Woman with a Green Stripe 
of late 1905 (fig.69 & fig. 70) seen by Kirchner in the January,1909 exhibition at 
Cassirer’s.636  
Despite Gordon’s reading, in a letter to Schiefler of 1919 Kirchner protested 
against Paul Ferdinand Schmidt’s criticism of his works when shown in Frankfurt’s 
Gallery Ludwig Schames.637 He wrote, “My works are once again suffering strong 
hostility, and I am charged with early imitation of Nolde, Matisse, Munch etc, when I 
didn’t even know their names at that time.”638 Although Kirchner denied Munch’s 
                                                                
634 Kirchner to Helene Spengler 16.03.1919. Original in private collection, manuscript letter, 3 sides. See also; Kirchner, 
Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.1, p. 356-357. The influence of Matisse on Kirchner’s Dresden works is verifiable, as Gordon 
suggests, but Kirchner’s discussion with Spengler was ended by the criticism of the Frankfurt exhibition, which 
contained primarily works from Berlin, Fehmarn, Jena and Konigstein, in which the connection with Matisse is hard to 
prove. 
635 Gordon. p.348.  
636 Ibid., p.349. 
637 Kirchner had four exhibitions at the Gallery Ludwig Schames: October 1916, February-March 1919 (graphic 
works), January-February 1920 (paintings), 22 January-28 February 1922 (paintings and works on paper). 
638 Kirchner to Gustav Schiefler, 31.03.1919. Original in the Universitäts- und Staatsbibliothek Hamburg. Manuscript 
letter, 2 sides. Published in: Kirchner, Schiefler, and Henze; ibid. Stuttgart 1990, no.106. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and 
Kornfeld. Vol.1, p. 362 for how Kirchner kept abreast of contemporary art criticism, and had was always well-informed 
about the artistic currents of his time. In a postcard to Max Pechstein and Erich Heckel, dated 12.01.1909, the content 
proves that he had seen works by Matisse early in 1909 at Cassirer’s Gallery in Berlin See: Original postcard in 
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northern influence and that of Matisse, his Four Bathers of 1909 (fig. 71), certainly 
imitated the plein-air practice of the Impressionists during his first summer trip to the 
lakes of Moritzburg. On this occasion, he was accompanied by Heckel, plus selected 
female models including the child models Fränzi and Marzella.639 When the females went 
about naked, Kirchner painted the beauty of his models with extempore rapidity, as is the 
case with Girls Bathing, Lake Moritzburg of 1909 and Reclining Blue Nude with Straw 
Hat (figs. 72 and 73) of the same year. 640 However, this raises a problem, since how are 
we to know that certain naked human forms and not others are standard bearers of the 
beautiful and fit for aesthetic contemplation – at least according to Schopenhauer? 
Schopenhauer’s solution is that “human beauty is an objective expression that 
denotes the will’s most complete objectification at the highest grade at which this is 
knowable, namely the Idea of man in general, completely and fully expressed in the 
perceived form.”641 In art, Schopenhauer says, this is not to be obtained simply by 
imitating nature because nature has never produced anything completely beautiful. Nor is 
it achieved by gathering together individual aspects of the beautiful from several different 
human beings and creating an idealised whole from them. In fact, knowledge of beauty is 
not gained a posteriori but a priori in such a way as to demarcate it from the principle of 
sufficient reason. The kind of a priori knowledge which presents to us the beautiful is, he 
says, the what of appearances as opposed to the how of appearance because the how of 
appearance can only be explained by the principle of sufficient reason. 642 
On being presented with the beautiful, Schopenhauer believes that we are all able 
to recognise it when we see it because we are all manifestations of the same will. However, 
                                                                
Altonauer Museum in Hamburg. Published in: Dube-Heynig, Annemarie, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, Postkarten an Erich 
Heckel, Cologne 1984, No. 1. Postmarked Berlin 12.01.09. Sketch of Soldier and Coquette, pencil and coloured chalks. 
639 Lina Franziska Fehrmann (1900-1950) and Albertine Olga Sprentzel (1895-1977). 
640 Gordon and Kirchner. p.64. 
641 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.221. 
642 Ibid., p.222. 
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it is the artist (particularly the genius) who is especially suited to anticipate nature and 
therefore recognise the Idea of beauty within individual things. This is because the artist 
more than most people, “understands nature’s half-spoken words. He expresses clearly 
what she namely stammers”643 and is able to complete for nature what she was unable to 
fulfil herself. 
Historically speaking Schopenhauer says, it was the Greek artistic genius who 
anticipated and discovered the ideal human form, thereby establishing it as the “canon for 
the school of sculpture.”644 Consequently, the anticipation of the Greek artist, like the 
modern artist, refers to an Ideal. This means that: “The possibility of such anticipation of 
the beautiful a priori in the artist, as well as of its recognition a posteriori by the 
connoisseur, is to be found in the fact that artist and connoisseur are themselves the ‘in-
itself’ of nature, the will objectifying itself.”645 For Schopenhauer, such anticipation 
presupposes a particular inner disposition within an artist which can absorb the Idea and 
then ‘reproduce’ it in art. Therefore, his opinion was that much is attained through the 
inner force of an artist’s disposition and objects of natural beauty which inspire 
contemplation.646 
When Schopenhauer refers to this inner force of artistic disposition he is referring 
to an objective state of mind, a will-less calm. According to him, objects of beauty should 
deliver us from every arousal of the will into a state of pure knowledge. At that point, 
shorn of the will, having offered ourselves up to pure will-free knowing, we step into a 
new world where all that compels our will and all that forcefully troubles us ceases to 
exist.647 And so it is that, in theory at least, a state of pure will-free knowing attained 
                                                                
643 Ibid. As a typical German savant of his time Schopenhauer is not inclined to mention female painters or use the 
feminine in relation to artists as a whole. 
644 Ibid. 
645 Ibid. 
646 Ibid., p.197. 
647 Ibid., p.197. 
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through a Kirchner nude, or any other beautiful object, could eliminate C1 through will-
lessness and the predominance of representation. 
In spite of this, Schopenhauer’s promotion of ‘pure will-less knowing’ has been 
described as one devoid of a love for beauty.648 As Philip Nicholas Pothen argues: 
There is little love of beauty, nor indeed, longing for life in Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysic…By making the artwork a mere vehicle for Platonic Ideas it becomes 
divested of its materiality, of a particularity that might ground our appreciation of 
it in a joy more closely associable with other joys of a more everyday kind.649 
 
Should Pothen also be correct in assuming that Schopenhauer’s contemplation of the 
beautiful is one of “disembodied joy,”650 then, as we shall note later on, it raises the 
possibility that unlike Kirchner, Schopenhauer was a despiser of the body. Indeed, in his 
address to such ‘despisers of the body’ Nietzsche states that: 
 
The creative self-created respect and disrespect for itself, it created pleasure and 
pain for itself. The creative body created spirit for itself as the hand of its will. 
Even in your folly and your contempt, you despisers of the body, you serve your 
self. I say to you: your self itself wants to die and turns away from life.651 
 
Nietzsche clearly repudiated the exaltation of abstractions through aesthetic 
contemplation at the expense of the body beautiful.652 In The Genealogy of Morals his 
belief was that “…contemplation first appeared in the world in disguise, with an 
ambiguous appearance, an evil heart and often with an anxiety-filled head.”653 For him, 
art should seduce us through the contemplation of pleasure itself so as to empower 
                                                                
648 Pothen’s opinion perhaps misses the point and has allowed Schopenhauer’s pessimistic world-view to colour his 
thinking, since Schopenhauer did appreciate beauty on many different levels. In fact, Schopenhauer’s mother Johanna, 
would write to her son convinced that, “…I have a feeling for beauty, and I am pleased that you perhaps inherited this 
from me…”  (The original text of the letter from Johanna to Arthur of 4.08.1803, is taken from Schopenhauer, A. et al., 
Die Schopenhauers : der Familienbriefwechsel von Adele, Arthur, Heinrich Floris und Johanna Schopenhauer (Zürich: 
Haffmans, 1991)., p. 57. It is translated in: Cartwright.,p.51). Johanna also remarked upon Arthur’s ability to overcome 
his aversion to boarding school in London by contemplating beautiful things. We also know that Schopenhauer 
appreciated the beauty of Berlin and Dresden’s architecture. Indeed, we must acknowledge too his deep appreciation of 
music, his playing of the flute and the fact that a substantial feature of his major work reflects his ‘love’ of aesthetics as 
a whole. 
649 Pothen, P., Nietzsche and the Fate of Art (Ashgate, 2002). p.159. 
650 Ibid., p.159. 
651 Nietzsche, Caro, and Pippin. p.24. 
652 Nietzsche, F., Clark, M., and Leiter, B., Nietzsche: Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality (Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). p.43. 
653 Nietzsche, F. W. and Samuel, H. B., The Genealogy of Morals (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2003). p.139-
40. 
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procreation, thus perpetuating our existence both as individuals and as a species. This 
entails an embodied process of reciprocity between artist and viewer, an act of 
Kunsttrieb654 which stands in opposition to the morality of self-abnegation and 
disinterested contemplation. Consequently, for Nietzsche it typified “the seductive guise 
under which the castration of art is presently trying to create a good conscience for 
itself.”655 
The notion of art ‘trying to create a good conscience for itself’ is present in 
Kirchner’s development of the nude and in his self-assessment as an artist. In a letter to 
Spengler of 1919, in an attempt to clear his conscience, Kirchner said: “I forgot to show 
you the photos of the Matisses today.  Here they are with some pictures of mine. It is 
unclear to me what they are supposed to have in common. I have never painted in such a 
sweet and soft way.”656 Yet, Bathing Nudes in a Room of 1909 (fig. 74) has been praised 
by Gordon as being situated alongside the most accomplished formal compositions of 20th 
century German art, showing how his progress during 1909 matched Matisse’s own 
progress during the years 1905-1907.657  
In another letter to Will Grohmann of 1925, he mentions that he had laid out some 
coloured prints of his red nudes next to some by Pablo Picasso, Georges Braque, and 
Matisse in order to demonstrate the distinctiveness and strength of German modernism in 
relation to that of the French.658 Kirchner argued that their prints appeared weak when set 
                                                                
654 Kunsttrieb in Nietzsche takes on various meanings such as artistic drive. For a detailed explanation see: Brown, K. 
and Golden, K. B., Nietzsche and Embodiment: Discerning Bodies and Non-dualism (State University of New York 
Press, 2006).p.100. Also Moore, G., Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor (Cambridge University Press, 2002).p.94-5. The 
term is used by Schopenhauer in chapter 27 of the World as Will and Representation ‘Vom Instinkt und Kunsttrieb’ (‘On 
Instinct and Mechanical Tendency’). See: Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.2, 
p.342. 
655 Nietzsche, F. W., Norman, J., and Horstmann, R.-P., Nietzsche, Norman, and Horstmann, Beyond Good and Evil: 
Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). p.33. 
656 Kirchner to Spengler, 19.03.1919. Original in private collection. Manuscript letter, 2 pages. Extracts published in: 
Grisebach.p.104. Kirchner enclosed four photographs of Matisse’s works and four photos of his works. See: Kirchner, 
Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol 1, p. 357. 
657 Gordon and Kirchner. p.65. 
658 Ibid., p.65. Grohmann was an art historian, and writer, his works included monographs on Max Ackermann, Willi 
Baumeister, Wassily Kandinsky, Kirchner, Paul Klee, and Henry Moore. 
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against his and that it was the first opportunity he had found for years to compare them. 
He was firmly convinced that he was not vain enough to deceive himself. His work, he 
thought, was something new and powerful, while the artists he had compared himself with 
appeared academic and quite unoriginal.659 
 
Although Kirchner’s visual language from 1909 to 1911 was Fauvist, Gordon 
argues that, of his works shown in Dresden during September 1910, the Marzella in 
Stockholm (fig. 75) seems to be derived from Munch’s image Puberty (fig. 76). His 
argument is that “what is surprising in the Kirchner painting is the marriage of the Munch 
subject matter with the colorful and two-dimensional forms of the Fauve painting style.”660 
Yet Kirchner’s work can be contrasted with Munch’s in the final analysis since the 
naturally folded limbs of the former’s imagery “bespeak a cheerful casualness utterly 
distant from the Norwegian’s symbolic conception.”661  
Kirchner was at pains to deny any links to Munch, as is seen in a letter to 
Grohmann of 1924. In it Kirchner expresses his gratitude for Grohmann’s criticism of the 
October 1924 Munch exhibition held at the Galerie Arnold. Although Kirchner felt that 
the criticism was valuable, he said that “… I always remained opposed to such a hysterical 
weakling as Munch, I was always very cool and without sympathy.” He added that:  
… I recently saw (the monograph on Pechstein in the Biermann series), in which 
the fellow dishes up the greatest lies about my time in Dresden. That is where the 
mistake about Munch comes from, as it was not I, but he, who admired him - I still 
didn’t know Munch at all at that point…I have many enemies who denigrate the 
power of my work and only a few true friends.662  
 
                                                                
659 Will Grohmann to Kirchner 02.07.1925. Original in Grohmann Archive of the Staatsgalerie Stuttgart. Manuscript 
letter, 3 pages.See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. 
660 Gordon. p.353. 
661 Ibid., p.353. 
662 Kirchner to Grohmann, 28.11.1924. Original in Grohmann Archive in Staatsgalerie Stuttgart. Manuscript letter, 7 
pages. By the Biermann series, Kirchner refers to the 'Serie über junge Kunst im Verlag Biermann und Klinkhardt' 
which is unknown. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 2, p. 810-813. 
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It was only Schiefler, the Munch collector who had collected his work since 1907-08, 
Kirchner believed, who had said that Kirchner’s work was something different and new.  
3.7 The ‘Primitive’, the Artist as ‘Genius’, and problems with the Platonic Idea 
 
 
Whether we believe Kirchner’s petitions concerning himself and Munch or not, 
we do know that by the latter part of 1911 Kirchner’s proclivity towards Fauvism had been 
transformed when he and other members of Die Brücke encountered the ‘primitive’ art on 
display at the Dresden Ethnographical Museum. Although Die Brücke artists as a whole 
denied that ‘primitive’ artefacts had influenced their work, Gordon discerns an 
unmediated effect of ‘primitive’ sources on Kirchner’s style.663 Indeed, Kirchner himself 
acknowledges his encounter with the ‘primitive’ in a letter of 1910, commenting on a day 
trip to the Ethnographical Museum, where he saw artefacts from the Pueblos in Mexico 
and some Negro sculptures.664  
In fact, Kirchner made an ink drawing which reproduced the bulbous abstractions 
of a Cameroon sculptured nude (fig. 77) and a drawing called Bather in Studio of 1910 
(fig. 78), which Gordon describes as “…all but transformed into an African sculpture in a 
drawing whose taut angular and geometric shapes characterize Kirchner’s drawing style 
in 1910 and early 1911.”665 That there was an African influence on his depictions of nudes 
Kirchner did not deny, as we hear in a letter to Graef of 1916. In it Kirchner explicitly 
mentions his visit to Dresden where he saw works by the Palau people, Negro sculptures, 
and ornamented feather coats which he believed paralleled his own works.666 
                                                                
663 Gordon and Kirchner. p.21. 
664 Kirchner to Heckel 31.03.1910. Original in Altanauer Museum in Hamburg. Manuscript letter, 4 sides. Published in: 
Kirchner, E. L. et al., Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, Postkarten und Briefe an Erich Heckel im Altonaer Museum in Hamburg 
(Köln: DuMont, 1984). Postcard to Erich Heckel, Cologne 1984, nr. 30. 
665 Gordon and Kirchner. p.21. * 
666 Kirchner to Botho Graef, 21.07.1916. Original in private collection. Manuscript letter, 3 sides. Published in: 
Grisebach. p.53. Kirchner may have been answering a request from Graef for his biography. Kirchner was planning a 
book to contain essays on him by Graef and Schiefler.  
- 189 - 
 
What can be read out of Kirchner’s interest in southern peoples and distant lands 
is perhaps “a critique of northern rationality” as contrasted with “southern imagery, which 
provokes the collapse of the rational self.”667 That is to say, “this collapse of self engenders 
more primal modes of feeling and perception” leading “to a reconstruction of an aesthetic 
perspective, also expressed through the projection of southern exotic imagery.”668 As 
Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei argues, from a philosophical position both Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche impacted upon modernist artists “in their search for alternatives to the 
fragmentation, aesthetic impoverishment, and alienation of modern culture.”669 On this 
basis, we may suggest that Die Brücke’s turn towards the inner life of the individual did 
not necessarily offer peace via aesthetic contemplation of beautiful ‘primitivised’ bodies, 
but rather the means to approach more profound origins of vitality restrained by modern 
European culture.670 As Gosetti-Ferencei reveals: 
Schopenhauer insisted on the essential animality of the human self: self-
consciousness is conditioned ‘durch das Gehirn und seine Funktion’ (‘through the 
brain and its function’); and he proposed, against Kant, a zoological account of the 
intellect as arising ‘aus dem Organismus’ (‘from the organism’).671  
This ‘zoological account’ of the human organism implies a more primal, more organic 
root to human self-consciousness, the consideration of which was being overridden by 
Europe’s rapid industrialisation. Therefore, Kirchner’s nudes may indicate a modernist 
yearning to reconnect with a pre-industrialised state of being. This suggests that he, as a 
European, could not look to his familiar modern environment for a more primordial 
experience, compared to that which might be aroused by “imagining other, exotic realms 
within the psychic interior, which take on more significance in the fragmentation of the 
                                                                
667 Gosetti-Ferencei, J. A., Exotic Spaces in German Modernism (OUP Oxford, 2011). p.181. 
668 Ibid., p.181. 
669 Ibid., p.168. 
670 Ibid. 
671 Ibid. 
- 190 - 
 
rational self.”672 That is to say, through nudes such as his African Sculpture ink drawing 
of 1910 (fig. 79), Kirchner maps onto this ‘primitive’ body what he imagines to be the 
psychic landscape of those more in tune with the natural world. This nude and arguably 
his nudes in general, becomes a cipher, a passport into a ‘pre-rational’, comparatively 
inchoate world of ‘original experience’ unmediated by Western technology.673 Indeed, 
Lloyd has posited a link between the ‘primitive’ and the ‘more original’ experience of 
childhood through the iconography of child models Marzella and Fränzi. This notion may 
be seen in Kirchner's Fränzi at Breakfast of 1910 (fig. 80), which juxtaposes her naked 
body against a sculptured tribal image.  
At a philosophical level, the concept of a ‘more original’ experience may be 
associated with Schopenhauer’s treatment of the artistic genius, who is able to unify and 
repeat their original experience through art. In fact, Schopenhauer states that it is only the 
artistic ‘genius’ who is able to apprehend the Platonic Ideas. A ‘genius’ is able to remain 
in pure perception by forgetting himself and removing knowledge from servitude to the 
will, thus becoming “a pure knowing subject, the clear eye of the world.”674 Through an 
overabundance of knowledge, the ‘genius’ repeats that which he has apprehended during 
creative activity - having been purified of the clamouring will. It is the ‘genius’ therefore, 
who is able to repeat “the inner nature of the world”675 in his art, and who would be able 
to negate C1 through will-less contemplation. 
Kirchner too had something to say on the nature of genius. In 1929, he wrote to 
Elfriede and Hansgeorg Knoblauch and suggested that in 1912, it was said that the genius 
could be a swine as a person and yet a great artist. By contrast, in 1929 it was commonly 
                                                                
672 Ibid., p.171. 
673 The notion of journeying into exotic psychic landscapes, (as in Gosetti-Ferencei’s concept of ‘psychic topgraphies’), 
through art could of course be viewed as a form of existential tourism to the ‘other side’; a form of aesthetic escapism 
from modernity and a narcotic for the soul. 
674 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.186. 
675 Ibid. 
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held, or so he believed, that only a pure person could be a true artist, that is to say artistic 
development was closely linked to personal development as a human being. He said that 
“I have been fighting since 1900 for this viewpoint (Auffassung) and for that reason almost 
fell out with my friend Gräf. In place of ‘mens sana in corpore sano’ we have the saying 
today: true person, true art.”676 
For Schopenhauer, a ‘genius’ is not necessarily a morally ‘true person’ but merely 
one who is able to transcend their will.677 His concept of ‘genius’ concerns an individual 
who apprehends the Idea which is absolutely perceptible, representing a myriad of 
individual things and is quite definite. Unknown to ordinary individuals, and only known 
to those, who in their ‘genius’, have raised themselves above their individuality and 
willing to become a pure subject of knowing. Only attainable by the ‘genius’ the Idea is 
communicated with conditions, since the Idea received and reiterated in the artwork 
attracts people according to their intellectual worth.678 In contrast to the Idea, a concept 
appeals because it is pragmatic, serviceable in daily life and easily accessible. The Idea is 
the true cradle of all genuine art. Through its commanding originality the Idea is extracted 
from life and the natural world. It is extracted only by an authentic ‘genius’ or he who 
fleetingly accesses true genius under inspiration.679 
The ‘genius’ apprehends the Platonic Idea by freeing knowledge from the service 
to the will, not through learning which merely develops concepts, but through intuitive 
                                                                
676 Kirchner to Elfriede and Hansgeorg Knoblauch, 30.07.1929. Original in: Kirchner Archiv E.W. Kornfeld, Bern-
Davos. Manuscript letter, 7 sides.  Published in Kirchner, E. L., Dümmler, E., and Knoblauch, H., Ernst Ludwig 
Kirchner: Briefwechsel mit einem jungen Ehepaar, 1927-1937, Elfriede Dümmler und Hansgeorg Knoblauch (Bern: 
Verlag Kornfeld, 1989). p.87. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 2, p. 1345-1346. Gräf was an art collector 
in Wiesbaden. Elfriede Knoblauch was a friend and correspondent of Kirchner as was her architect husband Hansgeorg. 
677 The relationship between ‘genius’ and morality is complex and shall not detain us here. However, Arati Barua is 
right to point out that what the aesthetic ‘genius’ and the saint share in common is a vanishing sense of individuality. 
Yet for the aesthetic ‘genius,’ the loss of that sense is temporary, whereas for the saint the resignation from individuality 
and egotism is lasting. See: Barua, A., Schopenhauer and Indian Philosophy: A Dialogue Between India and Germany 
(Northern Book Centre, 2008). p.142. See also Lucian Krukowski ‘Schopenhauer and the aesthetics of creativity' 
in:Jacquette, Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts. p.79, fn.7. 
678 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.234. 
679 Ibid., p.235. 
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power.680 Because the ‘genius’ possesses greater knowledge than is needed for meeting 
the everyday demands of the will, what remains after servicing their will allows them to 
perceive the world in a purified way. Therefore, not only does this purified perception 
negate C1, but it also reveals how the Ideas were obtained in which an aesthetic pleasure 
consists. This is due not only to the artwork portraying things with greater clarity through 
accentuating the most essential compared to the least essential, but just as equally to the 
“fact that the absolute silence of the will, required for the purely objective apprehension 
of the true nature of things, is attained with the greatest certainty.”681 
Among his works, perhaps Kirchner’s Bathers on the Stones (Fehmarn) of 1912 
(fig. 81) does emphasise the essential by eliminating the inessential through the confident 
singularity of his draughtsmanship which favours a simple curvilinear line. The same 
economy of line is achieved in Man and Woman (Sitting in a Meadow) of 1909 (fig. 82), 
which is illuminated by contrasting yellows and blues. Interpreted through Schopenhauer, 
we may argue that both of these images stand for the ‘objective apprehension of the true 
nature of things’ and have been attained with the greatest certainty. 
Assuming there is a ‘true nature of things’ Gordon claims that, “though completely 
committed to self-expression, Kirchner would never completely reject either the world of 
nature or the possibility that his art might communicate from self to other.”682 However, 
if Kirchner’s art leads an individual to obtain pleasure through will-less contemplation 
of a nude,  then there is a tension to note, since such a communication does not 
necessarily produce knowledge of the Platonic Ideas. In fact, it may be argued that 
will-less contemplative peace does not necessarily equate to knowledge of any type, 
let alone Platonic knowledge. That said, if will-less knowledge of a Platonic Idea can 
                                                                
680 Ibid., p.321. Upon the condition of freeing knowledge from the service of the will, the genius is able to contradict 
C1. 
681 The World as Will and Representation. p.370. 
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be achieved by the ‘genius’ and repeated in art, then it would be sufficient to nullify the 
assertion of C1, despite the epistemic hollowness of aesthetic contemplation.683 
Should we hypothesise that Kirchner was a ‘genius’, and humour Schopenhauer 
that will-less peace leaves the genius as a pure subject of knowing, then we learn that not 
only has the will vanished from consciousness through a silencing of the will, but that 
individuality vanishes along with its concomitant pains. Thus, Schopenhauer describes the 
‘genius’, the pure subject of knowing, as “the eternal world-eye.”684 If the ‘eternal world 
eye’ is the creator of purely objective representations, then Schopenhauer says that: 
…only in the consciousness of this does the objective world have its existence. As 
such he is all things, in so far as he perceives them, and in him their existence is 
without burden and hardship. Thus, it is his existence in so far as it exists in his 
representation; but then it is without will. On the other hand, in so far as it is will, 
it is not in him.685 
 
Schopenhauer attaches the label of genius to every genuine work of art and philosophy 
which represent the Platonic Ideas through pure perception.  Because the Ideas are not 
abstractions, the proper nature of a ‘genius’ has to exist in the fullness of knowledge 
arising from perception.686 Such fullness of knowledge from perception may be read out 
from Kirchner’s Bather with Hat of 1913 (fig. 83). Here vigorous strokes of the crayon 
perhaps capture the universal Idea of the human body, while schematic colouring suggests 
an immediacy of perception. As a result, colouring has been simplified and applied briskly 
in a brief space of time.  
According to Schopenhauer, the universal Ideas are of no interest to the vulgar and 
uncultured who, “have no thought or desire for universal truths, whereas the genius 
                                                                
683 Although Schopenhauer suggests that an Idea yields the ‘true essence’ of an object, contemplation of an Idea does 
not yield the variegated knowledge which we can acquire through intuitively perceived objects born from the principle 
of sufficient reason and individuation. Therefore, as Jacquette argues an Idea remains “thin in terms of the knowledge 
it embodies” See: Jacquette, D., The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Taylor & Francis, 2015). p.105. 
684 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.2, p.371. 
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overlooks and ignores what is individual.”687 On the other hand, Schopenhauer says 
‘genius’ pertains to a universal objectivity of the mind, whereby the world as 
representation has achieved a greater degree of clarity through a concentrated grasp of the 
whole. 688 Therefore in theory, since the world as representation rather than the will has 
attained greater clarity through the creative genius, C1 can be refuted. Nevertheless, whilst 
the ‘ordinary’ individual and the ‘genius’ both see the naked body as an object per se, 
Schopenhauer observes a difference between the two, whereby the intuitive perceptions 
of real objects differ in the mind of a ‘genius’ compared to that of the ‘ordinary’ individual.  
In the latter case, they lack the same will-lessness of the ‘genius’, whereas in the ‘genius’ 
will and representation are more effectively separated, and consequently the 
representation becomes purer and more liberated from references to the will.”689 
If we accept that Kirchner was a ‘genius’ in Schopenhauer’s understanding of the 
term, then we may assume that this ‘genius’ apprehended the universal Idea of the nude 
through disinterested contemplation. From one point of view, disinterestedness does not 
mean that the will is ‘denied’ in aesthetic contemplation – in which case C1 is not 
necessarily refutable. Phenomenologically, ‘will-less’ basically refers to a form of self-
transcendence, which has nothing mystical about it. It means that our self-centred focus 
changes into a focus upon the object for its own sake.690 
Another point of view might be to argue that Schopenhauer clearly distinguishes 
between the aesthetic contemplation of Ideas, which is strictly will-less, and the 
production of an artwork in terms of physical matter, where willing and embodiment are 
given. In Parerga he argues that: 
                                                                
687 Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.2, p.4. 
688 Ibid., p.76. 
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…the original artistic cognizance is one that is entirely separate from, and 
independent of, the will, a will-free, will-less cognizance … On the other hand, 
with the execution of the work, where the purpose is to communicate and present 
what is known, the will can, indeed must, again be active, just because there exists 
a purpose. Accordingly, the principle of sufficient reason here rules once more… 
691 
 
Unfortunately, he does not explain the transition between both states; how the Idea keeps 
its extraordinary significance while becoming an object like others. There must be a 
coincidence of will-lessness and will-fullness in Kirchner the artist which is inexplicable, 
and this is a reason why Schopenhauer’s aesthetics as such is problematic contrary to his 
metaphysics which fits much better.692 
It is also problematic to explain how the Ideas, born from will-less contemplation, 
can be practically linked to their artistic portrayals. It is both a problem and a paradox for 
us to understand how the artistic portrayal of a nude figure, as in Kirchner’s Reclining 
Nudes in a Meadow of 1909-20 (fig. 84), could be interpreted in such a way as to ignore 
everyday perception. Indeed, it is not entirely clear how the Ideas are linked to everyday 
things, whether to nudes or not. As Patrick L. Gardiner states, “if there is no other, 
independent, method of pointing them out, the question of making a comparison between 
them and their artistic portrayals can hardly be said to arise.”693 Gardiner’s instinct is that: 
…the uncomfortable feeling persists that his metaphysical conception of art as 
consisting in the apprehension of eternal unchanging Ideas is liable to lead in its 
turn to distortion, and that it may in the end be exposed to objections similar to 
those which can be brought against crude imitationist theories of the sort he 
attacks.694  
 
Gardiner has a valid point here since Schopenhauer’s notion of unchanging Ideas 
presupposes an ‘Ideal form’ which is ‘fixed and unalterable’. Consequently, if we argue 
that Kirchner depicted the Ideas, which are ‘fixed and unalterable’ in his nudes, then this 
                                                                
691 Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.2, p.418-19. 
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- 196 - 
 
ironically presupposes that Kirchner was a mere imitator of that which is ‘fixed and 
unalterable.’ Therefore, the problem with Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the Ideas per se is 
that they do not do justice to our modern day sensibilities of what counts for originality or 
expressive innovation. Gardiner corroborates this view and asks whether by “regarding 
the products of art as essentially renderings of fundamental forms or Ideas, he 
[Schopenhauer] himself over-emphasizes the purely reproductive side of artistic work, to 
the neglect of its complementary inventive aspect?”695 However, it might be equally 
justifiable to conclude that Schopenhauer did allow for artists as special individuals, who 
could make that which is familiar seem new to our eyes through their creative originality. 
Original creative imagination is not only an antidote to ‘the purely reproductive 
side of artistic work’ but it might also act as a bridge between will-lessness and will-
fullness. Indeed, Kirchner comments upon creative imagination in a letter to Schiefler of 
1923, where he described how he had learned to see the wonderful and the ‘secretive’, not 
in external phenomena, but in the simple appearance of everyday life, so that the objects 
on his sheets of paper were symbols of that ‘secret’696 He claimed that he felt strong 
enough to both find and communicate this ‘secret’ in the representation [Vorstellung] of 
form itself. He said that, “I have also given form to a great number and variety of naked 
people and [sketches] from imagination.”697 Here Kirchner was thinking of the woodcut 
cycles Absalom (fig. 85), Petrarch’s Triumph of Love both of 1918 (fig. 86), The Dance of 
the Man of 1919 and A Thousand and One Nights of 1922 (fig.87). 
                                                                
695 Ibid., p.211. 
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Schopenhauer’s philosophy of creative imagination extends the artist’s horizon 
beyond their personal experience so as to perceive things in nature not as “actually formed, 
but what she endeavoured to form, yet did not bring about, because of the conflict of her 
forms with one another…”698 As a result, imagination may be regarded as the ‘companion’ 
and ‘condition’ of genius, an organically alive faculty, and possibly a bridge between will-
lessness and  will-fullness. Yet, evidence for a strong imagination would not be evidence 
of ‘genius’ in Kirchner.  
 
3.8 Kirchner’s Imaginative Appropriation of Ajanta Cave Paintings and the Oriental  
 
 
Although imagination can be used with pure objectivity for apprehending the 
Platonic Ideas, it can also be misused to build sand castles in the air through the work of 
self-indulgence or madness. Indeed, Kirchner’s imagination was stimulated not only by 
the African nude, but also by Buddhist wall paintings of nudes (and clothed figures) as 
found in the Ajanta cave-temples of India dating to the 6th century A.D. These paintings 
are situated in the region of Aurangabad, Maharashtra in India and are inspired by the 
Hinayãna and Mahãyâna doctrines of Buddhism. They depict numerous jãtaka stories 
from one of the births of the Buddha699 with a limited spectrum of colour.   700 These 
visualised stories were discovered by Kirchner during the autumn of 1910, when he visited 
the Central Art Library of the Dresden Museums and found an illustrated two-volume 
work by John Griffiths on the cave-temples.701 Several years later in a letter to Nele van 
der Velde of 1919, he remarked how strong and fresh the originals were and that: 
                                                                
698 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.186. 
699 Pradhan, S., "Ajanta to Amaravati: A Comparative Study of Art," in: Bulletin of the Deccan College Research 
Institute  Vol. 68/69 (2008). p.417. 
700 Pradhan, S. A., "Painted Decorative Motifs in The Ajanta Caves," in: ibid. Vol. 56/57 (1996).p.134. On the rise of 
global modernism through Indian art see: Somathilake, M., "Analysis on Fresco and Tempera: An Analysis of the 
Technique of Murals in South Asia," in: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Sri Lanka  Vol. 53 (2007). 
701 Griffiths, J., The Paintings in the Buddhist Cave-Temples of Ajanta, Khandesh, India (London: W. Griggs, 1896).See 
also Yazdani, G., Guide to Ajanta Frescoes (Hyderabad, Deccan: H.E.H. the Nizam's Govt., Archaeological Dept., 
1935). 
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These works made me almost helpless with delight. This unheard-of unity of 
representation, this monumental tranquillity of form, I thought I never would 
achieve. All my endeavours seemed hollow and restless to me. I copied a lot from 
the pictures, only to gain my own style.702 
 
Eleanor Moseman observes something of the impact of the Ajanta paintings in Kirchner’s 
Five Bathers at the Lake of 1911 (fig. 88), in which he “translated the sensuous curvilinear 
forms of the fleshy Gupta figures by using bold blue to accentuate the rounded contour of 
the women's breasts, hips, and bellies.”703 In addition, Gordon believes that “Kirchner’s 
references to ‘unity of representation’ and ‘monumental tranquillity of form’ are alone 
sufficient to indicate the meaning Ajanta held for the artist.”704 Indeed, Kirchner made 
numerous copies of the Ajanta illustrations from Griffiths’ book, and in Gordon’s opinion, 
Five Bathers at the Lake is a peroration to the sequence of copies taken from the Buddhist 
scene.705 As a consequence, this work approaches the ‘unheard-of unity of representation,’ 
and that ‘tranquillity of form’ which he appreciated in Ajanta art. 
Given that the Ajanta site was discovered in 1819, it is highly probable that, as a 
self-confessed Buddhist, Schopenhauer knew about it. Being something of an Indologist 
he was an avid reader of the Asiatic Researches to which he often refers in his work.706 
The Asiatic Researches was a journal published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal which 
changed its name to the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal around 1838 – and the 
latter remained an important journal for archaeological matters throughout the 19th 
century. Following Ajanta’s discovery, it was regularly featured in reports and discussions 
of India’s monuments, especially from the 1840s when the cave temples were championed 
                                                                
702 Kirchner to Nele van der Velde,12.05.1919. Original in: Kirchner Archiv E.W. Kornfeld, Bern-Davos. Manuscript 
letter, 5 sides. Published in: Kirchner, E. L., Velde, N. v. d., and Velde, H. v. d., Briefe an Nele und Henry van de Velde 
(Munchen: R. Piper, 1961). See also: E. L. Kirchner, "Die Arbeit E. L. Kirchners," in (catalogue) Bern, 1954-55, and 
Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 1, p. 372. 
703 Moseman, E., "At the Intersection: Kirchner, Kubišta, and 'Modern Morality', 1911-14," in: The Art Bulletin  Vol. 
93, no. 1  
704 Gordon, D. E., "Kirchner in Dresden," in: ibid. Vol. 48, no. 3/4 (1966).,p.357. 
705 Ibid., p.359. 
706 See: Cross, S., Schopenhauer's Encounter with Indian Thought: Representation and Will and their Indian Parallels 
(New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 2014). Also: App, "Schopenhauer, Begegnung mit Buddhismus” in: 
Verhältnis zu Schopenhauer. Jahrbuch, Vol. 79, (1998), pp.35-56, Vol. 79. 
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by James Fergusson.707 His involvement led to the establishment of the Caves 
Commission in the 1840s and the appointment of the artist, and later photographer, Robert 
Gill to document the caves through the late 1840s and ‘50s.708 Ajanta paintings clearly 
influenced Kirchner’s representations of the naked body; Gordon stating that: 
His increasing departure from fauve like full intensity harmonies, first noted in 
Standing Nude with a Hat from late 1910, and leading in the Five Bathers to nudes 
of pale tonality and a stress on unusual shades of nonprimary hues, may be 
attributed to his experience of Indian color composition sometime after the 
Gauguin exhibition of September 1910.709 
 
Five Bathers was exhibited at the November 1911 Neue Sezession in Berlin, and the 
Cologne Sonderbund International exhibition of May 1912.710 The Ajanta drawings in 
general, Harem Scene of 1910-11 (fig. 89) and Nude with Kerchief I of 1910-1911 (fig. 
90) in particular, are derived from the Ajanta figure group and belie their European 
origins.711 However, although Kirchner  was greatly influenced by such figure groups he 
arguably remained true to his modern European origins – especially when working on the 
German island of Fehmarn. We can see this in Four Bathers among the Rocks by the Sea 
(fig. 91), and Bathers at the Shore (fig. 92), both of 1913. His modern mind-set entailed 
that, unlike the ‘primitive’ artists which he attempted to emulate, not all of his work can 
be described as spontaneous ‘plein-air’ executions because some were produced from a 
combination of memory and photographs, as in Brown Nude at the Window of 1912 (fig. 
93). In contrast to the apparent extemporaneity of non-European ‘primitive’ art, his use of 
photographs perhaps undermines the perceived spontaneity of his earlier nudes.712  
That form of spontaneity in the nude can be seen in the lithograph Girl in Bathtub 
                                                                
707 Scottish Indologist and antiquarian. 
708 Gill was commissioned by the Indian government to make copies of the cave paintings between 1844-1863. In an 
attempt to copy the painting from Cave 1 at the Ajanta site, Gill produced an oil painting of it between 1850-1854.  
709 Gordon and Kirchner. p.76. 
710 Ibid., p.76. 
711 Gordon. p.358. 
712 Lloyd. p.125. 
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of 1908 (fig. 94), which reveals how her body has been reduced to one continuous line 
under the influence of Matisse’s work.713 However, as Frances Carey and Antony Griffiths 
argue, Kirchner has surpassed Matisse “in swiftness of line and directness of response.”714 
Similarly, Bathers by Stones a dry-point of 1912-1913 (fig. 95), shows how Kirchner has 
distilled the upper body in the left-hand figure into a cylindrical shape. Here Carey and 
Griffiths suggest that this practice was probably derived from Cameroon wood carvings, 
since a Cameroon figure can be found in the painting Seated Woman with Wood Sculpture 
of 1912 (fig. 96), which probably was owned by Kirchner.715 
Cameroon and Ajanta art were not the only ‘exotic’ influences upon Kirchner’s 
depictions of the nude. During 1911, he derived pictorial ideas from Gauguin, as seen in 
the lithograph Reclining Nude Seen from the Back, which refers to Gauguin’s Spirit of the 
Dead Watches of 1892 (fig. 97).716 Furthermore, Gauguin’s Ta Matete; The Market of 
1892 (fig. 98), with its Egyptian profiles and thoracic frontalities, may have influenced 
Kirchner’s lithograph Bathing Bohemians of 1911 (fig. 99).717 Thus, if it is true as Gordon 
says, that Kirchner’s response to Gauguin was the most inventive of the Die Brücke group, 
then it is worthwhile noting how Kirchner’s Two Nudes with Sculpture of 1911 (fig. 100) 
replicates the central figure in Gauguin’s Tahitian Women Bathing of 1891-2 which was 
on display in September 1910 (fig. 101).718 In addition, along with Gordon, we may be 
convinced that in bodily terms, Kirchner’s Three Standing Nudes of 1910 (fig. 102) 
                                                                
713 The model is probably his ‘friend’ Doris ‘Dodo’ Grosse. 
714 Carey, F. et al., The Print in Germany 1880-1933: The Age of Expressionism: Prints from the Department of Prints 
and Drawings in The British Museum: With a section of illustrated books from The British Library (London: British 
Museum Publications, 1984). p.109. 
715 Ibid., p.111. 
716 This work was viewed by Kirchner in the Arnold exhibition. 
717 Four years later after Bathing Bohemians, Kirchner wrote to Fritz Meyer-Schönbrunn, on 16.09.1915 telling him 
that, “I got to see the magnificent Coptics in the Kaiser Friedrich Museum. It would be a terrific work for me to master 
the proportions of a three metre figure.” See: Original in the Archive of the Karl Ernst Osthaus Museum, Hagen, 
manuscript letter, 2 pages. Published in:Hesse-Frielinghaus, H. et al., Ernst-Ludwig Kirchner und das Folkwang-
Museum Hagen : Briefe von an und über Kirchner, zusammengesellt aus den Beständen des Osthaus-Archivs Hagen ... 
aus Anlaß des 100. Geburtstags von Karl Ernst Osthaus und der Eröffnung des Um- und Erweiterungsbaus des Karl-
Ernst-Osthaus-Museums Hagen (Münster: Aschendorff, 1974). p.20. See also:Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 1, p. 
110-111. 
718 Gordon.p.464, fn.77. 
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appropriates “the typically ‘Gauguinesque’ alternation of curve and straight line in the 
stylization of the hip and in the elongated elbow.”719 
In 1919, Kirchner would acknowledge Gauguin in a letter to Henry van de Velde. 
Here Kirchner commented upon how Gauguin’s letters were very beautiful and that he 
had read them all in one night and would read them often again.720 In another letter to van 
de Velde of 1920, Kirchner thanked him for the Gauguin woodcuts, which interested him 
very much. He described the woodcut A Horse and Birds of 1899 which had appeared on 
the title page for Le Sourire, and how Gauguin had grasped the Orientalised Persian 
miniatures, the Indian Batiks, and the Chinese because they were somehow in his blood. 
Yet, Kirchner felt that in the final analysis although his art looked very good, Gauguin 
could not excite people any longer. He believed that “we need a more direct route from 
life to a representation of form. We will achieve that by constant drawing of all that we 
see.”721  
The Orientalising representation of the naked form manifests itself from the 
summer period of 1910 when Kirchner’s art might be epitomised by three of his 
Moritzburg paintings , Three Nudes in Front of Trees (fig. 103), Nudes Playing under 
Tree (fig. 104) and in Naked Couple in the Sun (fig. 105) of 1911.722 In these pictures 
human anatomy becomes angular, distorted, and geometrical in an attempt to appropriate 
‘primitive’ sculpture as an “animist vehicle of expression.”723 Indeed, a geometric line 
informs the composition of Standing Nude with a Hat of 1910-1920 (fig. 106) which was 
                                                                
719 Gordon and Kirchner.p.464, n.77. 
720 Kirchner to Henry van de Velde, 22.11.1919. Original in Kirchner Archiv E.W. Kornfeld, Bern-Davos. Manuscript 
letter, 3 sides. Published in: Kirchner, Velde, and Velde.p.101. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 1, p. 416. 
In addition, see: Gauguin, P. et al., Lettres de Gauguin à Daniel de Monfreid (Paris: Falaize, 1950). 
721 Kirchner to Henry van de Velde, 29.11. 1920. Original in: Kirchner Archiv E.W. Kornfeld, Bern-Davos. Manuscript 
letter, 7 sides. Extracts published in Original in: Kirchner Archiv E.W. Kornfeld, Bern-Davos. Manuscript letter, 7 sides. 
Extracts published in: Kirchner, Velde, and Velde.p.30. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 1, p. 471. 
722 Gordon and Kirchner.p.40. Arguably, this can be more clearly accounted for in Kirchner’s Moritzburg subjects from 
the late summer of 1911. 
723 Ibid., p.40. 1 
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inspired by a reproduction of Lucas Cranach the Elder’s Venus of 1532 (fig. 107) he saw 
in Otto Mueller’s Berlin studio.724 Of Standing Nude with a Hat he would write that, “into 
this picture has come the first deep love of a woman’s body, which only happens once... 
Today I might leave out the hat and the shoes, but at that time they belonged to the 
conception, in spite of the fact that this woman had stirringly beautiful feet and hands so 
fine.”725  
This Cranach picture was significant to Kirchner because he refers to it several 
times in his correspondence. In a letter to Erna Schilling of 1925, he says that “I saw the 
wonderful Venus today in the original, delicate pink against black.”726 Later in 1930, he 
wrote to Carl Hagemann that it had made him happy when he saw the large photograph of 
the Cranach Venus in Mueller’s studio, the original of which was hanging in Frankfurt’s 
Städel.727 Kirchner confirmed the significance of this when he wrote that: 
This picture was for me at that time the Ideal female nude. My picture of a naked 
woman with a black hat of 1907 shows that well. We also had in common a sensual 
reverence of women and an admiration of elegance. Only, in human relations with 
women he clung more to the bourgeois forms, while I preferred a free 
camaraderie.728 
 
In another letter to Hagemann of 1933, Kircher would write and ask him if he liked the 
two pictures sent by him, feeling that Standing Nude with Hat must look beautiful in his 
house. Kirchner said that it was his best picture from Dresden and that in Frankfurt 
Hagemann would have the opportunity to compare it with the Cranach which had given 
                                                                
724 Ibid., p.70. 
725 Ibid., translation from Gordon, p.70.  
726 Kirchner to Erna Schilling, 22.12.1925. Original in: Kirchner Archiv E.W. Kornfeld, Bern-Davos. Manuscript letter, 
5 sides. Postcard enclosed: Lucas Cranach the Elder, Venus, Städelsches Kunstinstitut. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and 
Kornfeld. Vol. 2, p. 979-980. 
727 Lucas Cranach, Venus, Friedländer-Rosenberg no. 246. Hagemann was a Chemist, art collector and long-time friend 
of Kirchner. 
728 Original in possession of Max Beckmann Archive. Manuscript letter, 7 pages. Published in: Hagemann et al. 
Ostfildern 2004, no.353. The woman with the black hat in the painting is Dodo. For the painting see Gordon 136. 
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him inspiration.729 Gordon adds to this by suggesting that Standing Nude with Hat shows 
how: 
The fashionable hat and the canon of figure proportion, with shortened torso and 
swelling hips, do derive from the Venus-type of Cranach; but the full breasts 
enframed by the arms and the widespread placement of legs and feet reveal an 
utterly natural sexuality in this woman, far removed from the self-conscious 
posturing of her Renaissance source.730  
 
 
3.9 The Nude as Idea and Issues of Sex 
 
 
The portrait model for Kirchner’s painting mentioned above, was Dodo who posed in the 
nude for him from 1909-1911. Whilst her anatomy typifies ‘Kirchner’s proportional 
canon’ of 1910, Gordon suggests that she does not “display the mannered attenuation of 
proportions to be found in much sixteenth-century art.”731 Rather, it is the attenuated 
narrowness of the format which adds expressivity to the picture. In fact, by 1911 Kirchner 
had returned to a Fauvist economy of line and purity of colour as in Half-Length Nude 
with Hat (fig. 108), introducing for the first time a depiction of semi-nudity in fashionable 
women. On this image, Gordon states that: 
The picture is erotic in a way no French fauve work is erotic; yet Dodo transcends 
pornography precisely because of her conception in primitive terms. Like some 
ancient fertility goddess from prehistoric Europe, Mesopotamia, or India, she bares 
her breasts and holds her pose without self-consciousness…the content of the 
painting is, once again, iconic in its universality.732 
 
If Kirchner really did transcend the pornographic and ascend to the universal Idea of his 
nudes, then theoretically he should have been less interested in his female models from a 
sexual-physical angle.  
                                                                
729 Kirchner to Carl Hagemann, 20.06.1933. Original in possession of Max Beckmann Archive. Manuscript letter, 4 
pages. Published in: ibid., Ostfildern 2004, no.509. See Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 3, p. 1739-1740. Kirchner 
mentions the Cranach a final time to Hagemann, from Davos on 22.07.1935. Ostfildern 2004, no.623. See; ibid., Vol. 
3, p. 1867-1868. 
730 Kirchner to Carl Hagemann, 22.07.1935. See also: Gordon and Kirchner.p.70. The Cranach was a significant point 
of reference for Kirchner, as we hear in 1919 when he wrote to his common-law-wife Erna Schilling. He told her that, 
“… you gave me the strength to speak about your beauty in the purest picture of a woman, compared to which the 
Cranach Venus is an old c**t.” Kirchner and Grisebach. See: Kirchner to Erna Schilling, 05.07.1919. Ibid., p.43. 
731 Gordon and Kirchner. p.70. 
732 Ibid., p.40. 
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This may be indicated by a letter Kirchner wrote to Graef in 1916 in which he 
described his experimental creativity. His personal observation was that, with his insight 
into human empathy and the potential for osmosis between people, came a dissolution of 
his psyche into the ‘other’ - all of which benefited more intensive representations. He 
claimed that “the less I was physically interested myself, which occurred very early due 
to the nature of my constitution, the more freely and better I could penetrate into another 
and portray them.”733 
Kirchner’s claim, that the less physically interested he was in his naked models the 
more freely he could portray them, does suggest an objective apprehension of the Idea. 
However, we should treat this claim with caution because in a letter written to Heckel in 
1910, Kirchner defined his attraction to the child model Marzella: 
We have become quite at ease with each other, we lie on the carpet and play. There 
is a great charm in such a pure female, hints which could drive you crazy. Better 
than in the older girl. More free, without losing the mature woman. Perhaps there 
is something in her more mature than in the riper girl, which withers away again. 
The richness is surely greater now. Today she brought her 12 year-old friend who 
has a sister of 15.734 
 
In his letter Kirchner drew a picture of Marzella holding a Japanese Samisen.735 Sherwin 
Simmons argues that the Samisen may have acted as a sexual message between Kirchner 
and Heckel, given that Geisha girls were often depicted playing such an instrument. 736 It 
is from this letter that charges of paedophilia have been made against Kirchner, although 
no firm evidence of sexual relations between child model and artist has yet been 
                                                                
733 Kirchner to Graef, 21.07.1916. Original in private collection. Manuscript letter, 3 sides. Published in: Grisebach. 
p.53. 
734 Kirchner to Heckel, c. April 1910. Original in Altonauer Museum Hamburg. Manuscript letter, 4 pages. Published 
in: Kirchner et al. Cologne 1984, nr. 31. As Delfs and Kornfeld show, Dube dates the letter between 30.03.1910 and 
02.04.1910, since during this time a dancer named in the text was staying in Dresden. See: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. 
ibid., Vol.1, p.38.  
735 See first page of a four-page letter from Ernst Ludwig Kirchner in Dresden to Erich Heckel in Berlin, late March 
/early April,1910.  
736 Simmons, S., "A Suggestiveness That Can Make One Crazy: Ernst Ludwig Kirchner's Images of Marzella," in: 
Modernism/Modernity  Vol. 22, no. 3 (2015). p.526-27. 
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discovered. However, Simmons suggests that for Kirchner “deep seated feelings of 
infantile reprimand and loss could be compensated for by grandiose feelings of artistic 
and sexual power, as well as provoke some identification with a girl model whose 
subjectivity was both diminished and emboldened by his fascination.”737 
Given Kirchner’s fascination for the child model Marzella, it appears questionable 
that the metaphysical purity of her nakedness could have exceeded her sexual value. 
Viewed in this way, one must question how often sexual feelings insinuated themselves 
into the ‘non-aesthetic’ glances between Kirchner, his child models and his mature 
models, which overrode considerations of metaphysical worth.738 If this was so, then it 
leads us to suspect that C1 may be supportable after all, since it would be an example of 
the world as will dominating the world as representation through sexual attraction.  
On the topic of sexual attraction through initial furtive glances, Schopenhauer 
regards it as a Platonic Idea ‘in the making’ which needs the procreative act to become 
‘objectified’. Thus, between an organically mature couple and their furtive glances, there 
is the possibility for a birth of a particular Idea through the birth of a particular body. 
Moreover, Schopenhauer suggests that: 
To a certain extent this new individual is a new (Platonic) Idea; and, just as all the 
Ideas strive to enter into the phenomenon with the greatest vehemence, avidly 
seizing for this purpose the matter which the law of causality divides among them 
all, so does this particular Idea of a human individuality strive with the greatest 
eagerness and vehemence for its realization in the phenomenon. This eagerness 
and vehemence is precisely the two future parents’ passion for each other.739 
 
Matter, it must be noted for Schopenhauer, is a condition of perceptual experience, the 
mere objectification of causality. Thus, while in principle each Idea or grade of the will’s 
objectification could have an infinite number of copies or representations, in actuality 
                                                                
737 Ibid., p.554. 
 
739 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.2, p.536-7. 
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there is only a finite amount of matter. As with every grade of the will’s objectification, 
the Ideas fight with each other in order to gain entrance into time and space through 
matter.740 
This sense of the Ideas in conflict meant that for Heckel, and possibly Kirchner 
too on one occasion, the ‘eagerness and vehemence’ of their sexual impulses 
(Geschlechtstrieb) overrode any sense of metaphysical purity that they had for their other 
child model Fränzi.741 The Idea, in waiting so to speak, attempted to seize the naked matter 
before it through the body of ten-year old Fränzi.742 That is to say, through the illicit 
assertion of the artist’s will, child-sex abuse took place. Contrary to Wolf-Dieter Dube, 
Bernhard Fulda argues that there is evidence to suggest that Heckel and maybe Kirchner 
had sexual intercourse with their 10-year-old child model Fränzi. If they had been caught 
by the police of Moritzburg then they would have found themselves in prison for 
paedophilia.743 
On the one hand, this example of the artist’s decadent and vehement willing 
(Wollen) would be at odds with the chaste morality of Nacktkultur devotees such as those 
of the painter/sculptor Sascha Schneider. His belief was that devotees wished to portray 
                                                                
740 The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.147. 
741 The vehemence and eagerness of the will, as a source of conflict, shall be explored from another angle in Chapter 
4, where we investigate Marc’s claims as they pertain to war. 
742 On the topic of sexuality, modernity and the child see: Egan, R. and Hawkes, G., Theorizing the Sexual Child in 
Modernity (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2010).See also the work by Sarah D. Goode on the sexual theorist Baron von 
Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902) in Goode, S.D. Understanding and Addressing Adult Sexual Attraction to Children: A Study 
of Paedophiles in Contemporary Society. Taylor & Francis, 2009. 
743 Fulda, B. and Soika, A., Max Pechstein: The Rise and Fall of Expressionism (De Gruyter, 2013). p.99. As Fulda 
points out in note 233 on p.99, few scholars have broached this difficult topic. However, Tanja Hommen observes that 
on the penalty for paedophilia at the time: “In Paragraph 182 of the RStGB [Reichstrafgesetzbuch is the German penal 
code] it states: ‘Whoever seduces a girl of good character, who has not yet completed her 16th year, will be punished 
by up to a year in prison. The prosecution will only proceed on the application of the parents or guardian of the seduced 
girl.’ ” See: Hommen, Tanja. ‘Sittlichkeitsverbrechen: Sexuelle Gewalt Im Kaiserreich’ [in German]. Frankfurt/Main: 
Campus, 1999, p.57. On the other hand, it may be possible to interpret the Expressionists’ use of child models as an 
engagement with the ‘cult of the child’. The cult of childhood’ is a term employed by art historians such as Anthony 
Parton (2010) to identify a widespread interest in childhood manifested by the expressionist generation in the first years 
of the early 20th century. The term takes in not only a newly discovered appreciation of children’s art on the part of the 
avant-garde but also a love of ‘childhood’, which, they believed, possessed the ‘authenticity’, purity and innocence of 
vision that they as adults had lost. This led some artists to collect children’s art and to emulate its features in an attempt 
to revitalise their own practice whilst other artists wished to become intimate with children as a means of engaging 
directly with the perceived ‘authenticity’ of the childhood condition and as a means of releasing the expressive and 
creative potential of ‘the child within’. For further information see: Parton, A., Goncharova, N., and Antique Collectors, 
C., Goncharova: The Art and Design of Natalia Goncharova (Woodbridge: Antique Collectors' Club, 2010). 
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no afflictions, nothing old, nothing decadent, not the street or the brothel, but rather the 
merry playgrounds of healthy youth.744 On the other hand, it is possible that the impetus 
to produce images of Fränzi naked may have been inspired, initially at least, by a genuine 
intention to apprehend the Idea of the body.745 If there was any such genuine intention, 
then it matched the intellectual vision of gynaecologist Carl Heinrich Stratz. He believed 
that through art and nature people should aspire to an uninhibited understanding of the 
human body which was usually the province of doctors.746  
Kirchner did possess an uninhibited understanding of the naked body, but Carol 
Duncan argues that through the depictions of his nudes the emancipation of the artist 
entailed the subordination of the female. The depictions, she argues, imply opposition to 
the status quo of society, yet “the drastic reduction of women to objects of specialized 
male interest - embodies on a sexual level the basic class relationships of capitalist 
society.”747 This notion of reducing the Idea of women to ‘objects of specialized male 
interests’ is echoed by Martin S. Weinberg and Colin J. Williams who refer to the notion 
of the “looking glass body.”748 By this they infer that a woman’s sense of ‘self’ is 
sometimes formed in response to what she imagines men think of her, experiencing herself 
as highly gendered and sexually objectified.749 From a feminist point of view then, 
Kirchner may be seen to engage in a degree of misogyny - charges also levelled against 
Schopenhauer himself. 
                                                                
744 Schneider, S., Mein Gestalten und Bilden (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1916). p.8. 
745 Real name Lina Franziska Fehrman, (b.1900-?). While the Fränzi affair could be seen as an exploitation of the child 
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746 Foreword by and from Stratz, C. H., Die Darstellung des menschlichen Körpers in der Kunst (Berlin: Springer, 
1914). 
747 Duncan, C., The Aesthetics of Power: Essays in Critical Art History (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993). p.105. 
748 Weinberg, M. S. and Williams, C. J., "Bare Bodies: Nudity, Gender, and the Looking Glass Body," in: Sociological 
Forum  Vol. 25, no. 1 (2010). p.47. 
749 Ibid., p.48. 
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Although Schopenhauer’s misogyny has gone relatively unchallenged in recent 
years, Tom Grimwood and Angelika Hübscher agree that to perceive Schopenhauer as an 
‘irrational hater of women’ would be erroneous.750 It would also be erroneous to omit the 
fact that his philosophy inspired a ‘school’ of female followers such as Helen Zimmern, 
Olga Plümacher, the radical feminist Helene von Druskowitz and the Viennese cultural 
philosopher, artist and feminist Rosa Mayreder.751 Despite his alleged misogyny, 
Schopenhauer would agree that the female body can be a beautiful manifestation of the 
will at its highest grade. Yet, Nietzsche felt that Schopenhauer’s contemplation of the 
Platonic Idea counteracted a frustrated sexual interest in women.752 This meant that “he 
never tired of singing the praises of this escape from the ‘will’ as the great advantage and 
use of the aesthetic condition.”753 Thus, Nietzsche concluded that Schopenhauer’s 
redemption from the will “treated sexuality as a personal enemy (including its tool, 
woman, that ‘instrumentum diaboli’).”754 As a result, Nietzsche doubted whether 
Schopenhauer’s approach could offer any insights into the nature of beauty. 
Although Schopenhauer ascribed a calming of the will to some objects of beauty, 
Nietzsche denied that this could occur regularly. As an alternative, Nietzsche compared 
Schopenhauer’s sense of beauty with that of Stendhal’s, for whom the effect of it promised 
an excitement of the will. On that basis, Nietzsche asked, “what does it mean if a 
philosopher pays homage to ascetic Ideals? We get our first hint: he wants to free himself 
                                                                
750 Grimwood, T., Irony, Misogyny and Interpretation: Ambiguous Authority in Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche (Cambridge Scholars Publisher, 2012).p.37. See also: Angelika Hübscher, 'Schopenhauer und die Weiber' in: 
"Schopenhauer Jahrbuch,"  (Würzburg). p. 187-203. 
751 Mayreder, R., Mein Pantheon: Lebenserinnerungen (Dornach: Philosophisch-Anthroposophischer Verlag am 
Goetheanum, R. Geering, 1988). 
752 During a conversation with Carl Georg Bähr, dated to 12.04 1856, Schopenhauer confessed that, “…as far as women 
are concerned, I was very well-disposed towards them – if only they had wanted me.”Schopenhauer, A., Schopenhauer-
Bibliothek. Originalhandschriften Schopenhauers, 166 Bände aus seiner Privatbibliothek, seine Schriften, Briefe und 
Gespräche, Literatur über ihn. [A catalogue.] (Frankfurt am Main: Baer, 1905). p.239. 
753 Nietzsche, F. W., Ansell-Pearson, K., and Diethe, C., On the Genealogy of Morality, Revised student edition. ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). p.75. 
754 Ibid., p.76. 
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from torture.”755 Therefore, it is in this sense that Schopenhauer might be regarded as a 
‘despiser of the body’. Indeed, Wicks has persuasively argued that despite natural beauty 
possessing significant value for Schopenhauer, its value in his philosophy is less than that 
of ascetic or moral experience gained through intense suffering. It is of lesser value 
because it lacks the permanence gained through such experience.756 Consequently, when 
contemplating beauty, it is not a question of permanent deliverance from the will but one 
of “a brief hour of rest.”757 
If the above is true, then reading between the lines of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, 
we might conclude with Wicks that the ‘brief hour of rest’ achieved through contemplating 
a beautiful body might be a misleading one. His hypothesis appears tenable, since 
Schopenhauer apparently undermines our reception of natural beauty and any long-term 
optimism born from contemplating it. We can say this because Schopenhauer felt that 
“human life, like all inferior goods, is covered on the outside with a false glitter; what 
suffers always conceals itself.”758 Therefore, if like Kirchner, we are distracted by the 
‘false glitter’ of contemplating beautiful bodies, then the hypothesis is that we might be in 
danger of becoming distracted by morally superficial representations. That is to say, we 
could claim that the pleasure and optimism which they afford may distract us from the 
fact that “at bottom every individuality is really only a special error, a false step, something 
that it would be better should not be, in fact something from which it is the real purpose 
of life to bring us back.”759 As a result, we may reasonably infer that any release from 
willing effected by contemplating beautiful Ideas, is a transient and insecure refutation of 
C1. Therefore, as we shall note in the following chapter of this thesis, and according to 
                                                                
755 Ibid., p.75-76. 
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757 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.2, p.363. 
758 The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.325. 
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Schopenhauer, the most secure refutation of C1 would be a resignation from the will to 
life through great suffering. 
During 1914, Kirchner did experience great suffering brought about by his 
conscription into the army from which he was provisionally discharged in November 1915 
on the grounds of ill-health. In December of that year he would inform Schiefler that the 
demands upon him were too much and that he had disintegrated mentally and 
physically.760 Four years later, in a letter to Georg Reinhart of 1919, Kirchner wrote about 
the long months of his convalescence in Kreuzlingen’s Sanitorium and how the images of 
the woodcut The Triumph of Love of 1911 had taken form.761 He referred to the Neo-
Platonist and poet Francesco Petrarch, observing how the poet had expressed the effects 
of love between the sexes in both sensual and spiritual terms. As a result, it was after 
reading Petrarch some years previously that Kirchner had begun to develop the material 
for his nude in The Triumph of Love series of woodcuts.762 
The Triumph of Love is a series of eight woodcut prints (plus one cover page), and 
is related to Petrarch’s literary work of the same name - The Triumph of Love. Kirchner 
must have wanted to work on these prints for a couple of years, since he mentions them 
in a letter of 1912 to Marc, although the series was not completed until 1918. Indeed, 
according to Delfs et al., Marc had arranged for the Reinhard Piper Company to publish 
Petrarch’s Triumph of Love with woodcuts by Kirchner.763 In the 1912 letter, Kirchner 
                                                                
760 Kirchner to Gustav Schiefler, 15.12.1915.Original in the Universitäts- und Staatsbibliothek Hamburg. Manuscript 
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763 See Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld., Vol.1, p.73. and a letter from Kirchner to Reinhard Piper, 12.12.1912, 
published in: Piper, R., Buergel-Goodwin, U., and Göbel, W., Briefwechsel mit Autoren und Künstlern, 1903-1953 
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would discuss his hopes for The Triumph of Love series and thanked Marc for all of his 
efforts.  Kirchner hoped that, “this time we will be successful. The Triumph of Love in the 
German translation and abridgement takes 32 pages.  Every nine lines are arranged in three 
verses which form one page, and a woodcut always faces every page of text.”764 
Kirchner suggested that the setting and the woodblock would have to be of equal 
size, and that he would probably cut a vignette in wood for every setting. The title and 
cover he said, might also be woodcuts and that there would then be 33 pages with 33 
woodcuts with the same number of vignettes.  For this he argued that he would need an 
advance of 300 Marks, and asked Marc if he thought that too much. Although Kirchner 
did not feel that the cost was prohibitive, he believed that he could cut the whole text in 
wood, but in order to achieve that he would need 600 Marks since it would take at least a 
quarter of a year to execute. Despite this, it was his opinion that the woodcut series would 
be magnificent, and he expressed a longing to carry out such a work.  
The ideal cycle in The Triumph of Love would be a ‘script’ of pictures, similar in 
format to Egyptian papyrus rolls with hieroglyphs full of narrative symbolic imagining. 
In what appears to be a tentative apprehension of the Platonic Ideas, he argued that “from 
the ecstatic vision, and nothing more, arises a representation [Vorstellung] with few lines 
and surfaces, which… can deal with conditions of the soul.”765 In addition, he told 
Reinhart that the pictures should arouse the imagination of the viewer and through their 
feelings lend them another meaning. He added that, “You can imagine that for me this is 
a very interesting attempt to see how far the human capacity for perception [Auffassung] 
extends through pictures.”766 Ironically, just as Kirchner found comfort through the 
                                                                
764 Kirchner to Franz Marc, 06.11.1912. Original letter in the Germanisches Nationalmuseum Nuremberg, German Art 
Archive, Marc Estate, I, C, manuscript letter, 5 pages (with envelope). 
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imagination of Petrarch so too did Schopenhauer who, in the preface of The World as Will 
and Representation, wrote that he had found consolation for his long neglect as a 
philosopher through Petrarch’s comment in De Vera Sapienta, that “if anyone who 




In order to investigate C1 and follow Schopenhauer’s methodology, this chapter 
introduced his theory of the Platonic Ideas. Our finding here was that, as the most 
elementary form of representations, the Ideas in Kirchner’s work undermined C1 despite 
the theoretical notion that they stand for the most adequate objectivity of the will. This 
was so, since the Ideas which are manifestations of such an objectivity are not the will per 
se. Yet, according to Schopenhauer’s thinking, we were  supposed to find that, particular 
nudes in Kirchner’s art can be theorised as universal Ideas. However, as Janaway argues: 
From a picture's portraying an individual in accurate detail we can make no 
inference to its revealing the essence common to everything of a certain species. 
On the contrary, the two features seem in danger of excluding one another at least 
sometimes, since many of a thing's peculiarities will precisely be peculiar to it 
alone. The leap from individual to Idea here is enormous and perverse.768 
 
Although Janaway may be right, we need to add that the Ideas of nudes were a form of 
representational knowledge (and the thing-in-itself under the form of the representation), 
which entails that as Ideas they refute C1 due to  their absence of will. Yet, upon reflection 
this too  might be considered an ‘enormous and perverse’ inference since, as we noted 
earlier in the chapter,  we asserted that there must be a coincidence of will-lessness and 
will-fullness in Kirchner the artist which is inexplicable. However, according to 
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Schopenhauer’s philosophy, Kirchner’s work as an object steps out of all relation to that 
which was external to it, and the viewing subject in turn steps out of relations to their will 
– which would lead to an abatement of suffering. On that theoretical basis, we found that 
the effect upon the artist and viewer undermined C1, because the viewer and artist, cease 
to be purely individual through the practice of aesthetic contemplation. It was argued that 
this  is only possible when individuals lose themselves in aesthetic contemplation and 
become a “pure will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge.”769 Through the 
exercise of aesthetic contemplation, particular naked bodies as objects allegedly become 
the Idea of their species,  while the perceiving individual becomes the pure subject of 
knowing.770 Therefore, according to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, we attain  respite from 
the will and “…celebrate the Sabbath of the penal servitude of willing; the wheel of Ixion 
stands still.”771 In theory then, a state of will-lessness and the predominance of 
representation invalidates C1. 
It was also mooted through Schopenhauer in this chapter, that it is the ‘genius’ 
who is most capable of repeating “the inner nature of the world,”772 through aesthetic 
contemplation and with their art negate C1 by allowing the world as representation to 
dominate the world as will. We noted that whilst a layman and a ‘genius’ would perceive 
a naked body as an object, Schopenhauer informs us of a difference between them.  In the 
layman’s case, they cannot attain to the same level of will-lessness as the ‘genius’, who is 
able to separate will and representation with greater efficiency, so that representations 
become purer and liberated from references to the will.773 Thus, if some consider Kirchner 
to be a ‘genius’, then arguably he was capable of apprehending the universal Idea of a 
nude through disinterested contemplation. Yet, we found that disinterested contemplation  
                                                                
769 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation., p.179. 
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does not entail that the will is completely  ‘denied’ through  aesthetic contemplation, 
which means that  C1 is not ineludibly refuted. 
Having discussed Schopenhauer’s theory of disinterested contemplation, we went 
on to examine the possibility that sexual desire insinuated itself into Kirchner’s contact 
with his child models and mature models. We found that this may well have been the case, 
although concrete evidence beyond Kirchner’s letters is still in need to convict him of 
paedophilia, However, what evidence we do have appears compelling and allows us to say 
that C1 may be uphold in this sense, because it would be an example of the world as will 
dominating the world as representation through sexual desire.  
As we noted in this chapter, Schopenhauer suggests that the consolation which art 
gives, the pleasure of contemplating a beautiful nude when freed from the pain of willing, 
permits the contemplated object as an Idea to express the world as representation ‘whole 
and pure’. However, as we have shown this is a highly contingent emancipation from the 
will and as such offers only a temporary repudiation of C1. Yet, Schopenhauer asserts that 
“this purely knowable side of the world and its repetition in any art is the element of the 
artist. He is captivated by a consideration of the spectacle of the will's objectification.”774  
Although Kirchner arguably never tired of contemplating the will’s objectification, 
or repeating it in his art, there was a price to pay, since he was the striving will which 
objectifies itself in all of nature, entailing that he remained in constant suffering. Thus, for 
Kirchner and all artists, Schopenhauer would say of their endeavours that: 
…it does not become for him a quieter of the will, as we shall see in the following 
book in the case of the saint who has attained resignation; it does not deliver him 
from life for ever, but only for a few moments. For him it is not the way out of life, 
but only an occasional consolation in it, until his power, enhanced by this 
contemplation, finally becomes tired of the spectacle, and seizes the serious side 
of things.775 
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Since the ‘occasional consolation’ of beauty, as and when afforded by ‘enhanced’ 
contemplation, could not invalidate C1 due to the transient nature of such a practice, we 
must seize ‘the serious side of things’ in the following chapter in order to ascertain how 
an artist, or any individual, might affirm or deny the will. By pursuing this policy, we shall 
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We begin this chapter by defining what is meant by affirmation and denial of the 
will in terms of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. After this, we briefly discuss Beckmann and 
Marc’s military affiliations and then move on to consider Beckmann’s war time 
experience in relation to C1 as an example of his will to life. Following this, we examine 
Beckmann’s knowledge of Schopenhauer and his interactions with the philosopher’s text. 
Then, after interpreting Marc’s affirmation of the will to war in the context of C1, we shall 
think about Marc and Beckmann’s attitudes towards the war according to their 
conceptions of fate. This is significant, because Schopenhauer had much to say on the 
question of fate, and as will be noted, Beckmann in particular interacted with the 
philosopher’s texts which discuss this issue.  
For some active servicemen fate and morality possessed a close relationship to 
each other. Since this was the case, this chapter necessitates not only a close scrutiny of 
Marc’s attitudes towards fate, but also an evaluation of his moral stance towards the war. 
From this discussion, it may surprise some of us that Marc, (more often than not), affirmed 
the will to war, yet it may not surprise others that many servicemen such as Beckman 
displayed a high degree of self-interest and a resolute will to live. By contrast for Marc, 
self-interest had to be sacrificed to the natural justice of war – an ‘unfailing atonement’ as 
he put it. However, for arguably less robust servicemen such as Beckmann, no sense of 
self-sacrifice could offset his existential pain, his encounters with bodily disfigurement 
and subsequent nervous breakdown. In addition, it shall be noted that not only did human 
beings suffer disfiguring injury and pain during the First World War but that animals also 
suffered on an enormous scale.  
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As a consequence of the above, the war might appropriately be described on 
Schopenhauer’s terms as the will at war with itself - thus making C1 fully justifiable. Yet 
as we shall demonstrate, what seems unjust to some of us is that artists such as Marc and 
Macke lost their lives through combat and the fact that we shall never know what the fruits 
of their aesthetic labours might have been - had they survived. In fact, although Macke 
appreciated Schopenhauer’s interpretation of the striving restless nature of the will, his 
letters to his wife show that he was deeply anxious about the mortal danger he was in – 
compared to Marc whose only fear (it seems) was that he might never complete his 
aesthetic labours.  
In this chapter, it could be argued that overly concrete conclusions are drawn from 
tenuous premises, such as when a phrase in a letter is used to make claims about something 
as complex as an individual's experience of war. Indeed, there is some truth to this which 
requires methodological reflection. Therefore, on the one hand it may be correct to say 
that, by imposing my own intellectual prejudices upon such tenuous premises throughout 
this chapter that an interpretative sin has been committed. Yet, on the other hand for Hans 
Gadamer, the activity of understanding cannot occur without prejudices at all, or without 
an apriority of personal anticipations, which provide the “initial directedness of our whole 
ability to experience.”101 Thus, it may be argued, that the prejudices of my findings in this 
chapter could have been continually remodelled, as and when they encountered the past, 
in order to attain a certain hermeneutical ‘rectitude’. However, as Gadamer argues, the 
interpretive act itself must remain insurmountable since the hermeneutic circle cannot be 
destroyed as “it is the fundamental precondition of understanding.”776 
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That said, one plausible method for interpreting the letters and experiences of the 
artists in this chapter would have been to ‘reconstruct’ all of the possible conditions in 
which they had experienced the war, and in this way gained some sort of interpretative 
‘rectitude’. Yet, as Gadamer suggests, that which is reconstructed and retrieved from the 
past is not the original work, since its perpetuation in an alienated condition merely gives 
it “a derivative, cultural existence.”777 Consequently, in order to think historically then 
our ideas of the past must inevitably undergo a transposition when we attempt to think 
through them, which in turn entails that “to think historically always involves mediating 
between those ideas and one's own thinking. To try to escape from one’s own concepts 
in interpretation is not only impossible but manifestly absurd.”778  
In spite of the above, it may still be the case that the interpretations of this chapter 
become “dissolved into the subjective or the occasional.”779 If this is the case, then it 
could in theory be tolerable since there is no ‘canonized first performance’ for this 
chapter, and any striven for ‘correctness’ of interpretation (especially when we apply 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy) might inflict an injustice on the artists in question. Should 
this be conceivable, then Gadamer for one is convinced that “in view of the finitude of 
our historical existence, it would seem that there is something absurd about the whole 
idea of a unique, correct interpretation.”780  
What is not a unique interpretation, but nevertheless indubitably correct, is the 
fact that before the outbreak of war, Marc and Beckmann engaged in a conflict of their 
own. Marc had published ‘Die neue Malerei’ in the journal Pan, in March 1912 and 
Beckmann had subsequently responded to it in the following issue of 14.03.1912 with 
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his article ‘Gedanken über zeitgemässe und unzeitgemässe Kunst’ (‘Thoughts on 
Modern and Non-Modern Art’). As Dietrich Schubert has demonstrated, Beckmann 
established a fundamentally opposite position to Marc on art, whereby the former 
perceived that his own art – in contrast to the ‘modern’ Marc’s – was not modern. By 
contrast, he postulated instead, through an art of inwardness, that his art led to the 
representation of a visible contemporary reality, a powerful depiction of the world of 
sensory perception, which referenced among others Goya, Géricault, Delacroix and 
Vincent van Gogh.781 Marc responded with a short ‘anti-Beckmann’ statement which 
did not contain anything new but emphasised the impossibility of any reconciliation 
between the viewpoints. Thus, Schubert goes on to suggest that: 
…the fundamental questions of the relationship of subjectivity and objectivity, of 
objectivity and the inner life, of art to ‘Nature’ (visible reality and the invisible), 
of depiction to life (in the Nietzschean sense), ultimately, with regard to content 
and ‘réalisation’, raise questions of turning to life or a mystical turning away from 
life.782 
 
Schubert understands this to mean that the controversy between the artists possessed a 
significance, not only for the times, but with respect to two basic positions: artistic 
shaping, (thus realisation) of reality perceptible to the senses, and the shaping of a purely 
subjective imagination (fiction).783 
For many Expressionists the start of the First World War as a field of conflict 
exemplified a turning-point in German history. While some artists volunteered for military 
service others were conscripted into it, but for most of them their affirmation of the will 
to war (die Bejahung des Willens zum Krieg) quickly changed into one of despair and a 
complete denial of the will to war (die Verneinung des Willens zum Krieg).784 This chapter 
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is primarily, but not exclusively, about the artists Beckmann and Marc who served their 
country, either willingly or unwillingly, during the First World War. It is about the effect 
of war service upon them as examples of embodied willing, as reported by their own texts 
and their own images. These texts and images will be interpreted through Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy of the will and it shall be asked to what extent these artists affirmed or denied 
the will to war. This interpretative process makes it possible to test and expand upon the 
core research area of this thesis as stimulated by C1. Consequently, research methodology 
is grounded upon aspects of Schopenhauer’s ‘Fourth Book the World as Will, Second 
Aspect: With the Attainment of Self-Knowledge, Affirmation and Denial of the Will-to-
Live’ from Volume 1 of his major work. It shall be construed therefore, that the self-
affirmation of the human body through war extended this affirmation to such a degree that 
it led to the denial of the same will (which we all share in) appearing in other bodies.785  
 
4.1 Defining Affirmation and Denial of the Will 
 
 
Although Schopenhauer does not use the phrases ‘will to war’ or ‘denial of the 
will to war’ they are congruent with his overall philosophy. For example, Schopenhauer 
points out how the “will manifests that self-affirmation of one’s own body” is so common, 
yet “by virtue of the egoism peculiar to all, it very easily goes beyond this affirmation to 
the denial of the same will appearing in another individual.”786 By denying the embodied 
will appearing in an ‘other’, whether through war or otherwise, this selfish affirmation of 
the usurping will of the ‘other’ is underwritten by Schopenhauer’s concept of wrong 
(Unrecht). Therefore, “the sufferer of the wrong feels the transgression into his own 
body’s sphere of affirmation through the denial of this by another individual, as an 
                                                                
785 Schopenhauer believed that the most vehement affirmation of the will is a sexual one. This may have been true for 
him, but let us argue that since his lifetime modern warfare has evidently proven far more vehement. 
786 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation., Vol.1, p.334. The concept of egoism will be 
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immediate and mental pain.”787 Inevitably, every artist in question during their military 
‘career’ suffered from both physical and mental pain, whether through military discipline 
or combat. If that is so, then how can we begin to interpret this suffering through 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy? One answer to this question is that true loss was as unlikely 
as true gain for every artist who suffered during the war. This is because in the world of 
phenomena, “The will alone is; it is the thing-in-itself, the source of all those 
phenomena. Its self-knowledge and its affirmation or denial that is then decided on, 
is the only event in-itself.”788  
Schopenhauer defines the affirmation of the will (die Bejahung des Willens) as the 
persistence of willing itself, unperturbed by knowledge, indwelling the life of man as a 
whole. The body of an individual is the objectivity of the will appearing at this grade in 
this individual. An individual’s willing which develops through time is, Schopenhauer 
says, “the paraphrase of the body, the elucidation of the meaning of the whole and of its 
parts. It is another way of exhibiting the same thing-in-itself of which the body is already 
the phenomenon. Therefore, instead of affirmation of the will, we can also say affirmation 
of the body.”789 In addition, every individual pursues their own willing and does not 
generally pursue any other knowledge.790 As a result, it is possible that the will of an 
individual can become aroused to such a pitch that it exceeds the reasonable affirmation 
of their body. This pitch manifests itself in vehement emotion by which the individual not 
only affirms their own will but denies and supresses that of other individuals who oppose 
them.791 
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- 222 - 
 
This pitch encapsulates the violence of war by which an individual affirms his own 
existence, denying and seeking ‘to suppress that of others when it stands in his way’. If 
this is so, could it be said that Beckmann and Marc affirmed their own existence and 
suppressed that of others when it stood in their way? As will be shown, Beckmann did 
affirm the will to war for a time although he could not be said to be a man who, when 
faced with the embodied will of others, denied and suppressed that of others when it 
opposed him. By contrast, the same could not be said of Marc as we shall see in this 
chapter. 
Before proceeding with the above, it is important to offer a working definition of 
what denial of the will (die Verneinung des Willens) means. It means a quieting of the 
will, often through extreme suffering, leading to a metaphysical form of salvation and 
deliverance from pain. As Cartwright states, “The denial of the will connotes the ultimate 
triumph of the intellect or cognition over the will.”792 When denial of the will takes place 
it does not occur as a result of causality or personal contrivance. Instead, true denial of the 
will arrives all of a sudden as if from an external source with a semblance of spiritual 
revelation. In a metaphysical sense the denial of the will then leads to an almost holy 
renunciation of the world, a turning away from all willing in general and a state of abject 
resignation. As a consequence, the state achieved is a relative nihilism without knowledge, 
incommunicable and devoid of subject object/relations, closely allied to the Buddhist state 
of nirvana and Indian asceticism. However, whilst we might acknowledge this definition, 
it must be stated that no artist ever attained Schopenhauer’s ascetic denial of the will to 
life or the will to live. Indeed, as we shall note later on in this chapter, Beckmann for 
example could never adopt an ascetic philosophy.793 
                                                                
792 Cartwright. p.183. 
793 Cf. Beckmann and Buenger. End note 6, p.400. In general, we might interpret Schopenhauer’s doctrine as one which 
prioritises knowing over willing and one which advocates a subjugation of bodily appetites. In fact, future research 
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Whilst many artists denied the will to war, in doing so they merely affirmed the 
will to life and the will to live as an act of self-preservation. For example, Karl Schmidt-
Rottluff did not deny his will to such an extent that he sought ‘voluntary poverty’ or 
asceticism, but he did maintain a moral denial of the will to war. On 28.06.1917, he 
expressed a will to end the war when observing how, “the troops, whom I have got to 
know in the past 21 months, now only want peace, and for a long time have not cared 
under what conditions.”794 In August of that year, he again repudiated the will to war 
when, referring to historian and collector Wilhelm Niemeyer’s support for the conquest 
of Riga, he judged it to be a “pre-meditated crime.”795  
Although Heckel did not go so far as to completely deny every need of his will, 
his denial of the will to war began to emerge slowly from around mid-1916. This can be 
seen in a letter which was written by him to art historian Walter Kaesbach in August 1916 
from Ostende in which he states that: 
Today I received a letter from Kestenberg. He would like to have something for 
an expanded issue (of the Bildermann) which will be ‘directed’ against the horrors 
of war. No word, the line of the National Committee [i.e., the committee of the 
Reichstag advocating peace negotiations]. I don't know. They are both right and 
wrong. When I walked through the casualty transport train at Ghent, yes. When I 
                                                                
might benefit by exploring research on asceticism. Expressionist figuration, for example, may be illuminated by the 
work of John M. Dillon, who, who discusses the contribution of Platonism to the European tradition of asceticism. 
(Dillon, M. J. ‘Rejecting the Body, Refining the Body: Some Remarks on the Development of Platonist Asceticism’ in: 
Wimbush, V. L., Valantasis, R., and Union Theological, S., Asceticism (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995)., p.81). He argues that each of two major traditions in Europe have arisen from Platonism and have evolved into 
distinct historical accounts. The first tradition rejects the body as an impediment to the health of the soul, while the 
second disciplines and refines the body by making it a suitable habitation for the soul. He argues that both aspects 
necessitate ascetic practices and that the most significant demonstration of Plato’s rejection of the human body can be 
found in the Phaedo. And so it is that, contrary to humanity’s lust for war and bodily training for it, we might invoke 
Socrates who stated that we should do well “if we consort with the body as little as possible, and do not commune with 
it, except in so far as we must, and do not infect ourselves with its nature, but remain pure from it, until God himself 
shall release us.” (Gallop, D., Phaedo (Clarendon Press, 1975).,(67a), p.12). This is what Dillon refers to as “the world-
negating tradition of asceticism.” (Wimbush, Valantasis, and Union Theological.,p.81). Indeed, in line with this 
tradition, Socrates concludes that “we men are in some sort of prison.” (Gallop.,(62b), p.6). By contrast, the second 
tradition has no dispute with our bodies or our world, but rather perceives “the ensouled body as an organism that gains 
greatly by being finely tuned. Soul should dominate body, and rational soul should dominate irrational soul, and the 
whole organism should dominate - or, rather, transcend as far as possible - its environment.” (Wimbush, Valantasis, and 
Union Theological.,p.82). In this respect, we could in future argue that artists such as Kandinsky aspired to knowing 
over willing and that this would negate C1. 
794 Soika, A., Moeller, M. M., and Brücke Museum, Weltenbruch: die Künstler der Brücke im Ersten Weltkrieg. 1914-
1918 (München ; London: Prestel, 2014).p.209. Cf. Letter from Schmidt-Rottluff to Niemeyer 28.06.1917, and LMO-
GW 3.   
795 Letter from Schmidt-Rottluff to Niemeyer 12.08.1917, and LMO-GW 3. 
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see the daredevils of sailors, healthy predators, wonderfully filled with strength - 
then one sees the good side (of the issue).  796 
 
Early on in the war Otto Mueller wrote to his wife Maschka that, “life is interesting to be 
sure, but in the long term unbearable.”797 By the end of 1916 he would write “my life is 
terrible, you’ve no idea what I have to suffer and endure. Everything disgusts me here, the 
people, the food and running around the whole day with guns. No peace and quiet … 
madness.”798 Although Mueller never arrived at an ascetic denial of the will to life he at 
least denied the will to war when he told Mashka that “I hope that the war will come to an 
end and we will soon be together.”799 However, if he, or indeed the whole human race, at 
any time achieved an utter denial of the will to life or the will to live, then the world would 
automatically vanish into nothing according to Schopenhauer.800 Consequently, there 
would be no triumph of the will at all since if this became the rule then the human 
race would become extinct and along with it the animal kingdom. Therefore, with the 
total eradication of knowledge everything would vanish into oblivion “for there can 
be no object without a subject.”801  
 




At the outbreak of the First World War, Beckmann was far from oblivion, being 
on holiday close to Danzig where Schopenhauer was born.802 When war preparations 
began Beckmann subsequently returned to Berlin, and as Barbara Buenger indicates, 
                                                                
796 See: Werckmeister, O. ‘Heckel and the First World War’ in:  Rumold, R. and Werckmeister, O. K., The Ideological 
Crisis of Expressionism: The Literary and Artistic German War Colony in Belgium 1914-1918 (Columbia, S.C.: Camden 
House, 1990). p.223. 
797 Letter from Mueller to Maschka, 21.1.1917, from “Briefe von Otto Mueller”, no. 11. In: Lüttichau, M.-A. v., Pirsig, 
T., and Mueller, O.,  Otto Mueller CD-ROM, München, 2003). 
798 Mueller quoted in: Buchheim, L. G. n., Otto Mueller: Leben und Werke (Feldafing: Buchheim, 1963). p.168. 
799 Ibid., p.181. 
800 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.380. 
801 Ibid.Vol.1, p.380. 
802 The Schopenhauer family fled Danzig in March 1793 to escape Prussian annexation. 
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Minna Beckmann-Tube was asked by Scheffler to choose samples of  Beckmann’s war 
letters to her for publication shortly after his posting to East Prussia.803 We know that the 
letters were written between 14.09.1914 and 12.06.1915 being published in Kunst und 
Künstler from December 1914 to July 1915. By 1916, these military letters were made 
public through the publisher and gallery owner Bruno Cassirer as a book with the title 
Briefe im Kriege.804  
Buenger has suggested that there is no record of Beckmann’s military unit, 
although she has believed that he was attached to a division of the Eighth Army.805 There 
is however a record of his military assignment made by the artist himself which Buenger 
overlooks. This record can be found in one of Beckmann’s sketchbooks that he kept during 
the war. There, on page 91 verso, can be found his exact military affiliation written down 
as “M. Beckmann volunteer nurse at the Military Hospital Department of the Active Guard 
Corps Stage Inspection of the IV. Army.” We know, therefore, that he was in the 4th Army 
and not the assumed 8th Army.”806  
By contrast, Marc’s military service began on 01.10.1899, as a 1-year volunteer 
in the Königlicher Bayerischer 1. Feldartillerie-Regiment ‘Prinzregent Luitpold’ (Royal 
Bavarian 1st Field Artillery Regiment ‘Prince Regent Luitpold’) where he was made a 
private in April 1900, then discharged to the Reserve in September 1900. When the First 
World War broke out, Marc moved from his hometown of Ried on 06.08.1914 to join his 
active service regiment. On 30.08.1914, after a transfer to the Leichte Munitionskolonne 
(Light Munitions Column), he returned to the field as a new non-commissioned officer. 
                                                                
803 Beckmann and Buenger. p.133. He agreed to their publication with reluctance. However, the letters are not to be 
taken as unmediated 'truth', just because they are personal disclosures to Minna. It may well be the case that Beckmann 
shaped his letters carefully since he knew that they would be published. 
804 Ibid., p.133. 
805 Ibid., p.134. 
806 “M. Beckmann freiwilliger Krankenpfleger der Kriegslazarettabteilung des aktiven Gardecorps Etappeninspection 
der IV. Arme(e).” in: Max Beckmann. Die Skizzenbücher. Ostfildern 2010. See: sketchbook no. 9, page 330. 
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He was appointed to the rank of Vizefeldwebel und Offizier-Aspirant (Staff Sergeant and 
Officer Candidate), awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class, promoted to Offizierstellvertreter 
(Acting Officer), and finally on 13.10.1915 promoted again to Lieutenant of the Field 
Artillery.  
Overall, Marc strongly affirmed the will to war and was profoundly grateful for it, 
often writing and commenting about his experiences as Beckmann did. As early as mid-
October 1914, Marc had written an article called ‘In War’s Purifying Fire’ for the 
December 15th edition of the Vossische Zeitung in which he aired this affirmation. In 
affirming the will to war Marc kept company with writer Thomas Mann, author of the pro-
war book Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (Observations of a Non-Political Man). On 
04.10.1914, the ‘Manifest der 93’ (Manifesto of the Ninety-Three) was signed by 93 of 
Germany’s intellectual elites in support of the war, among them being the painter Max 
Liebermann, art historian Wilhelm von Bode, philosopher Rudolf Christoph Eucken, and 
historian Karl Gotthard Lamprecht who discussed the concept of Reizbarkeit (excitability) 
in German society.807 
Beckmann’s own excitability about the war can be sensed in a letter to Minna 
written on 11.10.1914 in which he claimed that he went out, through hordes of wounded 
and shattered soldiers who were coming from the battlefield, and listened to the 
tremendous ‘music’ of war.808 From the safety of his position Beckmann seemed to be 
affirming the will to war after reporting how he longed to paint the sound of war with it’s 
“beautiful depths!” 809 In this context Beckmann managed to produce a lithographic image 
                                                                
807 See Lamprecht’s 1902 work titled: Zur jungsten deutschen Vergangenheit (On the Most Recent German History) 
discussed in: Cowan.p.13. Also in Cowan note the connections between Lamprecht and ‘nervous art’ on p.17. See too: 
Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg and Wolfgang von Ungern-Sternberg, Der Aufruf 'An die Kulturwelt!': das Manifest der 
93 und die Anfänge der Kriegspropaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1996. 
808 Beckmann. p.18. Buenger suggests that this was probably Gumbinnen (Gusev), which was a focal point for a 
campaign against the Russians at the Battle of Tannenberg. See: Ibid., p.370. 
809 Ibid. p.18. 
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of exhausted combatants called Fallen Soldiers in 1914 (fig. 109), highlighting the 
devastating effects of war upon the body. Here Beckmann depicts the sight of three figures 
in a state of mortal collapse, with the only upright figure carrying a drawn dagger marking 
out the declination of the seated figure before him. This sight of wounded or dead soldiers 
subsequently became an everyday occurrence for Beckmann and medical orderlies. 
On 10.03.1915, whilst working at the Kriegslazarett-Museum, Beckmann’s role 
was to attend to patients who were not serious casualties.810 His duties were to clean the 
operating theatres, to collect wounded soldiers transferred from the trenches and to care 
for their wounds. However, his work in this respect did not deter his will from creative 
action since on 16.03.1915 he enthused that on his day off, instead of making an excursion, 
he threw himself into his drawing like a wild man and drew a self-portrait for seven 
hours.811 We can see that creative will in an oil painting titled Self-Portrait as a Nurse of 
1915 (fig. 110), where Beckmann looks out as if in surprise whilst holding a paint brush. 
As he does so, he almost casts before the viewer an image of detached self-
aggrandisement. The Red Cross on his lapel, which signifies his military affiliation, picks 
up the pinkish skin tones of his face perhaps expressing a powerful will to life.  
 
4.3 Beckmann, the Will to Life and Hedonism 
 
 
Beckmann’s will to life at times verged on hedonism during the war. In fact, when 
reading his war writings what comes across is the image of a man participating in both 
hedonism and tragedy.812 There are several letters which substantiate this claim, but 
                                                                
810 Buenger states: “The Kriegslazarett-Museum (Field hospital museum) was a collecting place for the sick and 
wounded close to the Courtrai railway station.” His work was carried out under the supervision of a chief medical officer 
who knew his paintings. See: Beckmann and Buenger. p.371. 
811 Beckmann. p.27. Buenger identifies Beckmann’s location as “Thorn (Torun), an old fortified town on the Vistula, is 
238 miles from Berlin and was of great importance in the history of both Poland and Prussia. Thorn was a main place 
of transfer, about sixty miles from Mlawa”. See: Beckmann and Buenger., p.369. 
812 Schopenhauer suggests “that the measure of an individual’s possible happiness is determined beforehand by his 
individuality. In particular, the limits of his mental powers have fixed once for all his capacity for pleasures of a higher 
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two in particular are worth mentioning. The first was written from Ostende on 
16.03.1915 while others were dying on the front line or struggling with their wounded 
bodies. The letter to Minna shows that Beckmann was ‘spirited away’ from danger 
through the instigation of a certain Captain Ludwig Thormaehlen.813 Beckmann 
subsequently reported that, “Here I am sitting in an elegant hotel room, I have lit a 
cigarette and a bottle of red wine stands before me. It amuses me to gaze at the smoke 
from my cigarette and to think about the drunken sailor with whom I have just driven back 
or about the grotesque variations in my life.”814 This image of a man taking his leisure 
in an ‘elegant hotel room’ whilst others were on the brink of nothingness is hedonistic. 
It is reminiscent of a charge which was made against Schopenhauer by Georg Lukács 
in The Destruction of Reason, when he described how “Schopenhauer’s system, well 
laid out and architecturally ingenious in form, rises up like a modern luxury hotel on the 
brink of the abyss, nothingness and futility. And the daily sight of the abyss, between the 
leisurely enjoyment of meals or works of art, can only enhance one’s pleasure in this 
elegant comfort.”815 
The second letter to Minna was written on 27.03.1915, when Beckmann was in 
Wervicq, seven miles from Ypres. Once more a parallel might be drawn between 
Beckmann and Lukacs’ perception of Schopenhauer, especially when Beckmann confided 
that whilst eating an orange he could peacefully observe the most exquisite shooting at 
planes, and how “at night I have wonderful fireworks” (wundervolles Feuerwerk) arising 
                                                                
order. If those powers are small, all the efforts from without, everything done for him by mankind or good fortune, will 
not enable him to rise above the ordinary half-animal human happiness and comfort. He is left to depend on the pleasures 
of the senses, on a cosy and cheerful family life, on low company and vulgar pastimes.” See: Schopenhauer, Arthur, 
and Eric Francis Jules Payne. Parerga and Paralipomena. Short Philosophical Essays Vol.1, p.317-318. Cf. World as 
Will and Representation, Vol.2, chap. vii. 
813 “Ludwig Thormaehlen (1889-1956), a sculptor, had become director of the Charlottenburg Kunstgewerbeschule at 
the war’s beginning. The same year he also began a career at the Berlin Nationalgalerie that eventually led to his 
appointment as curator in the department of prints and drawings.” See: Beckmann and Buenger. p.372. 
814 Beckmann. p.28. 
815 Lukács, G., The Destruction of Reason (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981). p.243. 
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from flares in the trenches.816 Subsequently, he acted as if he were a connoisseur of war, 
remarking upon how his ear was learning to differentiate machine gun fire from infantry 
fire along with the gratifying power to recognise French and German cannons. 
Beckmann’s motivation to pursue gratifications of this type during 
unprecedented human slaughter might come as a surprise to us. Yet, it would come as 
no surprise to Schopenhauer, who acknowledges that motives of this kind can “in this 
way obtain power over the will, and bring about acts of will of the most various kinds.”817 
In addition, he says that the will is only made visible in motives and that a motive declares 
itself as a candidate for quenching the thirst of the will.818 However, even if these motives 
satisfy the will it quickly creates new demands for new satisfactions. Therefore, if every 
individual succumbs to such hedonic egoism then Beckmann is no exception here, since 
he exemplifies how the individual often pursues their own willing at the expense of other 
knowledge.819 
4.4 Beckmann’s Knowledge of Schopenhauer 
 
Despite the fact that Beckmann often pursued his own willing and did not possess 
knowledge born from a University education, he did read the works of Schopenhauer 
avidly. He owned a copy of the 1902 edition The World as Will and Representation, along 
with Volumes 1 and 2 of Parerga and Paralipomena in their 1891-93 editions. He also 
had a 1921 edition of the Sämtliche Werke (Collected Works).820 Of these books, 
Beckmann’s copy of The World as Will and Representation is particularly interesting 
since it contains annotations made by the artist himself.821 The annotations to volume 1 
                                                                
816 Beckmann. p.32. 
817 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.327. 
818 Ibid., p.327. 
819 Ibid.,p.327. 
820 Schopenhauer, A. and Frischeisen-Köhler, M., Arthur Schopenhauer (Berlin: Weichert, 1921). The Parerga itself 
was given to him by his first wife Minna-Tube in 1906 but we do not know about the origins of the other volumes. 
821 The comments which Beckmann made in his copies of Schopenhauer have been published in: Beckmann In the 
preface to his book, Uwe M. Schneede tells us that the vast majority of Beckmann’s notes are in Schopenhauer’s and 
- 230 - 
 
are undated and appear in an older version of the work, whilst many of those in volume 2 
are date-lined to the 1940s and it is these that will be used here. Whilst it is not conclusive 
to relate annotations made in the 1940s to Beckmann’s thinking and practice of his earlier 
years, the annotations do provide a basis on which we can begin to assess his 
understanding of Schopenhauer. This is supported by the fact that, although the extant 
copy of Beckmann’s volume 2 was published in 1921, we know that Beckmann had 
sourced older versions of volume 2 and read them before the war.  
Given the evidence available to us, Beckmann continued to read Schopenhauer 
after the war as part of his ongoing autodidacticism. As Buenger has shown, Beckmann’s 
early decision to study philosophy also bought him into contact with Hegel’s Enzyklopädie 
der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences) and Nietzsche’s Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil).822 In 
addition, she argues that Beckmann’s “strong reaction to the ‘logarithmic’ reasoning of 
Immanuel Kant, for instance, was undoubtedly reinforced by reading critiques of Kant in 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.”823  Moreover, at the time of his death, Beckmann owned a 
1908 copy of Kant's Kritik der reinen Vemunft (Critique of Pure Reason) of 1781, so it is 
therefore possible that Beckmann had read Kant for himself as early as 1903.824 We can 
argue for this given the following diary entry where the artist says that: 
Yes, he’s certainly a first-rate thinking machine, this Kant; but what's it for, this 
lifetime spent investigating human intelligence. Is it really worth it? Haven't the 
                                                                
Madame de Blavatasky’s works. By contrast, there are no marks in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason or Theorie der 
Reinmoralischen Religion - although Beckmann recommended the former, and the works of Schopenhauer, to Schneede 
in a letter of 1936 as necessary reading. In Schneede’s opinion, Beckmann’s notes on Schopenhauer and Blavatsky read 
like conversations with personal friends, displaying both strong criticism and insight. Indeed, Schneede elaborates on 
this by saying that “… he conversed with the authors now and again, as if they had been sitting intimately opposite him 
for a long time, […] ‘Schoppi, Nitsche und old Auntie BLV’.  With all three […] he could find individual parts charming 
and excellent and very pretty, but he could equally denounce them as pointless rubbish (Blavatsky) academic 
(Schopenhauer) or Jugendstil rubbish (Nietzsche).  Nowhere is he an unbounded admirer, but also nowhere […] is he 
purely a harsh critic.” Ibid., p.7-8. 
822 Hegel, G. W. F., Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner 
Verlag, 1999). Nietzsche, F., Nikol Verlagsgesellschaft mb, H., and Co, K. G., Jenseits von Gut und Böse (2017). 
823 Beckmann and Buenger. 
824 Ibid. End note 48, p.332. See: Kant, I. and Schmidt, H., Kritik der reinen Vernunft, herausg. von H. Schmidt. 
Volksausg (Leipz1908).  
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most beautiful deeds sprung directly from unconscious action, and isn't that always 
by far the most beautiful. What has this tedious logarithmic table achieved? 
Something he can be proud of. Be comically proud of something.825 
 
Although Beckmann rarely referred to Kant, Buenger is persuaded that the artist’s wide 
philosophical reading during the 1920s may also have been informed by Paul Deussen's 
Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie.826 
Despite the caveat that Beckmann’s readings of Schopenhauer straddled the First 
World War, it is important to deploy his annotations nonetheless, since they clearly 
demonstrate that Schopenhauer was important to Beckmann.827 Even though such 
evidence cannot be relied upon to prove categorically that ‘x’ or ‘y’ was of significance 
to Beckmann at specific points of artistic creation (or even philosophically), it could 
nonetheless be regarded as a strong indicator that this was likely to be the case. Therefore, 
although Beckmann may have made fewer references to Schopenhauer during the war 
years, subsequently however, we do have strong evidence for him reading Schopenhauer’s 
work which suggests the possibility of an earlier interest that develops after the conclusion 
of the war. As a result, we may employ the evidence as an indicator with a warning that it 
cannot be used in any conclusive way.828 
In his copy of the World as Will and Representation Volume One for example, 
Beckmann has marked out for attention pages 314-315 in their entirety without dating 
them.829 Certain sections have been underlined by Beckmann such as: 
What might otherwise be called the finest part of life, its purest joy, just 
because it lifts us out of real existence, and transforms us into disinterested 
                                                                
825 Beckmann’s diary entry for 30.08.1903, translated in: Beckmann and Buenger., p.20.  
826 Deussen, P., Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Religionen, 3rd Aufl. ed. 
(Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1920). Cf. Beckmann and Buenger. End note 12, p.393. 
827 It may be of interest to note that when in Frankfurt Schopenhauer lived at Schöne Aussicht 16-17 in ‘rooms’ and that 
Beckmann lived near there briefly after the First World War at Untermainkai 3. 
828 When using such evidence, the English translated versions of Schopenhauer will be cited in-text along with the 
German language Beckmann/Schaffer collection reference in the corresponding footnotes. Bear in mind that Beckmann 
actually read Schopenhauer in the following: Schopenhauer, Arthur, and Max Frischeisen-Köhler. Arthur Schopenhauer 
[in In Fraktur].  Berlin: Weichert, 1921 and earlier 1902 versions. 
829 As paginated in the English translation which we are using throughout this thesis, not his German edition. 
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spectators of it, is pure knowledge which remains foreign to all willing, 
pleasure in the beautiful, genuine delight in art.830  
 
Here Beckmann has underlined the phrase ‘pure knowledge which remains foreign to all 
willing’. Although Beckmann may have read this passage before the war, and in relation 
to a purely artistic experience, it does lead us to suspect that, if Beckmann could peacefully 
observe whilst eating an orange ‘the most exquisite shooting at planes’, then he may have 
been engaging in ‘pure knowledge which remains foreign to all willing’ and sublimating 
his observations into an aesthetic experience. On the other hand, he has also attended to a 
passage on page 314 which says, “But this need for exciting the will shows itself 
particularly in the invention and maintenance of card-playing, which is in the truest sense 
an expression of the wretched side of humanity.”831 There, Beckmann has marked the 
whole passage with four strokes in the margin. If Beckmann’s reading offers us a clue as 
to his personal character, let us ask if he was a disinterested spectator or a mere hedonist 
entertaining the basic instincts of his will? Furthermore, could it be inferred that 
Beckmann looked to Schopenhauer for practical insights to help transform his 
character?832  
The answer to the first question must be yes, since he was at least a moderate 
hedonist, while the answer to the second was probably no. Supportive evidence to the 
effect can be found in a diary entry of 07.02.1904 where he writes that: 
Once again, the Closerie des Lilas (which incidentally means the Lilac Nurseries, 
as I recently discovered), once again red wine, not quite so good as on the previous 
pages. I have read through the whole meaningless muddle of moods once again 
and I am very content that I still have half a bottle of red wine left. That is all. 
Schopenhauer lies in front of me. A matter of duty. And in spite of him I have no 
                                                                
830 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.314. See: Beckmann, P. and Schaffer, J., 
Die Bibliothek Max Beckmanns: Unterstreichungen, Kommentare, Notizen und Skizzen in seinen Büchern (Worms am 
Rhein: Wernersche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992). p.85-6. 
831 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.p.314. Beckmann and Schaffer. p.86. 
832 Practical and philosophical insights into the nature of human character will be examined in Chapter 6 of this thesis, 
through Schopenhauer’s philosophy of free will. 
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desire left to penetrate these tedious idiotic mysteries of a man who seems to be 
dried up in his living body. I will live I swear it a thousand times. I will.833 
 
4.5 Marc, Will-Power and Fate 
 
 
As with Beckmann, in a manner which perhaps upholds C1, Marc too shared in a certain 
excitement for the will to war and the will to life, however he was never to be found in an 
‘elegant hotel room’ but more often suffering bodily fatigue through combat duties. 
We can hear this in a letter to Kandinsky of 24.10.1914 where Marc had stated that, “I am 
living in this war. Indeed, I see in it the healing, if dreadful, gateway to our goals; it won’t 
set back the people, but it will clean Europe and make it ‘ready’.”834 Yet, by 16.11.1914 
Marc would inform Kandinsky that he was suffering from bodily fatigue and wrote that: 
Unfortunately, my body isn’t as capable of resistance as I thought in the beginning, 
but must endure all the same; my heart isn’t angry with the war, but is grateful 
from the depths; there was no other gateway to the time of the spirit, the Augean 
stables and the old Europe could only thus be cleaned, or is there a single person 
who would wish this war hadn’t happened?835 
 
His commanding officer Lieutenant Öhler considered his health to be in danger and 
offered Marc the post of supervisor and billeting officer which he accepted.836  
Several months later, undeterred by bodily fatigue, Marc wrote an article called 
‘The Secret Europe,’837 published in the March 1915 edition of Das Forum, affirming the 
will to war. Other artistic journals and newspapers of the day, such as Kunst und Künstler 
and Kriegzeit also affirmed the will to war at first. They found support from aesthetic 
luminaries such as Fechter, whose article ‘Confirmation of the War’ not only affirmed war 
but suggested that a renewal of German art would result from it. In addition, Adolf 
                                                                
833 Beckmann, M., Beckmann-Tube, M., and Schmidt, D., Frühe Tagebücher, 1903/04 und 1912/13: mit Erinnerungen 
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Behne’s 1915 article ‘Organisation, Germanness, and Art,’838 used the significant phrase 
‘willpower’ in his discussion of the war. This is significant because the nurturing of 
‘willpower’ through ‘will-training’ was an essential aspect of the war effort.  
Although Marc’s ‘willpower’ did not require reinforcement through military 
training, many soldiers would never accommodate such training. The objective behind 
military ‘will-training’ in the First World War involved harnessing the natural aggression 
of the human will in pursuit of its war aims – and as such validates C1. As Cowan points 
out, ‘will-training’ was deployed in order to prepare combatants for the enormous stresses 
of industrialised warfare and unprecedented human slaughter. As an example, he cites a 
1914 pamphlet, Der Wille zum Sieg (The Will to Victory) by Colonel Friedrich Immanuel, 
who realised that mass technological warfare required unparalleled self-control. Immanuel 
contended that military training was not just about acquiring the skill-sets of a soldier but 
“to a much greater extent, soldiers must train their wills, their capacity for self-
mastery.”839  
For many soldiers, this would have made no difference since their characters were 
such that they could never affirm the will to war anyway, and their resolution to escape 
military action was unlikely to be shaken by military ‘will-training’. Nevertheless, as 
Cowan shows, military theoreticians such as Immanuel boldly asserted the will to war. 
Even though Immanuel acknowledged that wars were conducted under different 
circumstances than in the past, and that the enemy might be equipped with all manner of 
technological wonders, he emphasised that: 
…all such thoughts must recede before the singular idea that we are at least as 
formidable as our enemy and that we possess the unbreakable will to achieve 
victory in battle, however great the sacrifices. Weakness, hesitation, and doubt are 
                                                                
838  Behne, Adolf, ‘Organization, Germanness, and Art' in: Haas-Keye, O., Zeit-Echo (München: Graphik-Verlag, 
1914). 1, nos. 25-24, (1915): p. 561-65. 
839 Friedrich Immanuel, Der Wille zum Sieg (Leipzig: Heinrich Finck, 1914), 66. Quoted and translated in: Cowan. 
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unknown concepts in our army, no matter what terrifying and fantastic scenarios 
laymen might dream up to describe the horrors of future wars.840 
 
Within this culture of willpower, and what appears to be an aggressive confirmation of 
C1, on 29.01.1915 Marc went so far as to write to Macke’s widow that, “I love today all 
people who tremble with us in our life and with the ‘will of fate’ of this war. Strangely 
enough, there are many others who anxiously avoid everything which could draw their 
soul into the war, the ‘Neutrals’ in this country!”841 Here, Marc alludes to the pacifist 
voices who aroused suspicion amongst those who were affirming the will to war. Such 
pacifist voices found their way into anti-war magazines which were subsequently 
prohibited from publication, or severely censored, forcing some to relocate in neutral 
Switzerland in order to continue publishing.842 As Deborah Lewer reveals, Swiss-based 
magazines and newspapers such as Der Revoluzzer (Zurich), Zeit-Echo, Die Freie 
Zeitung, Die Weissen (Bern), and Demain (Geneva) regularly aroused suspicion, their 
editors and contributors - often inaccurately - branded anarchists or ‘Bolsheviks. ”843  
Marc was aware that the war as a ‘will of fate’, not only had a political dimension 
but was the tool of a deeper will.844 This is corroborated by a letter he wrote to his wife 
Maria Marc only a month earlier on 23.12.1914. In it he argued that the bloody-
mindedness of the French politically speaking was becoming ever more puzzling to him. 
                                                                
840 Ibid., p.256. 
841 Marc. p.205. 
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He observed that it was uncanny to see how the politics of national interests, which was 
the tool of a deeper will, necessarily turns against itself when this deeper will demands it 
(wenn dieser tiefere Wille es will). That was the ‘mistake’ of politics he believed. He 
concluded that he would be patient and not hope for a premature ending to the war even 
if German ‘interests’ required it.845 
Undoubtedly, Marc’s fated affirmation of the will to war was shared for the most 
part by the German nation, especially the ruling classes who for some time had felt 
undermined by incipient Socialism. When the German nation affirmed the will to war a 
Burgfrieden ended the internal political dissension “behind the banner of a fully justified 
war of self-defence.”846 As David Welch points out, “In August 1914 therefore, it seemed 
that the war had created a new sense of solidarity in which class antagonisms were 
transcended by some entirely fictitious national community (Volksgemeinschaft).”847 In a 
letter to Maria, Marc extended this transcendence to include the whole continent by 
suggesting that the war was a self-willed act undertaken by Europe to ‘purify’ itself.848 He 
therefore believed that the “war was a natural consequence and hence a just, unfailing 
atonement.”849 As we shall see, this belief was ironically to become an unfailing prophecy 
for his own tragic fate and an affirmation of C1, since an overpowering affirmation of  C1 
took his life in an ‘unfailing’ manner. Indeed, his statement, perhaps unwittingly, reflected 
Schopenhauer’s view that “the true sense of the tragedy is the deeper insight that what the 
hero atones for is not his own particular sins, but original sin, in other words, the guilt of 
existence itself.”850 Consequently, Marc readily affirmed the will to war, harbouring no 
                                                                
845 Marc and Meißner. p.123. 
846 A Burgfrieden is a form of political truce and was a critical factor in war propaganda. See: Welch, D., Germany and 
Propaganda in World War I : Pacifism, Mobilization and Total War (2014); ibid., p.14. 
847 Ibid., p.14. 
848 Letter to Maria, 22.02.1916 in: Marc, F., Lankheit, K., and Steffen, U., Letters from the War (New York: P. Lang, 
1992).p.138. Cf. Original letter to Maria, 22.2.1916 in: Marc, F., Briefe aus dem Feld: mit 32 Bildern des Verfassers 
(Berlin: Rembrandt-Verlag, 1940). p138. 
849 Quotation and translation from Werckmeister, O. K., The Making of Paul Klee's Career, 1914-1920 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989). p.62. 
850 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.254. 
- 237 - 
 
regret at enlisting, feeling lucky that it was his fate to be playing his own part in it despite 
its tragic costs. 
4.6 Beckmann, Schopenhauer and the Question of Fate 
 
 
Beckmann also shared Marc’s perception that the war was a question of fate. On 
24.05.1915, he wrote that he was not participating in the war as some kind of historian, 
instead he was immersing himself in the war as if it were a manifestation of life, as in 
sickness, love or ecstasy. Since he pursued fear, sickness and ecstasy to their utmost limits, 
he felt that he could do the same with the war. He was persuaded that “everything is life, 
wonderfully changeable and rich in ideas. Everywhere I find deep lines of beauty in the 
suffering and bearing of this terrible fate.”851 
One key to interpreting Beckmann’s perception of history and fate is to be found 
in Schopenhauer’s essay ‘Transcendent Speculation on the Apparent Deliberateness in the 
Fate of the Individual’ in Parerga and Paralipomena Volume One. Indeed, Beckmann 
spent a great deal of time annotating, underlining and thinking about the nature of fate and 
history as found in Parerga. Within that thinking process, Beckmann has attended to a 
passage where Schopenhauer proposes that world history does not have a plan or 
blueprint, as the academic philosophy of his time suggested. Whilst nations have their 
existence in the abstract, individuals alone are real for Schopenhauer which means that 
“world history is without direct metaphysical significance; it is really only an accidental 
configuration.”852 In his copy, Beckmann has underlined the phrase “individuals are what 
is real”853 and appended his own comment to it with the words, “a confidence trick” 
(Hochstapelei). What Beckmann meant is open to speculation, but given the trend of 
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852 Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.1, p.204. Cf. Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. The World as Will and 
Representation. Vol.1, § 35. 
853 Beckmann and Schaffer. p.75. 
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Beckmann’s comments it is most likely a repudiation of Schopenhauer’s notion that 
‘individuals are what is real’. 
The greatest proportion of Beckmann’s commentary in Parerga is given over to 
the nature of fate. In this regard Schopenhauer warns his readers that they cannot expect 
to receive definite answers on the nature of fate. Yet, he does suggest that the belief in a 
supernatural providence is universally known amongst his readers. When we encounter 
bad luck, he says, many of us reassure ourselves with maxims such as ‘it could have been 
worse’, or ‘this was a blessing in disguise’, both of which arise from the notion that chance 
is the prince of this world and error its vice-regent. Since we are buffeted by both chance 
and its vice-regent, “we shun the blows of one world-tyrant and rush to the other in that 
we turn from chance and appeal to error.”854 
After reading this passage in later years, on 17.06.1940, Beckmann has underlined 
the words ‘although chance rules the world,’855 and then a few paragraphs later the phrase 
‘with strict necessity’. This is taken from Schopenhauer’s observation that, “without 
exception everything that happens takes place with strict necessity…”856 Further on, 
Beckmann has marked in the margin of his copy the whole section which speaks of an 
apparent occult power which guides external events.857 This section says that “in truth, 
however, that occult power that guides even external influences can ultimately have its 
root only in our own mysterious inner being; for indeed in the last resort the alpha and 
omega of all existence lie within us.”858  
There are many more instances in Parerga where Beckmann has either underlined 
passages on the nature of fate or added his personal comments. One final example 
implicates the concept of the will in relation to fate. This is where Schopenhauer asserts 
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that sometimes we adopt plans unsuitable to our welfare but “while we are eagerly 
pursuing it we experience against it a conspiracy of fate, which sets in motion all its 
machinery to defeat it. In this way, fate finally thrust us back, against our will, on to the 
path that is truly suited to us.”859 From this, Beckmann has underlined the words beginning 
with ‘while we are eagerly pursuing it’, right through until ‘a path that is truly suited to 
us’, underlining the phrase ‘conspiracy of fate which sets in motion all its machinery to 
defeat us’.860  
It is clear that Beckmann was interested in Schopenhauer’s thoughts about fate, 
and ironically ‘a conspiracy of fate’ did thrust Beckmann away from the military and back 
to the world of art – onto a path which truly suited him. This machinery of fate meant that 
by the end of the summer in 1915 Beckmann found himself at the 15th Corps’ headquarters 
in Strasburg on medical leave following a nervous breakdown; then by October, his will 
to war broken and his health in jeopardy, a doctor he had known in Belgium finally 
arranged for his transfer to Frankfurt. A broken will and nervous breakdown as a result of 
war trauma was not uncommon as history has shown. Indeed, Cowan argues that: 
Given their experiences with shell-shocked soldiers, military doctors were some 
of the most vocal critics of the model of hysteria as a female disease. Schleich, for 
one, insisted that hysteria was gender-blind: ‘Thus hysteria knows no sex, and it is 
high time to free women from the curse of being the only bearers of hysteria - an 
idea probably invented by men to make themselves believe that they are more 
reasonable than women.’”861  
 
Although there is no evidence that Beckmann exhibited symptoms of ‘hysteria’, he was 
discharged from military duty in November 1915, and was not alone among artists in 
feeling the effects of war service. As the war began to intensify there is some evidence to 
suggest that the experience of combat had undermined Marc’s will to war. Indeed, a 
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fluctuation in Marc’s affirmation of the will to war did manifest itself on occasions, for 
example when he was on leave on 05.10.1915. On that occasion, Macke’s widowed wife 
was to hear from Marc that he was “full of hate against the war,” but at the same time 
enjoying the unchallenged reputation of being an “excellent” soldier – an incongruity 
which he described as grotesque (das Groteske).862 
4.7 Marc and the Morality of War 
 
 
The above incongruity leads us to point out that, although Marc was proud of his 
military prowess and the sensation of becoming a better soldier, scholarship to date has 
neglected the moral implications of his actions as a trained killer.863 If we are to make any 
judgement about these implications then Schopenhauer concludes that right and wrong are 
moral determinations, being valid to human conduct “in reference to the inner significance 
of this conduct in itself.”864 Therefore, according to Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy, 
there are three fundamental incentives which motivate human conduct. These are egoism, 
malice, and compassion.865 
 Because Marc’s military duty compelled him to kill other human beings, beyond 
this mandate it would be objectively impossible to discern whether his killing included 
egoism, malice or compassion. Yet, when a sensitive human being injures another they 
often find that the act presents itself to their consciousness as a wrongdoing shadowed by 
an inner pain. This pain is the perpetrator’s consciousness of an internal affirmation of 
their will which has denied the will of their victims. Consequently, some perpetrators are 
aware that even though they are different from their victim as phenomena, they are in 
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themselves somehow identical with that victim.866 
 On the other hand, Schopenhauer argues that the recipient of the wrong is 
achingly conscious of the denial of their will as it is disclosed in their body. At the same 
time, they are conscious that without doing wrong, they could fend off that denial by all 
means, unless they lacked the power.867 In fact, in what amounts to another validation of 
C1, Marc must have regarded the killing of another human being as the warding off of a 
potential denial of his own embodied will. In a letter to Maria dated 02.02.1916, his sense 
of warding off harm comes across when he likened the process of war to a man who does 
not die of a cancerous growth but of the deadly kernel of it which cannot be overcome.868  
 His will to life and his will to live, is also evident a month earlier in a New Year’s 
Day letter to Maria (which provides us with further evidence of the validity of C1 due to 
an overriding emphasis on the will) where he stated that, “I do not enter this year 
reluctantly – my optimism is indestructible; lack of optimism is a lack of the power of 
desire and a lack of will.”869 However, Schopenhauer would never share Marc’s optimism 
believing instead that: 
 
At bottom, optimism is the unwarranted self-praise of the real author of the world, 
namely of the will to live which complacently mirrors itself in its work. 
Accordingly, optimism is not only a false but also a pernicious doctrine, for it 
presents life as a desirable state and man’s happiness as its aim and object.870  
 
Even so, Marc clearly remained optimistic about the war because in his letter to Maria on 
02.02.1916, he would tell her that he was struggling against the thoughtlessness 
(Gedankenlosigkeit) of hating the war. He said that he resisted such thoughtlessness 
feeling that he must direct his thoughts not against the war, but against himself. He 
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reasserted that “nothing is more comprehensible, or more just than this war. Nobody sees 
that - or at least, nobody wants to see it in themselves.”871 
Marc’s opinion that nothing was more just than the war is significant. If Marc was 
affirming the will to life and the will to live, then he was living proof of C1. Yet, according 
to Schopenhauer, “if we consider the will to live as a whole and objectively, we have to 
think of it, according to what has been said, as involved in a delusion.”872 To renounce 
this will to live and will to life is what the religionists term self-denial, since our real self 
is both the will to live and the will to life.873 However, moral virtue, justice and 
philanthropy stem from the will to life seeing through the delusions of the principle of 
individuation and seeing itself in all phenomena. The principle of individuation 
(Principium Individuationis), entails that space and time are the conditions for multiplicity 
and diversity – in fact both space and time stand for this principle. Furthermore, because 
space and time are a priori forms of our sensibility, they operate as necessary 
characteristics for the cognisance of the world as representation. For all those who see 
themselves in others and all phenomena – and ‘see through’ (durchschauen) the principle 
of individuation - it is a sign that the will which appears in them is not held in the grip of 
that delusion: “Thus, it might be said figuratively that the will already flaps its wings, in 
order to fly away from it.”874  
By contrast, Schopenhauer argues that injustice, wickedness, and cruelty are 
symptomatic of a profound involvement with that delusion.875 If Marc considered the will 
to war as an example of justice, then moral virtue should have been instrumental in 
promoting a denial of the will to war, not the denial of the phenomena appearing in 
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another’s body through war. If such a denial had occurred, then C1 would have been 
discredited since the will would have been nullified. For many, a complete renunciation 
of the will is difficult to achieve, since genuine righteousness and justice as the foremost 
cardinal virtues, can be onerous. Therefore, the individual who practices such virtues must 
undertake self-sacrifices which often deprive life of its pleasure. Consequently, these 
painful virtues necessitate an utter commitment to self-abjuration and an ongoing denial 
of the will to life.876  
4.8 Beckmann and Schopenhauer’s Eigennutz 
 
 
Of course, Beckmann was no self-abjuring ascetic and not about to “deprive life 
of the sweetness required to make it enjoyable.”877 When he was in Roeselare, a Belgian 
city of West Flanders, on 01.04.1915 he affirmed the will to life in no uncertain terms. 
That afternoon he had been out for a walk, when he saw an aeroplane being fired at above 
his head, leading him to take cover under a tree. The experience forced him to conclude 
that, “It’s funny how from this really quite rotten thing, by that I mean life, not the war, 
there is still so much enjoyment to be gained […] Enjoyment of the self. Naturally in its 
highest form. A feeling of existence.”878  
If we are to believe Beckmann, then his actions might be explained according to 
Schopenhauer’s concept of Eigennutz (self-interest), which denotes egoism as an attitude 
guided by the reflective processes of reason. The latter faculty in turn assists egoism to 
pursue its intentions “systematically.”879 For both man and animal, egoism is coexistent 
with their innermost essence and identical with that essence.880 On this basis, we could 
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plausibly interpret some of Beckmann’s testimonials as indicative of a man egoistically 
driven. This in turn may allow us to evaluate his innermost essence as a human being and 
thus escort our interpretations of C1 and C2. Should this be the case, then we could infer 
that his actions sprang from an everyday egoism which Schopenhauer says is boundless. 
Indeed, Beckmann, along with most individuals, had the inclination to safeguard his life, 
to ensure that it was free from suffering and privation. Therefore, as one who affirmed the 
will, he was inclined to possess the optimum levels of comfort and well-being whilst 
fostering within himself new abilities for enjoying life.881  
Beckmann’s war-time appetite for the greatest possible amount of well-being 
extended into his affirmation of both life and art. For example, on 26.04.1915 he nursed a 
large number of wounded soldiers and reaffirmed his will to life in a letter. He said: 
I am often amused by my own so idiotically tenacious will to life and to art. I care 
for myself like a loving mother, spit, choke, shove, jostle, I must live and I want 
to live. I have never bowed down to God or anything like that in order to achieve 
success, but I would push myself through all the sewers of the world, through all 
the humiliations and defilements, in order to paint. I have to do this.882 
Many years later at the age of 65 on 12.02.1949, Beckmann reflected upon the will to life 
once more. In his copy of the World as Will and Representation Volume Two, he 
annotated an aspect of Schopenhauer’s ‘epiphilosophy’. Here Schopenhauer asks, from 
where does the great discord arise which pervades the world?883 Beckmann has singled 
out the passage which reads:  
Further, it may be asked how deeply in the being-in-itself of the world do the roots 
of individuality go. In any case, the answer to this might be that they go as deeply 
as the affirmation of the will to [life]; where the denial of the will occurs, they 
cease, for with the affirmation they sprang into existence. We might even put the 
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question: ‘What would I be, if I were not the will to-[life]?’ and more of the same 
kind.884 
Beckmann has underlined the phrase, ‘What would I be, if I were not the will to life?’ to 
which he has then written, “Eh bien, after effortful denial, would a new affirmation be the 
next class possible of denial of individuality by simple willing? - One can anaesthetise it 
as if with ether or chloroform - kill off? Who believes such nonsense. (Unsinn) ...”885 The 
word ‘nonsense’ has been underlined by Beckmann showing that he has probably 
misunderstood Schopenhauer as saying that the denial of the will is itself another 
affirmation, that is to say an effort. What Schopenhauer calls the “self-suppression of the 
will”886 stems from knowledge, even though all knowledge and insight are separate from 
free choice. However, a denial of the will which leads us into true freedom cannot be 
contrived, rather it arises from “the innermost relation of knowing and willing in man; 
hence it comes suddenly, as if flying in from without.”887 
The will to life compelled Beckmann to create art during the First World War. On 
26.04.1915 he looked through over seventy of his works remarking that: 
Looked at all together, they please one better than when seen individually. One 
sees the will that goes through them, which I am not conscious of in the individual 
drawing, for when I draw I only feel and don’t think…Since, as I told you, my 
fresco is progressing too, I have today once again a certain feeling of satisfaction 
that the time has not been completely wasted. Grit your teeth and hold on, through 
the war and through life, which isn’t such a very different thing.888 
 
However, Beckmann’s will soon began to show signs of weakening leading to an eventual 
denial of the will to war. For instance, on 04.05.1915 he confessed that for the first time 
he had had enough. Whilst at the dressing station nearest to the outermost trenches, in the 
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midst of a major bombardment at Ypres, he found the onslaught too much for him. 
Subsequently he had to concede that, “I must tell you frankly that I had some not 
inconsiderable feelings of the most extreme concern for my worthy self.”889 
 
4.9 Marc, Klee and War as Natural Justice 
By comparison, Marc did not share in the same ‘extreme concern’ for his ‘worthy 
self’, being fully prepared to die and shoulder his “burden of the evil imposed on human 
life.”890 Yet, this did not lead to an unconditional ‘resignation’ from an affirmation of the 
will to life, the will to live, or a renunciation of his will to war. Even though his sacrifice 
for Germany was arguably a noble sacrifice, Schopenhauer would not uphold the will to 
war as a just action.891 Instead, the real essence of justice lies in the righteous individual’s 
not imposing upon others hardships and sufferings accidental to life - as is the case with 
the unrighteous individual. Thus, “Justice thereby becomes a means for advancing the 
denial of the will to live since want and suffering, those actual conditions of human life 
are its consequence; but these lead to resignation.”892 
Rather than advancing a denial of the will to live or the will to life in an ascetic 
sense of the term, Marc firmly believed that the war was natural, and that it was not tenable 
to place the war beyond the normal course of human events as Maria always did. He was 
therefore complicit in furthering a devastating war which cost many lives, thereby acting 
out C1 through an unjust affirmation of the will. However, in a letter to Maria written on 
22.02.1916, he would confide that “my glance has long since turned away from the war” 
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with the caveat that “my nature, however, does not seek to gain the indifference of Klee 
and Campendonk…”893   
As a friend of Marc’s, the Swiss born Klee initially appeared to affirm the will to 
war, feeling that patriotism might inject a new passion into German art.894 However, Klee 
recoiled at the prospect of being drafted into military service – an event which eventually 
happened on 11.03.1916. His denial of the will to war was to harden from January to April 
1915, especially when he found sympathetic listeners in Maria and the composer Heinrich 
Kaminski. They all concurred in denying the will to war, with the exception of Marc who 
alone maintained the most overt affirmation of the will to war.  
As a consequence of their discussions on the war, Maria was to write to Marc that 
for Klee, “the war does not touch him inside at all…All the more odd since his artistic 
sensitivity is so completely assured and very rich.”895 This suggests that either Maria 
misread Klee’s denial of the will to war and interpreted him as one who was simply 
indifferent, or that Klee really was disinterested in the war. Indeed, as Otto Karl 
Werckmeister shows, by 26.04.1915 Maria would conclude that “Klee does not strive, 
does not torment himself, does not suffer.”896 This is significant, because the concept of 
striving resonates with Schopenhauer’s notion concerning the essential character of the 
will, in which “willing and striving are its whole essence, and can be fully compared to an 
unquenchable thirst. The basis of all willing, however, is need, lack, and hence pain, and 
by its very nature and origin it is therefore destined to pain.”897 Furthermore, 
Schopenhauer adds that, in all its guises the will “always strives, because striving is its 
                                                                
893 Marc and Meißner. p.197. 
894 For the relationship between the First World War and the German art market see: Werckmeister, O.K., ‘The Incipient 
Recovery of the German Art Market’ in: Werckmeister. In point of fact, because Klee’s father was a German he was 
obliged by law to receive the same nationality as his father independently of his birthplace. As a result, Klee could not 
escape his military draft. 
895 Quotation and translation in:ibid. p.38. 
896 Ibid., p.38. 
897 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.311. 
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sole nature, to which no attained goal can put an end. Such striving is therefore incapable 
of final satisfaction; it can be checked only by hindrance, but in itself it goes on for 
ever.”898 Therefore, unless Klee was genuinely detached from all aspects of life, it would 
be inappropriate for us to believe that Klee did not ‘strive’ if all things in nature strive. 
The exception to this condition applies only to those who cease willing through aesthetic 
contemplation – which is temporary; or to those who deny the will to life and the will to 
live through severe asceticism – which is permanent.  
4.10 Beckmann, Existential Pain and Disfigurement 
 
 
For those artists suffering in mind and body during the war, their struggle for 
survival, their ‘need, lack, and hence pain’, could have led to a permanent renunciation of 
the will to live but it did not. A sense of existential pain was certainly present in 
Beckmann’s 04.05.1915 confession that he had ‘had enough’, yet, such pain could not be 
classified as the onset of a renunciation of the will to live or the will to life. Such existential 
pain is inevitable so that “in every individual the measure of the pain essential to him has 
been determined once for all by his nature, a measure that could not remain empty or be 
filled to excess, however much the form of the suffering might change.”899 Therefore, in 
Schopenhauer’s terms, Beckmann’s suffering was preordained by his character and 
fluctuated according to circumstance - but the fruits of it did not lead to self-abjuration. 
These facts are of great importance, since Beckmann paid much attention to the 
areas of Schopenhauer’s philosophy which deals with ‘the inevitability of pain’. As we 
can see from his annotations on p.316 of The World as Will and Representation, 
Beckmann has concentrated on the phrase, “Conversely, experience also teaches us that, 
after the appearance of a long-desired happiness, we do not feel ourselves on the whole 
                                                                
898 Ibid. p.308. 
899 Ibid.Vol.1, p.316. 
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and permanently much better off or more comfortable than before.”900 This is significant 
because Schopenhauer observes that if a great concern has been lifted from us by good 
fortune then another immediately replaces it. The material for this new concern already 
existed in potential but could not enter consciousness due to its preoccupation with a 
previous concern. However, as soon as there is room the new concern “at once comes 
forward and occupies the throne of the reigning care of the day.”901 
Beckmann has underlined another passage on page 318 on the topic of pain which 
runs as follows: 
Every immoderate joy (exultatio, insolens laetitia) always rests on the delusion 
that we have found something in life that is not to be met with at all, namely 
permanent satisfaction of the tormenting desires or cares that constantly breed new 
ones. From each particular delusion of this kind we must inevitably later be 
brought back; and then, when it vanishes, we must pay for it with pains just as 
bitter as the joy caused by its entry was keen.902 
 
From the above Beckmann has marked the phrase ‘pay for it with pains just as bitter as 
the joy caused by its entry was keen’.903 He has also paid attention to Schopenhauer’s 
belief in the relatedness of art to pain.904  On this, Schopenhauer states that in art the true 
reflection of the real character of life is that all joy is negative, not positive, and cannot 
provide lasting gratification. This means that we are always delivered from one pain to a 
newer one sooner or later. Consequently, every artistic hero finds that their shimmering 
goals, through which they hoped to obtain happiness were but a mockery, leading them to 
suspect that they were no better off than before. Therefore, Schopenhauer concludes that, 
“since a genuine, lasting happiness is not possible, it cannot be a subject of art…”905 
                                                                
900 Ibid., p.316. Beckmann has underlined this phrase. 
901 Ibid. Vol.1, p.317. 
902 Ibid., p.318. 
903 Beckmann and Schaffer. p.87. 
904 The relatedness of art to pain shall be dealt with in depth when we explore Nolde’s life and work under Nazism. 
905 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.320. In Beckmann’s copy, he has underlined the 
concluding phrase ‘cannot be a subject of art’, and written in the margin ‘that’s a bit better now’. What this annotation 
signifies is open to speculation. 
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It is likely that Beckmann’s 1914 portrait In Memory of a Friend Killed in Action 
(fig. 111) was not ‘a subject of lasting happiness’. The depicted image of a bandaged head 
reminds us that death was not always outright and sudden but often followed injury or 
severe disfigurement. As Suzannah Biernof shows, visions of mutilated faces led to ‘a 
crisis of representation’. Thus, it followed that: 
Facial casualties presented a medical challenge, to be sure, but the public spectacle 
of the mutilated face also provoked a crisis of representation; a ‘symbolic 
collapse’, to use Julia Kristeva’s term: a crisis that threatened to undermine the 
very concept of human nature in the context of social and economic upheaval and 
mass slaughter.906 
 
Biernhof rightly stresses that disfigurement through war often undermined a man’s sense 
of self and the social proof which validated his identity.907 Sights of disfigurement and the 
smell of death were occupational hazards for Beckmann, who as a medical orderly often 
came face to face with it. For example, on 16.09.1914 he wrote of how he assisted with 
the dissection of a man who had died that night, and despite the emotional pain of the 
event, he had sufficient presence of mind to observe that the profile of the dead man looked 
similar to his model for Christ.908  
Another occupational hazard entailed that Beckmann had to visit the morgue, and 
his drawing The Morgue of 1915 (fig. 112) illustrates the interior of one. Here, two men 
are helping each other place a heavily bandaged cadaver into a wooden coffin, whilst a 
third living figure is heaving a coffin into an upright position in the background. In the 
foreground are two naked cadavers in open coffins. The image is matter of fact and a 
chilling reminder of the tragic cost to the human body through the effects of war. Indeed, 
Beckmann one day remembered how two of the morning’s dead were left lying in the 
                                                                
906 Biernoff. p.60. 
907 Ibid., p.71. 
908 Beckmann. p.7. 
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open for burial. He lifted the cloths from their faces and saw that one was totally sallow, 
brownish white and with a remarkable otherworldly expression on his face, while the other 
had a brutal face, totally covered with blood, showing a huge gaping wound in his lower 
face and upon his neck - a deep, bloody abyss. They lay there silently he said, whilst 
nearby their comrades dug the shallow grave.909  
His work as a medical orderly also meant that he witnessed terrible wounds as 
depicted in the dry point on paper called The Operation of 1914 (fig. 113). In this image, 
two naked bodies are laid upon stretchers which are juxtaposed in contrapuntal motion to 
one another. The scene is one of emergency and chaos with health professionals crowding 
the picture space. It is a scene which Beckmann knew well and which touched his senses 
in a vivid manner. As a result, he once reported how that everywhere, in spite of good 
ventilation and bright rooms, there was a sharp smell of decomposition.910 
Neither Beckmann nor Marc were alone amongst artists who came face to face 
with such disfigurements or mass slaughter. George Grosz’s well-known work Remember 
Uncle August, The Unhappy Inventor of 1919 (fig. 114) addresses this very question; 
evoking the physical disfigurement of soldiers by the artistic dislocation of the face and 
the use of early prostheses by use of collage elements of machine forms. There was also 
Max Slevogt who was involved with Paul Cassirer’s new pacifist periodical, Der 
Bildermann: Steinzeichnungen fürs deutsche Volk (The Picture Man: Lithographs for the 
German People). In January 1917, his war pictures appeared in a book entitled 
Kriegstagebuch with the euphemistic text being written by an unnamed contributor. 
Slevogt himself wrote only the foreword which was a repudiation of war’s deathly 
                                                                
909 Letter of 04.05.915. Ibid., p.56. 
910 Ibid., p.7. 
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‘heroics’.911 In the foreword he wrote that whilst in the magic spell (im Banne) of 
devastation, he experienced the mutilation of houses and trees as atmospheric, charming 
and portrayable, but not so the mutilated person, the corpse. The humanity in him was 
deeply affected by the world turned on its head, and the portrayer, the artist in him was 
repelled.912 As a result, all that remained for him was a final and decisive memory - a 
world which appeared desecrated by blind destruction. 
The problem of bodily destruction and the mutilated person expressed an 
underlying anxiety which affected both military personnel and the civilian population 
alike. It was a well-founded anxiety born from the brutalisation of the human body which 
was without precedent. Indeed, every combatant must have feared terrible disfigurement, 
and as Biernhof suggests:  
Disfigurement was a loss – a sacrifice – that could never be commemorated in a 
culture that, as Gabriel Koureas has shown, institutionalized the ‘sanitised and 
aestheticised body of the ‘picturesque soldier’ while banishing – at least in the 
public sphere – the private memories of pain and mutilation.913 
 
Such ‘memories of pain and mutilation’ must have reminded Marc and Beckmann that 
death was not always outright but a prolonged and disfiguring agony. This reminder must 
have induced Beckmann to affirm the will to live as opposed to denying it through heroic 
self-sacrifice. By comparison, Marc was prepared for heroic self-sacrifice, although there 
is some evidence to suggest that ‘a cessation of willing’ in his relation to the war effort 
began to appear.  In fact, we can sense a degree of cognitive dissonance beginning to 
emerge between his will to live and his will to war. Take for instance therefore, a letter 
                                                                
911 Bartholomeyczik, G. and Slevogt, M., Im Banne der Verwüstung: Max Slevogt und der Erste Weltkrieg; Begleitheft 
zur Ausstellung Schloss Villa Ludwigshöhe, Edenkoben 13.04.-13.07.2014 (Mainz: Generaldirektion Kulturelles Erbe 
Rheinland-Pfalz [u.a.], 2014). p.10. 
912 Slevogt quoted in: ibid., p.10. 
913 S. Biernoff, Portraits of Violence: War and the Aesthetics of Disfigurement (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2017), p.64. 
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written to Maria on 29.02.1916 where he suggested that, “this deeply shameful, 
humiliating war (beschämende schmachvolle Krieg) must surely soon come to an end.”914  
4.11 Animals and the Will at War with Itself. 
 
 
Marc’s experience of war, and his suggestion that ‘this deeply shameful, 
humiliating war’ should come to an end, might be contrasted with a pre-war yearning for 
an apocalyptic catharsis of European culture. Indeed prior to, and often during the First 
World War, thoughts of world destruction, apocalyptic horsemen and messianism flooded 
the European consciousness. Many in the Expressionist avant-garde in fact embraced such 
apocalyptic thinking as they bestrode the growing gulf between modernity and tradition. 
Since that time a wealth of literature has appeared which often concerns itself with 
“mapping a plenitude of modern German apocalyptic visions, political programs, and 
philosophical motifs onto the ‘canonical’ Christian apocalypse.”915 
 If this is the case, then we could argue that Schopenhauer’s vision of the will at 
war with itself, where nature devours itself at every grade of the will’s manifestation, is a 
philosophical motif which resonates with turn of the century visions of apocalyptic doom 
and mirrors the perspicacity of C1. In line with this, later philosophers such as Walter 
Benjamin came to view history as a natural cycle of ‘coming to be’ and ‘passing away’ 
interspersed with cycles of catastrophic ruin.916 This is a viewpoint which informs his 
discussion of Klee’s Angelus Novus, (an oil transfer drawing with watercolour) of 1920, 
describing the depicted angel as the ‘angel of history’ - one  who presides over an 
apocalyptic storm of progress through catastrophe.917  In the ninth thesis of his ‘Theses on 
the Philosophy of History’(Über den Begriff der Geschichte) Benjamin states that: 
                                                                
914 Marc and Meißner. p.199. 
915 Rabinbach, A, ‘Apocalypse and Its Shadows’ in: Rabinbach, A., In the Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals 
between Apocalypse and Enlightenment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). p.6. 
916 Wolin, R., Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption (University of California Press, 1994).,p.61. 
917 In 1921, Klee purchased this image and hung it in his apartment. 
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The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been 
smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with 
such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly 
propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris 
before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.918 
 
In what we may regard as a storm blowing from Paradise, prior to the war in 1914, Marc 
had painted Fighting Forms (fig. 115), which may be interpreted as an abstract 
conceptualisation of the will at war with itself and as a premonition of war per se.919 It 
may also be interpreted as a dialectical protagonist within modernism’s aesthetic shift 
towards abstraction and away from figuration. As a metaphorical protagonist within 
modernism’s overall ‘evolution’, Fighting Forms may consequently be understood as a 
protagonist within the dual nature of the world as will and representation.  
In Fighting Forms, one becomes aware of the striving nature of pure form as a 
bearer of the will. This is especially so where swirling masses of pure form suggest flux, 
indeterminacy and the ever striving violence of the will. The violently swirling masses of 
warm colours on the left of the painting appear to cause the cooler colours to the right of 
the painting to retreat, almost as if the heat of the will in its fury attempts to overpower 
the cooler world as representation. This reminds us therefore how Marc asserted that “one 
no longer seeks a picture of nature, but destroys it, in order to show the mighty rules which 
prevail behind the beautiful appearance.”920  
                                                                
918 Benjamin, W., On the Concept of History (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016)., p.258-59. Also see 
‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ in: Benjamin, W. and Arendt, H., Illuminations. Edited and With an Introd. by 
Hannah Arendt. Translated by Harry Zohn (New York, Schocken1969). 
919 In another moment of perspicacity Marc had written a foreword for the planned second volume of the Blaue Reiter 
in February 1914. There he prophesied that: “The world is giving birth to a new time; there is only one question: has 
the time now come to separate ourselves from the old world? Are we ready for the vita nuova? This is the terrifying 
question of our age. It is the question that will dominate this book. Everything in this volume is related to this question 
and to nothing else. By it alone should we measure its form and its value.” See: Kandinsky, Wassily, Franz Marc, and 
Klaus Lankheit. The 'Blaue Reiter' Almanac. p.260. It was a new world which he was never to see and the time would 
come when he would have to separate himself from the ‘old world’ through his death. 
920 Marc and Lankheit. p.108. The concept that ‘one no longer seeks a picture of nature, but destroys it’ perhaps echoes 
Nietzsche who felt that, “For a Dionysian task the hardness of the hammer, the pleasure even in destroying are crucial 
preconditions. The imperative ‘Become hard!’ the deepest conviction that all creators are hard, is the true badge of a 
Dionysian nature.” Nietzsche and Large. p.76. 
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During the war Marc’s attempt (as in C2) to reveal ‘… the mighty rules which 
prevail behind the beautiful appearance’ was most often focused upon the animal body.921 
He neglected the human form in favour of the animal body since he believed that the 
animal body was a purer expression than that of the human. In a letter to Maria dated 
12.04.1915, he described the instinct which had led him away from a feeling for people 
towards a feeling for the purity of the animal. The ‘impious people’ (Der unfromme 
Mensch) who surrounded him, above all the masculine, did not arouse his true feelings 
whereas the unspoiled feeling for animal life released all that was good in him. As a result, 
the unspoiled feeling for animals generated an instinct within him for the abstract which 
then led to even greater excitement.922 This excitement stimulated a spiritual ‘second 
sight’ which he believed was quite Indian, timeless and purifying. However, there is a 
degree of incongruity to be aware of in his thinking as we note in the following disclosure 
where he states that: 
I felt very early that people were ‘ugly’ [hässlich], the animal seemed to me much 
more beautiful and pure; but I found in the animal also much that was repugnant 
and ugly; so that my portrayals instinctively (from an inner compulsion) became 
ever more schematic and abstract.923 
 
Marc may have had Schopenhauer in mind since the philosopher believed that there was 
something beautiful about every animal, although in certain animals, such as apes, this 
was not so obvious.924 By antithesis, that which Schopenhauer found most ugly in 
mankind was a lack of individuality.925 As far as he was concerned what humans ‘will’ 
and think is etched upon their faces as if they were common herd animals, making them 
                                                                
921 These works were later published under the title Franz Marc: Skizzenbuch aus dem Felde in 1920 by Paul Cassirer 
in Berlin. 
922 Marc, F., Briefe, Schriften und Aufzeichnungen (Leipzig: Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1989). 
923 Marc and Meißner. p.140-155. 
924 Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.2, p.424. Cf. Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. The World as Will and 
Representation.Vol.1, § 41. 
925 Schopenhauer appears to contradict himself when he argues that human portraits should be Idealised individuals with 
a balance between beauty and character. This presupposes that beauty does exist in humankind. He also states that: 
“Beauty cannot be abolished by character, or character by beauty. For the abolition of the character of the species by 
that of the individual would give us caricature, and the abolition of the character of the individual by that of the species 
would result in meaninglessness.” Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.225 
- 256 - 
 
superficial, trite and vulgar. Consequently, their behaviours are predictable since they are 
‘mass produced’ and have no uniqueness.926 
Marc also asked himself this: “Does there exist a more mysterious idea for artists 
than the representation of itself which nature mirrors in the eye of an animal? How does a 
horse see the world, or an eagle, a deer or a dog?”927 This puzzling question could be 
answered by means of a drawing in his war-time sketch book Four Horses (fig.116). This 
pencil sketch is a highly symmetrical and balanced depiction where one horse feeds with 
a rounded neck at the bottom right of the sketch, whilst the shape of this is mirrored by 
the rounded neck of another horse at the top right of the drawing. At the same time, the 
only horse to look directly at the viewer is complimented by the opposing gaze of its 
immediate neighbour which looks away from us and to our right. Undoubtedly, Marc 
conceived the horse per se to be a pure affirmation of the will to life and worthy of 
compassion – all the more remarkable since he was involved in a conflict which would 
involve the denial of the will to life for millions of animals. As an affirmation of life 
therefore, these near abstract animal sketches suggest a certain timelessness connatural 
with organic existence. 
Schopenhauer linked timelessness to the animal when arguing that “the life of 
every animal species throughout the thousands of years of its existence is to a certain 
extent like a single moment; for it is mere consciousness of the present without that of the 
past and of the future, and consequently without that of death.”928 When contemplating 
the animal species in his art during the war, Marc’s attention, we may infer was attracted 
to “a steady and enduring moment, a nunc stans”929 which is reflected in the animal 
                                                                
926 Schopenhauer and Payne.,Vol.2, p.598. Cf. ‘Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, 'Freedom of the Will', Pt III (2) 
and Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, § 55. 
927 Marc and Lankheit. p.99. 
928 Ibid., p.571. 
929 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.2, p.571. 
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species. The animal species, as with every general ‘form of life’, as a “phenomenon of the 
will with consciousness” 930 is in effect one continuous present. By contrast, the past and 
future are conceptual additions peculiar to the human being known only in the abstract 
and are possibly exemplified by representations of the imagination.931  
 




As a friend of Marc’s, Macke shared his fascination with animals as well as 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. In a letter written from Kandern on 27.08.1905, Macke 
discussed Schopenhauer’s philosophy with his future wife Lisbeth.932 He recalled from 
his reading that the world is will, a great striving will, and that this great will meets various 
obstacles. He explained to her that he did not read Schopenhauer to go through hell and 
high water for some philosophical ideas, but instead to improve his thinking. In this letter, 
he quoted directly from Schopenhauer on the differences between man and animal. He 
understood Schopenhauer as one who argued that man surpasses animals in suffering, and 
how animals live in the present, whereas man can roam through the past, present and future 
with the aid of abstract reflection. He conveyed to her Schopenhauer’s belief that if the 
sufferings of mankind are justified (as an atonement for the guilt of existence) then this 
cannot be extended to animals “whose sufferings are considerable, brought on for the most 
part through man, but often also without his agency.”933 
If Schopenhauer’s woeful vision is true, then we need to ask what is “the purpose 
of this troubled and tormented will in its thousands of different forms without the freedom 
                                                                
930 Ibid.Vol.1, p.571-2. 
931 Ibid., p.572. 
932 Elisabeth Erdmann-Macke née Elisabeth Gerhardt (1888-1978). 
933 Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.2, p.322. Cf. Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. The World as Will and 
Representation.Vol.2, Chapter 28. 
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to salvation which is conditioned by reflectiveness?” 934 Schopenhauer’s answer is that 
the sufferings of animals are justifiable from the fact that, “the will to live must devour its 
own flesh because in the phenomenal world absolutely nothing exists besides it, and it is 
a hungry will.”935 Therefore, each grade of this hungry will lives at the expense of another 
grade. As a result, Schopenhauer argues that the will to live (or the will to life), as the 
expression of the innermost being of nature, has passed through the entire sequence of 
animals in ceaseless striving for its complete objectification - eventually achieving 
“reflection in the being endowed with the faculty of reason, namely man.”936  
Being ‘endowed with the faculty of reason’, the situation becomes critical for 
mankind in general, and in particular for a philosophical artist such as Marc. From 
Schopenhauer’s perspective, certain questions force themselves upon the philosophical 
mind such as, “whence is all this and for what purpose, and principally whether the trouble 
and misery of his life and effort are really repaid by the profit.”937 Or as he puts it, “Is the 
game worth the candle?”938 For Macke and Marc ‘the game’ was apparently worth the 
candle and worth enduring with optimism. Indeed, Macke approached the possibility of 
his own tragic death with the hope that he could return home one day. On 21.09.1914, he 
wrote from Somme-Pie that the day before he had received with joy the Iron Cross from 
his Colonel. He said that he was sending it to Lisbeth in his letter, and that if he ever saw 
it again “it will remind me of the most terrible thing that a person can experience.”939  
Unfortunately, Macke never saw the Iron Cross or Lisbeth again since he was killed in 
action on 26.09.1914, at Perthes-les-Hurlus – he was just 27 years of age. 
                                                                
934 Ibid., Vol.2, p.322. 
935 Ibid., p.322-3. In sections §153 and §154 of Parerga Volume 2, Schopenhauer argues that “the capacity for suffering 
is in the animal very much less than in man. Now what might be added beyond this would prove to be hypothetical or 
even mythical and may, therefore, be left to the reader's own speculation.” Ibid., p.323. 
936 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.2, p.572. 
937 Ibid., p.572. 
938 Ibid., p.572. 
939 Macke, A., Frese, W., and Güse, E.-G., Briefe an Elisabeth und die Freunde (München: Bruckmann, 1987). p.334. 
Macke was killed in action on 26.09.1914 at Perthes-les-Hurlus in Champagne, France. 
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From here on in, Marc’s attitude to the war was forced into greater philosophical 
profundity. As Werckmeister suggests, “For the first time, Marc conceived the avant-
garde’s characteristic ‘spiritual’ alternative to physical life as a longing for death itself…  
By actually facing death at the front, Marc had given his stance a compelling 
authenticity.”940 That ‘longing for death’ eventually achieved its ‘compelling authenticity’ 
through his demise which occurred on 04.03.1916. Marc’s death arose from a 
reconnaissance mission around 4pm when he was fatally wounded by two grenade 
splinters to the head near the woods of Herméville-en-Woëvre at Braquis.  
There is a chilling irony to Marc’s death, since only a few weeks earlier on 
17.02.1916 he had written to his mother on the topic of death. He shared her calm 
conviction that death was not to be feared and said that:  
Today I would greet death in a very melancholy and bitter way, not from fear or 
agitation – nothing is more calming than the prospect of the peace of death – but 
because I have half-finished work, which my whole mind is focused on 
completing. My unpainted pictures contain my whole will to live.941 
 
Ultimately, both Marc and Macke’s deaths represented a turning point in the history of 
German art since for many critics Expressionism had become synonymous with German 
patriotism. As Werckmeister argues: 
Marc’s death in action on March 5, 1916, was a turning point in the nationalist 
revalidation of expressionism. Although his wife launched a press campaign in 
order to establish him as the leading painter of expressionism on nationalist terms, 
Walden and Hausenstein, Marc’s most influential advocates, in their publications 
left no doubt that Marc’s patriotic assent to war was no longer perceived as the 
platform for his success.942 
 
Werckmeister rightly shows that whenever a Sturm ‘contributor’ was killed in action943 
                                                                
940 Werckmeister. p.46. 
941 Marc and Meißner. p.195. Marc does not mean a single half-finished work but his incomplete career as an artist. 
942 Werckmeister. p.64. 
943 Marc was to write a self-fulfilling prophecy in an aphorism of how: “I followed things, like a man who walked around 
after his funeral. He was happy that the heavy burden of his life had been carried away from him and he felt free and 
light, the Schopenhauerian man. I reined in my senses, so that they couldn’t hear or see or taste any more. Only my spirit 
communed with things, which revealed all their joyful secrets to it, the good new European” See: Marc, Franz, and 
Klaus Lankheit. Schriften [in German].  Köln: DuMont, 1978. p.206. 
- 260 - 
 
then Walden denigrated what war had done to the modern art world - Walden’s argument 
being that war neither validated nor affirmed any particular art.944 To the German art world 
it appeared to be an unjust blow that they had lost two of their leading artists. For observers 
both then and now, it is often difficult to reconcile such tragic losses, yet as Schopenhauer 
writes: 
…we are like lambs playing in the field, while the butcher eyes them and selects 
first one and then another; for in our good days we do not know what calamity fate 
at this very moment has in store for us, sickness, persecution, impoverishment, 






With this in mind let us conclude that if the will to live and the will to life is one which 
“devours its own flesh,”946 then Marc’s claim C1 has been fully confirmed in the context 
of war. It can also be confirmed that, if war was an overabundant expression of the will, 
manifesting the self-affirmation of individuals, then out of human egoism it went beyond 
this affirmation to the denial of the same will appearing in other individuals.947 Therefore, 
we may see the war as an overabundant expression of egoism. This entailed that 
combatants suffered a transgression of their “body's sphere of affirmation”948 through the 
denial of it by other combatants. Consequently, they experienced this as “immediate and 
mental pain.”949 We have also learned that Beckmann, Marc and other artists during their 
military ‘careers’ experienced the denial of their bodily sphere by other individuals. For 
Marc and Macke that denial led to their deaths, while for Beckmann, Kirchner and many 
others it sometimes led to ‘immediate and mental pain’.  
                                                                
944 In the following chapter of this thesis, Walden’s assertion shall be proven wrong when we explore the influence of 
Nazism on art. 
945 Schopenhauer and Payne. p.292. 
946 Ibid.,Vol.2, p.322-23. 
947 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.334. 
948 Ibid. Vol.1, p.335. 
949 Ibid., p.335. 
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The world of pain in which they fought meant that what these artists saw was the 
most terrible suffering induced by catastrophic circumstances - which could and did claim 
their own lives. As a result, it is the purpose of tragedy, in both art and life, to induce a 
sudden moment of shocking recognition in us – that is to say a form of mimetic shuddering 
(Schauder) bought about through the most horrifying examples of ‘the antagonism of the 
will with itself”. As Schopenhauer asserts, when we recognise what tragedy means, 
whether in art or life, as did Beckmann and Marc, “then, shuddering, we feel ourselves 
already in the midst of hell (dann fühlen wir schaudernd uns schon mitten in der 
Hölle).”950 Indeed, Schopenhauer goes so far as to argue that tragedy reveals the “terrible 
side of life (der schrecklichen Seite des Lebens).”951 As it does so he argues that “…the 
wailing and lamentation of mankind, the dominance of chance and error, the fall of the 
righteous, the triumph of the wicked” bring before our eyes an aspect of the world “which 
directly opposes our will.”952 When this happens he says, “at this sight we feel ourselves 
urged to turn away from life, to give up willing and loving life.”953  
Thus, at the sight of tragedy, Beckmann, Marc, Macke and all those affected by 
war, were given the opportunity to ‘give up willing and loving life’ - which they did not 
do. Even so, as Schopenhauer states, “at the moment of the tragic catastrophe, we become 
more convinced more clearly than ever that life is a bad dream from which we have to 
awake.”954 As we shall see in the next chapter, Schopenhauer’s opinion that ‘life is a bad 
dream from which we have to awake’ possesses a tragic resonance for the plight of the 
gypsy community in Nazi Germany. 
 
                                                                
950 Ibid., p.255. 
951 The World as Will and Representation.Vol.2, p.433. 
952 Ibid., p.433. 
953 Ibid., p.433. 
954 Ibid., p.433. 
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Chapter 5: Degenerate Art, Degenerate Bodies - Otto Mueller and the Gypsies 
Introduction 
 
In this penultimate chapter, we shall begin with a brief discussion about the fate of 
Expressionism and the German economy following the First World War. We shall also 
briefly outline the institutionalisation of anti-gypsy politics under the Third Reich. After 
this we shall define what ‘degeneracy’ means and how it emerged historically. This 
discussion will then lead us to explore links between race, art and intelligence as they were 
understood by Nazi anthropologists. In addition, we shall look at Mueller’s relationship 
to the gypsies in both his art and personal life. In fact, much of this chapter can be 
interpreted through Schopenhauer’s ‘racial theory’ which lends us an intellectual 
paradigm by which we may understand Mueller’s ‘degenerate’ art.955  
On the one hand, this will necessitate an investigation as to how miscegenation, 
‘degeneration’ and the exoticism of the gypsy were construed by the Nazis, while on the 
other it will allow us to reinterpret the so called ‘gypsy nuisance’, as the Nazis termed it, 
through Schopenhauer’s philosophy. We shall then undertake a Schopenhauerian 
evaluation of human morality as it pertains to German citizenship, the will and the fate of 
art under Nazism. That said, no claim is being made that Mueller had read Schopenhauer. 
Instead, the claim is that his work, and the socio-political context of that work, can be 
usefully assessed through Schopenhauer’s philosophy. 
Before we go any further, it is important to point out that this chapter in no way 
argues that Marc prefigured National Socialism - or that C1 and C2 stand for a 
corresponding leitmotif.  Indeed, as Christian von Holst and Karin von Maur point out, in 
their exhibition catalogue ‘Franz Marc, Horses’, held at the Staatsgalerie Museum in 
Stuttgart from 27.05.2000 to 10.09.2000, his work does not uphold Beat Wyss’s 
                                                                
955 As we will note, in the following chapter of this thesis, charges of ‘degeneracy’ were also levelled at Nolde. 
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interpretation of it as “die explosive Gaerverbindung”956 (an explosive ferment of 
intellectual fascism) – or one mirroring the Betonung des Willensprinzips”957 (emphasis 
on the principle of the Will) as discovered in the literature of Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche.958 Yet it is true to say, as does Isgard Kracht, that in 1935 the Nazi Director of 
the Hamburger Kunsthalle, Harald Busch, defended Marc’s work as ‘German Nordic 
art’.959 Kracht also points to a contemporary press article by an anonymous author with 
the title ‘Der Maler der Blauen Pferde: zur Ausstellung in Hannover’ which described 
Marc’s work as one born of ‘Nordic faith and Germanic spirit’.960 It is also true that, as a 
proselytizer of the ‘Nordic faith and Germanic spirit’, Baldur von Schirach and his wife 
Henriette, brought up the topic of Marc’s art with Hitler when they visited him at the 
Berghof. Henriette presented to the Führer samples of the artist’s work from his early 
period with hopes of them being accepted. After seeing them, the Führer reluctantly 
recognised the excellence of Marc’s work but remained intractable saying that “…if he 
could draw properly, why didn't he?”961  
In 1937, Ernst Holzinger would write to Eberhard Hanfstaengl, the director of 
Berlin’s Nationalgalerie, and refer to anecdotal evidence which suggested that in 1934, 
Goebbels had allegedly said that “[Franz] Marc would probably have been the leading 
German artist if he had not fallen in war.”962 Whilst many of the gallery staff were unsure 
of this evidence, Petropoulos believes that it may, if true, uphold the fact that Goebbels 
had supported German modernism before changing his mind. Apart from Hitler’s 
undoubted influence on Goebbels’ change of mind, Expressionism has sometimes been 
                                                                
956 Wyss, B., Der Wille zur Kunst: zur ästhetischen Mentalitat der Moderne (Köln: DuMont, 1996).p.191. 
957 Staatsgalerie, S., Franz Marc: Pferde.p.206. 
958 Marc, F. et al., Franz Marc, Horses (Hatje Cantz, 2000).p.206 
959 Kracht, Isgard. ‘Angriff auf die Avant-Garde. Kunst und Kunstpolitik im Nationalsozialismus’ in: Fleckner, U. 
and Fleckner, U., Angriff auf die Avantgarde: Kunst und Kunstpolitik im Nationalsozialismus (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
2007). p.315. 
960 Ibid.,p.330-31. See: Anonymous: ‘Der Maler der Blauen Pferde: zur Ausstellung in Hannover’ in:. "Berliner 
Morgenpost," in: Berliner Morgenpost.   (1898). 07.03.1936 (no page number given). 
961 Petropoulos.,p.181. 
962 Ibid.p.20. 
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associated with anti-Semitism via its anti-Impressionist tendencies. As Petropoulos has 
shown, Impressionism had been finagled upon the German public by Jewish suppliers, 
and the elite of the Weimar Republic, which Otto Andreas Schreiber called the ‘Jewish 
Republic’. This ‘Republic’ had allegedly conspired to introduce Impressionism into 
Germany, thereby betraying Expressionists such as Marc, Ernst Barlach, Nolde, Heckel, 
Rohlfs, and Schmidt-Rottluff.963 
On the one hand this is true, because Impressionism had been repudiated for its 
numerous Jewish art dealers.964 In fact, Schreiber, a member of the NSDAP from 1932, 
would assert, at the Jugend kampft  für deutsche Kunst (Youth fights for German art) rally 
of 29.06.1933, that the Expressionists mentioned above “ [had led] the war of destruction 
against Impressionism.”965 Indeed, Petropoulos shows how Schreiber once argued that 
these artists had repulsed the ‘Jewish Republic’, and how “…we reject [the Impressionist] 
forms’.”966 In Schreiber’s opinion, then, the resurrection of Expressionism entailed that 
the artists of this ‘movement’ were the practitioners of a genuine völkisch culture.967 As a 
consequence, for a brief time, alongside Barlach, Marc was treated more leniently than 
other artists due to his death in battle.968 
Despite this, Isgard Kracht refers to what Robert Scholz, the art editor of the 
Völkischer Beobachter, described as “the so-called ‘Franz Marc problem’.”969 This relates 
to the fact that, even before the Nazis seized power, Marc had received respect from the 
wider public for which the other Expressionists still had to strive.970 Marc’s unusual 
                                                                
963 Ibid.,p.35. 
964 Several Jewish art dealers to note are: Alfred Flechtheim, Paul Cassirer, Johanna Ey, Hans Goltz, Daniel-Henry 
Kahnweiler, Curt Valentin and Heinrich Thannhauser of the same dynasty which owned the Tahannhauser Galleries. 
965 Petropoulos.,p.40. Jugend kampft fur deutsche Kunst was planned by the National sozialistischer Deutscher 
Studentenbund (National Socialist league of German students) and held at Friedrich -Wilhelm University in Berlin on 
30.06.1931 The Studentenbund was a unifying force for adversaries of Nazi policies in the arts and canvassed for 




969 Fleckner and Fleckner.,p.333. 
970 Ibid.,p.333. 
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popularity with the public was in part due to the accessible motifs of his animal pictures, 
and in part due to the widespread admiration, even glorification, of his character. His 
Letters, Sketches and Aphorisms of 1920, was well received by the public, who needed to 
recover from their great losses in the First World War and who needed to rediscover their 
national identity. As a result, Marc embodied a virtuous and courageous model from which 
a new national self-consciousness could be created. Consequently, he was no longer 
viewed merely as an artist, but above all as a role model, and ‘culture carrier’ 
[Kulturträger].971  
Marc was widely regarded as a man of integrity who had made his contribution to 
the welfare of society, quite apart from his artistic creations. In fact, Kracht proposes that, 
“as a self-sacrificing war hero he supported the myth of the Führer, but as an intellectual 
he undermined it. He was simultaneously an enemy and friend to the dictatorship and 
presented an incalculable potential of danger to a totalitarian system.”972 For the Nazis 
then, this stood for ‘the problem of Franz Marc’. He was a brave war hero and standard 
bearer for the German people; even so the Nazis asked whether he was nothing more than 
a dangerous, society-threatening ‘cultural bolshevist’? As Kracht puts it, “he who strives 
for a spiritual revolution and preaches ‘opposite thinking’ will always be anything but 
acceptable to the regime.”973 
   
5.1 The Fate of Expressionism, Germany and the Gypsy. 
 
 
Among the many organisations which dealt with a perceived opposition to the 
regime, we find that in 1936 the Rassenhygienische und Bevölkerungsbiologische 
Forschungsstelle (Racial Hygiene and Demographic Biology Research Unit) (RHF) had 
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been established under the directorship of Robert Ritter.974 As we shall see later on in this 
chapter, this unit was created for the planned destruction of Europe’s gypsies. It acted as 
an organisational link “between science and the National Security Headquarters and its 
precursors.”975 This was not the first time that the gypsies had suffered organised 
persecution. As far back as March 1889, an information service on gypsies had been 
created by the security police for Munich’s Imperial Palace Headquarters. Then in 1905, 
the same year as Die Brücke was formed, a Munich policeman called Alfred Dillmann 
published a book which ‘leaked’, (in a manner contrary to the law), compromising 
personal data belonging to 3,500 gypsies.976 That said, it is not the purpose of this chapter 
to provide a history of the gypsy peoples under National Socialism, rather the purpose is 
to explore in depth a link between the artist Otto Mueller, his paintings of the gypsies, and 
the concept of ‘degeneracy’ as it was understood by the Nazi regime. It is also the purpose 
of this chapter to explore these links in a unique manner through Schopenhauer’s moral 
philosophy. 
Arguably, the general paranoia with which the Nazis persecuted the gypsies (and 
denigrated Mueller’s depictions of them) was exacerbated by Germany’s humiliating 
defeat at the hands of the Allies in the First World War. Indeed, following the war in 
November 1918, Germany was convulsed by revolution, Kaiser Wilhelm’s abdication and 
the eventual inception of the German Republic. In December of that same year a group of 
artists and architects known as the Novembergruppe was formed in reaction to the 
revolution. This group aimed to popularise art, assist social revolt and republican 
organisations in order to accelerate artistic emancipation. Indeed, many Expressionist 
artists appear to have trusted that their endeavours were in harmony with the working 
                                                                
974 This was department L3 of the National Health Office and part of the Ministry of the Interior. 
975 Fings, K. et al., From "Race Science" to the Camps: The Gypsies during the Second World War (1997). p.30. 
976 Ibid.. p.23. 
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classes who had accomplished political transformation through revolution. Over forty 
artists and architects contributed to the Novembergruppe exhibitions in 1918, often 
recruited by the Expressionist painter Georg Tappert, who in 1918 circulated his letter 
‘Expressionists, Cubists, and Futurists’ in Die Schöne Rarität. 977 
The Novembergruppe created its directives in January 1919, paralleling many of 
the aims of the socialist group of artists known as Arbeitsrat für Kunst (Working Council 
for Art). As Weinstein has argued, the nebulous revolutionary declarations of both the 
Arbeitsrat für Kunst and the Novembergruppe, had secured an almost instant ratification 
amongst Expressionist art journals such as Das Kunstblatt, which in turn had smoothed 
the path towards revolution.978 Yet, there was a contrast between the Novembergruppe’s 
obdurate conviction in the radical character of Expressionism, regardless of any political 
consequences, and the Arbeitsrat für Kunst’s incessant attempts to embrace innovative 
policies when confronted by political reversals thereby “opposing first imperial and then 
SPD art policies.”979 However, the Novembergruppes’s political impetus was brief and 
ultimately collapsed when the working classes rejected the Expressionists’ proclivity for 
abstraction. Furthermore, the Expressionists’ vacillation over urban life, industrialisation 
and modernisation contradicted the day to day realities of the working classes whom they 
had hoped to inspire but had instead affronted.980 As a result, forms of Expressionist 
practice that had been popular amongst the avant-garde in the years before the war were 
increasingly seen as irrelevant to the pressing demands of the moment.  
                                                                
977 Several rejoinders to the letter were published in Helga Kliemann’s Novembergruppe manifesto, circular letter and 
guidelines, reprinted in Grohmann, W. Zehn Jahre Novembergruppe‘, Kunst der Zeit, Zeitschrift fur Kunst und Literatur, 
Sonderheft, 3:1-3 (1928), 11-12, 16. 
978 Weinstein and Chicago.p.30. 
979 Ibid.,p.105. 
980 Rigby, I. K., "German Expressionist Political Posters 1918-1919: Art and Politics, a Failed Alliance," in: Art Journal  
Vol. 44, no. 1 (1984). p.39. 
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By June 1919, this irrelevance became the topic of vocal criticism as Weinstein 
has shown. One such critic was Willi Wolfradt, who had promptly announced the end of 
Expressionism in the journal Die Neue Rundschau. Wolfradt’s contention was that 
Expressionism had been ineluctably wedded to the November Revolution, but that this 
‘marriage’ had miscarried in the following manner: 
The revolutionary forms itself in art (sic). If art is submerged in the actuality of the 
revolution - that is, politicizes itself in such a way that it remains tied to an actual 
goal to be realized - then, as soon as this goal begins to emerge from the utopian 
phase, art dies. One used to think that in a perfect world there would be no art. 
This is correct and only expresses the deep relationship between art and 
dissatisfaction, the revolutionary character not only of today’s, but of all and every 
art.981 
 
Since Expressionism had lost its revolutionary credibility its successes were perceived as 
increasingly finagle. Indeed, as Weinstein has shown, the architect Bruno Taut now 
proclaimed that Expressionism had become “absorbed into literariness and vaudeville.”982 
Thereafter, many of Expressionism’s most fervid devotees had to confess that, as a style, 
it had lapsed into unoriginality and modishness. As a result, for many avant-garde critics, 
because Expressionism had attained the status of an ‘official’ style it’s subsequent 
institutionalisation portended its historical internment.  
Three other contemporary essays also demonstrate the new mood that began to 
surface amongst the post-War avant-garde. In an essay, ‘Art of this Moment’ of 1919, 
Wilhelm Hausenstein argued for the bankruptcy of Expressionism, whilst Worringer in 
‘Current Questions on Art’ of 1921 laid a post-mortem at the door of Expressionist 
spiritual revolution.983 Similarly, Iwan Goll’s ‘Expressionism is Dying’ of 1921 expressed 
a sense of aesthetic demoralisation and anti-climax following Germany’s defeat in the 
                                                                
981 Weinstein and Chicago.,p.229. In Weinstein’s opinion Wolfradt’s position subpoenaed the concept of the end of art 
as imagined by Hegel. See Ibid., p.230. 
982 Ibid. p.227. 
983 1919 Wilhelm Hausenstein; "Die Kunst in diesem Augenblick," Der neue Merkur 3, Sonderheft no 2 "Werden" 
(1919-1920), 117, 119-22, 123, 125-26. Wilhelm Worringer, Künstlerische Zeitfragen (Munich: Hugo Bruchmann, 
1921), 7-8, 9-10, 15, 19-20, 27, 28-29, 31-32. p .849. 
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war. 984 It was in this context that G.F. Hartlaub, in the preface to the catalogue of the 1925 
Neue Sachlichkeit exhibition held in Mannheim, appealed for a new social realism and a 
return to the object in art. Additional reactions to the unfulfilled promises of ‘Utopian’ 
Expressionism, such as those made by the late Franz Marc, also signalled a return to 
objectivity. Consequently, Franz Roh for example, proclaimed the arrival of what he 
called ‘post-Expressionism’ or ‘Magic Realism’ which signalled the return to 
objectivity.985  
Objectivity of another kind confronts many historians who agree that without 
Germany’s defeat at war and Versailles there would have been no Hitler. The reparation 
payments enforced upon Germany by article 231 were onerous, and from 1925-1930 “the 
German economy was deprived of between one and 2.2 billion Reichsmark (RM) 
annually, which amounted in the late 1920s to nearly 2.5 per cent of Germany’s GDP.”986 
Despite the increasing economic impact of War Reparations, Germany entered a period 
of relative stability in the mid-1920s. In 1923, Chancellor Gustav Stresemann formed a 
centre coalition which controlled inflation, and in 1924 the worst effects of Reparations 
were off-set by American intervention in the form of the Dawes Plan. In 1929, however, 
Stresemann died and the Wall Street Crash meant that American loans to German industry 
and business were called in. The German economy ‘crashed’ and unemployment soared. 
                                                                
984 Iwan Goll, "Der Expressionismus stirbt," Zenit (Zagreb), 1, no. 8 (October 1921): 8-9. See also his post-war poem 
Requiem for the Dead of Europe. 
985 See: Roh, F., Nach-Expressionismus; Magischer Realismus, Probleme der Neuesten Europäischen Malerei (Leipzig: 
Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1925). 
986 Hantke, M. A. X. and Spoerer, M., "The Imposed Gift of Versailles: The Fiscal Effects of Restricting the size of 
Germany's Armed Forces, 1924-9," in: The Economic History Review  Vol. 63, no. 4 (2010).p.849. Part vii, Reparation 
Section I, General Provisions, Article 231, reads as follows: “The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and 
Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied 
and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them 
by the aggression of Germany and her allies.” See: Allied and Associated, P., Treaty of Peace between the Allied and 
Associated Powers and Germany, and other Treaty Engagements signed at Versailles, June 28th, 1919: Together with 
the Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace 
(London: H.M.S.O, 1920). p.137-38. 
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The collapse of the last Weimar coalition just one year later paved the way for Nazism 
and the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in 1933.   
After the Nazis gained power they placed a renewed importance to the human body 
in life and art. We shall investigate this renewed importance and explore the question of 
the German Expressionist body through the lens of National Socialism. In particular, this 
chapter takes the work of Otto Mueller as its case study in relation to his paintings of the 
gypsy people. This is done with special reference to the later treatment of the gypsy 
peoples by the Nazis after his death in 1930. 
 
5.2 Conceptualising ‘Degeneracy’ and Hitler’s reading of Schopenhauer 
 
 
Before we discuss Mueller’s work, let us begin with an exploration of the concept 
‘degeneracy’ and of its origins. First of all, let us establish a working definition of this 
term and then refer this to the meanings ascribed to it by Nazi racial ideology. Our 
attention will then turn to Mueller’s paintings of gypsies and to their reception in the 
1930s. This will be set in the context of a widespread criminalisation of the gypsy people 
by the Nazi regime, and of the Entartete Kunst (Degenerate Art) exhibition held in Munich 
1937. This exhibition represented a virulent attack on German modernist art.987 Within the 
context of this exhibition and beyond, the response to Mueller’s paintings of gypsies 
reveals much about Nazi attitudes towards sexuality and race. From the National 
Socialists’ point of view, Mueller’s paintings were evidence of ‘degeneracy’, however an 
exploration of these paintings through Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of sexuality and race 
opens up new perspectives. One specific implication of this exploration suggests that C1 
possessed a prophetic quality undreamed of by Marc. 
                                                                
987 As we shall see in the next chapter of this thesis, this exhibition and the rise of Nazism would have a crippling effect 
on artistic expression. It will therefore lead us to examine the problem of free will for Nolde who attempted to live and 
work under the duress of Nazism. 
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Concepts of ‘degeneracy’ may be said to originate in the work of the physiologist 
Johann Blumenbach, and the work of the French psychiatrist Bénédict Morel. Blumenbach 
on the one hand used the female skull to epitomise Caucasians, which he considered to be 
“the most beautiful and primitive race from which all others have degenerated.”988 Morel 
on the other hand harnessed the concept of ‘degeneracy’ to classify mental illnesses, 
arguing that environment and life style caused ‘degeneracy’. He also argued that 
‘degeneracy’ was hereditary and ultimately fatal.   989 Then, towards the latter part of the 
nineteenth century the Italian scholar Cesare Lombroso’s work on anthropological 
criminology furthered investigations into ‘degeneracy’, perhaps foreshadowing the Nazi 
belief that criminal behaviours were hereditary qualities.990 Subsequently, the Jewish 
physician Max Simon Nordau, an ardent Zionist and supporter of Theodor Herzl, built 
upon the above authors’ concepts of ‘degeneracy’. 991As a result, Nordau’s conceptual 
development of the sociological, medical and aesthetic problems of ‘degeneracy’ led him 
to state that the ‘degenerate’ was “a morbid deviation from an original type.”992 His 
opinion was that each individual had the capacity to transmit ‘degeneracy’ from one 
generation to another: 
Degeneracy betrays itself among men in certain physical characteristics which are 
denominated stigmata, or brand marks, an unfortunate term derived from a false 
idea, as if degeneracy were necessarily the consequence of a fault, and the 
indication of it a punishment.993 
 
                                                                
988 Schiebinger, L., "The Anatomy of Difference: Race and Sex in Eighteenth-Century Science," in: Eighteenth-Century 
Studies  Vol. 23, no. 4 (1990). p.396. See also: Blumenbach, J. F., Joh. Friedr. Blumenbach's Geschichte und 
Beschreibung der Knochen des menschlichen Körpers (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1807). 
989 Andreas, H. and Kluge, U., "Anthropological and Evolutionary Concepts of Mental Disorders," in: The Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy  Vol. 24, no. 3 (2010).p.294. See also: Morel, B.-A., "Traité des dégénérescences physiques, 
intellectuelles et morales de l'espèce humaine et des causes qui produisent ces variétés maladives," (Paris: J.-B. Baillière, 
1857). 
990 See: Lombroso, C., Genio e degenerazione. Nuovi studi e nuove battaglie (Palermo: Sandron, 1897). 
991 Theodor Herzl was a leading Zionist. In August1897 he became the World Zionist Organization’s first president. 
992 Nordau, M. S. and Mosse, G. L., Degeneration, 2nd ed. (Lincoln ; London: University of Nebraska Press, 1993). 
p.16. 
993 Ibid., p.17. 
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He felt that ‘degeneracy’ could be distinguished from the phylogenetic development of a 
new species, since the morbid variety of the degenerate body could not renew itself 
through procreation but would eventually terminate through reproductive sterility.994 He 
was certain that ‘degeneracy’ could be reflected in art and argued for a medical 
examination of artists who were thought to be ‘degenerate’. This therefore would entail 
an examination of their biological ancestry and an analysis of their family character traits. 
Consequently, Nordau was convinced that if this was undertaken it could be possible to 
trace those family ancestors who were responsible for transmitting the seeds of degeneracy 
to a ‘degenerate’ artist.  
Alongside artists, Nordau also found philosophers such as Schopenhauer to be 
‘degenerate’. In his 1892 work Entartung (Degeneration), Nordau begins an amusing 
mockery of Schopenhauer who had cited Benedict de Spinoza in order to illustrate an 
argument about causality. Schopenhauer referred to Spinoza’s suggestion that, “If a stone 
flung by a human hand could think, it would certainly imagine that it flew because it 
wished to fly.”995 Furthermore, Nordau ridiculed Schopenhauer’s attachment to 
Buddhism, Quietism and aesthetic contemplation. As a result, Nordau argued that the 
‘degenerate’ (Schopenhauer) despised action born of ‘free determination’ and justified 
himself with: 
…a philosophy of renunciation and of contempt for the world and men, asserts that 
he has convinced himself of the excellence of Quietism, calls himself with 
consummate self-consciousness a Buddhist, and praises Nirvana in poetically 
eloquent phrases as the highest and worthiest ideal of the human mind. The 
degenerate and insane are the predestined disciples of Schopenhauer and 
Hartmann and need only to acquire a knowledge of Buddhism to become converts 
to it.996 
                                                                
994 Phylogenesis: “The evolutionary development of a species or other group of organisms through a succession of 
forms. Also: the evolutionary development of a particular (esp. anatomical) feature of an organism. Also in extended 
use. Cf. ontogenesis n., phylogenesis” Quotation from Oxford English Dictionary. "Phylogenesis, N." [in English]. 
Oxford University Press. For further information see Gould, Stephen Jay. Ontogeny and Phylogeny [in English]. 
Cambridge, Mass; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977, p.1. 
995 Nordau and Mosse. p.20. 
996 Ibid., p.20-21. Quietism is a complex issue and scholars often disagree over its definition. As a general rule, it has 
been defined as a religious attitude of passivity belonging to forms of European mysticism. It is commonly seen as a 
practice of detachment from worldly affairs. Glenn Alexander Magee has argued that Quietism runs throughout 
- 273 - 
 
 
Moreover, the ‘degenerate’ person, like Schopenhauer, when sunk in an ‘inane reverie’ of 
contemplation “is tormented by doubts, seeks for the basis of all phenomena, especially 
those whose first causes are completely inaccessible to us, and is unhappy when his 
inquiries and ruminations lead, as is natural, to no result.”997 
Aside from art and philosophy Nordau, together with Georg Simmel, argued that 
the aetiology of ‘degeneration’ and bodily regression could be traced to the destructive 
influences of 19th century urbanisation.998 Furthermore Nordau suggested that: 
Parallel with the growth of large towns is the increase in the number of the 
degenerate of all kinds of criminals, lunatics, and the higher degenerates of 
Magnan; and it is natural that these last should play an ever more prominent part 
in endeavouring to introduce an ever greater element of insanity into art and 
literature.999  
 
While Nordau argued in this way, and Simmel argued that regression was a result of 
modern man experiencing an overwhelming Steigerung des Nervenlebens, by contrast 
Hitler was to argue that it was in fact racial interbreeding which led to ‘degeneration’.1000 
Moreover Hitler, who had his own concepts of ‘degeneracy’ as we shall note, accused the 
‘degenerate’ Jews in particular of betraying Germany at the end of the Great War. This he 
believed had effectively rendered Germany defenceless and powerless. Therefore, after 
the Great War, Hitler was convinced that the will power of the Volk was just as necessary 
                                                                
Germany’s intellectual history and that “Hegel comes nearly as close as Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein do to embracing 
quietism in the fullest sense.” See: Magee, G. A., "Quietism in German Mysticism and Philosophy," in: Common 
Knowledge  Vol. 16, no. 3 (2010). p.486. 
997 Nordau and Mosse. p.21. 
998 Ibid., p.36. Simmel argued that: “The deepest problems of modern life derive from the claim of the individual to 
preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social forces, of historical heritage, 
of external culture, and of the technique of life. The fight with nature which primitive man has to wage for his bodily 
existence attains in this modern form its latest transformation.” Simmel, G. and Wolff, K. H., The Sociology of Georg 
Simmel (Free Press, 1950). p.409. For a useful commentary on this see Brigitta Nedelamnn in: ‘On the Concept of 
Erleben’ in: Kaern, M., Phillips, B. S., and Cohen, R. S., Georg Simmel and Contemporary Sociology (Springer 
Netherlands, 2012). p.231. 
999 Nordau and Mosse.p.36. Valentin Magnan (1835-1916), was a French psychiatrist who classified mental illnesses 
and was connected to the Hôpital Sainte-Anne in Paris. 
1000 ‘Steigerung des Nervenlebens’ stands for intensified nervous stimulation induced by rapid urbanisation and 
modernity. However, Nedelmann suggests that what Simmel actually means by this phrase is ‘intensified strain’ upon 
the nerves of the mind and body. She also states that the phrase as translated does not refer to “an intensification of 
emotional life.” Kaern, Phillips, and Cohen. p.231 and p.240, fn.2. 
- 274 - 
 
to Germany’s ‘resurrection’ as was the repossession of its ‘outward power’. Thus, 
Germany’s future ‘resurrection’ presupposed ‘the forces of the will’ and this involved a 
violent attempt to curb the effects of ‘degeneracy’ in both Germany’s art and racial life. 
Through these attempts, Hitler felt that he was not only reasserting the will of the German 
Volk over ‘degeneracy’, but that he was also asserting the will of the ‘Almighty’, in which 
case Marc’s claim C1 might prevail.  
This apparent conflation between Hitler’s assertion and C1 might be illuminated 
in the following way. On 4.10.1936, at the end of the Nationalsozialistischer 
Rechtswahrerbund (National Socialist Jurist’s Organization) -  a conference for university 
lecturers - Carl Schmitt delivered a speech known as Die deutsche Rechts-wissenschaft im 
Kampfgegen den judischen Geist (German Jurisprudence and the Struggle against the 
Jewish Spirit). In this speech, (and worth quoting at length), he made the following 
connections between the Jews, the world of art and Hitler’s self-appointed ‘spiritual 
work’. In that speech he stated that: 
…the speed with which Jewish art dealers or intellectual merchants hurl 
themselves at German artists, poets, and scholars in order to get their hands on a 
pension are no merits and no qualities that allow us to turn our gaze from the 
fundamental here. The Jew concerns us not for his own sake. That for which we 
are searching and that for which we are fighting is our own unadulterated kind, the 
undamaged purity of our German volk. “By fending the Jew away from me,” says 
our Führer’s, Adolf Hitler, “I fight for the work of the Lord.”1001 
 
Hitler’s ‘fight’, and self-induced conviction that he was undertaking the will of the ‘Lord’, 
should not be conflated with C1 per se - as if the latter could somehow be interpreted as 
supportive of Nazism – no such thing is being implied. However, at a purely metaphysical 
and technical level, if all things are a manifestation of the will according to Schopenhauer, 
then Hitler’s assertion was unexceptional in Schopenhauer’s technical sense of the term 
                                                                
1001 Carl Schmitt, ‘Die deutsche Rechts-wissenschaft im Kampf gegen den judischen Geist’, first published in Deutsche 
Juristen-Zeitung 41, no. 20, (15.10.1936), pp.1193-99. Translated by Timothy Nunan in: Rabinbach, A. and Gilman, S. 
L., The Third Reich Sourcebook (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2013). p.218. 
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will. The latter’s understanding of the term would not deny that such a will is cruel, blind, 
destructive and worthy of being abolished. What he would deny is that his use of the 
concept will is identical with, interchangeable with, indebted to or underwritten by, a 
Christian theology or divinity - or for that matter a deliberate anti-Christian dogma. 
In contrast to Schopenhauer’s atheism, Hitler’s political strategies attempted to co-
opt and manipulate a Christian mythology which would involve a concerted purge of the 
nation’s Jewish and gypsy population. Without this purge he believed that the triumph of 
the Jewish people would “be the funeral wreath of humanity…”1002 Therefore, Hitler 
argued that by defending himself against the Jewish people, he was fighting for the Lord 
- a theme that is expressed in several of his portraits e.g. Hubert Lanzinger’s The Standard 
Bearer of c.1935-6 (fig. 117), which depicts Hitler as a Medieval crusader knight.  
Hitler’s metaphysical beliefs lead us on to consider that, amongst many the 
apocryphal stories which have abounded with regards to his literary and philosophical 
tastes, Ernst Hanfstaengl (who we shall encounter again in chapter 6 of this thesis) once 
claimed that Hitler had read Schopenhauer, Karl Marx and Nietzsche whilst at Landsberg 
prison.1003 Whilst there is no firm evidence to support this account, another is that: 
Hitler’s confidant Hans Frank claimed that Hitler told him he carried 
Schopenhauer’s central work, The World as Will and Representation, with him 
during the First World War...the claim becomes even less credible when one 
observes that Hitler…did not even know how to spell the philosopher’s name.1004 
Whether such stories are true or not, it is a fact that Hitler borrowed books by 
Schopenhauer from Krohn’s Library at the National Socialist Institute between 1919 and 
1921.1005 In fact, there is no doubt either that Hitler owned books by Schopenhauer, 
although in his personal library only one book by the philosopher survives to this day. 
                                                                
1002 Hitler, A. and Manheim, R., Mein Kampf, [New ed.]. ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1974). 
1003 Ryback.p.68. Hanfstaengl was Hitler’s confidant. He lost that friendship, and through a dramatic turn of events, he 
then defected to the United States where he became involved with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘S-Project’. In that project 
he revealed important details on Nazi leaders including Hitler.  
1004 Ibid.,p.104. 
1005 Ibid.,p.104. 
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This is a 1931 reprint of the Hand Oracle and the Art of Worldly Wisdom, a translation 
from the work of Baltasar Gracián.1006 
Among other evidence for Hitler’s ‘appreciation’ of Schopenhauer, we know that 
on the evening of 25.10.1941, among the Führer’s special dinner guests were SS-
Reichsführer Himmler and SS-Obergruppenührer General Reinhard Heydrich. At this 
dinner Hitler is reported to have stated that: 
 
In our parts of the world, the Jews would have immediately eliminated 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Kant. If the Bolsheviks had dominion over us for 
two hundred years, what works of our past would be handed on to posterity? Our 
great men would fall into oblivion, or else they’d be presented to future generations 
as criminals and bandits 1007 
 
Three years later on 16.05.1944, in a Berlin restaurant, Hitler is said to have declaimed on 
the history of philosophy, and it is a declamation worth quoting at length. He told his 
guests that: 
 
In the Great Hall of the Linz Library are the busts of Kant, Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche, the greatest of our thinkers, in comparison with whom the British, the 
French and the Americans have nothing to offer. His complete refutation of the 
teachings which were a heritage from the Middle Ages, and of the dogmatic 
philosophy of the Church, is the greatest of the services which Kant has rendered 
to us. It is on the foundation of Kant’s theory of knowledge that Schopenhauer 
built the edifice of his philosophy, and it is Schopenhauer who annihilated the 
pragmatism of Hegel. I carried Schopenhauer's works with me throughout the 
whole of the first World War. From him I learned a great deal. Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism, which springs partly, I think, from his own line of philosophical 
thought and partly from subjective feeling and the experiences of his own personal 
life, has been far surpassed by Nietzsche.1008  
                                                                
1006 The Spaniard Gracián was a Jesuit scholar and philosopher. His Criticón, appeared in 1651, 1653, and 1657 Oráculo 
Manual y Arte de Prudencia (literally Manual Oracle and Art of Discretion. It is also a fact that Hitler’s ‘appreciation’ 
of Schopenhauer motivated him to place a sculpted bust of the philosopher on his desk. 
1007 Hitler, A. et al., Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-1944: His Private Conversations, 3rd ed. (New York City: Enigma Books, 
2000)., p. 89. (Hitler’s dinner conversations were recorded by Martin Bormann). In another infamous comment, Hitler 
co-opted Schopenhauer for rhetorical support when stating that: “The Jew’s life as a parasite in the body of other nations 
and states explains a characteristic which once caused Schopenhauer, as has already been mentioned, to call him the 
‘great master in lying’. Existence impels the Jew to lie, and to lie perpetually, just as it compels the inhabitants of the 
northern countries to wear warm clothing.” See: Hitler and Manheim., p.277. However, as Cartwright has shown, Hitler 
also conveniently forgets that Schopenhauer’s comment was written in a context where Schopenhauer denounced 
cruelty, as with “Christians against Hindus, Mohammedans, American natives, Negroes, Jews, heretics and others.'” 
See: Vol. 2, p. 358/ibid, Vol. 6, p. 379. For an extensive coverage of the Hitler/Schopenhauer connection see: Wolfgang 
Weimer, ‘Der Philosoph und der Diktator’: Arthur Schopenhauer und Adolf Hitler' in: Schopenhauer Jahrbuch, Vol. 
84 (2003), pp. 157-67. Cf. Cartwright., p.543. 
1008 Hitler et al., p.720. Moreover, in this conversation when it came to discussing the purity of the German language, 
he is said to have commented that, “Only writers of genius can have the right to modify the language. In the past 
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Although Hitler appears to be conversant with philosophy, Hans Sluga has argued that 
“Hitler’s knowledge of Nietzsche’s philosophy seems, indeed, to have been negligible; 
while he referred occasionally to the titles of Nietzsche’s books, there is no evidence that 
he ever read any of them.”1009 In addition, Sluga points out that Schopenhauer could never 
become the Nazis’ ‘official’ philosopher simply because he was no nationalist. Moreover, 
despite Schopenhauer’s metaphysics appealing to the Nazis, Hitler and Rosenberg could 
never condone his moral philosophy of compassion which would uphold C1 due to the 
Nazis’ affirmation of the will.1010 This was so because on the one hand, Schopenhauer 
promoted a denial of the will and a withdrawal from the world of public affairs which was 
antithetical to Nazism, just as on the other hand the Nazis disavowed his pessimism and 
his conviction that salvation entailed a complete denial of the will. As a consequence, the 
Nazis adopted Nietzsche instead, “particularly a Nietzsche interpreted as the heir of 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysical system, as the one who had turned Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism into an affirmative.”1011 It also appears that Hitler in particular, had not 
embraced all of Schopenhauer’s philosophy – especially what might be termed his 




                                                                
generation, I can think of practically nobody but Schopenhauer who would have dared do such a thing.” See: Sherratt, Y., 
Hitler's Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).,p.23. 
1009 Sluga, H. D., Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany (Harvard University Press, 1995). 
1010 Ibid.,p.180. Yvonne Sheerratt has said that: “… Hitler would eventually become irritated by the contemplative side of 
philosophers and complaining about his ‘fatherly friend' Dietrich Eckart he stated that: `Schopenhauer has done Eckart no 
good. He has made him a doubting Thomas, who only looks forward to a Nirvana. Where would I get if I listened to all his 
[Schopenhauer’s] transcendental talk? A nice ultimate wisdom that: To reduce on[e]self to a minimum of desire and will. 
Once will is gone all is gone. This life is War.” See: Sherratt., p.24. Eckart was convinced that Fichte, Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche were the ‘philosophical triumvirate of national Socialism’. Ibid., 24. 
1011 Sluga.,p. 181. In a similar way, Sherratt has written that: “Hitler’s businessman friend Hanfstaengl heard him remark: 
‘Now it is the heroic Weltanschauung which will illuminate the ideals of Germany’s future.’ ‘What was this?’ Hanfstaengl 
questioned. 'This was not Schopenhauer, who had been Hitler’s philosophical god in the old ... days. No, this was new. It was 
Nietzsche: SS Hitler had moved his allegiance elsewhere.” See: Sherratt., p.24.  
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5.3 Race, Art and Intellect 
Even though Hitler had not embraced all of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, by 
contrast the Nazi’s own idiosyncratic doctrine of the will was welcomed in certain 
academic quarters. For instance, as part of his personal and professional vow of allegiance 
to Hitler, Professor Wilhelm Pinder claimed that the resurrection of Germany would lead 
to the same freedom of artistic expression as had been the case in the Middle Ages.1012 
Furthermore, on a specifically racial note, philosopher Ernst Krieck suggested in his 1934 
essay, ‘Das rassisch- völkisch-politische Geschichtsbild’ (The Racial-Folkish - Political 
Conception of History) that; “race manifests itself in the will, the outlook, and the 
worldview in accordance with the racial hierarchy of values.”1013 This will ensured that 
the Germanic value system led to a hardened human body with a hardened will committed 
to a ‘völkisch totality’, which in turn would reinvigorate native German culture and so act 
against ‘degeneracy’. Therefore, given a political hardening of the will, C1 may be 
regarded as possessing continued relevance for the 1930s. 
Anthropological interest in the ‘völkisch totality’ of the human body and German 
culture pre-dated the Nazi era. As Andrew D. Evans points out, an anthropology of the 
human body began in Germany around the 1870s in conjunction with ‘ethnology and 
prehistory’. It was subsequently in the Weimar era that anthropologists of the body 
                                                                
1012 Rabinbach and Gilman. p.277. Wilhelm Pinder (1878-1947) was an art historian and nationalist whose close 
attention to German art appealed to the Nazis. As a professor at the University of Berlin, Pinder acted as an adviser to 
the Nazis on the confiscation of art for the Party. Along with Martin Heidegger, Pinder and other lecturers in Higher 
Education took a voluntary vow to the Nazi Party in 1933. This grandiose vow was published in: Bekenntnis der 
Professoren an den deutschen Universitäten und Hochschulen and Hochschulen zu Adolf Hitler and dem NS Staat (Vow 
of Allegiance of the Professors of German Universities and Institutions of Higher Learning to Adolf Hitler and the 
National Socialist State). Cf. Ibid. p.271-78. 
1013 Ibid., p.120 First published as "Das rassisch- völkisch-politische Geschichtsbild," in: Wissenschaf t, 
Weltanschauung, Hochschulreform (Leipzig: Armanen Verlag, 1934), 6-8, 36-39. In 1933 Ernst Krieck was rector at 
the University of Frankfurt and by 1934 had become rector to the University Heidelberg. Krieck joined the Nazi Party 
in 1932 and found himself at the vanguard of Nazi academic philosophy. His belief in the totalising effects of völkisch 
philosophy stressed a pedagogy of political values. However, he was not convinced by the politics of racial hygiene. He 
died in 1947 as a prisoner whilst in American custody. For more on Krieck see: Sluga, H.D. Heidegger's Crisis: 
Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany. Harvard University Press, 1995. pp.7,131, 174-5, 215, 241. Also, on Krieck 
and other philosophers under Hitler, note the tabloid sensationalism of: Sherratt. 
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renamed their science as Rassenkunde, (racial science). From then on, by “using new 
approaches from the burgeoning field of genetics, adherents of Rassenkunde set out to 
determine the links between race, intellect, and culture.”1014 For the Nazi Party ‘the links 
between race, intellect, and culture’ raised the spectre of both racial and artistic 
‘degeneration’.  
In 1937 the links between race, intellect, and art reached a crisis point when the 
National Socialists staged the Entartete Kunst (Degenerate Art) exhibition, described by 
Stephanie Barron as “the most virulent attack on modern art” 1015. Among the 650 
‘degenerate art’ works on display were those of Expressionist artists who had taken a 
particular interest in the human body. These works had been systematically confiscated 
from museums around Germany. In retrospect, the exhibition may be regarded as a 
manifestation of the National Socialists’ will taking precedence over the world as 
representation and thus contributing towards a vindication of C1.  
The political will of the National Socialists was to undermine not only the work of 
Cubists, Constructivists and Dadaists, but also the ‘wilfulness’ of the Expressionists. The 
art works displayed were regarded as exemplars of moral and racial ‘degeneracy’.1016 By 
way of contrast, the National Socialists organised the Grosse Deutsche Kunstaustellung 
(Great German Art Exhibition), which exhibited the fruits of a racially ‘purified’ art. This 
exhibition was shown in the premises of the Haus der Deutschen Kunst (German House 
of Art) at the same time as the Degenerate Art exhibition and within walking distance of 
it. Before these exhibitions Goebbels had initially thought it politically expedient to 
publicise Expressionism’s völkisch aspects in order to further the Nazi cause, but was 
                                                                
1014 Evans, A. D., "Race Made Visible: The Transformation of Museum Exhibits in Early-Twentieth-Century German 
Anthropology," in: German Studies Review  Vol. 31, no. 1 (2008). p.88. 
1015 Barron and Guenther. p.9. 
1016 Edwards and Wood. 
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eventually overruled by Hitler at the Nuremberg party rally in 1934.1017 There Hitler gave 
his speech ‘Kunst verpflichtet zur Wahrhaftigkeit’ (Art and Its Commitment to Truth). In 
it Hitler expressed his belief that the ‘sovereign spirit’ of a true German artist “reaches 
deep into the sum total of related cultural achievements of his species throughout millennia 
and still manages to resolutely lend expression to his own artistic will and intent.”1018 The 
sovereign German ‘artistic will and intent’ was set in opposition to those whom Hitler 
described as the “destroyers of art (Kunstverderber)” whose motto was “innovation at any 
price.”1019 In addition, under the National Socialists, he believed that, “The nobility of 
the human body has cast off the bane of rape and deformity. A whole new world of 
beauty is emerging.”1020  
Later, when giving his speech for the opening of the Great German Art Exhibition 
on 18.07.1937, he alluded to the German Expressionist body as one of, “Deformed 
cripples and cretins, women whose image can but elicit disgust, men who look more 
like animals than humans, children who would be considered a curse from God if they 
were to actually live the way you portray them!”1021 In theory, the ‘curse from God’ 
upon art could be avoided if the forces of racial purity were obeyed. As a result, Hitler 
reasoned that the racial power at the hub of Germany’s development in history 
continued to form his nation through the Aryan peoples, who in the past, present and 
                                                                
1017 In 1931, Goebbels’s empirical will expressed itself in a leading article written for the Nazi periodical Wille und Weg 
(first edition). The periodicals title ‘Will and Way’ was later renamed as Unser Wille und Weg (‘Our Will and Way’). 
In this article, Goebbels stated that “The will of the National Socialist movement is laid out in its program.” See 
translation by Randall Bytwerk in: Calvin College, German Propaganda Archive. Cf. Goebbels, Josef ‘Wille und Weg’ 
in:  Goebbels, Joseph, Nsdap Zentralverlag der, and N.S.D.A P. Reichspropagandaleitung der. Unser Wille Und Weg 
(in German). Mun̈chen: Zentralverlag der N.S.D.A.P. 1 (1931) p.2-5. Goebbels also stressed that: “Political methods 
always presume a political goal. Only when the goal is crystal clear and unchangeable is it possible to determine the 
foundations of practical work. The means one uses to reach the goal is political will.” Ibid., Bytwerk. Note how Goebbels 
disengenously claims that the Volk would retain their free will. His assurance being that, “We will gain power only with 
the people, not against them. They will join us when it feels as we do, when it is persuaded that what we want is correct.” 
See: Ibid., Bytwerk. For similar ideas see: Stoltzfus, N., Hitler's Compromises: Coercion and Consensus in Nazi 
Germany (Yale University Press, 2016). p.41. 
1018 Rabinbach and Gilman. p.490. 
1019 Ibid., p.490. 
1020 Ibid., p.491. 
1021 Ibid., p.498. 
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future had objectified themselves as standard bearers of culture. His vatical oratory 
concluded that “…degenerate peoples such as the gypsies and Jews could never become 
standard bearers for unsullied representations of the Aryan body in art or everyday 
life.”1022 
Hitler’s vatic oratory is the subject of Hermann Otto Hoyer’s painting In the 
Beginning Was the Word of 1937 (fig. 118). The Nazi intention here was to reinstate the 
world as representation according to the ‘word’ of Hitler. The title and depiction of the 
painting depicts Hitler’s sermonising gestures in a parody of the opening line from the 
Gospel of John in the New Testament which describes Christ as the word of God being 
made flesh. In doing so Nazism reinstated the ‘conventional’ aesthetic of representation 
through the ‘word’ and ‘will’ of its Messianic figure - Hitler. Since the reinstatement of 
‘conventional’ representation was typical of Nazi policy, we are faced with a paradox, 
because on the one hand it invalidates C1 by reinstating ‘conventional’ representations in 
art. On the other hand, it also reveals the dominance of Nazi will, presiding over and 
dictating to the world as representation, which paradoxically validates C1. 
As did Hitler, Alfred Rosenberg inscribed racial values into German art. As far as 
he was concerned, philosophers had neglected notions of racial beauty when writing about 
art. Consequently, it became necessary that the aesthetic conditions of art should be linked 
to an ideal physical appearance according to an ideal racial typology and value system. 
For this reason Rosenberg in his book The Myth of The Twentieth Century: An Evaluation 
of the Spiritual-Intellectual Confrontations of Our Age that, “In this respect, it is evident 
that if the nature of art is to be discussed, then the pure physical representation, for 
example, of a Greek, must have a different effect upon us than, for instance, the portrait 
                                                                
1022 Ibid., p.496. 
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of a Chinese emperor.”1023 All art he believed, was produced through “different race 
souls,” by artists who embodied spiritual values and manifested “certain racial 
peculiarities.”1024 He was convinced that the Nordic racial form expressed ‘true’ art, just 
as the will of a great leader conducted the masses toward that art. Physiologically 
therefore: 
…in art forms, the head alone is drawn into prominent position. This 
representation symbolically shows what is significant, what is essential, for 
Germanic man. The forehead, nose, eyes, teeth and chin all become bearers of the 
will, of the direction of ideas. The movement from the static to the dynamic is 
discernible here. At this point, Nordic western art separates from the Greek 
ideal.1025 
 
Having said this, Rosenberg felt that aesthetic philosophy had neglected the 
representation of racial ideals pertaining to beauty, with the exception of H.F.K. 
Gunther’s Rassenkunde of 1922, and Schultze Naumburg’s Kunst und Rasse of 1928. 
Therefore, Rosenberg inferred that in the world as representation, laypeople, artists, 
and art historians passed through art galleries without truly seeing anything at all.1026 
In addition, Rosenberg’s belief that “race is the outward image of a definite soul”1027 
was a safeguard against all that was unfamiliar or ‘un-German’ in the world as 
representation. In essence, we may argue that although Rosenberg was asserting his 
will, his conception stands for a rebuttal of C1, since Rosenberg wished to restore 
‘conventional’ forms of representation. Indeed, as Eric Michaud points out, Nazi 
politics aimed at “transfiguring bodies so as to render them Heimlich, familiar.”1028 
                                                                
1023 Rosenberg, A., The Myth of The Twentieth Century: An Evaluation of the Spiritual-Intellectual Confrontations of 
Our Age (Sussex: Historical Review Press, 2004). p.176. 
1024 Ibid., p.177. 
1025 Ibid., p.185. 
1026 Ibid., p.185. 
1027 Ibid., p.345. 
1028 Michaud, E. and Lloyd, J., The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004). p.24 
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However, the gypsy body was far from being Heimlich, instead being that which 
stood for the “anti-people or anti-race (Gegenvolk, Gegenrasse).”1029 
5.4 Mueller and the Gypsies 
 
 
If the gypsy body was ungewohnt (unfamiliar), then it had to be dealt with 
according to Nazi racial legislation. This obviously raises several moral questions, 
not simply with respect to the gypsies, but also with respect to the philosophy and 
practice of art.1030 Firstly, let us note how Schopenhauer proposes that, “In morality 
the good will is everything, but in art it is nothing; for, as the word art (Kunst) already 
indicates, ability (Können) alone is of any consequence.”1031 Yet, as far as Hitler was 
concerned, there was an absence of both ‘good will’ and ability in the cultural decay 
of the old Reich. This he believed resulted from pernicious foreign influences inimical 
to German art. Thus, “a spiritual degeneration that had reached the point of destroying 
the spirit”1032 became visible via the effects of ‘Art Bolshevism’. Therefore: 
Anyone to whom this seems strange need only subject the art of the happily 
Bolshevized states to an examination, and, to his horror, he will be confronted 
by the morbid excrescences of insane and degenerate men, with which, since 
the turn of the century, we have become familiar under the collective concepts 
of cubism and Dadaism, as the official and recognized art of those states.1033 
 
When the Nazi official Adolf Ziegler gave his opening speech for the Degenerate Art 
exhibition on 19.07.1937 in Room 3 of the exhibition hall, he was flanked on his left-hand 
side by four of Mueller’s ‘degenerate’ paintings.1034 These paintings were all of the gypsy 
                                                                
1029 Ibid., p.80. 
1030 We will apply more of Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy to Nolde’s situation under Nazism in the following chapter 
of this thesis. 
1031 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.2, p.384. 
1032 Hitler and Manheim.p.234-5. 
1033 Ibid.,p.235. 
1034 Adolf Ziegler was president of the Reichskammer der Bildenden Künste. Following Goebbel’s decree of 30.06.1937, 
Ziegler, along with five others, was commissioned to confiscate ‘degenerate’ art from any German Museum. Such art 
was to be shown in Munich’s ‘Degenerate Art’ exhibition. In addition, a second commission organised by Goebbels 
enabled Ziegler to sell off the confiscated works. His was assisted by Hans Schweitzer and Robert Scholz, together with 
Franz Hofmann, Cari Meder, Karl Haberstock, and Max Taeuber. For an in-depth discussion of this see the essays by: 
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people and in this same room the exhibition organisers had placed captions on the walls 
in an attempt to thematise the artworks on display. Accordingly, along with Paul 
Kleinschmidt, Kirchner, and Karl Hofer, Mueller’s work was damned with the captions 
‘An insult to German womanhood’ and ‘The ideal-cretin and whore’. Another caption 
which overshadowed the works of Mueller, Pechstein, and Nolde read “The Jewish 
longing for the wilderness reveals itself - in Germany the Negro becomes the racial ideal 
of a degenerate art.”1035 The racial ideal of the National Socialist Party meant eradicating 
or marginalising all ‘alien blood’ from the Volk, leaving no room for images of the gypsy 
body in German art. However, for Mueller, the gypsy had been a major preoccupation for 
many years and now it was inevitable that his paintings of the gypsy body would find 
themselves on display.1036 
As a child Mueller had developed a lasting affinity for the gypsy people to such an 
extent that this affinity has led many to claim that he had gypsy blood in his veins. Yet 
Lothar Günther Buchheim states that: 
That is not true: Otto Mueller’s mother, Marie Maywald, was admittedly just as 
dark-haired and dark-eyed as his father, but she was no gypsy, but rather a 
Bohemian. In any case one can say that Otto Mueller’s genealogical line soon 
disappears into oblivion on his mother’s side, as the father of his mother is not 
known. Her mother was born to an unmarried Bohemian maid, and brought up in 
the house of the only sister of Robert Hauptmann, the father of Carl and Gerhart 
Hauptmann. This aunt of Gerhart Hauptmann married the estate owner Julius 
Göhler. The Göhlers took in Marie Maywald as their own child. 1037 
                                                                
Andreas Huneke and Stephanie Barron in: Barron, Stephanie, Degenerate Art: The Fate of the Avant-Garde in Nazi 
Germany [in English]. Los Angeles, Calif New York: Los Angeles County Museum of Art Harry N. Abrams, 1991. 
In 1940 Kurt Pinthus observed that, “Never before has Germany given so many literary awards or arranged for so many 
festivals, official art exhibitions and meetings of authors.” From: Pinthus, K., "Culture Inside Nazi Germany," in: The 
American Scholar  Vol. 9, no. 4 (1940). p.484. 
1035 Barron and Guenther., p.308. No paintings depicted African Negroes in this room. For the Nazis, the African Negro 
more often appeared in the context of ‘primitivism’ and Jazz. Therefore, this wall caption was more relevant to the 1938 
Entartete Musik exhibition held in Düsseldorf. 
1036 This chapter uses the National Socialist’s inventory numbers for those works shown in the 1937 Munich ‘Entartete 
Kunst’ exhibition as reconstructed by Mario-Andreas von Luttichau. This chapter follows those inventory numbers by 
using the abbreviations ‘NS inv.no’ followed by the inventory number itself. For further details on all inventory 
numbered paintings in this exhibition see: ibid., p.20. 
1037 Buchheim. p.33. 
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The aunt of Hauptmann, having married the wealthy landowner Göhler, ‘adopted’ Marie 
Maywald. Subsequently it is easy to understand how the conjunction of being ‘dark haired 
and dark eyed’, together with the presence in Bohemia of gypsies, and an unknown father 
led to the romantic perception of Mueller being a gypsy. This romantic perception was 
addressed by his sister Emmy who said that: 
“Our mother”, wrote Emmy, “who became almost deaf at 12 years old, brought 
great joy to the Göhlers, and they adopted her before her marriage to Lieutenant 
Julian Mueller. Today it is claimed that our mother was a gypsy. This is very 
unlikely for the following reasons: when I visited the Göhlers in my youth, I once 
saw my grandmother there. I came across her in the hallway, and I still today have 
a firm recollection of her as a maid who was dressed like our Bohemian maids and 
who had nothing gypsy-like about her.”1038  
 
Although Mueller never disputed rumours that he had gypsy blood in his veins, it was not 
uncommon for modernist artists to foster ‘romantic’ myths about their ‘primitive’ origins. 
Gauguin, for example, claimed that he had Peruvian blood in his veins, and the Russian 
artist Natalia Sergeevna Goncharova claimed that she was from gypsy stock, though there 
is no proof for either. However, when any orthodox Nazi official looked at Mueller’s 
Gypsy Woman of 1926 (fig. 119), it would have become clear to them that the natural 
stylisation of gypsy racial features, and the mysterious allure of this strange race with their 
dark skin, was the embodiment of an alien ‘barbarism’.  
Apart from the gypsy being the embodiment of an alien ‘barbarism’, one of the 
major problems for Nazism was the semi-nomadic lifestyle of the gypsies within 
Germany. As we shall see, this is a theme often referenced in paintings by Mueller and 
was also likely to have proven problematic in the reception of his work by the authorities 
in the 1930s. Indeed, the semi-nomadic lifestyle of the gypsies was one factor that led to 
their demise. As Guenter Lewy points out concerning Himmler’s decree titled ‘Combating 
                                                                
1038 Lewy. p.201. 
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the Gypsy Plague’ of 12.12.1938 “It had become clear…that Zigeunermischlinge were 
responsible for most of the criminal offences committed by gypsies. It therefore was 
necessary that racially pure gypsies and Mischlinge be treated differently.”1039 
One of the grounds upon which gypsies were ‘treated differently’ was their dark 
skin, whilst another was the history of their perceived anti-social behaviours. However, as 
Lewy argues, more compelling grounds for being treated differently stemmed from the 
threat of gypsies ‘polluting’ the gene pool of the völkisch body. Ironically, Himmler’s 
1938 decree was founded upon the earlier Nuremberg Laws of 1935 and did not refer to 
gypsies per se.1040 Yet, one decree issued by Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick on 26 
November “noted that, besides Jews, there were others who polluted the German blood - 
gypsies, Negroes and their bastards.”1041 Furthermore, an authoritative commentary on the 
new racial legislation published in 1936, stipulated that persons of ‘alien blood’ could not 
become German citizens. As a rule therefore, Jews and gypsies were classified as being 
of alien blood in Europe.1042  
Subsequent to this, Mueller’s paintings of gypsies found themselves implicated 
within a complex racial argument based on a specific theory. This theory was that Aryan 
tribes had once invaded India and driven out the native Dravidians, leading to an 
                                                                
1039 Ibid., p.201. 
1040 On the 15.07.1935 at the Nuremberg rally, the Nazi Party announced a series of laws which largely implicated the 
Jews. Two particular laws which covered this were the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour, 
which aimed to curb the problem of racial ‘degeneracy’ by prohibiting relationships between German natives and Jews 
and the Reich Citizenship Law which excluded all who were not native Germans (or related to them) from being 
described as Reich citizens. The remainder were effectively dispossessed of civil rights whilst remaining subject to the 
state. Two months later on 26 November, the Nuremberg laws were extended to gypsies and African Negroes. Wilhelm 
Stuckart and Hans Globke, in their 1936 commentary, Globke Kommentare zur deutschen Rassengesetzgebung (Civil 
Rights and the Natural Inequality of Man) observed that, “The community of the Volk, sustained by a common will and 
consciousness of honor of the racially homogeneous German Volk, constitutes political unity. This community is not 
only spiritual; it is real. The real bond is the common blood. This community of blood is what forms the völkisch-
political unity of purpose in our confrontation with the surrounding world.” Quotation from: Rabinbach, Anson, and 
Sander L. Gilman. The Third Reich Sourcebook [in English]. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2013. 
p.212. 
1041 Lewy. p.201. Wilhelm Frick was a member of the NSDAP, and Hitler’s Reich Minister of the Interior from 1933 to 
1943. 
1042 Ibid., p.202. 
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intermarriage between the two peoples.1043 Dr. Robert Ritter, as head of the Berlin 
Rassenhygienische und Bevölkerungbiologische Forschungsstelle (RHF), disagreed with 
those who suggested that gypsies could trace their racial origins to India, or that the 
Sanskrit language might entitle them to be called ‘Aryan’.1044 Himmler, by contrast was 
particularly fascinated by the gypsies and in 1942 issued orders for new research into their 
way of life.1045 
5.5 Schopenhauer’s ‘Racial Theory’ 
Although it may surprise us that Himmler took an interest in the gypsies, it may also 
surprise some of us that Mueller’s fascination with gypsies, and their Indian provenance, 
resonates with Schopenhauer who had what might loosely be described as his own racial 
theory. He often referred to the Indian Vedas and Upanishads while maintaining a belief 
that these texts (and Sanskrit literature in general) would permeate Germany in a similar 
manner to the way that Ancient Greek literature had in the fifteenth century.1046 He 
believed that, “The Vedas and Puranas know no better simile for the whole knowledge of 
the actual world, called by them the web of Maya, than the dream, and they use none more 
frequently.”1047 The Hindu belief surrounding the veil of Maya suggests that the world is 
an illusion inherent to human perception. Because the veil of Maya which consists of 
multiplicity and plurality, it is only a virtuous character who is able to see through this 
illusion. They can achieve this out of high levels of compassion and empathy which 
                                                                
1043 The Aryan Invasion theory has been discredited. There is no archaeological evidence of large-scale warfare, or even 
substantial demographic changes at the presumed time of the ‘invasion’ (late second millennium BCE) in the north-
western region of the subcontinent. It is impossible to prove that Dravidian-speaking peoples were at any time inhabiting 
those areas in the prehistoric age. More likely, there was a migration over centuries of small groups hailing from the 
Iranian plateau (ancient Iranic languages and Sanskrit being cognate), some of whom settled in what is today Panjab, 
then interbred with the pre-existing population and created the Vedic culture that is at the origin of most later 
developments. I am grateful to Dr. Vincenzo Vergiani for his assistance on these issues. 
1044 The word ‘Aryan’ itself is derived from a Sanskrit adjective – ārya –with meanings akin to ‘noble, righteous’, 
without ethnic connotations. 
1045 Lewy. p.203. 
1046 Schopenhauer makes his claims about Sanskrit literature in: Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and 
Representation.Vol.1,p.xv. 
1047 Ibid., p.17.  
- 288 - 
 
enables them to identify with others as if no distinction exists between themselves and the 
‘other’. As a result, Schopenhauer considers that this disposition “reveals the identity of 
the will in all appearances and the illusory status of individuation.”1048 This means that for 
such a disposition “the veil of Maya has become transparent and he or she recognizes his 
or her self in all things.”1049 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy also nurtured a high regard for the Hindu religion as 
one of compassion for all living creatures. From his earliest manuscripts, we know that he 
had a profound interest in aspects of Indian philosophy. He related this to his own, 
especially in terms of affirmation and denial of the will.1050 His acquaintance with Indian 
texts was made whilst living in Weimar through Friedrich Majer, which then led to a 
lifelong interest in Buddhism. Later, Schopenhauer would conclude that, “if I wished to 
take the results of my philosophy as the standard of truth, I should have to concede to 
Buddhism pre-eminence over the others.”1051  
Schopenhauer’s views on racial issues (possibly under the influence of Indian 
philosophy) finds extensive coverage in the second volume of his work Parerga and 
Paralipomena. If Hitler had truly engaged with all of Schopenhauer’s works and 
encountered the philosopher’s ‘racial theories’ here, then perhaps his admiration would 
have quickly turned to disgust. By contrast, Schopenhauer’s ‘racial theories’ help us to 
interpret Mueller’s paintings in a new way, which runs counter to the aesthetic and 
political ambitions of Hitler’s regime. 
Schopenhauer begins his Parerga essay on ‘racial evolution’ by noting that in 
different regions of the world similar organisms come into being under similar physical 
                                                                
1048 Cartwright., p.109. Schopenhauer’s use of the Sanskrit term ‘Tat Tvam Asi’ (तत्त्वमसि) means ‘Thou art that’. See: 
Cartwright, p.169. This term can be found in the Chandogya Upanishad 6.8.7. 
1049 Cartwright. p.109. 
1050 Schopenhauer and Hübscher.Vol.1, p.515. 
1051 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.p.169. Friedrich Majer was a little-known 
Orientalist and student of Johann Gottfried Herder. 
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conditions. This means that numerous species share common characteristics without being 
identical. He argues that the variety of the human race cannot have been derived from each 
other, despite the species remaining the same. He also argues that consonance of species 
does not equal a single origin from a single pair: “Who will believe that all oaks are 
descended from a single first oak, all mice from a first pair, or all wolves from the first 
wolf?”1052 Thus, Schopenhauer seems to conflate convergent evolution (where similar 
evolutionary effects are found in different places) with phylogenetic closeness (where 
species within genera are closely related).  
Schopenhauer’s ‘evolution theory’ entailed that the first human beings from the 
torrid zones were black in skin colour, or at any rate dark-brown - just as the gypsy 
paintings by Mueller are. Of such skin colour he states that:  
This, then, is the true, natural, and characteristic colour of the human species, 
regardless of race, and there has never been a naturally white race. In fact, to talk 
of such and childishly to divide people into white, yellow, and black, as is still 
done in all books, is evidence of great prejudice and a lack of thought.1053  
 
Schopenhauer was also convinced that, “a white man has never sprung originally from the 
womb of nature. Only in the tropics is man at home, and here he is always black or dark 
brown.”  1054 In addition, Schopenhauer was evidently convinced that it was only after 
mankind had multiplied in the tropics and then extended into colder regions of the world 
that it became white. Therefore, it was only due to the consequences of a temperate climate 
and colder regions that the European stock became white.1055 
In many ways, Schopenhauer’s ‘evolutionary theory’ is correct. This ‘theory’ 
might be visualised through Mueller’s ‘degenerate’ gypsies who, being of Hindu origins, 
migrated into Europe so that their “colour is roughly midway between that of the Hindu 
                                                                
1052 Schopenhauer and Payne. p.155. 
1053 Ibid., p.156. Schopenhauer spends some time on this topic in ‘The Metaphysics of Sexual Love’. See: Volume 2, 
The World as Will and Representation. Chapter XLIV. 
1054 Ibid., p.156-157. 
1055 Ibid., p.157. 
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and ours.”1056 Furthermore, Schopenhauer suggests that Negro slaves had become fairer 
in skin colour, “despite the fact that in this respect they are checked through their 
interbreeding with fresh ebony-coloured immigrants, a renewal that does not happen to 
the gypsies.”1057 Consequently, Mueller’s ‘degenerate’ tempera on canvas, Gypsy Child 
with Donkey of 1927 (fig. 120), leads us to believe that Schopenhauer was correct due to 
the child’s dark skin tones. In this image, a naked child has her back turned to the spectator 
whilst wrapping her arms around a tree trunk. Her skin tonality is dark-brown which 
harmonises with the saturnine tonalities of the whole composition. As a result, the dark 
tonalities of the gypsy body imply an exoticism at variance with the Nordic world as 
representation.  
 
5.6 The Problem of the Gypsy and Mueller’s ‘Degenerate’ Works 
 
 
For the Nazis, the gypsy was a serious problem, and the latter’s apparently feculent 
exoticism threatened to ‘infect’ the German people. An anonymous author writing in Das 
Schwarze Korps on 15.07.1937 commented that, “The German people must find a way of 
solving the gypsy problem, for we cannot tolerate a foreign body amongst us which would 
be an eternal danger of infection, an eternal source of criminality, an eternal parasite on 
the wealth of the people.” 1058 Perceived in this way, Mueller’s gypsy paintings were 
redolent with a ‘danger of infection’ for the German people. However, from a political 
standpoint it became increasingly problematic for the Nazi authorities to calibrate exactly 
how a gypsy body should be defined. To calibrate a Jewish body was relatively 
straightforward - it depended upon religious faith and the ancestry of the family. By 
comparison, no similar calibration was available for the definition of a gypsy body, 
                                                                
1056 Ibid., p.157. 
1057 Ibid., p.157. 
1058 Anonymous, "Verlogene Romantik " in: Das Schwarze Korps.,15.07.1937, p.12. 
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especially for those who had already interbred with the ‘Aryan’ race. Consequently, as we 
noted at the beginning of this chapter, in 1936 the Ministry of the Interior had created the 
RHF institute whose purpose was to gather intelligence on Germany’s ‘nomadic’ gypsy 
population and its resultant Zigeunermischlinge.1059 This intelligence was subsequently 
handled by the Kripo in order to deal with the gypsy menace.1060  
The problem of the gypsy menace was subsequently mapped onto those artists who 
portrayed them. In fact, simply to have a dark skin aroused suspicion in the minds of the 
Nazi authorities. However, there were other works of Mueller’s that did not have gypsy 
orientated titles but still portrayed suspiciously dark-skinned females. One such example, 
shown at the Munich Entartete Kunst exhibition, was his Two Nude Girls of c.1919 (fig. 
121). Here, if we look at the two darkly hued girls through Nazi eyes, then they possess a 
nakedness suggestive of their ‘contaminated’ racial sexuality.1061 The prevailing context 
for this antipathy was a concern that the Volk would become contaminated through 
interbreeding with the gypsies. As a result, in 1937 Robert Krämer, the author of ‘Racial 
Examinations on the ‘Gypsy’ Colonies Lause and Altenburg bei Berleburg (Westf)’, 
would report that, “… almost parallel to the skin, hair and eye-colour studies, a lower 
level of talent was connected with the increase in gypsy blood ratios.”1062 Therefore, if 
there was a ‘lower level of talent’ concomitant with an ‘increase in gypsy blood ratios’, 
                                                                
1059 Zigeunermischlinge means to be of mixed race but predominantly of Aryan stock. About 90% of gypsies living in 
Germany were categorised as Mischlinge (mixed blood). This information was from Niewyk, D.L., and F.R. Nicosia, 
The Columbia Guide to the Holocaust. Columbia University Press, 2012. In addition, “Germans of mixed blood 
(Mischlinge) were further defined as first degree Mischlinge and second-degree Mischlinge according to the number of 
Jewish grandparents.” This quotation was taken from Atkins, S.E. Holocaust Denial as an International Movement. 
Praeger, 2009, p.35. 
1060 Lewy. p.202. The Kripo, or the Kriminalpolizei (‘Criminal Police’), became the Criminal Police Department for 
Nazi Germany from 1936. 
1061 Notions of ideological ‘contaimination’ are discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis as they might relate to Nazism, 
Nolde and the problem of and free will. 
1062 Krämer, R., "Rassische Untersuchungen an den 'Zigeuner'-Kolonien Lause und Altenburg bei Berleburg (Westf)," 
in: Archiv für Rassen und Gesellschaftsbiologie  Vol. 31, no. 1 (1937).  p.46. 
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then Mueller’s gypsy females manifested the potential seductive power of a ‘degenerate’ 
race over the German male.1063 
From a Nazi perspective, another of Mueller’s ‘degenerate’ works illustrated the 
consequences of racial interbreeding. This work of c.1920 was entitled Lovers (fig. 122) 
and executed in tempera on canvas shows a fair skinned (probably Aryan) female who, 
while seated in the nude, is being watched by a dark-skinned male (probably a gypsy) in 
the shadows behind her. It was all too easy for the Nazi authorities to read out of this 
image the presence of a sexually ‘parasitic’ gypsy leering over an Aryan female. For the 
National Socialists, images of this nature were examples of racial treason and exemplified 
the threat of interbreeding. Therefore, after observing the two gypsy colonies in Lause and 
Altenberg bei Berleburg, Krämer argued that it could be shown how “their blood 
inheritance, furthered by a decades-long negative selection process, still determines today 
their parasitic form of life.”1064 The problem facing the Nazis then was to ‘triumph’ over 
the will of the Volk in such a way that it was compelled to reproduce itself from Aryan 
stock alone. The compulsion to do so, as an act of political will, lends weight to Marc’s 
claim C1. Thus, the sexual denial of ‘foreign individuals’ as with gypsies, was a 
convincing mandate for every racial hygienist who wished to enforce that will.1065  
As a consequence of the above, the defamation of Mueller’s gypsy paintings 
became embroiled in policies for Aryan self-preservation. Gustav Adolf Küppers spoke 
of the gypsies as a foreign body amongst the Aryan peoples. This necessitated that Aryans 
                                                                
1063 A certain Curt Thomella commented on the Nuremberg race laws of 1935 so that party officials could be sure of 
certain ‘facts’. He explained the difference between ‘Reichsbürger’ (Reich citizens) and ‘Staatsangehörige’ (nationals), 
arguing that the concept ‘German blood’ had to be explained. He asserted that, “members of foreign races, so for 
example gypsies, Negroes and Jews, are not related to German blood. It must be pointed out once and for all, although 
it probably seems superfluous and self-evident to do so, that it is not the body fluid ‘blood’ which is meant by this 
explanation, but rather the concept ‘blood’ is symbolic of the sum total of the inherited physical, mental and spiritual 
qualities of man.” See: Curt Thomalla: ‚Der Schutz des deutschen Blutes und der Ehre‘ in: ‚Unser Wille und Weg‘ 1937, 
p.308. 
1064 Krämer. p.50. 
1065 Rosenberg’s belief was that the Jew and Negro were symbolic of a disintegrating world-view since they were given 
an undue importance in Germany. He said that: “The race and soul of the Negroes is regarded - along with the good 
Jews - as being more important than the nation to which one has the honour to belong.” Rosenberg. p.124. 
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had to take “clear and unambiguous precautions.”1066 One way to protect the Volk was to 
prevent any art such as Mueller’s from appearing at all. Indeed, the only state-approved 
appearance for Mueller’s work was in the context of a heavy propaganda programme 
designed to undermine other races.1067 Hitler began this programme by asserting that the 
Volk’s need for self-preservation was itself an act of will. He claimed that: 
What is ultimately decisive in the life of a Folk is the will to self-preservation, and 
the living forces that are at its disposal for this purpose. Weapons can rust, forms 
can be outdated; the will itself can always renew both and move a Folk into the 
form required by the need of the moment.1068  
 
Hitler’s racial propaganda meant that Mueller’s work, which was shown in the Entartete 
Kunst exhibition, went on a national tour between 1938 and 1941. For this purpose, a 
communiqué was sent from Berlin’s Reichspropagandaleitung (Reich Propaganda 
Directorate) on 23.11.1937 to party organisers in each German province. Having taken 
over the Entartete Kunst exhibition, the Reichspropagandaleitung of the NSDAP allowed 
at the most four-week stays for the travelling exhibition in each location.1069 However, for 
the sake of ‘financial support’, Mueller’s Three Women of c.1922 (fig. 123) was sent back 
to Berlin in the hope of its being sold on to support Party funding.  
Of the remaining exhibits pertaining to the original Munich exhibition, works by 
Mueller such as Boy Standing in front of Two Standing Girls and One Sitting Girl of 
c.1918-19 (fig. 124) would have still have been interpreted as morally and racially 
inappropriate. Although it is not certain whether the bodies shown in this painting are full-
blooded gypsies, what is certain is that the accurate depictions of an alien body type by 
                                                                
1066 Küppers, Gustav Adolf: ‘Begegnung mit Balkanzigeunern’ in: Volk und Rasse illustrierte Monatsschrift für deutsche 
Volkstum, Rassenkunde, Rassenpflege; Zeitschrift. des Reichsausschusses für Volksgesundheitsdienst und der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Rassenhygiene Vol. 17, no. 3 (1942). p.193. 
1067 The influence of propaganda was felt not only by ethnic minorities but also by native Germans as we shall see in 
the next chapter.  
1068 Hitler, A., Attanasio, S., and Taylor, T., Hitler's Secret Book (New York: Grove Press, 1961). p.25. 
1069 Barron and Guenther. p.90. 
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Mueller closely parallel the observations of racial commentators such as Sophie 
Ehrhardt.1070 In her 1942 essay, ’Gypsies and Gypsy half-breeds in East Prussia’, she 
observed that the gypsies were of slim build and had a well-developed musculature. The 
bone structure in them she found not to be coarse, but rarely fine, although the gypsy head 
was often broadly projecting.1071 
This corporeal analysis matches Mueller’s depiction of the gypsy skull in Half 
Nude Girl in Profile (in Front of a Picture) of 1922 (fig. 125), where the mandible and 
parietal areas of the skull are quite ‘projecting’.1072 The fact that these areas of the skull 
are ‘broadly projecting’ would have confirmed Bertil Lundman’s findings.1073 These 
findings were that many, if not most, of the predominantly Nordic people of ‘feeble’ 
constitution (surveyed in Dalarna, Sweden), had acquired their weakness through their 
gypsy ancestry.1074 Yet, despite the Nazis’ use of such visual and ethnographic 
generalisations, the gypsy works of Mueller were hemmed in by a virulent racial ideology 
so that little of an aesthetically positive nature could be read out of them at the time. By 
contrast, what was required was an ideal Aryan skull type. For a point of aesthetic and 
moral reference, ‘The Great German Art Exhibition’ exhibited three sculptured busts of 
Schopenhauer. Hitler himself purchased a marble portrait bust of him by Rudolf Schmid 
for 4000 RM which was exhibited in 1942.1075 The second the Schopenhauer-Büste by 
Munich based sculptor Fritz Müller-Kamphausen shown in 1939. The third was a bronze 
                                                                
1070 Dr. Sophie Ehrhardt was involved with gypsy research and a member of the anthropology faculty at the University 
of Tübingen from 1942. For her research, at the Racial Hygiene and Population Research Office, she managed to avoid 
prosecution after the war. See: Stewart, M. and Rovid, M., Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to Romany Studies (Central 
European University Press, 2011); Lemarchand, R., Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and Memory (University 
of Pennsylvania Press, Incorporated, 2011); ibid.p.143. Stewart, M., M. Rovid, and M.R.R. VID. Multi-Disciplinary 
Approaches to Romany Studies. Central European University Press, 2011.p.180. 
1071. Ehrhardt, Sophie, ‘Zigeuner und Zigeunermischlinge in Ostpreussen’ in: Volk und Rasse illustrierte Monatsschrift 
für deutsche Volkstum, Rassenkunde, Rassenpflege 1942, Vol. 17, no. 3, p.56. 
1072 “Landscapes, architectural works, flower pieces, still life and so on show me my knowing, but historical paintings 
and heads show me my willing or my being, which are one and the same.” Schopenhauer and Hübscher. Vol.1, p.335. 
1073 Lundman, B. and Swan, D. A., The Races and Peoples of Europe (IAAEE, 1977). 
1074 Ibid., p.304. 
1075 Although he does not say who the sculptor was, Timothy W. Ryback argues that: “The most solid piece of evidence 
for the centrality of Schopenhauer in Hitler’s life is the bust of the wild-haired philosopher that Hitler displayed on a 
table in his Berghof study.” See: Ryback. p.105. 
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head of Schopenhauer (fig. 126) by Willhelm Neuhäuser, shown in 1941 and bought by a 
private collector for 500 RM.  
 
5.7 Miscegenation, ‘Degeneration’ and the ‘Exotic’ Gypsy 
 
 
Despite the virulent racial ideology which framed his art, not all of Mueller’s 
‘degenerate’ works were of gypsies or Asiatic body types. Those seen in Six Nudes in a 
Landscape of 1924 (fig. 127), in tempera on canvas, are evidently Nordic bodies. 
Although the prevailing Nazi fear was that miscegenation would adulterate the Nordic 
body type, many racial theorists pointed out that the gypsy blood line could also 
‘degenerate’ through inter breeding. This was turned to Nazi advantage in 1938 when 
Küppers wrote: “It is not hard to recognise that gypsies have acquired large mixtures of 
blood from the affected host people. (This is a) sign of the degeneration of the gypsy 
race.”1076 However, the ‘degeneration’ of the gypsy was of no concern to the Nazis. 
Instead, their concern was to deny any blurring of the Aryan archetype through the 
predatory sexual impulses of the gypsy. The sexual impulse is for Schopenhauer, as 
already noted, the strongest affirmation of life. Therefore, self-preservation and self-care 
are mankind’s primary goals. Once these are secured then procreation becomes the only 
goal. As a phenomenon of nature mankind cannot aspire to more.1077 
On this basis, we can interpret Mueller’s ‘degenerate’ works as the expression of 
the will as sexual impulse. For example, Lovers of 1919, executed in distemper on hessian, 
shows two dark-skinned lovers in an embrace. In this image, the female has her shirt open 
which exposes her breasts to the viewer, whilst a swarthy looking male kisses her with his 
head turned away from us. Simultaneously, the female leans her hips towards the male 
                                                                
1076 Küppers, Gustav Adolf: ‘Begegnung mit Balkanzigeunern’ in: Volk und Rasse illustrierte Monatsschrift für deutsche 
Volkstum, Rassenkunde, Rassenpflege; Zeitschrift. des Reichsausschusses für Volksgesundheitsdienst und der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Rassenhygiene 1938, Vol. 13, no. 6, p.184. 
1077 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.329. 
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whose body language anticipates the sexual impulse. The sexual impulse as the objectified 
will to life is set against a verdant background suggestive of fertility. A similar conjunction 
between nature and the sexual impulse can be traced in the lithograph Seated Couple I 
(Squatting Couple) of c.1908 (fig. 128), where there is little artificial covering over the 
genital areas. This too suggests a certain ‘naturalness’ and ‘pagan naivety’ on behalf of the 
sitters. 
In the latter of these paintings, the genitalia of the female are intimated suggesting 
that the sexual impulse may not have been lacking in the artist during the work in question. 
Mueller’s graphic intimation of the female genitalia reveal the subjection of the sexual 
organs to the will as the ultimate ‘force’ and inner kernel of nature. Since the inner kernel 
of nature is the will to life, it is she (nature) who compels man and animal to ‘propagate’. 
Consequently, “after this she has attained her end with the individual, and is quite 
indifferent to its destruction; for, as the will to live, she is concerned only with the 
preservation of the species; the individual is nothing to her.”1078  
What Mueller’s work might confirm is Schopenhauer’s view that, compared to 
other parts of the body, the genitals are subordinate to the will and none whatsoever to 
knowledge. In the case of the genitals the will manifests itself almost autonomously of 
knowledge, as in the case with mere vegetative life which responds to mere stimuli and 
reproduces itself blindly as does all of nature-without-knowledge.1079 Thus, one might 
interpret Mueller’s work as having depicted the sexual apparatus of the body as the 
essential objectification of the will to life. Through the medium of Mueller’s painting we 
see the means for reproduction which entails that, “the genitals are the real focus of the 
will, and are therefore the opposite pole to the brain, the representative of knowledge, i.e., 
                                                                
1078 Ibid., Vol.1, p.330. This is an example where Willle zum Leben ought to have been translated by Payne as the ‘will 
to life’ instead of the ‘will to live’. In the above context, it should be taken to mean the former. 
1079 Ibid., p.330. 
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to the other side of the world, the world as representation.”1080 Therefore, the genitals 
guarantee unending life through time and symbolise how the author of this world (the will) 
affirms itself.1081 
Mueller’s depiction of “the life-preserving principle”1082 and symbolic affirmation 
of the will was interpreted by the Nazis, not according to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, but 
rather as an act of sexual treason and moral transgression against their racialised values. 
Indeed, Mueller did transgress the social order of his day but in a very different manner. 
By turning towards the gypsies he was trying to express – probably unconsciously – his 
own aversion to the accepted order of society which derogated gypsies. Yet, as Buchheim 
concludes, Mueller was not making social accusations, nor was there any hidden agenda 
in his gypsy art as some of his interpreters have assumed.1083 
By comparison, the Nazi agenda did not take gypsy sexuality and social behaviour 
as lightly as Mueller had done in Gypsies in front of a Tent, c.1925 (fig. 129). Here there 
is a definite feeling of transience and a nomadic gypsy lifestyle laid before the viewer. 
As opposed to the bourgeois predictability of bricks and mortar the image depicts a 
crudely fashioned tent in front of which sit two gypsies. In the background, there is a 
black horse over which stand three yellow sunflowers. To the far left of the scene a 
gypsy sports an ochre-coloured headscarf and zebra striped costume. The whole scene 
appears exotically Indian and not at all sympathetic to a steel-cool Aryanism. However, 
as Buchheim argues, “only by living closely with the gypsies was it possible for him to 
see their world not as picturesque exoticism, but as a way to bring mystery and magical 
demonism into his pictures by experiencing it with evocative intensity.”1084 
                                                                
1080 Ibid., Vol.1, p.330. 
1081 Ibid., p.330. 
1082 Ibid., p.330. 
1083 Buchheim. p.130. 
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Mueller may well have been attracted to the gypsies through a shared interest in 
mysticism.1085 This extended to an alleged wearing of pentagram amulets and use of 
snakes as an artistic signature. In addition, he purportedly depicted images of the gypsy 
Madonna with magic symbols.1086 Yet, the magical exoticism of the ‘degenerate’ gypsy 
body, which fascinated Mueller, does not parallel that which the South Sea Islanders held 
for Gauguin. By comparison, Gauguin’s art experienced a clear transformation in the 
South Seas, whereas Mueller’s choice of the gypsy theme, from around 1912-13, did not 
stimulate any significant change in artistic form or expression. However, such a 
transformation had been the case for both Kirchner and Schmidt-Rottluff, whose 
encounters with ‘degenerate’ ‘alien blood’ from ‘exotic’ places led to new artistic 
expression and the development of new stylistic devices.  
Following the First World War, the ‘degenerate’ Mueller had hoped for another 
type of transformation - a political transformation -  by joining the left wing Arbeitsrat fur 
Kunst (Workers’ Council for Art), even though his art was arguably apolitical. However, 
it is true that he sent prints to left wing periodicals such as Die rote Erde (The Red Earth) 
and Der Anbruch (The Beginning) as well as becoming a member of the anti-conservative 
Novembergruppe.1087 To the Nazi authorities all artists who had contact with Communism 
were a danger to the German nation. Furthermore, throughout the period of 1930-33, 
almost all gypsies were presumed to be Communists whose chief activists usually 
belonged to the Antifaschistische Aktion (Antifa German Communist Party).  
This situation escalated when Antifa activists reputedly threatened the Berleburg 
National Socialists with death and arson. As a consequence, racial theorists such as 
                                                                
1085 Ibid., p.131. Cf. Just as Jean-François Millet, Camille Pissarro, van Gogh and Gauguin had done before him, Mueller 
arguably idealised and ‘romanticised’ the gypsy. His works, for example, do not reflect anything of the sometimes 
repellent realities of gypsy life. 
1086 Ibid. 
1087 Barron and Guenther. p.308. 
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Krämer could argue that, “During this time of state and cultural demoralisation they 
showed the true face of their Asiatic bestiality, which they understand how to hide in times 
of discipline and order, and which they are trying to hide again today.”1088 Therefore, not 
only did Mueller’s depictions of the ‘degenerate’ gypsy body signify ‘genetic pollution’ 
but they also signified the political corruption of the Nordic race. This inference was made 
despite the admission that many, if not the majority of gypsies in Germany, seemed to 
carry out their jobs reasonably well. 
With this admission in mind it is significant to note that of those considered to be 
of ‘alien blood’ at that time, the gypsies represented a tiny minority of c.26,000 compared 
to c.525,000 Jews. This small figure was a comparatively minor issue compared to the 
principal problem for the Nazis which was the Jewish Question.1089 However, the gypsy 
was to pose a specific threat at the outbreak of World War Two leading to an escalating 
confrontation with the ‘gypsy nuisance’. As Lewy shows, the rise in anti-gypsy policies 
at the start of the war originated with fears that the gypsies were involved in espionage, 
alongside pandemic governmental and social pressures which aspired “to get rid of the 
‘gypsy nuisance’.”1090 
5.8 Reinterpreting the ‘Gypsy Nuisance’ through Schopenhauer 
 
The ‘gypsy nuisance’ can be reinterpreted through Schopenhauer, who could well 
have perceived Mueller’s gypsy paintings as being congruent with his ‘racial 
philosophy’had he seen them. However, for racial theorists such as Rosenberg, this would 
be problematic. Rosenberg would air this problem in an article called ‘Revolution in der 
bildenden Kunst?’ in Völkischer Beobachter, of 07.07.1933.1091 Although he criticized 
                                                                
1088 Krämer. p.52. 
1089 We shall touch upon elements of anti-Semitism in the following chapter of this thesis as it relates to Nolde. 
1090 Lewy. p.202. 
1091 Rosenberg, Alfred, 'Revolution in the Visual Arts?' First published as "Revolution in der bildenden Kunst?" in: 
Völkischer Beobachter, 07.07.1933. Quoted and translated in: Rabinbach and Gilman. p.48. 
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Nolde and Ernst Barlach in particular, he associated Negritude with a lack of piety, 
rawness, and vacuity of true “inner strength of form.”1092 By contrast, Schopenhauer 
takes a very different view to ‘non-Aryan’ peoples, which makes it possible to understand 
Mueller’s gypsy paintings in a new way. Thus, Schopenhauer adduced that “the Adam of 
our race must in any case be conceived as black and it is ludicrous for painters to depict 
this first human being as white, a colour that has originated from the skin's turning 
pale.”1093 Moreover, Schopenhauer observed that since God created man in his own image 
he ought to be shown as dark skinned in art: “Here, however, he can be given the 
conventional white beard, as the thin beard is not associated with a dark colour, but merely 
with the Ethiopian race.”1094 He was also of the opinion that in older artistic depictions of 
the Madonna and child, as seen in ‘the Levant’ and Italy, the complexions are usually 
dark.  
Rosenberg and Hitler were either ignorant of or deliberately side-stepped, 
Schopenhauer’s ‘racial philosophy’. They certainly failed to notice Schopenhauer’s 
comments about the ‘chosen people’ where he suggested that:  
In fact, the whole of God’s chosen people was black or dark brown, and is even 
now darker than we who are descended from pagan tribes that immigrated earlier. 
Present-day Syria, however, was populated by half-breeds descended partly from 
northern Asia (like the Turcomans, for example).1095  
 
Whilst Schopenhauer took an enlightened view about dark-skinned bodies, other artists apart from 
Mueller relished depictions of dark skinned ‘degenerate’ bodies. To take but a single example from 
many, Pechstein’s Married Couple on Palau of 1917 (fig. 130) was regarded by the National 
Socialists as clear evidence of the ‘degeneracy’ of both the Palau people and of the artist 
himself. In the painting, a couple of Palau natives with Negroid features stand on a canoe in a river 
                                                                
1092 Ibid., p.48. 
1093 Schopenhauer and Payne. p.157-8. 
1094 Ibid., p.158. 
1095 Ibid., p.158. 
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which flows into the distance. While the whole scene is set in a tropical context, a semi-naked female, 
who is being embraced by the male, cradles a naked infant in her left arm and appears to be listening 
intently to her male partner. He carries in his right hand what appears to be a punt for the canoe. He 
stands on the canoe in a gesture of authority over both the canoe and what we may assume to be his 
family. This image seems harmless enough to us, but such images were a problem for Rosenberg 
since they stood for physical ugliness and animalistic traits.1096 His opinion was that “the avenging 
Furies were depicted by the Etruscans as “utterly loathsome, with animalistic or Negroid features, 
pointed ears, matted hair, fangs, and so forth.”1097 His conclusion was that the biological and 
aesthetic ideal for the German nation was to be “by physical appearance, Nordic.”1098 
This leads us on to look briefly at how Rosenberg received Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysics and how he responded to the philosopher in terms of his own aesthetic ideals. 
He acknowledged that whilst the German public honoured Schiller, Kant and 
Schopenhauer these philosophers had certain ‘limitations’. With these ‘limitations’ in 
mind he declared that, “we are cautious of these not because we fail to find the profoundest 
thoughts in their works, but because we can no longer use them in their entirety for the 
study of art.”1099 One specific ‘limitation’ he found was that they looked only to Greek art 
– or so he believed. Yet, he seems to have deleted from his memory the fact that 
Schopenhauer had a lasting appreciation of Salomon van Ruysdael, the Dutch Golden Age 
painter, and that he had a lasting appreciation of the Italian composer Gioachino Antonio 
Rossini. Even so, Rosenberg found another ‘limitation’ of a more general nature with these 
                                                                
1096 As Schopenhauer states: “… the purely objective contemplation of any object (but not of the ugly or disgusting) 
results in this stirring of the better consciousness, but in particular this results from a contemplation of vegetable and 
inorganic nature (landscape), of the beautiful human form and of architecture.” See: Schopenhauer and Hübscher. p.50. 
However, there is an exception to the use of ugliness in painting since: “Ugliness is perhaps inadmissible in sculpture, 
but admissible in painting, because, unlike sculpture, painting has as its subject not only the beauty of the human form, 
but is also the expression of character, temper and disposition. This expression can be so prevalent in the painting that 
beauty or ugliness of form here becomes a matter of secondary importance; and this itself again becomes fraught with 
meaning.” Ibid., p.356. 
1097 Rosenberg. p.32. 
1098 Ibid., p.387. 
1099 Ibid., p.175-76. 
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philosophers in the form of their universalising aesthetics. Rosenberg’s ‘corrective’ to this 
universalising principle is worth quoting at length since it encapsulates much of his 
aesthetic values. His solution reads as follows: 
If they would accept the fact of racial differences in art, then on their theoretical 
thought - the thought which we describe as the philosophy of the 18th century -  
we would have an acceptable base on which to build. Their thought could seize the 
art products of their own peoples. This contradiction between philosophical theory 
and concrete practice is present in Goethe, Schiller and Schopenhauer. The great 
fault of all 19th century aesthetics was that it was not likened to the works of the 
artists; it merely dissected works of art.1100 
 
Rosenberg also proposed that the Greeks’ inner life partook in ‘an act of will’ when their 
art was born. In doing so, he said that the Greek manifested a ‘universalising aesthetic 
will’ which was transferred into their mythology. He contrasted this ‘aesthetic will’ with 
Schopenhauer and Kant’s philosophy of disinterested aesthetic contemplation, whose 
teaching he believed had ‘condemned’ German aesthetics to one of infertility. By 
antithesis, Rosenberg asserted that ‘an active force’ was at work in genuine artistic 
production entailing that “a shaping will lies at the bottom of every art creation. It is 
concentrated in the work and it necessitates a powerful action of the soul. Without such a 
will, all our other efforts are in vain.”1101 Since this was his belief, then we must conclude 
such a conviction validates C1.  
There are more beliefs of a similar tenor throughout the second chapter of his book, 
which is titled ‘Will and Instinct’. In this chapter he makes it clear how Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy can be used “only to emphasise those points which might be helpful for a 
judgement of the laws of life as they are expressed in ideology, science and art.”1102 On 
that basis, he argued for a Schopenhauerian philosophy of the will as one of central 
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importance – which again appears to privilege C1 over C2. Even so, Rosenberg stated that 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy was “the tragic dream of a despairing seeker,” and that it had 
“failed because his intellect lacked the will.”1103 For Rosenberg, this was the most tragic 
aspect of Schopenhauer’s life and work, being persuaded that, “as the example of an heroic 
- in its powerful, truly European - struggle for the essence of this world, he gambled 
everything on one card and failed.”1104 
In brief, Rosenberg inverted Schopenhauer’s recommendation for a negation of 
the will through aesthetic contemplation and denial of the will to life, by arguing for a 
predominance of willing over knowing.1105 This, may be substantiated by a statement 
which arguably supports C1 where Rosenberg argued that: 
If I speak of a view of art which does not reject the will, then I do not wish to 
maintain the impossible assertion that art must have effect upon impulse, instinct 
upon Schopenhauer’s ‘will’, but that works of art, and especially a definite group 
of them, do not turn toward the subject of perception immersed in contemplative 
mood, but aim particularly at the awakening of a spiritual activity of a will.1106 
Rosenberg’s prescription for ‘the awakening of a spiritual activity of a will’ and his 
racialised aesthetics of human biology can be contextualised through comments such as 
those made by SS-Untersturmführer Professor Karl August Eckhardt. His article, 
‘Widernatürliche Unzucht ist todeswürdig’ (Sexually Indecent Abominations against 
Nature are Punishable by Death), written for the 22.05.1935 edition of the SS periodical 
Das Schwarze Korps, addressed the growing problems of racial ‘degeneration’. 
Eckhardt took as his context Karl von Amira’s discussion of how a particular use of 
the death penalty had been used in ancient Germany. This particular use was reserved 
                                                                
1103 Ibid., p.217. 
1104 Ibid., p.217. 
1105 We have discussed these values in detail throughout chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis 
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for those miscreants who through interbreeding had deviated “from the norms of the 
species”1107 Consequently, Eckhardt suggested that: 
The instinctual impulse within the Volk to maintain the purity of the race is 
congruent with the divine mandate to maintain the original God-given purity of 
the race. The degenerates, then, are offered as sacrifices so as not to provoke 
the anger of the gods in response to racial treason.1108  
 
The very thought, therefore, of permitting the appearance of Mueller’s ‘degenerate’ 
gypsy bodies or Pechstein’s Composition with Three Palauan Nudes, from: The Creators 
of 1918 (fig. 131) was literally ‘racial treason’. As a result, these conditions made it 
possible for Eckhardt to argue “that the power of racial thought should also be preserved 
in its purest form in the Germanic states and, for example, bastardizing the race with 
the blood of Negroes is considered an act of racial treason for the Germans.”1109 In 
conclusion, he also suggested that: 
Now that we have found our way back to our ancient Germanic perspectives on 
the question of mixed marriages with members of races that are alien to the 
species [artfremde Rassen], we must do the same for our assessments of the 
scourge of racial annihilation presented by the degenerate profile of the 
homosexual and return to the Nordic guiding principle of extirpating the 
degenerates. Germany's rise and fall rest on her ability to maintain the purity of 
the race.1110 
 
By contrast, according to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, we might reinterpret Mueller’s 
gypsy paintings not as a falling away from an archetypal purity of humanity, from light 
skin to dark skin, but rather the reverse. Therefore, we may invert Eckhardt’s edict and 
argue that the Caucasian race is in itself a ‘degenerate race’. In that case, aside from their 
modernist style, Schopenhauer would perhaps not judge Mueller’s paintings of gypsies  
as ‘degenerate’ at all. Taking an alternative view to Nazism, we might argue through 
                                                                
1107 SS-Untersturmführer Professor Eckhardt, ‘Sexually Indecent Abominations against Nature are Punishable by 
Death’. First published as ‘Widernatürliche Unzucht ist todeswürdig’, in Das Schwarze Korps, 22.05.1935, 13. 
Quotation and translation in: Rabinbach and Gilman. p.377. 
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Schopenhauer that: “… the white face is a degeneration and unnatural is shown by the 
aversion and repugnance that are excited among some tribes of the interior of Africa when 
they first see such a face; to them it looks like a sickly and unhealthy pining away.”1111 
Furthermore, such a reinterpretation made through Schopenhauer’s philosophy indicates 
that Mueller’s depiction of skin colour is not the essential point to consider. It is not the 
essential point because differences in skin colour originates solely with a greater or lesser 
distance travelled by indigenous human beings away from the ‘torrid zones’.1112 
Nevertheless, for Nazi theorists such as Johann Fahlbusch, skin-colour and racial 
integrity were essential things. In his February 1935 article, ‘Farbiges Blut im Rheinland’ 
(Colored Blood in the Rhineland), he voiced his concern that the Aryan birth rate had 
been falling for some time. This concern was underscored by a perceived threat to the 
purity of the Aryan bloodline through interbreeding with foreign races. In this article, 
Fahlbusch rhetorically asked who the mothers “of these bastards”1113 were. It was the 
lascivious Aryan female who was responsible – it was she who was leading the nation into 
a hereditary disaster. Therefore, he claimed that through “…the children of German 
mothers, these Negro bastards are in possession of German citizenship.”1114 
 
5.9 Moral interpretations of German Citizenship, the Will and Art 
 
German citizenship, the will and art can be interpreted according to 
Schopenhauer’s moral doctrine. Somewhat disconcertingly, as we have noted earlier, he 
states that, “In morality the good will is everything, but in art it is nothing; for, as the word 
art (Kunst) already indicates, ability (Können) alone is of any consequence.”1115 He adds 
                                                                
1111 Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.2, p.158. 
1112 Ibid., p.158. 
1113 Johann Fahlbusch, ‘Colored Blood in the Rhineland’. First published as ‚Farbiges Blut im Rheinland,‘ in Volk and 
Welt: Das deutsche Monatssbuch, February 1935, 8. Quoted and translated in: Rabinbach and Gilman. p.168. 
1114 Ibid., p.169. 
1115 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.2, p.384. 
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that art and philosophy should aim towards solving the problems of existence by those 
artists freed from the aims of willing.1116 However, this raises a problem for us if, as David 
S. Luft maintains, “Schopenhauer encouraged an art that transcended the merely wilful 
life of the ego and responded to the deepest sources of ethical motivation.”1117 This would 
entail that some artists, some of the time, necessarily created some art with an ethical 
‘good will’. Despite Schopenhauer’s pessimism that the body and its impulses are 
egregious and deluded, the ‘good will’ of some artists entails that we are motivated to 
comprehend life in a different manner. Thus: 
Through art, and especially tragic art, we comprehend these facts in a general way. 
The experience of spectatorship, which already, in its cognitive structure, 
exemplifies detachment from will, gives us, through this comprehension, new 
motives to reject and blame life as both evil and false.1118 
 
If a ‘good will’ stimulates these motives through some art, and if they are sometimes good 
to act upon, then sometimes that is where an artist’s “seriousness is to be found.”1119 For 
the National Socialists this ‘seriousness’ meant solving the problems of ‘degenerate’ art 
and the problems of miscegenation. As far as Nazi philosophy was concerned, only the 
‘aristocracy of nature’ through Aryanism could solve the problems of ‘degeneration’.1120 
As we have seen, prior to Nazism the concepts of ‘degeneracy’ had already been addressed 
by Blumenbach, Morel, Lombroso, and Nordau at length. While their doctrines were 
appropriate enough for lecture halls, they could never inspire anyone to act in a morally 
upright fashion. By antithesis, Schopenhauer argued that morality requires something 
                                                                
1116 Ibid., p.406 Cf. Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. The World as Will and Representation Vol.1, Section § 
49. 
1117 Luft, D. S., "Schopenhauer, Austria, and the Generation of 1905," in: Central European History  Vol. 16, no. 1 
(1983).p.73. 
1118 Nussbaum, M. C., "The Transfigurations of Intoxication: Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Dionysus," in: Arion: A 
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independent of the intellect which “speaks to every man, even the coarsest and 
crudest.”1121  
Hitler’s reaction to the problem of ‘degenerate’ art and his moral solutions to it 
appealed to ‘even the coarsest and crudest’ when he declared that: 
If some self-styled artist submits trash for the Munich exhibition, then he is either 
a swindler, in which case he should be put in prison; or he is a madman, in which 
case he should be in an asylum; or he is a degenerate, in which case he must be 
sent to a concentration camp to be ‘re-educated’ and taught the dignity of honest 
labour.1122 
 
The problem of ‘re-educating’ the artist entailed that Nazi civil law enforce its sense of 
justice. This it did through misguided concepts of philanthropy and beneficence on behalf 
of the German people. However, from Schopenhauer’s perspective, no amount of 
philanthropy or beneficence could generate just and lawful acts anyway, “since here 
everyone would like to be the passive part and no one active.”1123 Therefore, it would have 
been naïve of the Nazis, and anyone for that matter, to believe that just and lawful acts 
possess a moral origin: “On the contrary, the relation between justice as practised by men 
and genuine honesty of heart is analogous to that between the expressions of politeness 
and the genuine love for one’s neighbour.”1124  
In reality, Schopenhauer says, only two external necessities bring about acts of 
justice and good behaviour. They are firstly, the protection of one’s civil rights through 
the law, and secondly, through the possession of civil honour or a good name. Both entail 
that our behaviours are validated by public opinion.1125 The Nazis harnessed these two 
external necessities in order to undermine Mueller’s name. By manipulating public 
opinion against artists such as him, it could lead to “an indelible stain on the guilty man 
                                                                
1121 Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.120. 
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for the rest of his life.”1126 As a result, the Nazis played upon the public’s expectation that 
a man’s behaviours are a product of their inborn character and that he would inevitably 
repeat his ‘errors’ in similar circumstances.1127 
For good or ill, Schopenhauer says, such external necessities are the moral 
“guardians that watch over public honesty, and without which we should be in a bad 
way.”1128 Consequently, the Nazis associated Mueller, the bad ‘degenerate’ artist, with 
that of “forever being expelled from the great masonic lodge of honourable men who 
observe the law of uprightness.”1129 However, this association is problematic. If Mueller, 
and the Nazis, shared an indivisible will, and were manifestations of that will, then the 
Nazis could have seen themselves in Mueller’s depictions of the gypsy. At the very least, 
the Nazis possessed a body and sexual desires just as the gypsy did. If there is an 
indivisible will, then might we assume an indivisible manifestation of that will in terms of 
moral value?  
At first this seems to be a reasonable assumption. Yet, as Cartwright points out, 
for Schopenhauer to sustain the notion that the moral value of an individual’s character 
has a metaphysical basis, and that the moral value of that individual’s character flows from 
an indivisible will is perplexing. In addition, Cartwright argues that, for Schopenhauer to 
hold that “there are morally good and bad characters, he must also hold that the unitary 
metaphysical will bears a diversity of moral values.”1130 Indeed, Schopenhauer was 
conscious of this problem and referred to it as “the most difficult of all problems.”1131 He 
therefore asked: “In spite of the identity and metaphysical unity of the will as thing-in-
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1128 Ibid., p.123. 
1129 Ibid., p.125. 
1130 See: Cartwright’s Introduction in: ibid., p. xxx. 
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itself, whence the enormous difference of characters? - the malicious, diabolical 
wickedness of the one and the goodness of the other in such conspicuous contrast…”1132  
His answer to this is less than convincing, especially when he proposes that we 
could modify the problem so that the difference is merely a matter of degree. However, 
this is not particularly helpful - although we may concede that the problem of intellectual 
diversity might be less problematic if it rested upon degrees of neurological development. 
Even if we did, the problem of moral diversity in general and for art in particular, has not 
gone away. It remains as an unresolved contradiction, since diversity appears to emanate 
immediately from the will which is supposed to be ‘one’, outside of time and eternal. 
Problematically Mueller’s moral character, and every Nazi’s character, was therefore 
based upon the principle of individuation and diversification, whilst simultaneously being 
rooted in the thing-in itself.1133 It is from that eternal aspect, the thing-in-itself, that the 
human character supposedly arises and which resists immanent explanation.1134 Yet, the 
fundamental problem of moral diversity remains unsettled. In the end, Schopenhauer 





While we may not be able to shed light on this particular ‘abyss’, it may be possible 
to shed some light on some of the moral issues at stake within the parameters of this 
chapter. If moralists were to asservate that the Nazis’ sense of justice and honesty was 
simply ‘conventional’ and founded upon egoism, then we should not be surprised for there 
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is some truth in this. 1136 Goebbels’ egoism took on a moral tone in a speech called 
‘Unsterbliche deutsche Kultur’ (Immortal German Culture) for the 7th German Art 
Exhibition on 26.06.1943. He argued that the Axis powers were engaged in a fight to 
preserve the aesthetic values which had suffused European culture for the last thousand 
years. He suggested that since Germany was a primary source of those values, their roots 
at that moment were being threatened byAllied bombing campaigns. In essence, every 
nation which had made the greatest contribution to Western art, such as Germany, was 
“fighting for their material and spiritual existence.”1137 As a result., Goebbels would state 
that “it is almost a miracle that in the midst of this gigantic battle, art is able to exist, 
almost untouched by the storms of our people’s gigantic and fateful struggle.”1138 For him 
this was moral proof that National Socialism sustained the world of art. With this proof 
Goebbels placed German artists under a moral obligation, announcing that this:  
…does not mean that artists can ignore what is going on around them. There may 
be an artist here or there who believes that since his art does not concern the war, 
the elementary laws of war have no application to him. He must be reminded of 
his duty, perhaps rather firmly. His work, even if not related to the war, is not an 
end in itself. He is still working for his people, which is enduring the heaviest 
burdens and deepest sorrows.1139 
The moral obligation of the artist was to mitigate these ‘burdens and deepest sorrows’ 
during a decisive moment for the Volk - an urgent need for self-preservation. Indeed, 
Goebbels’ speech registered a certain element of desperation. 1140 By appealing to what 
Schopenhauer calls the ‘anti-moral incentive’ of egoism, Goebbels’ plea to artists reveals 
                                                                
1136 Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.125. 
1137 Josef Goebbels: “Unsterbliche deutsche Kultur. Rede zur Eröffnung der 7. Großen Deutschen Kunstausstellung,” 
Der steile Aufstieg (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP., 1944), pp. 339-346. Sourced from: The German Propaganda 
Archive. Calvin College. Trans. by Randall Bytwerk. 
1138 Ibid. 
1139 Ibid. 
1140 1943 was a significant year for Nazi Germany. Among many other problems, in May of that year German U-boats 
accrued high losses. In July, on the Eastern Front, the Battle of Kursk saw the Red Army repulse an intense German 
attack causing the retreat of the German army. That repulse was a contributory factor leading up to the eventual 
capitulation of Germany in 1945. Consequently, the spectre of the East bearing down on Germany loomed large in the 
Nazi consciousness from 1943 onwards. 
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that egoism is the well-spring of all actions.1141 On that basis, the motto for the individual, 
and the collective Nazi State, would be “everything for me and nothing for the others.”1142 
When egoism pursues its course, politically or individually, without being audited by an 
external force, as in a sound moral incentive or fear of the divine, then it goes on 
unchecked. Left unchecked, the result would be anarchy, therefore as Schopenhauer states, 
“reflecting reason very soon invented the machinery of the State which, springing from 
the mutual fear of mutual violence, obviates the disastrous consequences of universal 
egoism, as far as this can be done in the negative way.”1143 Thus, Nazi reflective reasoning 
harnessed the machinery of the State, not only to defame Mueller’s gypsy paintings, but 
also to obviate what they perceived to be ‘the disastrous consequences of universal 
egoism’ working against Aryan self-preservation.1144  
The maxim of extreme egoism culminated in the concentration camp and the 
eugenic clinic where the Nazis sought to contain those they considered ‘degenerate’. As 
Rabinbach and Gilman argue:  
The prevailing notion was that one could not alter the nature of the degenerate but 
could stop his or her degenerate acts. While the ‘concentration camps’ were not 
extermination camps (such as Auschwitz), the extremely high death rate through 
mistreatment and disease made them the pattern for the later sites of death.1145 
 
Schopenhauer’s views are relevant here, since he observes that if ‘malicious joy’ aroused 
by inhumane treatment of others is ‘theoretical cruelty’, then cruelty is malicious joy in 
practice appearing as cruelty whenever the opportunity arises. Derivations of spiteful 
mistreatment are “envy, disaffection, ill will, malice, malicious joy at another’s 
                                                                
1141 Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.131. 
1142 Ibid., p.132. 
1143 Ibid., p.133. 
1144 Schopenhauer states that: “the maxim of extreme egoism is Neminem juva, imo omnes, si forte conducit (hence still 
always conditioned) laede.” Trans. in Schopenhauer as: ‘Help no one; on the contrary, injure all people if it brings you 
any”. In addition, “the maxim of malice is Omnes, quantum poles, laede.” Trans. in Schopenhauer as: ‘Injure all people 
as much as you can’. Ibid., p.136. 
1145 Rabinbach and Gilman. p.207. 
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misfortune, prying curiosity, slander, insolence, petulance, hatred, anger, treachery, 
perfidy, thirst for revenge, cruelty, and so on”1146 - all of which are ‘anti-moral’ forces 
arising from extreme egoism.  
Schopenhauer’s views on the ‘anti-moral forces’ are particularly relevant if they 
give us a purchase on the moral classification of human characters. If they do, then what 
could make his views doubly relevant here is that we become aware of just how 
problematic it is to secure a motive which could inspire a nation to assume moral 
behaviours which oppose the most vicious tendencies of their ‘ingrained’ nature – and 
thus preculde C1.That is to say, “if such a line of conduct were given in experience, of 
finding a motive that would give an adequate, simple, and natural account of it.”1147  
Given the spiteful actions at work during the policing of ‘degenerate art’, what 
motive could have induced an individual to oppose the deeply ingrained instincts of his or 
her natural tendency towards extreme egoism? For Schopenhauer, no such motive resides 
in morality or sentiments of disposition since all actions arising from such are rooted in 
egoism. Paradoxically therefore, along with the Nazis, “we are sometimes just as much in 
error over the true motives of our own actions as we are over those of others.”1148 Despite 
this apparent paradox, Schopenhauer believed that the only actions which contain genuine 
moral worth are those executed under certain conditions.  That is to say, acts containing 
genuine moral worth are those performed (or not performed) to the benefit of another.1149 
Thus, the weal and woe of the ‘other’ is contingent upon identifying with the ‘other’, so 
that the difference between self and ‘other’ is eradicated or appropriately modified.1150  
                                                                
1146 Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.136. 
1147 Ibid., p.137. The problem is so complex that, for its solution he argues, it was necessary for the greater mass of 
humanity to resort to “the machinery from another world.” Ibid. On this basis, the will of the gods was invoked in order 
to inspire appropriate moral conduct through rewards and punishments fit for this world and the next. 
1148 Ibid., p.137. 
1149 Ibid., p.143. Schopenhauer offers nine hypotheses which can be treated as maxims to this effect. See: ibid., p.141-
42. 
1150 Ibid., p.143-44. 
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The only knowledge which can eliminate the difference between self and ‘other’ 
is through the representation of them in our minds. By identifying with the ‘other’ through 
the knowledge of representation we should obtain compassion and participate in the 
sufferings of the’other’. Therefore, “It is simply and solely this compassion that is the real 
basis of all voluntary justice and genuine loving-kindness.”1151 In theory, the virtue of 
justice, born of compassion, prevents individuals from mistreating the ‘other’ and helping 
them as much as possible.1152 Consequently, “justice is, therefore, the first and 
fundamentally essential cardinal virtue.”1153 
Through this ‘essential and cardinal virtue’, we must conclude that whilst every 
individual gypsy and Expressionist artist was unique, possessing their own spiritual ideals, 
to feel that everyone else was alien and less real was at the core of Nazi egoism, which 
resulted in hatred, injustice and malice.1154 Yet, on Schopenhauer’s terms, it has been 
suggested that individuation pertains only to phenomenal appearance in time.1155 Even 
though we all exist merely in another’s representation, Schopenhauer argues that “my true 
inner being exists in every living thing as directly as it makes itself known in my self-
consciousness only to me.”1156 In order to support his belief he cites the Sanskrit formula 
“tat tvam asi (this art thou)”1157 for the expression of this knowledge. As a result of this, 
the following chapter builds upon the expression of this knowledge, and the premise that 
‘individuation is mere phenomenon or appearance’. We shall pursue this premise in 
relation to the problem of free will for Nolde living and working under National Socialism.  
 
                                                                
1151 Ibid., p.144. 
1152 Ibid., p.148. 
1153 Ibid., p.162. 
1154 Ibid. p.210. 
1155 If ‘individuation is mere phenomenon or appearance’, then C1 has been fully vindicated in this chapter. 
1156 Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright., p.210. 
1157 Ibid., p.210. 
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Chapter 6: Nolde, Nazism and the Fable of Free Will 
Introduction 
 
Vigorous individualism appears to identify modernism with the autonomy of the 
modern artist. Being able to create freely by using voluntary rhythms of the body is a 
fundamental expression of individuality and human experience. This being so, the 
painter’s craft necessitates specialised vocabularies of action through the free selection of 
specific acts relevant to that craft. Impinge upon that selection and the painter’s craft is 
compromised. That is to say, once the artist has been dispossessed of the synchronised 
coordination between their creative brain and the rhythmic movements of their 
musculature, then free artistic creation becomes redundant. If the disruption is severe 
enough, then the disconnection of the free voyage from brain to nervous system means 
that the artist becomes severed from the fundamental right to express their individuality. 
During Nazism, this disruption was severe enough, so much so that artists were subjected 
to close scrutiny and the fear of punishment. 
The fear of punishment and unwanted close scrutiny, which many artists must have 
experienced during the Nazi era, was not always exercised by authorities ‘above’ them. A 
less commonly discussed aspect in relation to this (and one which, we may speculate, 
could have been at the back of Nolde’s mind) was the fear of being denounced from 
‘below’ by one’s fellow citizens as a traitor to the Nazi regime. Whilst the participation in 
free elections was prohibited under the Nazi regime, and politics divested of genuine 
meaning beyond the totalitarian, Robert Gellately argues that, although participation in 
democratic politics was negated during the Nazi era, citizens could “articulate their 
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interests, and seek to satisfy them” through other means.1158 One of those means was to 
become an informer and denounce your fellow citizens. As Gellately states: 
In contrast to Imperial Germany and especially the Weimar Republic’s rule of law, 
citizens in Nazi Germany, had more direct access to the coercive apparatus of the 
state. Judicial procedures were ‘simplified’ and citizens could take advantage of 
unmediated access to the system. Germans could not fail to become aware, that the 
Nazi regime needed more information than the Weimar democracy it had replaced, 
and they learned that this great hunger for certain kinds of information could be 
capitalized upon for purposes of their own. Many citizens took advantage of the 
system and even sought to manipulate it ‘from below’.1159 
 
Despite the important contextual information which Gellately’s comments affords for our 
exploration of Nolde’s free will under Nazism, this chapter does not pursue an analysis of 
privately made denunciations or how citizens ‘took advantage of the system’. Instead it 
investigates the disruption to free artistic expression, the validity of C1 and the extent to 
which Nolde possessed free will whilst living under National Socialism.  
Using Schopenhauer’s doctrine of free will, it shall be shown that the moral, 
physical and intellectual problems regarding this issue involve far wider implications than 
scholars have thus far imagined. The discussion which follows does not condone Nazi 
politics, or what is now known as ‘The Holocaust’ but is rather a philosophical 
investigation as to whether Nolde possessed free will (or not) under National Socialism. 
No case is being argued for Nolde being influenced by Schopenhauer in this chapter. 
Instead, a sustained case is put forward that a debate about this artist’s life and work under 
Nazism can be informed by Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The chapter is therefore founded 
upon Schopenhauer’s essay On the Freedom of the Human Will. As a consequence, in the 
first instance we begin our explorations by outlining the structure of this essay and  
offering a brief outline of Nolde’s historical reception. Following this, we explore the 
                                                                
1158 Gellately, R., "Denunciations and Nazi Germany: New Insights and Methodological Problems," in: Historical 
Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung  Vol. 22, no. 3/4 (83) (1997). p.238. 
1159 Ibid.,p.238. 
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extent to which Nolde possessed freedom of the will in the physical sense of the term‘free‘, 
by introducing arguments for and against freedom of the will such as those of determinism 
and indeterminism.  
This chapter will also ask whether Nolde could be charged with escapism during 
his aesthetic exile in Seebüll, whilst living in the district of Nordfriesland. Despite the fact 
that his exile was a consequence of his falling out of favour with the Nazi party, he had 
been a member of this party. Since this was the case, we shall apply Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine to this issue and question the nature of moral freedom per se. In doing so, we 
raise the spectre of indoctrination, anti-Semitism and the extent of Nolde’s moral 
responsibility according to Schopenhauer’s doctrine of free will. In the final instance, we 
discuss the problem of Schopenhauer’s conceptualisation of transcendental freedom and 
what this means for an account of moral responsibility in human behaviour. 
This chapter is important because the contemporary fashion amongst some 
scholars is to criticise Nolde for his links to National Socialism and his anti-Semitic 
remarks. Much has already been written about the links between Nolde and anti-Semitism 
and it is not the purpose of this chapter to explore them in any detail.1160 The purpose of 
this chapter however is to explore C1 in relation to Nolde’s life and work under Nazism. 
If we are to achieve that on Schopenhauer’s terms, then we must ask whether Nolde was 
free to choose what he chose. This appears to be a very simple question, yet as we shall 
see it is one of the most complex questions facing any human being and has a crucial 
bearing upon creative freedom. 
                                                                
1160 Among several other authors on the issue of Nolde and anti-Semitism see: Boa, E. and Palfreyman, R., Heimat - A 
German Dream: Regional Loyalties and National Identity in German Culture 1890-1990 (OUP Oxford, 2000). p.157. 
Wistrich, R. S., Who's Who in Nazi Germany (Taylor & Francis, 2013). p.181-82. For an in depth account of Max 
Liebermann’s links to Nolde see: Deshmukh, M. F., Max Liebermann: Modern Art and Modern Germany (Taylor & 
Francis, 2017). 
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Despite this, Fulda and Aya Soika, in a joint article, feel that it is too easy to depict 
Nolde as a victim of the Nazis.1161 They suggest that “…to portray Nolde simply as a 
victim of Nazi repression does scant justice to his own efforts to serve the new regime” 
and that “in 1933, Nolde welcomed the regime change in no uncertain terms...”1162 
Similarly, Peter Vergo argues that Nolde “seems almost wilfully to have laid himself open 
to at least some of these accusations.”1163 This argument can be instantiated by a letter to 
Goebbels of 1938, in which Nolde requested the return of his confiscated pictures from 
the Nazis, and asked that the defamation of him as a ‘degenerate’ artist would stop. He 
said that after the cession of North Schleswig it would have been easy for him to have 
become a world-famous artist for political reasons, had he not placed his loyalty to 
Germany ahead of all other things and every opportunity at home and abroad to fight for 
party and country. He added that “in spite of my defamation, or because of it so much 
more, I could testify to the world historical significance of National Socialism.”1164 
Nolde’s post-war reception in West Germany was initially more laudatory. In 1949 
Paul Ortwin Rave argued that, during the Nazi era, so-called ‘degenerate’ artists such as 
Nolde had behaved as “carriers of the internal and unbroken resistance, to which we 
Germans are certainly allowed to allude.”1165 Likewise, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD, 
Social Democrats) said that since he was 16, Nolde together with Barlach, had been for 
him the greatest German artist. However, Nolde’s inclusion in the Nazi exhibition of so-
                                                                
1161 Fulda, Bernhard and Soika, Aya “Emil Nolde and the National Socialist Dictatorship” in: Peters et al.p.186. Fulda 
is one of the leading researchers into Nolde’s relationship with National Socialism. His planned publication on this 
subject entitled, Emil Nolde and National Socialism: The Construction of Artistic ‘Genius’ in the Twentieth Century has 
been delayed publication as a result of the forthcoming Nolde exhibition in 2019 (in conversation with the author).  
1162 Ibid., p.186. 
1163 Vergo, P. et al., Emil Nolde (London: Whitechapel Art Gallery, 1995). p.38. 
1164 Letter to Dr Joseph Goebbels, Berlin, 02.02.1938 reprinted in: Schmidt, D., In letzter Stunde, 1933-1945: Schriften 
deutscher Künstler des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts (Dresden: Verlag der Kunst, 1964). p.152-153. 
1165 Rave, P. O. and Schneede, U. M., Kunstdiktatur im Dritten Reich (Berlin: Argon, 1987).p.133. Cf. Bernhard Fulda 
‘Myth-making in Hitler's Shadow: The Transfiguration of Emil Nolde after 1945’ in: Rüger and Wachsmann. p.184. 
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called ‘degenerate’ art when Schmidt was 17 years old became the reason for his personal 
break with National Socialism.1166 
Christian Saehrendt also shows how “the case of Nolde provides a typical example 
of the West German phenomenon of Verdrängung (displacement), of the reluctance to 
remember individual involvement with The Third Reich.”1167 Thus, the Nolde case, when 
discussed by German scholars such as Soika, might be conceived of as vicarious self-
exoneration. That is to say, they are perhaps  making a ‘scapegoat’ of Nolde and sending 
him away from themselves as Germans into the wilderness of political vilification. If this 
transference is conceivable, then it is not unreasonable to suspect that a political agenda 
is at work in Fulda’s criticism of Nolde. We must consider therefore the possibility that 
Fulda has a political agenda which is not impartial. On the other hand, it is also true to say 
that Nolde’s supporters have also had a political agenda. For example, Fulda is quick to 
point out that the hero of Siegfried Lenz’s novel Deutschstunde1168 (German Lesson), Max 
Ludwig Nansen, was modelled on Werner Haftmann’s characterisation of Nolde in his 
biography.1169 Fulda points out that Joachim von Lepel “had previously implored 
Haftmann to leave out any mention of Nolde’s party membership in his book; a request to 
which Haftmann eventually acceded.”1170 However, before we explore the complexities 
of  Nolde’s critical reception any further, let us note how Schopenhauer deals with the 
complexities of free will in his 1839 essay On The Freedom of the Will (Über die Freiheit 
des Menschlichen Willens). 
 
 
                                                                
1166 Helmut Schmidt to Siegfried Fenz, 12.12.1968, in: Archiv Helmut Schmidt (Hamburg), HS Privat Politisch - 1968 
- A-Z, lfd. Nr. 47. 
1167 Weikop, C., New Perspectives on Brücke Expressionism: Bridging History (Ashgate, 2011). p.223 
1168 Lenz, S., Kaiser, E., and Wilkins, E., The German lesson : [a novel] (London: Macdonald, 1971). 
1169 Haftmann, W. and Ada und Emil Nolde Stiftung Seebüll, Emil Nolde (Köln: M. DuMont, Schauberg, 1958). During 
1935 Haftmann produced articles for the journal Kunst der Nation which published volume 1 in November 1933, and 
volume 3 in February 1935. In 1935 the Nazis prohibited the journal from appearing so only 3 volumes were published. 
1170 Rüger and Wachsmann.p.186. Joachim von Lepel (1913-1962) was the Director of the Emil Nolde Foundation and 
so it was in his interests to defend Nolde’s reputation. 
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6.1 Schopenhauer’s Prize Essay the Freedom of the Will  
 
 
Schopenhauer entered this essay for a competition generated by the Royal 
Norwegian Society of Sciences in 1837. The question set for the competition was, “Can 
the freedom of the human will be demonstrated from self-consciousness?”1171 
Schopenhauer replied according to his metaphysics of the will from his major work The 
World as Will and Representation. In this competition essay, he never deviates from his 
belief that all human actions, every event, every state of affairs are ‘determined’ by 
“antecedent events and states of affairs.”1172 Nevertheless, there are numerous counter-
arguments which oppose Schopenhauer’s doctrine, such as those of indeterminism - the 
belief that some events are not necessarily determined by antecedent causes.1173 It is 
probably from an indeterminist’s position that Vergo, Fulda, Soika and others interpret 
Nolde’s early sympathy towards Nazism.  
The structure of the Prize Essay is divided into five sections. Section 1 outlines the 
central concepts pertaining to the Society’s competition question. Section 2 of the essay 
states that it is not possible to answer this question in the affirmative. That is to say that it 
is not possible to establish that we have free will through self-consciousness. Section 3 of 
the essay broadens out the argument by resorting to an alternative foundation for free will 
through the consciousness of other objects. However, Schopenhauer says that free will 
cannot be proven through the consciousness of other objects either. In section 4 he 
discusses his intellectual predecessors in theology and philosophy who argued that we do 
not have freedom of the will and finally in section 5, in what appears to be  a studied volte-
face, Schopenhauer suggests that we must turn to the problem of moral responsibility in 
                                                                
1171 Zöller. p.3. 
1172 Mautner.p.154. 
1173 Ibid., p.300. 
- 320 - 
 
order to prove that we possess freedom of the will.1174 Yet, as we shall see in this chapter, 
during our continued explorations of C1, in doing so Schopenhauer presents an 
unconvincing account whereby he argues that we have free will as something which arises 
from our ‘intelligible character’.1175 
Schopenhauer emphasises that the concept of freedom is 'negative’ - since by 
freedom we understand it to mean the absence of physical hindrances. Physical freedom 
is usually applied to sentient beings, where the “characteristic of animals is that their 
movements proceed from their will, are voluntary, and consequently are called free when 
no material obstacle makes this impossible.”1176 If this is the case, then for Nolde to be 
described as ‘free’ under National Socialism, it would have to be proven that no material 
obstacle made this impossible. This is important, since German Expressionists imagined 
themselves to be free thinkers and “understood themselves as attempting to free art from 
the alienation of representation.”1177 
In contrast to ‘free thinkers’ of his own era, Schopenhauer adopted a determinist’s 
view, which argues that everything which happens does so according to laws of absolute 
necessity - that is to say, the “necessary is that which follows from a given sufficient 
ground.”1178 By antithesis, indeterminists take the view that “if we accept freedom as a 
fact, we are bound to consider whether at least a certain measure of physical indeterminism 
may not also be a fact.”1179 However, Schopenhauer opposes physical indeterminism by 
counterarguing that “the two lowest senses, smell and taste, are not free from a direct 
stimulation of the will; thus they are-- always agreeably or disagreeably affected, and so 
                                                                
1174 For an overview of Schopenhauer’s essay, and which I am indebted to here, see: Zöller. 
1175 Zöller rightly points out this means that “the freedom of the will can be maintained although not explained or 
understood.” Ibid., p.xii. 
1176 Ibid. p.3. 
1177 Nirenberg, D., Aesthetic Theology and Its Enemies: Judaism in Christian Painting, Poetry, and Politics (Brandeis 
University Press, 2015). p.76. 
1178 Zöller. p.6. 
1179 Lillie, R. S., "Physical Indeterminism and Vital Action," in: Science  Vol. 66, no. 1702 (1927). p.140. 
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are more subjective than objective.”1180 He therefore rejected contemporary exponents of 
indeterminism.1181 From his position, hindrances to physical freedom always obstruct the 
will. Thus, we may infer that prior to the Nazi era, Nolde possessed sufficient physical 
freedom to paint images such as Nudes and Eunuch of 1912 (fig. 132), or indeed any 
image he chose. Yet as we shall see later on in this chapter, following the Munich 
‘Degenerate Art’ exhibition of 1937, Nolde lacked the same physical freedom of will.  
Freedom of bodily movement in artistic production implicates metaphysical 
and socio-political dynamics relevant to the human will. If creative ideas and feelings 
are normally expressed by the free flow of bodily movements, then they are rendered 
visible through aesthetic gestures. Since the art of the painter is a dynamic one, it 
loses that dynamism when subjected to the inspection of tyranny. The free use of the 
artist’s body as a manifestation of free will therefore reveals several things. It reveals the 
striving after an effect or a state of mind, just as the shapes and rhythms objectified in their 
work permit the artist to manifest certain attitudes, moods and their own character. None 
of these factors can be attained to in a work of art without freedom of will and bodily 
movement. Therefore, free will - and free bodily movements ensuing from it - are 
indispensable to the presentation of genuine art. 
To bring this into sharper focus Schopenhauer states that: with the “…physical 
meaning of the concept of freedom, animals and human beings are called free when neither 
chains, dungeon, nor paralysis, and thus generally no physical, material obstacle impedes 
their actions, but these occur in accordance with their will.”1182 Such a physical meaning 
is the most ‘original’ ‘immediate’ and frequent use of the concept. Similarly, from a 
political perspective, a people is termed free when governed by self-instituted laws and 
                                                                
1180 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.2, p.27. 
1181 Schopenhauer, A. and Kolenda, K., Essay on the Freedom of the Will (Dover Publications, 2012). p.xii. 
1182 Zöller. p.4. 
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“obeys only its own will.”1183 As a result, political freedom comes under the category of 
physical freedom. 
 
6.2 Physical Freedom, Determinism and Nolde’s Artistic Practice 
 
 
Nolde’s political and physical freedom certainly came under pressure from 1933 
onwards when he was asked to ‘voluntarily’ resign from the Akademie der Künste by the 
Nazis - which he refused to do.1184 Through the sheer force of Nazi will, and arguably an 
instance of C1, the Akademie der Künste faced mounting pressure from the Ministry of 
Education to comply with its demands that ‘unacceptable’ artists be removed from office. 
Three members of the Akademie did comply with the Ministry’s call for their resignation 
– notably Paul Mebes, Otto Dix and Schmidt-Rottluff. However, the majority stood their 
ground and refused to comply - thus temporarily maintaining their physical freedom.  
A little later in 1936, Nolde’s exhibition at the Galerie Ferdinand Moeller in Berlin 
was shut down, then re-opened again, simply because Nolde was far from willing to 
compromise in affairs of art or change his style.1185 In the same year, came the news that 
his autobiography Welt und Heimat was forbidden publication– yet another blow to his 
freedom of expression.1186 Perhaps the only expressive acts of Nolde’s which could have 
aroused the Nazis’ displeasure were the figurative oil paintings of 1936, Woman with 
Auburn Hair (fig. 133) and L. and I. The Sisters (fig. 134).  In the same year, Goebbels 
                                                                
1183 Ibid., p.4. 
1184 Urban, M., Nolde, E., and Parsons, G., Emil Nolde: Catalogue Raisonné of the Oil-Paintings: Volume Two, 1915-
1951 (London: Philip Wilson for Sotheby's Publications, 1990). p.25. 
1185 Brenner, H., Die Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1963). p.70. Nolde, E., 
Osterwold, T., and Knubben, T., Emil Nolde: Unpainted Pictures: Watercolours 1938 - 1945 from the collection of the 
Nolde-Stiftung Seebüll (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2000). p.8. 
1186 Urban, Nolde, and Parsons. p.26. 
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had issued his ‘Ban on Art Criticism’, which significantly eroded the freedom of 
Germany’s modernist movement.1187 
With the gradual erosion of Nolde’s physical freedom it may be wondered if he 
was constrained from acting freely by motives such as threats from his political situation, 
or hopes and fears.1188 To this Schopenhauer would reply that a physical obstacle might 
exceed the powers of a human being, but a motive is never irresistible per se, nor does it 
possess complete power since it might be overthrown by a more powerful counter motive, 
if it existed and the individual’s situation was determined by it.1189 
In terms of motivating events, ‘hard determinism’ would argue that all events in 
Nolde’s life were pre-determined because they followed specific antecedents, or an 
accumulation of antecedent causes. If an indeterminist would argue that no events in 
Nolde’s life were pre-determined, then a determinist would find this untenable since “it 
would involve the denial of any regular sequence whatsoever...”1190 However, an 
indeterminist might respond that Nolde’s art signified humanity’s free will through its 
very (at times) uncertain pictorial construction. Indeed, when writing for Der Sturm in 
1912, Paul Ferdinand Schmidt suggested that what Pechstein, Jean Puy, Maurice de 
Vlaminck  and Auguste Herbin had in common with Nolde was a manifestation of 
uncertainty.1191 Moreover Worringer had argued, for those who knew their heritage, how 
Germans had an “inborn sensual instinctive uncertainty.”1192 Yet on the other hand,  more 
                                                                
1187 In the first instance published as “Anordnung des Reichsministers für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda über 
Kunstkritik vom 27. II. 1936," for Völkischer Beobachter, 28.11.1936. Cf. Wulf, J., Die bildenden Künste im Dritten 
Reich : eine Dokumentation (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1983). p. 119-20. 
1188 Zöller. p.34. 
1189 Ibid., p.35. 
1190 Dotterer, R. H., "Indeterminisms," in: Philosophy of Science  Vol. 5, no. 1 (1938). p.62. 
1191 Paul Ferdinand Schmidt, "Die Expressionisten," in: Walden. Der Sturm 2, no. 92, January 1912, p.735. 
1192 Wilhelm Worringer, "Entwicklungsgeschichtliches zur modernsten Kunst," Im Kampf um die Kunst: Die Antwort 
auf den "Protest deutscher Kunstler" in: ibid., Der Sturm 2, no.75, (August 1911), p.598. 
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recent critics such as Andrew Graham Dixon propose that sometimes Nolde used a 
“determined, wilful application of a Fauve palette to Turnerian subject matter.”1193  
This tension between determinism and indeterminism is significant, because by 
1927 Werner Karl Heisenberg’s ‘Uncertainty Principle’ had begun to undermine the 
“predetermined future of strict causality,” 1194 thus leading scientists to relinquish their 
moral opposition to the possibility of free-will.1195 As Joshua C. Gregory points out, by 
1931 scientists such as Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington came to believe that it was a 
“gratuitous complication to presume determinism in the mental when there is 
indeterminism in the physical.”1196 Consequently, by 1935 Eddington would claim that 
science had opened the “door of human freedom by expelling determinism from physics, 
but only slightly.”1197 However, if an indeterminist would continue to argue that Nolde 
possessed free will, then we should do well to heed Gregory who suggests that:  
A capricious indeterminism involves neither the freedom we want nor the free will 
we think we have. Free will may be only a name for ‘unconscious determinism’ - 
a determination which seems to be freedom because it is not felt.1198 
 
Whether one believes in an ‘unconscious determinism’ or not, we can resolve in a more 
abstract way the problem as to whether or not Nolde’s will per se was free. This might be 
achieved by conceptualising freedom as the absence of necessity, where the concept 
                                                                
1193 Dixon. 
1194 Gregory, J. C., "Indeterminism and the Wish," in: Science Progress Vol. 36, no. 144 (1948). p.606. 
1195 The relevance of Heisenberg may on the one hand be due to the possibility that many people are interested in whether 
indeterminism is required for free will - and that that is a question the answer to which does not depend upon whether 
the world is actually deterministic or not. But on the other hand, the ‘Uncertainty Principle’ does not tell us anything 
about how macro-systems like human brains work. Plenty of macro systems would seem to be deterministic, or at least 
close enough to deterministic as to make the absolutely miniscule chances of something else happening irrelevant. Thus, 
one could detonate a bomb on an aircraft and everybody would definitely die – and in that sense perhaps, human 
decisions are more like that than like the behaviour of small numbers of subatomic particles. However, the success of 
quantum mechanics - and therefore Heisenberg’s ‘Uncertainty Principle’ - has made a big difference to the debate. That 
is to say, prior to Quantum Mechanics, philosophers basically either thought (a) the universe was deterministic (and so 
either free will is compatible with determinism, or else there is no free will), or (b) since free will obviously exists, then 
it must be that somehow the will lies outside the domain of physical description since such physical description will 
always be deterministic. (I am very grateful to Professor Helen Beebee for her guidance in this matter).  
1196 Gregory., p.606. 
1197 Ibid., p.606. 
1198 Ibid., p.607. 
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of freedom keeps its negative sense as mentioned above.1199 If we use the concept of 
necessity as that which ensues from a given sufficient ground, then there was always 
a sufficient ground for any event in Nolde’s life. Yet, if an indeterminist were to press 
for an absence of necessity in Nolde’s decision making (and in the use of his body), then 
this would be illogical. According to Schopenhauer it would be illogical because: 
A free will would therefore be one that was not determined by grounds; and since 
everything determining something else must be a ground - a real ground, i.e., a 
cause, in the case of real things - a free will would be one that was determined 
by nothing at all.1200 
 
If this was possible, then there would be no determinable grounds for explaining Nolde’s 
acts of will, or as Schopenhauer puts it, all human beings would be left without “even a 
terminus technicus for this concept; it is liberum arbitrium indifferentiae.”1201 Therefore, 
from this standpoint, Nolde did not possess freedom of will to use his body without 
hindrance, especially during the reign of National Socialism.  
As mentioned above, Nolde experienced more hindrance to his bodily freedom 
following the ‘Degenerate Art’ exhibition of 1937 since “no one occupied the officials 
more.”1202 In fact, by 1940 the State Security Police went so far as to request that Berlin’s 
Academy of Arts provide details about his biological ancestry.1203 Throughout that year 
Nolde produced twenty-one oil paintings, the majority of which were of flowers and buildings. 
However, in his depictions of the human body he does appear to have manifested a certain 
will to resist. This might be seen in Veterans of 1940 (fig. 135) which depicts two male figures 
clothed in what appears to be medieval costume. This could easily have been perceived (if the 
                                                                
1199 See also: Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.287. 
1200 Zöller., p.8. 
1201 Ibid., p.8. The Latin phrase ‘liberum arbitrium indifferentiae’ means ‘free choice of indifference’ which is a possible 
concept for an absolutely unconditioned will. 
1202 Vergo et al. p.57. 
1203 Ibid., p.57. 
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authorities wished) as undermining Germany’s veterans of the Great War given their ‘rustic’ 
and unflattering appearance.  
A work like Veterans ran the risk of flouting Nazi art regulations, the defining 
parameters of which were impactful. Fehr gives details of the law regarding ‘inferior’ 
works of art by referring to Section 2, Paragraph 1, of the ‘Order Regarding the 
Distribution of Inferior Art Products’.1204 This section stated that: “Acceptance into a 
Chamber can be denied, or a member can be excluded, in the event that there is evidence 
that the person in question does not possess the necessary reliability and suitability to 
practice their activity.”1205 Therefore, paintings such as Joy of Dancing of 1940 (fig. 136) 
flouted the restrictions imposed by the Nazi system. The most likely reason in this case being 
that Nolde had ‘freely chosen’ to paint figures which appear as dwarf-like and unnatural. 
Within the defining parameters laid down by the Nazi Party, more threats to Nolde’s 
physical freedom occurred in 1940, when he was compelled to give all of his work for that 
year to the Reich Chamber for the Visual Arts. As Petropoulos has shown, of around forty-
eight works submitted to the Reich many were never seen again. Additionally, Nolde’s 
freedom was threatened by a surveillance report of 25.08.1941, issued from the offices of 
Security Services Director Reinhard Heydrich. Heydrich was prompted by this report to 
declare that “the notorious art Bolshevist and leader of degenerate art, Emil Nolde, submitted 
a tax declaration for 1940 for the sum of RM 80,000 ($32,000).”1206 Thus, it is undeniable 
that Nolde must have felt the effects of this upon his freedom of will. Petropoulos recognises 
this and how “the direct involvement of the head of the Reich Security Main Office signalled 
the decision to ratchet up the pressure on the artist.”1207 The effect of this pressure resulted 
                                                                
1204 See: Völkischer Beobachter nr. 288, p.9, Vol. 9. 0 9.10.1940. 
1205 ,  Reichsgesetzblatt. Teil 1, Berlin, 1933).Part 1, p.797. 
1206 Petropoulos. p.168. Although this was a significant figure under the circumstances of war Petropoulos urges caution with 
regards to this figure. 
1207 Ibid., p.168. 
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in over 1,000 of Nolde’s works being confiscated from various sources. Indeed, we have 
noted in the previous chapter that this was a similar fate which awaited Mueller’s works 
and many others. 
A little while later on 23.08.1941 Ziegler, as president of the Reichskunstkammer, 
wrote to Nolde informing him that he was forbidden to practice in the visual arts due to his 
lack of ‘reliability’, formally ending his creative free will.1208 However, as Saehrendt and 
James van Dyke show, the prohibition on Nolde’s artistic practice by the Reichskammer 
der Bildenden Künste (Reich Chamber for Visual Arts) was only actioned after Heydrich, 
as leader of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD),1209 had heard about Nolde’s tax returns.1210 
Furthermore, as van Dyke argues, despite the NSDAP1211 radicals being able to impose 
their will on Germany’s  public institutions of culture, and “to define the terms of debate 
and description between 1930 and 1938,”1212 the acts of private collectors were not easy 
to supress.  
The Führer’s aesthetic will defined the terms of debate in the arts so as to promote 
a culture of responsibility towards Volk and State.1213  Fehr believes that these terms must 
have been well-known to Nolde because they were set out in the Führer’s speech at the 
opening of the ‘Great German Art Exhibition’ in Munich.1214 However, as Petropoulos has 
stated, Ziegler’s letter “…was indeed more extreme than the ban on exhibitions 
(Ausstellungsverbot) or professional activity (Berufsverbot), and effectively served as a ban 
on painting.”1215 Nolde’s reaction was to ask Fehr if this should mean the end of artistic 
                                                                
1208 Interestingly, Nolde never mentions the ‘ban’ in his letters. 
1209 Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS (Security Service of the Reichsführer-SS). 
1210 van Dyke, J., "Something New on Nolde, National Socialism, and the SS," in: Kunstchronik: Monatsschrift für 
Kunstwissenschaft Museumswesen und Denkmalplege  Vol. 65. 2012, p.267. 
1211 NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers’ Party) (abbreviated to 
the ‘Nazi Party’). 
1212 van Dyke. p.267. 
1213 The problem of what moral responsibility entails in Schopenhauer’s terms will be discussed in detail towards the 
latter part of this chapter. 
1214 Fehr and Smargiassi. p.126. 
1215 Petropoulos. p.168. 
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life, perhaps revealing that not only was his physical and moral freedom of will threatened, 
but also his intellectual freedom.1216 He would write to Fehr on 04.04.1942 in deep 
depression saying that from free artistic people they had been reduced to beggars, begging 
for a little favour and some understanding. He stressed that he was not ‘unreliable’, 
decadent or ‘degenerate’, being an artist who had striven for his art and for everything 
beautiful and noble which he could give to the German people, whilst he had also striven 
against external controls and being told what to think.1217 
Despite Nolde’s protestations, Ziegler prevented him from selling his pictures and 
practising as an artist; a ban which was also applied to Schmidt-Rottluff. At the time of 
the ban, Nolde said that he was “right in the middle of the most wonderful productive 
painting. The brushes slipped out of my hand.”1218 The tension of not knowing what he 
could or could not do led him to comment that “with a sword hanging over my head, I was 
deprived of mobility and liberty.”1219 During that year of 1941 he only managed to produce 
three oil paintings of flowers, Gladioli of 1941 (fig. 137), Gladioli and Coleus of 1941 
(fig. 138) and Sunflowers and White Dahlias of 1941 (fig. 139), which signifies the effects 
of the political situation upon his artistic free will.1220 One year later, in the latter part of 
December 1942, a draft letter from Ada Nolde to Otto von Kursell reported the effect upon 
Nolde’s freedom.1221 She said that, “for one and a half years my husband has been banned 
from parting with his paintings, from exhibiting, and from painting new ones.”1222 These 
                                                                
1216 Fehr and Smargiassi. p.127. 
1217 Ibid., p.130. 
1218 Nolde, E., Reisen Ächtung Befreiung: 1919 - 1946 (Köln: DuMont, 1978). p.125. 
1219 Ibid. 
1220 This Schopenhauerian interpretation might be contrasted with Max Sauerlandt’s 1921 monograph on Nolde. It would 
appear, since Sauerlandt wrote “that his development . . . has been achieved completely independent of the external 
events of his life, existing at first in a subterranean state, in the subconscious, until the inhibiting barrier falls away and 
the mysterious accumulated energy breaks through to the surface in a full, broad stream of creativity.” See: Bradley, W. 
S., Emil Nolde and German Expressionism: A Prophet In His Own Land (Ann Arbor, Mich: UMI Research Press, 1986). 
p.113. 
1221 Otto von Kursell was director of the State University of Fine Arts in Berlin-Charlottenburg and Senator of the 
Prussian Academy of Arts . He was also a member of the NSDAP from 1922. 
1222 Undated letter from Ada Nolde to Peter Thomas (late December 1942), in ANS. 
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effects would continue into 1944, when Ada drafted a letter to von Kursell, claiming that 
her husband was “sitting with bound hands and dishonoured in his beloved Germany.”1223  
In spite of his ban, Nolde managed to paint using watercolours creating what have 
become known as his ‘unpainted pictures’. He used watercolours in an effort to avoid the 
olfactory traces which oil paints leave behind in order to avoid detection by the Gestapo. 
After the war, Nolde referred to the ordeal of being policed by the Gestapo saying that he: 
…lived under the surveillance of the Gestapo. I do not know how extensive 
this surveillance of mine was, but as an artist I was struggling constantly 
under this fateful pressure and they came repeatedly to control me.1224 
 
Regardless of the pressure, Nolde produced more than 1,300 of these watercolours on 
small pieces of rice paper in a semi-secret room at his home in Seebüll.1225 In van Dyke’s 
opinion they could be read “as documents of persecution and resistance.”1226 This may or 
may not be so, yet we must qualify this statement through Schopenhauer and assert that 
this heroic act of resistance was subject to the determining laws of causality. Indeed, the 
same laws of causality must apply to Rave’s heroising statement that ‘degenerate’ artists 
were always at risk where the police were concerned while they remained faithful to their 
artistic calling during aesthetic exile.1227 
 
6.3  Imaginary Representations:  Expressionism as Pseudo-Profundity and Escapism 
 
 
In an attempt to escape these controls of the police, it seems as if Nolde retreated 
into a world of dreamlike reverie. In early December 1941, whilst in aesthetic exile, Nolde 
wrote that during the nights he wandered through magnificent landscapes of the 
                                                                
1223 Draft letter from Ada Nolde to Otto von Kursell, 10.02.1944, annotated by Emil Nolde, in ANS. 
1224 Letter Nolde to Feldenkirchen, 08.09.1945, in ANS. 
1225 Vergo et al. p.169.  
1226 James A. van Dyke ‘Something New on Nolde, National Socialism, and the SS’, in: van Dyke. p.266. 
1227 Rave, P. O., Kunstdiktatur im Dritten Reich (Hamburg: Mann, 1949). p.133. 
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imagination, full of wonders and splendours.1228 As a result, the imaginative use of his 
homeland acted as a determining ground for a personal attempt to find aesthetic freedoms 
of any sort whilst under duress.1229 Two years later, on 08.08.1943, Nolde recorded how 
his excursions into dreamlike fantasy stood outside of detached knowledge, feeling that 
these regions stood for a “profound and carefree spiritual experience.”1230  
About this, Manfred Reuther suggests that Nolde’s intimate visions were matched 
by the artist’s selection of small palm sized paper often roughly trimmed.1231 This intimacy 
of vision is registered in most of the watercolours dating from 1938-1945, as in Blue 
Couple (in profile) in Sidelight, (fig. 140) and Red-Bearded Treeman (fig. 141). The 
former image has an ethereal dream-like quality taken from the world of imaginary 
representations. The purples and blues have been applied with a full brush saturating the 
paper to give an hallucinatory depth. The latter image shares in the dream-like quality of 
imaginary representations often used to illustrate a children’s folk tales.  
Thinking about and filtering these works through Marc’s claims may at first sight 
appear problematic. On the one hand, they appear to be testimonials of Nolde’s 
representational power, and arguably possess something detached from the will, tempting 
us to refute C1. On the other hand, the realisation that the images were the compelling 
effects of external motives acting upon his will arguably resolves the problem. That is to 
say, even though his imaginary representations could be regarded as the product of his 
stubborn will to create, and as such validate C1, they were still determined by external 
motives and were not indifferently free acts. Therefore, it may be possible to reconcile C1 
and his use of imaginary representations in this way. 
                                                                
1228 Nolde, E. et al., Emil Nolde: Mein Wunderland von Meer zu Meer (Emil Nolde: My Wonderland from Sea to Sea) 
(Köln 
Seebüll: DuMont Nolde Stiftung, 2008). p.12. 
1229 Ibid., p.12-13. 
1230 Nolde quoted and translated by Reuther in: Nolde, Osterwold, and Knubben; ibid., p.10. 
1231 Ibid., p.10. 
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This is important because Nolde’s retreat into the world of the imagination was 
promoted by aesthetic solitude and perhaps deluded him into believing that he retained 
some vestiges of freedom from Nazi tyranny. On the power of imagination Schopenhauer 
says that the faculty of imagination possesses greater activity when fewer external 
perceptions are introduced through the sensory organs. Thus, lengthy intervals of solitary 
confinement in jail, overriding quiet, crepuscular light or calignosity assist its activity, and 
so without invitation it begins to perform.1232 
If the faculty of imagination is to be useful, it needs materials from the external 
world from which to draw inspiration. Schopenhauer makes a parallel between “the 
nourishment of the imagination as with that of the body… to which the body is indebted 
for all the power which it afterwards manifests at the proper time.”1233 Since Nolde was 
forced to retreat into the world of imaginary representations, we may suggest through 
Schopenhauer, that the faculty of imagination extended the artist’s horizons beyond the 
realities of his own personal experience. A powerful imagination is both a condition and 
co-traveller of genius, although a powerful imagination in itself “is not evidence of genius; 
on the contrary, even men with little or no touch of genius may have much 
imagination.”1234 Whether one believes that Nolde was a ‘genius’ or not is open to 
personal judgement, yet he thought that his desire for artistic progress and its 
representational potential extended into the uttermost primeval areas, whether in reality or 
fantasy.1235  
Nolde’s attempt to find freedom may be interpreted as an over- identification with 
the world of fantasy and the representational stuff of dreams - or even as a form of 
                                                                
1232 Schopenhauer and Hübscher.Vol.3, p.137. 
1233 Ibid., Vol.3, p.138. 
1234 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.187. 
1235 Nolde et al. p.13. 
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escapism. Indeed, Schopenhauer suggests that human experience has a kinship to the 
world of dreams and may be classified along with them.1236 However, Bart Vandenabeele 
finds this a wearisome kinship because Schopenhauer “regularly identifies the world as 
representation with a dream, which seems to lead him to precisely the kind of (Fichtean) 
idealism he absolutely wanted to avoid.”1237 This is a reasonable objection since 
Schopenhauer does state that life and dreams can be considered as leaves from one and 
the same book. 1238Yet, Schopenhauer’s statement is also reasonable since there can be no 
logical refutation of any presupposition that all of life is but a dream.1239 In order to support 
such a view Bertrand Russell observed how “there is no logical impossibility in the 
supposition that the whole of life is a dream, in which we ourselves create all the objects 
that come before us.”1240  
Although a powerful imagination is no guarantor for genius, Nolde could ponder 
an object either objectively, as would a ‘genius’, by apprehending the Idea of the object, 
or via the commonest way through the principle of sufficient reason and its relations to 
his own will.1241 Similarly, Nolde could have perceived an imaginary object in the 
following two ways. In the first instance it would have been an instrument to knowledge 
of the Idea, the message of which belongs to the work of art. In the second instance 
Schopenhauer says that: 
…the imaginary object is used to build castles in the air, congenial to selfishness 
and to one's own whim, which for the moment delude and delight…The man who 
indulges in this game is a dreamer; he will easily mingle with reality the pictures 
that delight his solitude, and will thus become unfit for real life.1242 
 
 
                                                                
1236 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.4. 
1237 Vandenabeele, B., "Schopenhauer on Sense Perception and Aesthetic Cognition," in: The Journal of Aesthetic 
Education  Vol. 45, no. 1 (2011). p.40. 
1238 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.18. 
1239 Vandenabeele, "Schopenhauer on Sense Perception and Aesthetic Cognition." p.55. 
1240 Russell, B., The Problems of Philosophy : Bertrand Russell (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).10. 
1241 Nolde could also perceive imaginary objects in these antithetical ways. 
1242 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.187. 
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The notion of building ‘castles in the air’ possesses overtones of escapism, not only for 
Nolde but also for Expressionism. In the 1930s, the philosopher Ernst Bloch pointed out 
how Lukács had drawn attention to the escapist ideology of Expressionism. He also 
pointed out how in the essay ‘Realism in the Balance’, Lukács was persuaded that the 
Expressionists lacked an aesthetic grip on reality.1243 In addition, Lukács argued that the 
Expressionists conferred “a pseudo-profundity and pseudo-perfection on immediate 
experience.”1244  
Through such pseudo-profundity, Lukács suggested that Expressionism had 
developed into a “mystical irrationalism.”1245 Indeed, critics who had pinned a ‘pseudo-
profundity’ onto Expressionism may have remembered Conrad Felixmüller’s comment of 
1918, that artists of his day could not gauge to what extent their new art was romantic 
escapism.1246 It is possible then that Nolde withdrew into a world of ‘mystical 
irrationalism’ in a vain attempt to exercise his perceived free will. In fact, Erich Bronner 
argues that, when it came to a “mystical irrationalism, the reliance on instinct, the attempt 
to merge with the dynamic force that supposedly sways nature and man - Nolde still 
believed it all.”1247  
                                                                
1243 Ernst Bloch ‘Discussing Expressionism’ in: Bloch, E., Aesthetics and Politics (London: NLB, 1977). p.19. Bloch 
was familiar with Schopenhauer's work, yet one may not find any specific interest in the concept of the ‘will’ in his 
work. He is interested in the epistemological treatment concept of hope and, as a Marxist, was sensitive to the influence 
of economic, social, and political influences on the development of human consciousness. By the time he came to write 
The Principle of Hope (1938-47, revised 1953 & 1959) he had consigned Schopenhauer to the origins of reactionary 
philosophy which had fed into National Socialism; as he put it in this work: “Feuerbach lies ... on the salvation-line 
which leads from Hegel to Marx, just as the German disaster-line leads from Schopenhauer to Nietzsche and the 
consequences.” See: Bloch, Ernst. The Principle of Hope (in Translation of: Das Prinzip Hoffnung.). Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1996 3 vols. p. 274). His work on Expressionism can be found in: Bloch, Ernst. Heritage of Our Times [in 
English]. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, is useful as is his work on display and the body in The Principle 
of Hope. (I am grateful to Dr. Vincent Geoghegan for his advice on the above). 
1244 Georg Lukács ‘Realism in the Balance’ in: ibid., p.51. 
1245 Lukács, G., Livingstone, R., and Fernbach, D., Essays on Realism, [English-language ed.] ed. (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1980). p.81. 
1246 Conrad Felixmüller,"Zur Kunst” in: Felixmüller, C., "Zur Kunst " in: Die Schöne Rarität   (1917). 
1247 Bronner, S. E., Modernism at the Barricades: Aesthetics, Politics, Utopia (Columbia University Press, 2012). p.90. 
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Extending this notion still further, Robert Ellis considers that the ‘irrationalism’ of 
Nolde and Expressionism was at home on the far Right of politics.1248 This line of 
argument mirrors the oft cited debate between Lukács and Bloch over Expressionism’s 
political integrity. During the mid-1930s, Lukács had argued that “Expressionism is 
grounded in an irrationalist mythology. Its creative style tends towards that of an 
emotive, rhetorical, vacuous manifesto, a declamatory pseudo-activism…”1249 If this 
was so, then in terms of political free will, should we agree with Lukács that 
Expressionists were not only unable to exercise that free will, but were pressed 
into serving the visual language of Fascism? Indeed, on the topic of 
Expressionism’s intellectual freedom Lukács stated that:  
… since they were unable to free themselves intellectually from an imperialist 
parasitism, and since they colluded in the ideological decay of the imperialist 
bourgeoisie without offering either criticism or resistance…their creative 
method could without distortion be pressed into the service of that synthesis of 
decadence and atavism which is the demagogy of Fascism.1250  
 
On the one hand, given Fascism’s aversion to Expressionism and its curtailment of Nolde’s 
freedom for the sake of völkisch thought, we must disagree with Lukács’ generalisations. 
In fact, Bloch criticized Lukács for tarring Expressionism and Fascism with the same 
philosophical brush, pointing out that Lukács never mentioned any Expressionist 
painters such as Nolde in his essay.1251 On the other hand, William S. Bradley argues 
that the most perspicacious of Nolde’s supporters did not comprehend the indebtedness of 
                                                                
1248 Ellis, R., Ernst Toller and German Society: Intellectuals as Leaders and Critics, 1914–1939 (Fairleigh Dickinson 
University Press, 2013). p.78. 
1249 Bloch. p.17. 
1250 Ibid., p.17. 
1251 In fact, as Richard Sheppard argues, before late 1911 Lukács “had no contact with, let alone knowledge of the 
embryonic avant-garde circles in Berlin.” See: Sheppard, R., Georg Lukács, Wilhelm Worringer and German 
Expressionism (Chalfont St Giles: Alpha Academic, 1995). p.246. Nor did Lukács have knowledge of Der Sturm, Die 
Aktion and the Neue Club which produced four Neopathetische Cabarets whilst he was in Berlin. Sheppard’s research 
concludes that Lukács’ Heidelberger Asthetik (Heidelberg Aesthetics) written between 1916-18, “clinches the argument 
about Lukács relationship to Expressionism. Throughout its 220 pages, he never once mentions an Expressionist writer, 
painter or aesthetician…” Ibid., p.246. Therefore, we are not obliged to regard Lukács relationship to Expressionist art as 
an authoritative one. 
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his art to völkisch thinking.1252 Yet, he also concludes that Nolde’s bid to reconcile his art 
with the Nazis’ cultural politics cannot be entirely excused. 
 
6.4 Nolde, Free Will and Membership of the Nazi Party 
 
 
With the above in mind, we need to approach the problem of Nolde’s freedom of 
will per se by exploring: i) Nolde’s relationship to National Socialism according to 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of free will, ii) the extent to which the will in itself is free, and 
iii) the freedom of willing per se. Perhaps Nolde’s early political remarks offer us a clue 
as to what motivated his will towards National Socialism in the first place. For example, 
it is known that in 1919 he was unhappy with border disputes between Germany and 
Denmark. He had written to Fehr in February of how “the newspapers bring rather disturbing 
news from Schleswig. It hurts me so that the land where I was born, my Heimat, should be torn 
through the middle.”1253  
Nolde was born close to the village of Nolde within the Prussian Duchy of 
Schleswig with the birth name of Emil Hansen, converting it to Emil Nolde in 1902. 
Following a referendum on 10.02.1920, the village became part of Burkal in Southern 
Jutland in Denmark. He was living in Utenwarf at that time so he officially became a 
Dane.1254 He was to claim that “we did not like the exaggerated political and petty-minded 
border matter ... We loved our land just the way it was.”1255 Subsequently, it seems as if 
Nolde could never accept these border disputes and the necessary shifts in national 
identity.1256  
                                                                
1252 Bradley, W. S., Emil Nolde and German Expressionism: A Prophet in his own Land (Ann Arbor, Mich: UMI 
Research Press, 1981). p.116. 
1253 Petropoulos. p.158. 
1254 Nolde et al. 
1255 Nolde. p.36 
1256 On this see: "Politics and Paint," Financial Times, 16/12/1995. 
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Petropoulos argues that the threat to Nolde’s Heimat motivated him to join the Danish 
branch of the Nazi Party in 1920, which has since been proven to be an incorrect date.1257 
The same incorrect date is also given by Barron and Peter Selz.1258 However, Vergo 
questions whether Nolde sympathised or communicated with the Nazi Party in the 1920s, 
especially since the artist’s political motives were ambivalent. This can be attested to by 
the fact that in 1919, Nolde was prepared to sign the left-wing Arbeitsrat für Kunst 
(Workers’ Council for Art) manifesto. Consequently, Vergo surmises that although Nolde 
was a Danish citizen, it was unlikely that he would have been motivated to join the Danish 
Nazi Party 
Further questions have been raised regarding Nolde’s membership of the Nazi 
Party. Monika Hecker lists two incorrect ‘facts’ which are often cited against Nolde. She 
says these are often based on a misreporting of the regional politics and history of North 
Schleswig.1259 This misreporting of Nolde’s association with the Nazi Party arises from 
two sources. Firstly, in 1949 Rave, the Director of the Berlin National Gallery, published 
a book called Kunstdiktatur im Dritten Reich1260 (Art Dictatorship in the Third Reich). 
There, Rave said that Nolde had become a Danish citizen in 1920, and that he became a 
party member of the NSDAP when he joined the NSDAP-N in North Schleswig at its 
foundation. However, he did not make clear to the reader what the NSDAP-N was and 
that it was not founded until 1935.1261 Secondly, an East German publication by Dieter 
Schmidt of 1964, misinterpreted Nolde’s letter to Goebbels of 02.07.1938, as meaning 
                                                                
1257 Petropoulos.,p.158. Heimat means ‘homeland’ or ‘roots’, signifying a special identification between an individual 
and their regional home. 
1258 Barron and Guenther. p.315 and Selz, P., German Expressionist Painting (University of California Press, 1974). 
p.124. 
1259 Hecker, M., "Ein Leben an der Grenze. Emil Noide und die NSDAP," in: Nordfriesland: Zeitschr. für Kultur, Politik, 
Wirtschaft, no. 110. pp.9-15. It is often misreported that Nolde joined the NSDAP (Nazi Party) in 1920 at the same time 
as Hitler. This false ‘fact’ was popularised in Siegfried Lenz’s novel Deutschstunde (German lesson) of 1968. 
1260 Rave. Kunstdiktatur im Dritten Reich, Hamburg, 1949. 
1261 NSDAP-N = Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei Nordschleswig (National Socialist German Workers’ 
Party of North Schleswig). The NSDAP-N was founded in 1935, and shortly after it was confirmed as a satellite of the 
NSDAP. All of the minor nationalist parties in North Schleswig were integrated into the NSDAP-N from 1935-1938 
(including the NSAN). 
- 337 - 
 
that he joined the NSDAP in 1920.1262 For political reasons, this misinterpretation was 
deliberately used by East German scholars to draw divisions between bourgeois (Western) 
artists, art critics and anti-fascist (East European) ones.1263  
After Denmark was occupied, Nolde’s membership of the NSDAP-N was 
investigated. On 07.04.1941, the Berlin Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and 
Propaganda made inquiries of the German Embassy in Copenhagen. Nolde claimed that 
he had joined the “NSAN-NSDAP”1264 ‘Group of Germans in North Schleswig’ on 
15.09.1934, with membership number 4060 or 3460. They were requested to check the 
correctness of this claim as soon as possible. It turned out that Nolde had joined the 
NSAN1265 on 15.07.1934 but had the membership number 1722.1266 In the summer of 
1935, rival National Socialist groups, including the NSAN, were brought into line and the 
NSDAP-N was founded. Therefore, Nolde was a party member of the NSDAP-N at the 
same time as the NSDAP was persecuting him in Germany as a ‘degenerate’ artist.1267 As 
Hecker points out, the membership list of the NSAN and NSDAP-N are presumed 
destroyed, as are the documents of the Regional Court in Hamburg. However, Hecker 
concludes that the documents of the Supreme Party Court of the NSDAP and the Reich 
Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda leave much unclear.1268 
Regardless of the above ambiguities, it is clear that on 09.11.1933, Nolde and Ada 
were invited by Reichsführer-SS Himmler to attend the commemoration of the 1923 Beer 
Hall Putsch in Munich. Yet, as van Dyke suggests:  
                                                                
1262 Schmidt. 
1263 Hecker. p.11. 
1264 This acronym is from Nolde’s letter which he uses – however this acronym cannot be found anywhere else. Hecker 
puts the phrase in quotation marks. Nolde’s own use of this acronym must be an error. He must have meant the NSAN 
because he did join them on 15.09.1934. 
1265 NSAN=Nationalsozialistische Arbeitsgemeinschaft Nordschleswigs (National Socialist Workers’ Association of 
North Schleswig). 
1266 See Bundesarchiv Potsdam, Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda, R55/409. 
1267 Hecker. p.13-14. 
1268 Ibid., p.14. 
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…it is important to remember that Himmler and the SS were not then what they 
would later become. The letter does not put Nolde in the vicinity of Auschwitz, 
but rather at the other end of the ‘twisted road’ that led there.1269 
 
Along with Himmler, Nolde and his wife saw the Führer for the first time in the Munich 
Löwenbräukeller. Nolde’s attendance implicated him with the Hanfstaengl family who 
had protected Hitler following the Beer Hall Putsch. It may have been Erna Hanfstaengl 
who had approached Himmler’s wife to prompt the Reichsführer-SS to invite the Noldes 
to this event, although van Dyke suggests that this may not have been the result of her 
efforts alone.1270 After the event, in a letter dated 10.11.1933, Nolde observed that they 
were “all united in hopes and wishes for our beloved Germany, though otherwise very 
divided through the growing gulf between military and art interests ...”1271 
Whilst Nolde mingled with the Nazi elites, it is plausible that a combination of 
artistic ambition and economic motives were at the back of his mind. As William Brustein 
argues, many individuals who joined the Nazi Party did so from economic interests, 
calculating “that the benefits of joining would exceed the costs.”1272 Yet, he acknowledges 
that many people were drawn to the Nazi Party for reasons other than economy, 
recommending that no single factor can adequately explain why 1.4 million Germans 
joined the Nazi Party between 1925 and 1932.1273 Feeling convinced that it is an error to 
assume that the Nazi Party’s successes can be attributed to anti-Semitism, he suggests that 
before 1933, Nazi Party anti-Semitism was unoriginal, sharing similar attitudes with 
various other Weimar political groups. In his view, “what was highly unoriginal in pre-
                                                                
1269 van Dyke. p.269. 
1270 Petropoulos.p.162-63. Cf. James A. van Dyke ‘Something new on Nolde, National Socialism and the SS’ van Dyke. 
p.270. Erna Hanfstaengl’s brother, Ernst ("Putzi") Hanfstaengl (1887-1975), a member of Hitler's elite inner circle, had 
watercolours by Nolde in his flat which were seen by Hitler. See Soika, A & Fulda, Bernhard: ‘Deutscher bis ins tiefste 
Geheimnis seines Geblüts‘: Emil Nolde und die nationalsozialistische Diktatur in: Krämer, F. and Städelsches 
Kunstinstitut und Städtische Galerie, Emil Nolde: Retrospektive; [... anlässlich der Ausstellung "Emil Nolde. 
Retrospektive", Städel Museum, Frankfurt am Main, 5. März - 15. Juni 2014; Louisiana Museum of Modern Art, 
Humlebaek, 4. Juli - 19. Oktober 2014] (München [u.a.]: Prestel, 2014). p.190. Cf. Petropoulos. p.163. 
1271 James A van Dyke ‚ ‘Something New on Nolde, National Socialism, and the SS’. Letter to Hans Fehr reproduced 
by van Dyke in: van Dyke. p. 268-269.  
1272 Brustein, W., The Logic of Evil: The Social Origins of the Nazi Party, 1925-1933 (New Haven ; London: Yale 
University Press, 1996). p.22. 
1273 "Who Joined the Nazis and Why," in: American Journal of Sociology  Vol. 103, no. 1 (1997)., p.217. 
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1933 Nazi Party programs was its anti-Semitism.”1274 By antithesis, Helmut K. Anheier 
questions whether economic interests were sufficient and believes that they were not.1275  
He argues that a combination of economic and ideological motives “including anti-
Semitism, accounted for the Nazi Party position in the early 1930s - a nationalistic position 
that combined modern and antimodern, pro-capitalist and anti-capitalist, as well as pro-
socialist and antisocialist elements, among others.”1276 
Although Nolde had a comparative freedom to make decisions on these issues, his 
capacity as a human being for deliberation gave rise to a conflict of political motives. 
According to Schopenhauer, motives born from conflict can be painful to the will - 
especially when uncertainty arises. This is because an individual permits motives to 
continually impinge upon their will, one motive conflicting with another. The individual’s 
will is then akin to a body which is buffeted between opposing forces, until the strongest 
motive prevails and determines the action of the will.1277 Thus, Robert A. Pois has found 
that the loss of the First World War, Nolde’s lost Heimat and the enforcement of Danish 
citizenship were among those conflict-motivating factors which pushed Nolde towards the 
political far-right.1278 
Vergo by comparison, appears uncertain about which was the strongest motive for 
Nolde to join the Nazis, being inclined to believe that he was motivated partly by 
expediency.1279 If we interpret this scenario through Schopenhauer, then whatever motives 
Nolde had for making his political decisions, they could never be irresistible, whether 
                                                                
1274 Ibid., p.220. 
1275 Ibid., p.209. 
1276 Ibid., p.209. The possibility that a combination of economic and ideological motives may ‘contaminate’ an 
individuals’ mental capacity to form decisions is a topic which shall be examined shortly in this chapter. Indeed, it may 
revivivify the previous debate we had in the previous chapter of this thesis on Mueller’s Two Nude Girls of c.1919 (fig. 
121), which through Nazi eyes, were perceived to possess a nakedness suggestive of a ‘contaminated’ racial sexuality. 
The context for this was a concern that the Volk would be ‘contaminated’ through interbreeding with the gypsy people. 
1277 Schopenhauer and Kolenda. p.32. 
1278 Pois, R. A., Emil Nolde (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982). p.186. 
1279 Vergo et al. p.54. 
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performed out of expediency or not. Thus, Schopenhauer argues that even the strongest 
motive for self-preservation can be overcome by other motives such as suicide, the laying 
down of one’s life for others, and competing interests. If this is the case, then we may 
question the extent to which the human will is free at all. On this issue, Janaway argues 
that: 
Though it seems a relatively straightforward matter to ask whether I can (in 
certain circumstances) do what I will, it is clearly a different matter to ask whether 
my will itself is free, that is, whether when I will to do a, anything prevented me 
from willing to do b, which seemed a possible choice but was not my actual 
choice.1280 
 
This observation now begs the question as to whether Nolde’s ‘will itself’ was free, since 
according to such a concept freedom of this kind means acting in conformity with 
our own will.1281 Corresponding to an empirical conception of freedom, most 
individuals feel themselves to be free to do whatever they want within reason. Yet, 
we are enquiring about the freedom of willing per se and asking if it is possible for 
individuals such as Nolde to will what they will.1282 If we assume an affirmative 
answer, then this assumption is grounded upon a presupposition that willing is dependent 
on another form of willing. As a result, Schopenhauer asks “can you also will what you 
will to will?”1283 This problematic question therefore necessitates that we investigate 
whether it was possible for Nolde to have made choices that were both free and causally 
determined.  
On the problem of choice in relation to free will, Brand Blanshard believes that, 
“The real issue, so far as the will is concerned, is not whether we can do what we choose 
to do, but whether we can choose our own choice, whether the choice itself issues in 
                                                                
1280 Janaway. p.232. 
1281 Zöller. p.5. 
1282 Ibid., p.6. 
1283 Ibid., p.6. 
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accordance with law from some antecedent.”1284 Thus, the indeterminist might attack the 
determinist’s position (on the issue of choosing that which is chosen) and would attribute 
responsibility to Nolde. However, the indeterminist could only do so if Nolde’s actions 
were provably not determined by antecedents.1285 As A.C. Ewing shows, indeterminists 
cannot evade the fact that causality is an intrinsic feature of human existence and that 
human actions are at least ‘partially determined’. If they attempt to refute this then, 
“Without at least some causal influence, if not complete determination, any of the reliable 
predictions we are constantly making or assuming about human action would be 
impossible.”1286 From Schopenhauer’s position this type of polemic is liable to ricochet 
into an infinite regression until we accept that willing per se is groundless and 
dependent upon nothing. Consequently, to argue that Nolde had freedom of the will 
(at least according to the popular concept of freedom) soon becomes inadequate and 
appears to sustain C1.  It becomes particularly inadequate when we question Nolde’s 
moral freedom of the will and his relationship to Nazism. 
 
6.5 Moral Freedom, Self-Consciousness and the Consciousness of other Objects 
 
 
Before engaging with this, let us presuppose that Nolde was self-consciously 
defining his own actions according to the world around him. This issue of self-
consciousness and free will is of significance to our discussion for the following reason. 
Self-consciousness resides in the contrast between one’s own self and the consciousness 
of other objects or other selves. The consciousness of other objects or other selves belongs 
to the faculty of cognition which organises space, time, and causality. Therefore, Nolde’s 
consciousness was always driven towards the external world, whereas his self-
                                                                
1284 New York University Institute of Philosophy and Hook, S., Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science 
(New York: Collier Books). p.21. 
1285 Ewing, A. C., "Indeterminism," in: The Review of Metaphysics  Vol. 5, no. 2 (1951). p.200. 
1286 Ibid., p.199. 
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consciousness was driven inwards towards his personal willing as internal experiences of 
pain and pleasure. As a result, through Schopenhauer it can be argued that “by far the 
greatest part of all our consciousness in general is not self-consciousness but the 
consciousness of other things (Bewusstsein anderer Dinge) or the faculty of 
cognition.”1287  
The immediate objects of Nolde’s self-consciousness were occasioned by both the 
consciousness of other things and acts of his will. His willing was only a reaction to 
external cognitions, and according to Schopenhauer, those cognitions which move the will 
are motives. If this is so, then was a specific act of Nolde’s will caused by a motive, or 
could some other act have occurred instead? That is a question which human self-
consciousness is unable to answer. Indeed, Schopenhauer argues that “the business of self-
consciousness is the act of will alone, together with its absolute mastery over the limbs of 
the body.”1288 Consequently, this is what people mean by the expression “what I will.”1289  
Whenever Nolde merely pondered an act of will it was only a form of wishing until 
a final decision objectified that pondering into an actual deed. Thus, we face the common 
illusion that in a particular circumstance, Nolde (or any individual), had diametrically 
opposed acts of will available to him. It is from this illusion that there arises the confusion 
between wishing and willing. Indeed, Nolde could have wished for diametrically opposed 
things but he could only will one thing, whether under the duress of Nazism or not. In the 
end Schopenhauer reduces this assumption to its bare essentials as follows: “I can will, 
and when I will an action, the movable limbs of my body will at once and inevitably carry 
it out the moment I will it. In short, this is equivalent to saying that ‘I can do what I 
will’.”1290 
                                                                
1287 Zöller. p.9. 
1288 Ibid., p.14. 
1289 Ibid., p.14. 
1290 Ibid., p.14. 
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Most individuals are more conscious of the active side of their acts of will and the 
effects produced by this as opposed to their passive side - of their dependence.1291 If we 
ask an individual about the origin of their acts of will, as to whether they are given by 
rules or none at all, then Schopenhauer believes that their self-consciousness cannot 
answer the question. This is because the will of the individual is their real self, the true 
kernel of their being; it therefore constitutes the ground of their consciousness, given 
absolutely and existing beyond which they cannot go.1292 As Schopenhauer says: “For he 
himself is as he wills, and he wills as he is. Therefore, to ask him whether he could will 
otherwise than he does is tantamount to asking him whether he could be different from 
what he himself is; and this he does not know.”1293 Therefore, Nolde could do what he 
willed, but he could only will one specific thing - and absolutely nothing else but that one 
thing.  
Thus far, we have considered Nolde’s will subjectively according to 
Schopenhauer’s understanding of self-consciousness. Now we must consider his will 
objectively, and move our investigation on from his will as the immediate object of his 
self-consciousness, to his will as the mediated object of the consciousness of external 
objects (including people). The consciousness of external objects gives rise to motives 
which are not always taken directly from perception, but are often worked up into abstract 
concepts. If this is so, then were Nolde’s acts of will by necessity brought into being by 
given motives, or could his will have retained complete freedom to will or not to will when 
a motive entered his consciousness? As Schopenhauer puts it: “Here, then, we have the 
concept of freedom in the abstract sense…as the mere negation of necessity, and 
consequently our problem is posed. ”1294  
                                                                
1291 Ibid., p.16. 
1292 Ibid., p.18. 
1293 Ibid., p.18. 
1294 Ibid., p.12. 
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Arguably, some acts of Nolde’s will were brought into being through the influence 
of Nazi propaganda which attempted to train the will of the masses through motives. 
However, the effectiveness of the Nazi motivational industry on Nolde’s will escapes 
many critics’ notice. One far-reaching propaganda effect arose from a speech given by 
Goebbels to the media on 15.03.1933 (and many more like it afterwards), where he 
discussed the new Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda’s mission. There 
he declaimed that: “I see in the newly established Ministry for Popular Enlightenment 
and Propaganda a link between government and people, the living contact between the 
national government as the expression of the popular will and the Volk itself.”1295  
The new Ministry was actively involved in motivating the German people, 
conspiring to win over the will of the people by addicting them to the Ministry’s own 
will - thus abrogating the freedom of the masses.1296 When Goebbels asserted the 
following statement it might be interpreted as a validation of C1 due to its headstrong 
insistency. He declared that:  
It is not enough to reconcile people more or less to our regime, to move them 
towards a position of neutrality towards us; we want, rather, to work on people 
until they are addicted to us, until they realize, in the ideological sense as well, 
that what is happening now in Germany not only can be permitted, but must be 
permitted.1297 
 
Not long after the inception of this Ministry, Goebbels asked Nolde if he would become 
Director of Berlin’s Vereinigte Staatliche Kunstschule (United State Art School). 
                                                                
1295 First published as: "Rede vor der Presse uber die Errichtung des Reichspropagandaministeriums," in: Goebbels-
Reden, vol. I, 1931-1939, edited by Helmut Heiber (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1971), S. 90, 94, 95, 106-7. Published 
in English in: Welch, David, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda (London: Routledge, 1933), 136-45 by 
Rabinbach and Gilman. As William S. Bradley says: “In his own deeply felt longing for a regeneration of the German 
spirit and the birth of a new German art, Nolde recognized the similarities between his own ideas and their transformed 
reappearance in the Nazi rhetoric, but he was no doubt guilty of being blind at least initially to the great and terrible 
difference between his motivations and those of the Nazis.” See: Bradley, Emil Nolde and German Expressionism: A 
Prophet in his own Land , p.116. 
1296 It is noteworthy how the will (Wille) became a media phenomenon throughout the Weimar and Nazi era. See: 
Appendix A, ‘Period Media Titles’, which contains a list of periodicals indicating the prevalence of will orientated 
publications.  
1297 Rabinbach and Gilman. p.456. 
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Although Nolde did not secure the position, Fulda argues how “Nolde made clear that he 
would have been willing to help the new regime in a letter written to Hans Fehr.”1298 Given 
these circumstances, it can surely be no coincidence that Goebbels’ pledge ‘to work on 
people until they are addicted to us’ acted as an external motive upon Nolde’s will 
which in turn made him susceptible and ‘willing to help the new regime’. On Goebbels’ 
offer Nolde confided that the possibility of being appointed to the position of Director was 
unsettling due to his artistic style, although he would have accepted it out of duty and done 
it gladly.1299 
Fulda builds on this and continues to question Nolde’s character and motives as 
follows. He proposes that: 
Nolde had not only been very willing to contribute to the re-ordering of the 
German art world, but had even used his meeting with the Propaganda Ministry 
official to disqualify a possible alternative candidate for the position, Max 
Pechstein, his former colleague in the artists' association Brücke (Bridge), by 
claiming that Pechstein was a Jew.1300 
 
The word ‘willing’ is significant here and ought to be contextualised within Goebbels’ 
campaign to addict the will of the people to the Nazi system and a resultant confirmation 
of C1. The campaign to addict the will of the people to the Nazi system is often overlooked 
with regard to Nolde. Certainly, Fulda shows little awareness of the possibility that 
‘mental contamination’, through Nazi mass ‘will-training’, exerted any number of 
unwanted influences on Nolde’s judgments and motivations.1301 As Timothy D. Wilson 
and Nancy Brekke show, mental contamination is “… the process whereby a person has 
an unwanted response because of mental processing that is unconscious or 
uncontrollable.”1302 This means that: 
                                                                
1298 Bernhard Fulda and Aya Soika ‘Emil Nolde and the National Socialist Dictatorship’ in: Peters et al. 
1299 Ibid., p.187. 
1300 Bernhard Fulda and Aya Soika “Emil Nolde and The National Socialist Dictatorship” in ibid., p.194. See also: 
Fulda, B., and A. Soika. Max Pechstein: The Rise and Fall of Expressionism. De Gruyter, 2013. p. 301-302. 
1301 Wilson, T. D. and Brekke, N., "Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments 
and Evaluations," in: Psychological Bulletin  Vol. 116, no. 1 (1994). p.117. 
1302 Ibid., p.117. 
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Mental contamination is difficult to avoid because it results from both fundamental 
properties of human cognition (e.g., a lack of awareness of mental processes) and 
faulty lay beliefs about the mind (e.g., incorrect theories about mental biases).1303 
 
 
6.6 Mental Contamination and Anti-Semitism 
 
 
With the above comment in mind, it is therefore tenable that the effects of Nazi anti-
Semitism, as ‘mental contamination’, led Nolde to inform Goebbels that Pechstein was a 
Jew. Even so, Pechstein was both motivated and angry enough to issue a complaint to the 
Prussian Academy of Arts about Nolde’s conduct. After the Deputy President of the 
Academy notified Nolde in a letter that Pechstein was of Aryan descent Pechstein dropped 
any charges against Nolde.1304 However, Nolde’s reputation was significantly damaged 
thereafter. Thus, from Petropoulos’s point of view, “to denounce a former colleague as a 
Jew, whether accurately or, in the case of Pechstein, mistakenly, showed how he tried to 
establish his Nazi bona fides and offers an on-the-ground example of anti-Semitism.”1305 
This was and is a moral issue. Therefore, in order to penetrate this issue, it is necessary to 
look into the relationship between Nolde’s character, his motives and free will. 
On this issue of personal character and free will, Janaway reminds us that 
Schopenhauer asked two important questions: “(1) How does the character of that upon 
which motives exert their influence contribute to an explanation of what is willed? and (2) 
Is there after all any justified basis for our sense of responsibility for our actions?”1306 The 
answer to these questions may be explored in relation to Nolde’s reputation as a Nazi 
sympathiser and anti-Semitic comments. This will involve an examination of his moral 
responsibility and character from the point of view of Schopenhauer’s doctrine of free 
will.  
                                                                
1303 Ibid., p.117. 
1304 Krämer, Nolde, and Städtische Galerie im Städelschen Kunstinstitut Frankfurt am Main. p.48. 
1305 Petropoulos. p.160. 
1306 Janaway. p.239. 
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Nolde’s anti-Semitism appears to originate with his 1910 contretemps with the 
Berlin Secession, whose jury had rejected his painting Pentecost (fig. 142). This caused 
Nolde to write a furious letter to Karl Scheffler, the editor of Kunst und Künstler (Art and 
Artists) criticising the Jewish chairman of the Secession, Max Liebermann. The letter 
itself was subsequently published along with a criticism of Nolde and the announcement 
of his expulsion from the Secession.1307 Afterwards, Nolde wrote about his expulsion and 
said that he stood alone, hunted for life by oppositional powers.1308 He said he felt as if he 
had been picked up by life, carried along for a short while, then cast out. This was the 
reason, he said, for his bold revolt against the Jewish power prevailing in all the arts: 
“What did I, a clumsy lad from the country, with my belief in right and humanity, want 
with this smooth, slippery place?”1309  
Selz associates the Secession affair with Nolde’s distaste for the Jewish members 
of its committee, believing that his anti-Semitism was aimed at Liebermann and Cassirer. 
Selz also claims that this led Nolde to becoming one of the founder members of the Nazi 
party for North Schleswig in 1920, which as shown above is incorrect.1310 However, Selz 
arguably lends us a biased opinion, since being of Jewish parentage, he and his family had 
fled Nazi Germany for America in 1936. By contrast, Lloyd has argued that Nolde’s letter 
of 1910 to Kunst und Künstler revealed nothing like radical nationalism at this point in 
time. Instead, Nolde indicted Liebermann with a deterioration in artistic qualities and an 
incapacity to welcome new advancements.1311 
Lloyd does qualify this statement though, when observing that by the time of 
Nolde’s 1934 autobiography, Die Jahre der Kämpfe (Years of Struggle), he would 
                                                                
1307 Selz. p.123. 
1308 Nolde, Jahre der Kämpfe. p.149. 
1309 Ibid., p.149. 
1310 Selz; ibid., p.124. 
1311 Lloyd. p.164. 
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describe the Secession affair as one cast in nationalistic terms.1312 Yet, arguably by 
1934 Nazi propaganda had begun to influence Nolde’s will and his political 
motivations. Indeed, Vergo maintains that few authors have stopped to ponder whether 
the statements made by Nolde in his autobiographies stand for his real beliefs or whether 
they were tailored to accommodate the political influences of the 1930s. He adds that, 
Nolde did not exploit the anti-Semitic feelings of the time and that to brand Nolde “…as 
a dyed-in-the wool chauvinist or an inveterate nationalist ignores the fact that his 
vehement personal crusade was in reality part and parcel of a much wider and long-
running debate over the question of German cultural identity.”1313 
German identity and ‘the Germanness of German art’ were amongst the major 
concerns of Nolde who admitted that he would have liked it if a clean separation could 
have ensued between Jewish and German art, and also between a German-French mixture 
and pure German art.1314 Nolde also suggested that if the identity of German art was to be 
equal to that of French art, or more meaningful, then it had to become completely German, 
even if that was not particularly wanted.1315 Furthermore, he did not wish for his identity 
to become confused with a Jewish one or to be promoted by Jews. He was motivated to 
complain how journalists had, “cast me in with the greatest enemies of my life, the 
thoroughly evil Jew Kerr, the two Cassirers, Katzenellenbogen and all the others, as if I 
belonged with them […].”1316 He felt that the injustices against him were greater than a 
responsible person could bear in silence. Eventually on 06.12.1938, Nolde importuned 
Otto Dietrich, Press Chief for the NSDAP, and argued that he had not been promoted by 
Jews.  
                                                                
1312 Ibid., p.164. 
1313 Vergo et al. p.47. 
1314 Letter from Emil Nolde to Max Sauerlandt, 08.04.1933, ANS. 
1315 Letter from Emil Nolde to Gustav Schiefler, 14.09.1911 Quoted in Nolde: Briefe aus den Jahren 1894-1926 (Berlin 
1927) p.78. 
1316 Six-page typed manuscript without an addressee, and with corrections in Nolde’s handwriting and dated by him 
06.12.1938 in the Hans Fehr Estate, ANS. 
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The problems regarding human identity, and moral responsibility for it, were 
addressed by Schopenhauer who believed that the essence of human identity was not the 
organic matter of the body, which changes over time, nor the form of the body which also 
changes over time. Instead, an ‘eternal’ aspect underpins bodily identity even though in 
terms of personal individuality “nothing is more necessarily determined.”1317 That many 
individuals feel as young as ever, despite old age, proves that there remains in us 
something ‘untouched’ by time which is ‘our inner nature’. If our ‘inner nature’ shapes 
our beliefs and behaviours, then a sense of moral responsibility is often attributed to our 
character. On this basis, many art historians are motivated to attribute moral responsibility 
to Nolde’s character.1318  
The need for moral responsibility has been applied not only to Nolde’s remarks 
but to some of his ‘theological’ paintings of the Jewish body. Some of Nolde’s work stood 
out for the Nazis as a profane, willful slur on the ‘divine,’ as in The Twelve-Year--Old 
Christ with the Doctors of 1911 (fig. 143). Here, the Christ figure is depicted reading in 
the Temple surrounded by four male figures, each of which is distorted into caricature, 
which detracts from the mythical solemnity of the occasion. Rather than depict the event 
in the classical manner, the event is rendered schematically - all of which angered Nazi 
purists. 
The same schematic qualities apply to paintings such as the Three Magi (fig. 144) 
and Discussion of 1913 (fig. 145). The latter has the signs of a Talmudic dispute between 
two Jews who are standing facing each other, and does not necessarily imply an anti-
Semitic message. We can see that the right-hand figure, who sports a dark rabbinic beard, 
gesticulates with upraised arms to another man who mirrors this gesture with his own. The 
                                                                
1317 Schopenhauer and Hübscher.Vol.4, p.14. 
1318 Vergo believes that, as a friend of Nolde’s, Fehr is probably the best commentator on Noldes’ character. Yet, if 
Vergo cannot trust Nolde’s personal testimony then we should have some reservations about Fehr’s possible bias 
towards his friend. See Nolde in: Nolde, Emil. Jahre der Kämpfe [in German]. Berlin: Rembrandt-Verlag, 1934. p.145. 
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whole tonality is imbued with a yellow hue, perhaps, but not certainly, suggestive of the 
Oriental religious Jew. 
Around 1915, Nolde was perplexed that his pictures were being criticised by both 
Evangelicals and Catholics.1319 In his opinion, rather than producing an anti-Semitic 
message, he had followed his own instinct in depicting Christ and the Apostles as simple 
Jewish country folk. He was motivated to say that “I painted them as strong Jewish types, 
for it certainly wasn’t weaklings who professed the revolutionary new teaching of 
Christ.”1320 As did Schopenhauer, Nolde believed that Renaissance representations of the 
Apostles and Christ as Italian or German body-types were an artistic deception. He 
eventually asked, “Where does that lead? If we want to see biblical characters painted as 
Aryans, should it not also be possible for Chinese Christians to see them depicted as 
Chinese, Negroes or blacks?”1321  
 
6.7 Moral Responsibility or Determinism? 
 
 
Given the biblical overtones just mentioned, how would Schopenhauer respond to 
ecclesiastical doctrine that Nolde, as a created being, had free will and was morally 
responsible for his ‘bad’ actions? Schopenhauer’s reply is simple: “what should we say of 
the watchmaker who was angry with his watch because it was off?”1322 Given this answer, 
theologians cannot realistically charge Nolde’s intrinsic character with being the result of 
his own ‘bad’ work’. As Schopenhauer states, if an action arises from the inherent nature 
of an individual, then the culpability rests with the creator of that nature, “which is why 
                                                                
1319 The general public and academic painters of the time also felt uncomfortable with his picture: See: Harries, R., The 
Image of Christ in Modern Art (Taylor & Francis, 2016). p.10-11. 
1320 Nolde, Jahre der Kämpfe. p.140. 
1321 Ibid., p.140. 
1322 Zöller.p.65. Schopenhauer put this another way in his letter to Johann August Becker of 23.08.1844, when discussing 
religious doctrine and the ‘original freedom of the will’: He said that "consequently, where the being is from, there also 
comes the doing." See: Schopenhauer and Hübscher. p. 213-216. 
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free will was invented.”1323 Therefore he concludes that “it is absolutely impossible to see 
from what that bad action is supposed to spring, since free will is at bottom a merely 
negative quality and simply states that nothing compels the human being to act in such-
and-such a way or prevents him from so acting.”1324  
Considered in this way, it is not certain from where Nolde’s actions arose, since if 
his actions arose from a created nature then the creator of it must be held responsible, or 
if his actions arose from purely natural non-divine causes, then responsibility could 
arguably be given over to chance.1325 Yet, if we argue from determinism, then Nolde 
cannot be held responsible for expressing Nazi sympathies out of an unconditionally free 
will. Thus, for Schopenhauer: 
The natural image of a free will is an empty set of scales. It hangs there at rest and 
will never lose its equilibrium unless something is laid on one of the pans. Free 
will can no more produce an action out of itself than the scale can produce a 
movement of itself, since nothing comes from nothing.1326  
 
As when scales go down on one side when a weight is laid on them, human actions must 
be determined by something which is positive and stands for more than negative 
freedom.1327 This only occurs through motives in and of themselves, that is by external 
circumstances, in which case no human being is responsible for their actions, since all 
human beings in similar circumstances must act in the same way. Or, it arises from the 
individual’s susceptibility to specific motives and from their inborn character, i.e., from 
inherently original tendencies belonging to them.1328 
                                                                
1323 Zöller. p.65. 
1324 Ibid., p.66. 
1325 As the German painter Alfred Otto Wolfgang Schulze once said, “Chance, seeing that is not chance, is a great 
master; chance only exists in our eyes, it is an agent for the ‘master’ of the universe.” See: Wols, Peter Inch, and Annie 
Fatet. Aphorisms and Pictures [in English]. Gillingham (11, Byron Rd, Gillingham Kent): Arc Publications, 1971. 
Quoted and translated in: Harrison, C. and Wood, P., Art in Theory, 1900-2000: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, New 
edition, [i.e. second edition]. ed. (Malden, Mass. ; Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2003). p.595. 
1326 Zöller. p.66. 
1327 Ibid., p.66. 
1328 Ibid., p.66. 
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Nolde’s ‘susceptibility’ to motives, as interpreted through Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine, means that he, and all individuals, possess an essential character known as their 
‘intelligible character’.1329 While he the individual was mere phenomenon, the thing-in-
itself which was inherent to him as the individual, lay beyond space and time being free 
from “succession and plurality of acts.”1330 Therefore, “it is one and unchangeable. Its 
constitution in itself is the intelligible character, which is equally present in all the actions 
of the individual and is stamped on every one of them, like the signet on a thousand 
seals.”1331 By contrast, ‘the empirical character’ of the individual, as a phenomenon called 
Nolde, was manifested through time in successive acts and was ‘determined by the 
intelligible’ so that he, like every individual, was compelled to act in accordance with his 
intelligible character.1332 Thus, on the one hand an external cause revealed his empirical 
character, while on the other it revealed its original inner ground being one not accessible 
to experience as his intelligible character.1333 Ultimately, mankind is no exception within 
nature, since “he too has his fixed disposition and unalterable character, which, however, 
is entirely individual and different in each case.”1334 
If this is so, then we need to explain the necessity of applying moral responsibility 
to Nolde. Through Schopenhauer, we answer this question by displacing the notion of 
responsibility away from his personal acts on to his character. However, Vergo for one 
does not trust Nolde’s self-observations about his own character, stating that to do so 
“brings a variety of other unfortunate consequences in its train.”1335 By contrast, Fehr 
seems to do so and refers to Nolde’s “goodness, which seems to me the chief characteristic 
                                                                
1329  “Our being or essence…is our intelligible character or the will as thing in itself, and this essence is expressed by 
our empirical character, which is the seat of our deeds.” See: Cartwright. p.149.  
1330 Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.110. 
1331 Ibid., p.110. 
1332 Regarding his own character Nolde confessed to Fehr that, “I would like to be simple and sophisticated at the same 
time” See: Fehr, Hans, and Gabriele Smargiassi. Emil Nolde. Ein Buch der Freundschaft. p.52. 
1333 Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.111-12. 
1334 Ibid., p.111-12. 
1335 Vergo et al. p.41. 
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of his being…”1336 Yet for Vergo, Nolde’s self-defined character matches the myth of a 
heroic artist who pits themselves against the world, isolated, devoted to their art and 
acknowledging only the inner compulsion to create.1337  
Vergo’s account lacks objective insight into the metaphysics of the human 
character, the difficult questions of free will, and the subtleties of moral responsibility. An 
insight into the metaphysics of the human character is vital if we wish to form an objective 
interpretation of Nolde’s moral responsibilities. Schopenhauer states that:  
...character is just as necessary a factor in every action as the motive; so in this 
way we can explain the feeling that our deeds proceed from ourselves, or the ‘I 
will’ that accompanies all our actions, and by virtue of which each person must 
recognize them as his deeds, for which he consequently feels himself 
responsible.1338 
If we adopt a Schopenhauerian view, then the only actions which could have emanated 
from Nolde during Nazism, or any other time, emanated from his character. Indeed, 
despite his determinism, Schopenhauer also concludes that most people feel themselves 
to be somehow responsible for their character, for being who they are. However, Janaway 
argues that Schopenhauer’s conclusion appears to be bizarre and unwarranted.1339 
Janaway has a point, because if Nolde’s character was pre-set at birth, then it is indeed 
bizarre to suggest that his character was his own work.1340  
                                                                
1336 Festschrift für Emil Nolde anlässlich seines 60. Geburtstages,  (Dresden: Neue Kunst Fides, 1927). p.16. 
1337 Lunn, F., McKeever, I., and Whitechapel Art Gallery, Emil Nolde [Whitechapel Art Gallery, London 8 December 
1995 - 25 February 1996, Museum of Modern Art, Copenhagen 15 March - 10 May 1996] (London: Whitechapel Art 
Gallery, 1996). p.41 
1338 Janaway. p.242. 
1339 Ibid. p.242. 
1340 On Nolde’s character Walter Jens said: “Some criticised what at the same time others praised – only slowly did the 
Janus face of the great painter emerge, and only gradually did spectators begin to perceive the interplay of naivety and 
sophistication which Nolde’s style of painting developed, corresponding to his own early wish.” See: Jens, W., Von 
deutscher Rede (München: Piper, 1969). p.105. On Nolde’s character Vergo notes that: “Moreover, despite his repeated 
references to the duality supposedly characteristic of himself and of his art, he writes so much more about the emotive, 
instinctual side of his nature, and so little about his intellectual concerns that most commentators have obligingly 
followed suit, overlooking a wealth of evidence that might have been used to flesh out other aspects of his personality 
and accepting virtually without question the image of a self-absorbed, unworldly figure, at best naive, at worst verging 
on the simple-minded.” See: Vergo, Peter, Nolde Emil. p.41. 
1340 Janaway. p.243. 
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If Schopenhauer pursues the notion that any individual’s character contributes 
towards the behaviours of that individual, then Schopenhauer attempts to uphold the 
notion of moral responsibility in the same way. As a consequence, Janaway states that: 
The result is scarcely coherent. Nothing has yet succeeded in explaining how we 
come by the ‘feeling of responsibility’. It is possible, for all that Schopenhauer has 
said, that there is no more to responsibility than a mere subjective feeling, a 
product of an ignorance of the causal ancestry of our actions forced upon us by our 
self‐conscious viewpoint.1341 
 
6.8 The Problem of Transcendental Freedom and Responsibility 
 
This observation is important, since it raises a problem for us with regards to 
freedom of will and our feelings of responsibility. On this topic, Janaway argues that an 
individual’s ‘feeling of responsibility’, at first glance, indicates not only an empirical 
version of free will, but also a transcendental freedom of the will. Although, 
Schopenhauer’s interpretation of the transcendental freedom of the will was influenced 
by Kant, by contrast he makes no causal links between a person’s intelligible character 
and the empirical world in which they live.1342 On this basis, we must infer that Nolde’s 
empirical character was mere appearance which manifested his intelligible character, or 
in other words, his will as thing-in-itself.1343 If this is so, was Nolde’s intelligible character 
really something which existed beyond the world as appearance and free from 
causality?1344   
                                                                
1341 .Ibid., p.243. 
1342 Ibid., p.243. In a letter to Julius Frauenstädt of 6.08.1852, Schopenhauer argued that: “Intelligible freedom of will 
is exactly that, intelligible and not intuitive; for it is based on the fact that 1) freedom is a negative concept, whose 
substance is merely the absence of any necessity; 2) that all necessity simply indicates ‘the consequence of a given 
ground’; and 3) that the grounds of reason, in its four forms, is simply the form of appearance, pre-formed in cerebro, 
not owing to the thing-in-itself; ergo such a thing is free as such. That the individual and his character is the work of the 
intelligible will results only from the fact that while deeds from necessity arise from motives and the given character, 
which they affect, nevertheless we have the clearest consciousness of responsibility for those things as the authors of 
our deeds. But we cannot make all these conditions possible to grasp intuitively ourselves; they are simply intelligible.” 
Schopenhauer and Hübscher. p.287-290. 
1343 Janaway. p.243. 
1344 Fehr described Nolde’s character as being reticent yet during their time together in St.Gallen Fehr recalled that: “We 
whispered and talked and talked and whispered about everything in the world. Our thoughts flew like buzzing bees 
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According to Schopenhauer, freedom from causality stands for transcendental 
freedom, which means that the will is free, but only in itself and beyond the realm of 
appearances.1345 Thus, we would have to infer that Nolde’s freedom of will should not be 
sought for in his actions but rather in his total being and essence. His character could then 
be considered as his free act, manifesting itself only for his faculty of knowledge, 
constrained as it is by time, space, causality and a plurality of acts.1346 
Should we interpret Nolde’s freedom of will in this sense, then we meet a 
stumbling block, since Schopenhauer’s account of free will, as does Kant’s, falters “over 
the problem that an intelligible object cannot act.”1347 However, if it could be said that 
Nolde possessed an essential ‘being’ beyond the world of appearance, then it might be 
said that his essence was his own act. But Schopenhauer is not very clear on issues of this 
type, because he also argues that every act takes place within the constraints of the 
principle of sufficient reason. Thus, if we follow Schopenhauer through, and link Nolde’s 
character to the thing-in-itself, then it must have been free from the modalities of space, 
time, and causality. However this, as Janaway argues, illustrates Schopenhauer’s difficulty 
since: 
…freedom, he comments, has not been entirely ‘removed’ (aufgehoben) by his 
account, but merely ‘pushed out’ (hinausgerückt), ‘namely out of the area of 
individual actions up into a region higher, but not so easily accessible to our 
knowledge’.1348  
Undeterred, Schopenhauer hopes to attach a sense of responsibility to human actions, 
despite the fact that no one is likely to feel responsible for their intelligible character. If 
we apply this hope to Nolde, then his intelligible character could be blamed for his 
                                                                
backwards and forwards, and the reserved man opened up his deep, rich heart more and more.” Fehr, Hans, and 
Smargiassi, Gabriele. Emil Nolde. Ein Buch der Freundschaft. p.15.  
1345 Janaway. p.243. 
1346 Ibid., p.244. 
1347 Ibid., p.244. 
1348 Ibid., p.244 
- 356 - 
 
behaviours.1349 This is so despite the fact that “it is not coherent to say of an intelligible 
character that it acts, that it is an act, or that we feel ourselves responsible for it, nothing 
like the relevant kind of freedom can have been preserved by Schopenhauer’s account, 
even should it make clear sense.”1350 Consequently, any congruent sense of free will, 
attributable to Nolde through a Schopenhauerian interpretation, has been conveniently 
banished into an obscure region ‘not so easily accessible to our knowledge’. As Janaway 
concludes: 
With Schopenhauer the free will seems to have reached its absurd limit: explicitly 
banished to a realm outside the objective world, and without even the possibility - 
which Kant tried so hard to salvage - of any interaction with the objective world. 
Nietzsche's ‘fable of intelligible freedom’ in Human, all too Human seems to hit 
the nail on the head.1351  
 
Nietzsche certainly believed that no human being was accountable for his deeds - or for 
his nature. He argued that to judge another is the same as being unjust, even when an 
individual judges themselves.1352 He asserted that the “proposition is as clear as daylight, 
and yet here everyone prefers to retreat back into the shadows and untruth: from fear of 
the consequences.”1353 As a result Janaway contends that Schopenhauer enters the fable 
and resists this conclusion, whereas “Nietzsche concludes that responsibility is an illusion, 
revealed as such by Schopenhauer’s fantasy version.”1354 In the end Janaway rightly 
adduces that “Schopenhauer has no reply to this pungent attack.”1355 And so it is that we 
                                                                
1349 On Nolde’s conservative character in relation to his art, Jill Lloyd argues that: “Central to the inner contradictions 
of Nolde’s early work was his engagement with modernity on the one hand, and his deep-seated conservatism on the 
other, reflected in the fluctuations of his career.” See: Lloyd, Jill. German Expressionism: Primitivism and Modernity. 
p.162. 
1350 Janaway. p.244. 
1351 Ibid., p.245. 
1352 Nietzsche, F. W. and Hollingdale, R. J., Human, All Too Human, [Rev.] ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). p.35. 
1353 Ibid., p.35. 
1354 Janaway.,p.245. 
1355 Ibid. p.245. 
- 357 - 
 
must not neglect this ‘pungent attack’ either, which is ‘as clear as daylight’, preferring 




This chapter has contributed to our existing knowledge of Nolde’s life and work 
under Nazism through a sustained engagement with Schopenhauer’s philosophy of free 
will. It has also contributed to a specific philosophical issue which has not been addressed 
to any great extent by scholars – the problem of free will during the reign of Nazism. As 
far as can be ascertained, little research has been undertaken which directly approaches 
this problem. In part this may reflect the uneasiness with which many German scholars 
retrieve their understanding of the past. Consequently, such a hiatus in current research 
makes this thesis significant in two ways. Firstly, it opens the debate on the problem of 
free will under Nazism and secondly, if contrary to Schopenhauer’s determinism, we 
might agree with Robert Kane that, in order to guarantee freedom of will at all, it would 
be necessary to take an incompatibilist or non-determinist’s position. This in turn would 
give us the following: 
(1) genuine creativity, (2) autonomy or self‐legislation, (3) true desert for 
achievements, (4) moral responsibility in an ultimate sense, (5) being suitable 
objects of reactive attitudes such as admiration, gratitude, resentment and 
indignation, (6) dignity or self‐worth, (7) a true sense of individuality or 
uniqueness as persons, (8) (freely given) love and friendship, and others.1356 
 
However, in this chapter we found that from a determinist’s point of view, none of the 
above could apply to Nolde’s case, excepting possibly Schopenhauer’s relevant account 
of (4) which we showed was a reductio ad absurdum. Therefore, whether we take a 
determinist’s view or not, all of the above criteria were unarguably compromised by 
Nazism, entailing that C1 prevailed through the Nazi’s empirical will. Indeed, should we 
                                                                
1356 Kane, R., The Significance of Free Will (Oxford University Press, 1998).p.80. 
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be obliged to concede that Schopenhauer’s philosophy only remains coherent at the level 
of determinism (as I have argued), then, as Karl Popper has proposed, physical 
determinism is a nightmare which renders us mere ‘sub-automata’ – that is to say, “it thus 
destroys, in particular, the idea of creativity.”1357 
As a result of the above, an additional contribution to knowledge might arise if we 
could take Nolde scholarship beyond the confines of determinism (which threatens 
creativity) in order to explore the nature of human ‘selves’ which attempt to function 
independently of totalitarianism.  In this sense, as Kane has put it, we might consider the 
possibility that “the power to be ‘self’ creating in this way is free will.”1358 Since this did 
not apply to Nolde we must conclude that, not only has C1 been vindicated in this chapter, 
but that ‘the power to be ‘self’ creating in this way’ was denied not only to Nolde, but 
every artist affected by Nazism. This issue could therefore become a topic for a future 
philosophy of aesthetics. 
In addition to the above, we found that Nolde’s physical freedom was heavily 
compromised from 1933, after being asked to resign from the Akademie der Künste by 
the Nazis - which he declined to do. Because the Akademie der Künste met with escalating 
pressures from the Reich Ministry of Education to submit to its commands, we may 
conclude that C1 was endorsable through the force of the Nazis political will. Yet by 
contrast, whilst Nolde was in aesthetic exile it was argued that his secretly produced 
watercolours possessed a dreamlike quality which seemed to stand for a detachment from 
the will, inviting us to renounce C1. However, the paintings could be regarded as the 
effects of an obdurate will to create in the face of personal hardship and therefore uphold 
C1. However, his paintings were compelled by external motives operating upon his will, 
                                                                
1357 Ibid.p.80. 
1358 Ibid.,p.96. 
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and because they were determined by external motives they were not indifferently free 
acts. It was concluded relatively early on in the chapter that, according to a popular 
concept of freedom (usually a sense of physical freedom), C1 can be vindicated in 
Nolde’s case.  
We also mentioned the fact that the new Reich Ministry conspired to addict the 
masses  to their own will, and how a speech uttered by Goebbels confirmed C1 when 
suggesting that it was not enough to reconcile the people to Nazism, but that they must 
become “addicted to us.”1359 It was established therefore, that the will of the German 
people was misguided into an escalating confirmation of C1 and as such this remains an 
historical  context often unheeded by Nolde scholars. 
It can also be concluded that the rhetoric of praise and blame presiding over 
Nolde’s life under Nazism is significant and shows no sign of abating. This rhetoric 
continued after 1945 when he, along with many other Germans, needed to explain his 
views on National Socialism.1360 On the one hand, in 1945, Ada portrayed themselves as 
liberated prisoners, suggesting that Nolde’s paintings had been freed from captivity, just 
like Nolde the artist.1361 On the other, Fulda argues that, communications of this sort were 
rehearsals “of defiant victimhood that held great appeal in the post-war period - and 
journalists were quick to discover its potential.”1362 Even so, whether one believes Ada’s 
version of events or Fulda’s, according to a Schopenhauerian interpretation, their motives 
were always conditioned by the determining grounds of causality. Thus, whether one 
praises or blames Nolde for his life under Nazism, it has proven all too easy for many ‘to 
retreat back into the shadows’ when it comes to the unsettling complexities of free will. 
                                                                
1359 Rabinbach and Gilman. p.456. 
1360 Fulda in: Rüger and Wachsmann. p.180. 
1361 Ada Nolde to Bernhard Sprengel, 16.07.1945, in Niedersachsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover, Dep 105, Acc 2 / 
80, 98. 
1362 Rüger and Wachsmann. p.181. 
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In spite of this neglect, several difficult questions surrounding Nolde’s freedom of 
will have been explored in this chapter. According to the above exploration, Nolde’s 
freedom of the will must be separated from his freedom of action. For Nolde, as with every 
individual, there was freedom of will only if he could experience willing in the absence of 
necessity. An objective exploration of Nolde’s acts of will showed that they were 
grounded in causes which pre-determined their manifestation, despite counter arguments 
from indeterminism. As a result for Nolde, as with every individual, there was no freedom 
of the will in this sense – particularly under the duress of Nazism - which leads us to 
suspect that C1 continued to bear down on Germany. 
This fact still cannot eradicate the feeling that Fulda, Soika and others have, that 
Nolde was responsible for his actions, or Schopenhauer’s belief that human actions must 
be explained from a higher standpoint. As we have seen, Schopenhauer promotes this 
higher standpoint, by postulating an ‘intelligible character’ from which freedom of the 
will can be imputed. However, as demonstrated above, Schopenhauer’s argument lapses 
into absurdity and can only remain coherent by retaining determinism. Yet, despite this 
flaw in his doctrine, Schopenhauer enables us to re-interpret and reconsider Nolde’s life 
under Nazism in a new light.  
This new light helps us realize, that as a phenomenon, Nolde’s existence arose 
only from the will per se which alone “is free; it is almighty.”1363 Consequently, the 
problems surrounding Nolde and Nazism are a mirror of that will, where “…all finiteness, 
all suffering, all miseries that it contains, belong to the expression of what the will 
wills.”1364 Therefore, life was as it was, and will be as it will be, “…because the will so 
wills.”1365 In this sense, Nolde did not possess aseity; his character was not his own work. 
                                                                
1363 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.351. 
1364 Ibid., p.351. 
1365 Ibid., p.351. 
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Thus, he cannot be blamed without reservation for his political sympathies, nor can he be 
praised without reservation for any perceived resistance to Nazism, or indeed any other 
reason. On Schopenhauer’s terms then, that which should be blamed is the will, for the 
will is the criminal author of this world, and as author of this world - in the past, present 
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Thesis Conclusion 
This thesis may well be caught up in what Joel C. Weinsheimer refers to as “the 
dichotomy of knaves and fools.”1366 While the ‘fool’ perceives everything as clear-cut, the 
‘knave’ perceives everything as full of mystery and, as Weinsheimer contends, “These 
corollary deficiencies result from the ‘converting imagination’ which the two share and 
exercise in common, though in opposite directions, ‘converting’ toward either the literal 
or the figural.”1367 Thus, it might be assumed that the interpretative strategy for this thesis 
ought to have been one which did not convert at all, and took the literal as literal and the 
figural as figural. However, as Weinsheimer argues, this is the solution of the ‘fool’, since 
it presupposes that the difference between literal and figural is itself clear-cut and in no 
need of interpretation.  
Weinsheimer also argues that the dichotomy between ‘knave’ and ‘fool’ is not 
depleted by surface/depth distinctions - that would be ‘knavish’ because curiosity would 
assume it.1368 “Foolish hermeneutics is therefore monistic; knavish is dualistic or 
pluralistic, in that it posits two or more levels of understanding, and its very activity 
consists in discriminating between them.”1369 The ‘fool’ finds it easy to identify what a 
misinterpretation is, whereas the ‘knave’ finds it problematic since it is the essence of 
interpretation that meanings shall differ. If this is so, then how is this thesis to be situated 
in terms of ‘knavish’ curiosity or ‘foolish’ monism? The answer is that it probably stands 
for both. That is to say, along with many Expressionist artists (and Schopenhauer), I may 
be charged with suspecting the invisible in the visible when there is no such thing, or 
making that which is not open to common understanding appear plain. 
                                                                
1366 Weinsheimer, J., Eighteenth Century Hermeneutics: Philosophy of Interpretation in England from Locke to Burke 
(New Haven, Conn. u.a.: Yale Univ. Press, 1993). p.1. 
1367 Ibid., p.2. 
1368 Ibid., p.2. 
1369 Ibid., p.2. 
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Whether or not this thesis is judged to be ‘knavish’, ‘foolish’ or both, I have 
attempted to explore the validity of Marc’s claims on Schopenhauer’s terms (who is both 
‘foolish’ and ‘knavish)’.1370 These claims originated from two essays written for the 
journal Pan in 1912, where Marc claimed that “in Schopenhauer’s terms, the world as will 
today takes precedence over the world as representation”1371 [C1] and in another essay 
written just two weeks earlier where he claimed that, “Today we seek under the veil of 
appearances things hidden in nature that seem to us more important than the discoveries 
of the Impressionists…”1372 [C2}  
At the close of research into the above, I found approximately 40 validations of 
C1 and 18 refutations of C1, 12 validations of C2 and 3 refutations of C2. These results 
are significant, since C1 and C2 can be described as being generally true, yet because the 
results are not completely true some scholars might issue a warrant on behalf of a 
coherence theory of truth.1373 Thus, they may rightly point out that we used 
Schopenhauer’s analogical inference for the sake of a coherent methodological analysis 
and that the conclusions drawn from chapter 2 are seriously underdeveloped. In essence, 
the results could be criticised for being too hazy to provide “a sound normative theory of 
evidence and proof.”1374 Certainly, if I were to argue for a holistic approach to the proofs 
provided in this thesis as a whole, then theorists of coherence would find this an insecure 
process since I may be accused by them of “unduly disregarding contradictory evidence 
                                                                
1370 This should not be misinterpreted as a frivolous indictment of Schopenhauer, rather it should be interpreted within 
the above context. Indeed, perhaps this caveat is both ‘knavish’ and ‘foolish’. 
1371Marc, "Die Konstruktiven Ideen der Neuen Malerei "., 21.03.1912, pp.527-531. Marc did not elaborate on these 
claims in an explicit manner in his writing. 
1372 Marc, F. "Die Neue Malerei "., (07.03.1912), pp.468-471..  
1373 A coherence theory of truth can be defined as “the view that either the nature of truth or the sole criterion for 
determining truth is constituted by a relation of coherence between the belief (or judgment) being assessed and other 
beliefs (or judgments)… the coherence theory holds that it is true provided it stands in a suitably strong relation of 
coherence to other beliefs, so that the believer’s total system of beliefs forms a highly or perhaps perfectly coherent 
system.” See: Audi.,p.154. 
1374 Amaya, A., The Tapestry of Reason: An inquiry into the nature of coherence and its role in legal argument 
(Oxford: Hart, 2015).p.124. 
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so as to enhance coherence.”1375 In addition, critics could suggest that I have augmented 
the force of my argument in order to discredit and ignore alternative explanations 
surrounding C1 and C2.  
Critics who are uncertain about the primary findings arising from C1 and C2, 
might also highlight the problem of circularity (as a facet of coherence-based theories) 
which “posit a reciprocal relationship between the evidence of the case and the hypotheses 
about the case.”1376 In response it could be argued that neither theory nor evidence was 
pre-eminent during research, but instead both theory and evidence were co-dependent. 
Even so, this thesis might demonstrate a circularity in terms of its internal relations in as 
much as detailed work is related in sometimes convoluted ways back to Schopenhauer.  
It could also be the case that, despite the narrative around C1 and C2 being 
coherent enough, the research can be criticised for omitting links to certain factual events 
which ought to have been mentioned – especially cultural studies of Imperial Germany 
and post-war Expressionism. On that basis, the coherence of the narrative it may be 
argued, becomes a foundation for judgements which encourages one to accept as justified 
factual conclusions which are in fact unresponsive to the evidence. As a result, critics may 
suggest that readers will form their decisions about the primary findings of this thesis - 
(should it appear to be coherent and reasonable to them) - based upon a narrative 
unsupportable by consistent evidence. Indeed, some incompatible, yet coherent narratives, 
could have shown that the coherence of my narrative fails to deliver a sufficient reason to 
believe it to be true. 
That said, it is possible that the conclusions drawn from investigating C1 and C2, 
are acceptable and justifiable according to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, but still false. 
However, perhaps no philosophical theory can succeed in eradicating every uncertainty 
                                                                
1375 Ibid.,p.126. 
1376 Ibid.,p.128. 
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characteristic of a study of historical facts. On the other hand, it is equally possible that 
the investigation of C1 and C2 has been based upon a philosophical theory which provides 
us with cogent enough reasons to be accepted as justified in accordance with this theory - 
and in general likely to be true. Thus, Charles S Peirce offers us a plausible reconciliation 
to the above abjections when he declared that: “Philosophy is the attempt - for as the word 
itself implies it is and must be imperfect - is the attempt to form a general informed 
conception of the All. All men philosophize; and as Aristotle says we must do so if only 
to prove the futility of philosophy.”1377 
Whilst all of the above may be true to an extent, as an art-historical study into 
German Expressionism (based upon a philosophy of aesthetics), it has attempted ‘to form 
a general informed conception of the All’. The above claims of C1 and C2, as researched 
on Schopenhauer’s terms, have been fundamental to a single thought (der einzige 
Gedanke) running throughout this thesis, which is that the world as will takes precedence 
over the world as representation.1378 Since this became my main thought (mein 
Hauptgedanke), I have shown that Kandinsky’s attempt to explore that which lies beyond 
the world of representational appearance [C2] was misguided - even though he had read 
his Schopenhauer.1379 This was so because the inner nature of the world cannot be 
discovered whilst we are on the path of mere representation whether abstract or otherwise. 
The methodological approach behind Chapter 1 of this thesis adopted the ‘First 
Book: The World as Representation First Aspect’ and introduced Kandinsky’s approach 
to the world as representation. The chapter defined Schopenhauer’s understanding of the 
concept representation and my adoption of it and how this related to the world of objects 
                                                                
1377 Peirce, C. S. et al., The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Electronic edition. Volume 7 : Science and 
Philosophy (Charlottesville, Va: InteLex Corporation, 1994).p. 347. 
1378 For information on der einzige Gedanke see this thesis p.19. 
1379 Schopenhauer uses the phrase mein Hauptgedanke interchangeably for der einzige Gedanke. I have co-opted 
Schopenhauer’s German language so as to mirror the spirit of his methodology. 
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in Expressionism. In addition, this chapter explored C1 and C2 in connection with 
Kandinsky’s departure from the world of recognisable objects as intuitive representations, 
and towards abstract representations in his art. This method allowed us to introduce the 
German Expressionist body per se as a site for discovering the content of our 
representations. By investigating C1 and C2 on Schopenhauer’s terms, we considered 
intuitive representations of perception through his use of dianoiology which refers to 
theories of understanding. 
This methodology was important to our research into C1 and C2, since 
Schopenhauer argued that in Plato’s Phaedo Chapter 10 the Greek philosopher has put 
forward a “false dianoiology” that contained “a secret metaphysical intention” in order to 
fulfil a rational psychology and “a doctrine of immortality attaching thereto.”1380 This 
‘secret metaphysical intention’ can be defined in the following way. In essence, that which 
knows within us is supposedly an immaterial substance, essentially dissimilar to the body 
and described by philosophers such as Plato and Descartes as the soul. By contrast the 
body with its impure sensory apparatus is an impediment to true knowledge - and 
according to our research appears to mirror Kandinsky’s belief system as well. Therefore, 
according to this doctrine, all knowledge arising from the senses is deceptive, whereas the 
only trustworthy and certain knowledge “is that which is free and removed from all 
sensibility (thus from all intuitive perception), consequently pure thought, i.e. an operation 
exclusively with abstract concepts.”1381 Pure thought in turn arises entirely through its 
own means, functioning best after death when the soul has departed from the body.  
                                                                
1380 Schopenhauer and Payne. Vol.1., p.43. This methodology could be equally applied to chapter 3 of this thesis. 
However, since Kandinsky eschewed the body in favour of the spirit it was felt that dianoiology was more suitable to 
his case. Indeed, we may conclude that Kandinsky’s quasi theological leanings and his interest in the occult which were 
discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis, testify to similar beliefs and reflected in his book On the Spiritual in Art. 
1381 Ibid. 
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As a result of the above, Schopenhauer concludes that “dianoiology here plays into 
the hands of rational psychology for the purpose of a doctrine of immortality.”1382 Yet, for 
Schopenhauer as an atheist there is no soul, no life after death where the individual retains 
any sense of self.  In other words, “There is no rational psychology or doctrine of the soul 
since, as Kant has proved, the soul is a transcendent hypostasis, undemonstrated and 
unwarranted as such.”1383 In Schopenhauer’s opinion then, we ought to accept his own 
doctrine as a corrective to that of a rational psychology of the soul. In sum, and in concise 
terms, his doctrine states that only “intuitive knowledge, that is kept clear of all connection 
with the will, reaches the highest objectivity and hence perfection.”1384 Therefore, 
Kandinsky’s belief in a ‘soul’, as an avatar within the body, could not lead us to understand 
C2 on Schopenhauer’s terms, since for the latter there is ‘no rational psychology of the 
soul’.  
It was also demonstrated, on Schopenhauer’s terms, how Kandinsky’s theory and 
practice repudiated C1, due to its emphasis upon representation. This conclusion was 
reinforced by the critical language of the age, which ironically referred more often to the 
world of representation than the world as will or emotion. Naturally, this is not the only 
way to interpret Kandinsky’s work.1385 Yet, my interpretation however may 
complement Lisa Florman’s Concerning the Spiritual - and the Concrete - in 
Kandinsky’s Art1386 (2014), which links the artist to the philosopher G.W.F. Hegel. 
Although, there is no direct evidence for this linkage, she argues that Kandinsky wrote in 
German “to use the same language - in many passages, even precisely the same phrasing 
                                                                
1382 Ibid. 
1383 Ibid., Vol.2., p.19. 
1384 Ibid., p.46. 
1385 In 1918 Westheim reflected not only the critical language of the age, but unconsciously the dichotomy between 
‘knave’ and ‘fool’ when he questioned who was the person detaching themselves most from Nature: “Is it he who relies 
purely on the evidence of his eyes, or he who instinctively feels his way towards a greater truth, which is hidden in the 
depths?” See: Westheim.p.32. 
1386 Florman, L., Concerning the Spiritual and the Concrete in Kandinsky’s Art (Stanford University Press, 2014). 
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- that Hegel himself had employed.”1387 Her evidence is taken primarily from 
conversations which Kandinsky had with his nephew Alexandre Kojève. That said, my 
work differs from Florman’s speculative work, and is perhaps more significant, in that we 
do have direct evidence for a correlation between Kandinsky and Schopenhauer.  
Despite such direct evidence, it may be argued that my solution to Marc’s claims 
is as ‘knavish’ as Kandinsky’s, since “for knavish curiosity, the real is hidden. This means 
that the object of interpretation is conceived as situated below a covering surface, behind 
some opaque but enticing hieroglyph, waiting to be deciphered.”1388 However, I argued 
that because abstract representations are open to error, our discussion had to be anchored 
in something tangible – the human body.1389 This was not the position of an hermeneutic 
‘fool’ who finds that there is “nothing ‘mere’ about the outside, since there is no inside 
with which to contrast it - which is merely to say that things are what they seem.”1390 
Instead, on Schopenhauer’s terms it was argued, perhaps ‘knavishly’, that the entire body 
is the will manifesting itself in the perception of our brain. This entails that the will is 
ubiquitously present in the entire body, which means that the identity of the body is 
therefore identical with that of the will.1391  
This identity was explored in Chapter 2, where it was argued that Expressionist 
artists translated into aesthetic perception the dancing body - as objectified movements of 
the will. By analogical inference, it was maintained that we might in theory know the inner 
nature of other bodies or objects by comparing the changes occurring within our own 
bodies to that of other bodies or objects.1392 Schopenhauer asserts that this is possible 
                                                                
1387 Ibid., p.1. 
1388 Weinsheimer. p.2. 
1389 As mentioned in the main text of this thesis, Schopenhauer argues that all primary evidence is from intuitive 
perception, which is trustworthy compared to derivative concepts which are akin to the moon borrowing light from the 
sun. See: p.58-59. 
1390 Weinsheimer., p.3-4. 
1391 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.2, p.250. 
1392 Peters, M., Schopenhauer and Adorno on Bodily Suffering: A Comparative Analysis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
p.125. 
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because we know the body as both will and representation, and as an object it is like other 
objects - a representation. In essence therefore, it was this possibility which allowed us to 
answer C1 and C2 in detail throughout this thesis. The methodological approach behind 
chapter 2 was, in contrast to chapter 1, more ‘edaphic’ when it engaged with 
Schopenhauer’s ‘Second Book: The World as Will First Aspect’. Therefore, via the 
medium of the human body we attempted to apprehend the verity of C1 and C2 through a 
phenomenology of the body. As a result, we argued that the content of our representations 
was the will according to Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The artistic focus of the chapter 
contended that portrayals of dance generated and illustrated Schopenhauer’s opinion that 
the body is a manifestation of the will. 
Through the theme of the body in dance, a relationship of power between the will 
and the intellect was exposed - one where “…the intellect strikes up the tune, and the will 
must dance to it.”1393 This happens even though the will is devoid of knowledge, and the 
intellect is devoid of will. The will can act as if it were a body controlled by the intellect, 
but ‘the primacy of the will’ reasserts itself by: 
…prohibiting the intellect from having certain representations, by absolutely 
preventing certain trains of thought from arising, because it knows, or in other 
words experiences from the self-same intellect, that they would arouse in it any 
one of the emotions previously described. It then curbs and restrains the intellect, 
and forces it to turn to other things.1394  
 
As soon as the will becomes serious about this it offers resistance to any representation it 
dislikes - thus confirming C1. If a representation interests the will, all is ‘well’, yet if 
abstract knowledge informs the will that a representation may give it pain, then the will 
compels the intellect to submit to its demands – again confirming C1. As Schopenhauer 
discloses, “this is called ‘being master of oneself’; where the master is the will, the servant 
the intellect, for in the last instance the will is always in command and therefore constitutes 
                                                                
1393 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol. 2, p.208. 
1394 Ibid., p.208. 
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the real core, the being-in-itself, of man.”1395 As a consequence, the intellect is a mere 
footman to its master, the will.  
The consequences of Chapter 2 may be applied to other branches of knowledge 
such as dance history. At one level, they might illuminate the work of Barbara Reiner, and 
Katharina Knauth’s Ausdrucksgymnastik und Ausdruckstanz: Tanzen bildet die Sinne1396 
(2013). These authors have enlarged upon elements of Wigman’s expressionist dance as 
an aid to psychotherapy. Through the authors’ knowledge of Expressionist dance, patients 
are enabled to communicate their feelings through movement. This playful form of self-
knowledge therefore, could perhaps benefit from my investigations into the nature of the 
body as objectified will.  
As we have seen, the form of the Expressionist body is not given to us through 
feeling alone, but solely through knowledge in representation. Since this is so, the body is 
a metaphysical key to understanding how we perceive the world. For example, every 
movement of our body is an act of objectified will which Expressionist artists translated 
into aesthetic perception. This implies that knowledge of the will in Expressionist art is 
inseparable from knowledge of the body and vice versa. The import of this being that, 
through our knowledge of the Expressionist body and the aspects of it we have explored, 
we have gained knowledge a posteriori of the will. To parody Schopenhauer, if the will 
is the thing-in-itself, the inner content of the Expressionists’ world, then the world of the 
Expressionists was also the phenomenon, the mirror of that will. Therefore, the world of 
the Expressionists accompanied that will as inextricably as their body was accompanied 
by a shadow. 
                                                                
1395 Ibid., p.208. 
1396 Reiners, B. and Knauth, K., Ausdrucksgymnastik und Ausdruckstanz: Tanzen bildet die Sinne (Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2013). 
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Through the medium of the body, Chapter 3 explored C1 and C2 in relation to the 
most adequate objectivity of the will - the Platonic Idea. This objectivity was related to 
Kirchner’s depictions of the naked body during the period c. 1905-1914. Although social 
historians have tended to associate Kirchner’s art with Nietzsche’s philosophy, by contrast 
our approach to this chapter was to employ facets from Schopenhauer’s third book, ‘The 
World as Representation Second Aspect: The Representation Independent of the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason: The Platonic Idea: The Object of Art..’1397 In this chapter we used 
an epistemological methodology as in the law of homogeneity and the law of specification 
and primarily appointed the former law as that which pertains to the Platonic Idea of the 
human body. The importance of this approach was that it showed how we might come to 
know the Ideas in Kirchner’s work. Yet, despite this knowledge, it could be argued that 
anything other than a plain and literal interpretation of Kirchner’s nudes would be 
pointless, or even worse, since it runs the risk of unnecessary misinterpretation. Certainly, 
as Weinsheimer might argue, that would be “the fool’s hermeneutic, and of course it is not 
entirely foolish or wholly anti-interpretive.”1398 However, to say that Kircher’s nudes 
speak for themselves I would argue forestalls interpretation - but “only interpretation as 
knavishly conceived.”1399 
Although Kirchner’s nudes were set in this new context, my findings reaffirmed 
what many scholars have found to be the inadequacy of Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the 
Ideas. As Gardiner points out, it is not entirely clear how the Ideas relate to real things in 
the world, nor is it clear how such inflexible archetypes allow for any unique expressivity 
by artists. Furthermore, because Schopenhauer has argued that the will is pernicious and 
ought to be abolished, who would wish to contemplate its most adequate objectivity? A 
                                                                
1397 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.168. 
1398 Weinsheimer. p.9. 
1399 Ibid., p.9. 
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‘knavish’ response may be that this is possible “because the pure subject of knowledge 
has become completely detached from the will and from its purposes, because the will-
less contemplation is unaffected by the unhappy character of the objectivations of the 
will.”1400 Even so, we are left with the uncomfortable feeling that the ‘knave’ has side 
stepped the issue and that, “the fool is right that anything beyond what is plain and 
apparent must be invented.”1401 
Whether we agree with the fool or the knave, Kirchner’s appreciation of the nude 
in Ajanta cave art is evident, as is Schopenhauer’s affinity with the Vedas, Upanishads 
and Buddhism. That means that this chapter may complement works such as Arati Barua’s 
book, Schopenhauer and Indian Philosophy: A Dialogue Between India and Germany1402 
(2008), as well as Stephen Cross’s Schopenhauer's Encounter with Indian Thought: 
Representation and Will and Their Indian Parallels1403 (2013). Consequently, future 
scholars might pursue Kirchner’s interest in Ajanta art through Schopenhauer’s teaching 
and its coincidence with Indian idealism.  
Since the Platonic Ideas expressed in Kirchner’s nudes were held to be the most 
adequate objectivity of the will, aesthetic contemplation of them was shown to offer but a 
temporary liberation from - and refutation of - C1. Yet, that is not the end of the story, 
because as Wicks suggests, Schopenhauer’s philosophy “indicates the gradual emergence 
within his aesthetics, of what can be called the art of suffering.”1404 This suggestion entails 
that a comprehensive rebuttal of C1 necessitates a resignation from the will to live and the 
will to life through suffering.  
                                                                
1400 Hübscher, A., The Philosophy of Schopenhauer in Its Intellectual Context: Thinker Against the Tide (E. Mellen 
Press, 1989). p.386. 
1401 Weinsheimer. p.11. 
1402 Barua. 
1403 Cross, S., Schopenhauer's Encounter with Indian Thought: Representation and Will and Their Indian Parallels 
(University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2013). 
1404 Wicks. p.281-82. 
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In chapter 4 of this thesis, an analysis of artists suffering through the First World 
War enabled us to proceed along these lines. The viability of interpreting Beckmann, 
Marc, and Macke’s attitudes to war and suffering was reframed through a new and original 
methodology. Therefore, our approach to chapter 4 and the research into Marc’s claims 
involved a recruitment of Schopenhauer’s ‘Fourth Book: The World as Will Second 
Aspect’, and an empirical methodology, where we studied the texts and images of 
Beckmann, Marc and August Macke. Two methods helped us interpret their feelings 
towards the First World War, firstly through their understanding of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy and secondly via contemporary military practices. The primary goal was to 
uncover their attitudes towards the war through the utterances expressed in their letters, 
and the extent to which they affirmed or denied the will to war. 
This goal might raise several objections since we cannot be certain, unless the 
matter is literal and plain, precisely what the intentions of the artists were in relation to 
their utterances. Due to that uncertainty, this chapter as was pointed out earlier on in the 
thesis, may justly be charged with forming concrete conclusions which have been drawn 
from tenuous premises - as when a phrase in a letter was used to make claims about an 
individual’s experience of war. Indeed, because some of the primary findings 
surrounding C1 and C2 were derived from such letters, some final methodological 
reflection may be necessary here. In the first instance, we might reflect upon Quentin 
Skinner’s argument that the:  
…special authority of an agent over his intentions does not exclude, of course, 
the possibility that an observer might be in a position to give a fuller or more 
convincing account of the agent's behavior than he could give himself. 
(Psychoanalysis is indeed founded on this possibility).1405 
                                                                
1405 Skinner, Q., "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," in: History and Theory  Vol. 8, no. 1 
(1969).,p.28. 
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Therefore, the vital point in our effort to understand such utterances (as expressed by the 
artists in their letters, and in connection with C1 for example) might have been one of 
retrieving the intentions of these artists. In that case, Skinner would suggest that we 
should have outlined the entire range of possible communications which usually 
operated at the time of the artists utterances.  
Following this, we ought then to have followed the links between the artists 
utterances and the broader verbal context in which they appeared - “as a means of 
decoding the actual intention of the given writer.”1406 Therefore, if we were to view the 
Expressionists letters as a special linguistic study, concerned only with a retrieval of 
authorial intentions, then a contextual study of the facts in question may have assumed 
their rightful place. Yet, as Skinner himself confesses, it often happens that “the ‘context’ 
mistakenly gets treated as the determinant of what is said. It needs rather to be treated as 
an ultimate framework for helping to decide what conventionally recognizable 
meanings, in a society of that kind, it might in principle have been possible for someone 
to have intended to communicate.”1407 If this is true, then we may have avoided such a 
problem in this thesis. 
That said, if some critics feel that this chapter has presumed too much upon 
tenuous evidence for its primary findings, and has argued for authorial intentions which 
are specious, then as David Boucher rightly points out, there are numerous cases where 
an utterance can manifest a force which was unintended by the author. Thus, at a simple 
level, it is possible that in some instances convention and not intention “determines the 
force an utterance will carry,”1408 and that “what the utterer means and what the utterance 
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means can be two distinct entities.”1409 Consequently, to enforce a philosophy of 
meaning which discounts features of a text, “such as the assumptions, presuppositions 
and implications, of which the author may not have been aware,”1410 would do violence 
to the truth of many possible meanings. Even so, for scholars such as John Dunn, it is 
the elusiveness of meanings, and the problem of consigning to them a distinct theoretical 
standing, which threatens the “coherence of our a priori presumptions.”1411Therefore, it 
remains open to debate whether this thesis has given due scope to such ‘presuppositions 
and implications’, or whether the a priori assumptions and attributed meanings which I 
have given to the Expressionists utterances have contaminated their original intentions. 
In spite of any potential misinterpretations, through Schopenhauer’s philosophy, 
some remarkable differences in the characters of Beckmann, Marc and Macke were 
revealed. Although these artists featured in a dedicated chapter, the new horizons which 
such a study has opened up means that scholars in future could advance upon my work. 
For instance, scholars could explore the entire life and work of Beckmann through his 
reading of Schopenhauer, including both his visual and literary art. Although I have gone 
some way towards addressing such deficits, future scholarship could take matters further 
by specialising in these areas through stand-alone theses. Despite the limited scope of this 
chapter, my work is at least significant for adding to Buenger’s thoughts on Beckmann 
during the war.1412  
 Whilst acknowledging the limited scope of this chapter and the thesis as a whole, 
there is an additional significance to note, since whether the Expressionists were at war or 
not, their work can now be set against Germany’s Willenskultur. As we saw, this term 
                                                                
1409 Ibid.,p.221. 
1410 Ibid.,p.2223. 
1411 Dunn, J., Political Obligation in Its Historical Context: Essays in Political Theory (Cambridge University Press, 
2002). 
1412 Beckmann and Buenger. 
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refers to a culture of the will, that is to say a culture of empirically willed human actions 
in opposition to those of passive acquiescence. Indeed, Willenskultur was not simply a 
minor Germanic phenomenon. The idea of ‘exercising the will’ was quite widespread and 
transmitted through popular self-help books. This does not mean that everyone followed 
it (this is unlikely), yet most people knew about it, much in the same way that we all know 
about alternative medicine. However, ‘will training’ was by and large an ideal for an 
aspiring bourgeoisie with reformist overtones, albeit less so for the working classes.1413 
Nevertheless, both Willenskultur and body culture impacted upon the consciousness of 
those involved in art and philosophy. As a result, I argued that one of the greatest impacts 
upon the human body was bought about by the Nazi dictatorship which contrived to give 
it a new significance for art and life. Consequently in Chapter 5, we turned our attention 
the work of Otto Mueller in relation to his paintings of the gypsy people.  
 Our approach to Chapter 5 entailed an interpretation of its findings through 
Schopenhauer’s essay On the Basis of Morality. We proceeded with the  conviction that 
the  foundation of ethics is made apparent through empiricism. Therefore, we began by 
discussing specific empirical facts, such as Germany’s ‘November’ revolution, the 
abdication of the Kaiser, the subsequent institution of the Weimar Republic war 
reparations, and economic depression. This chapter then approached the notion of the 
German Expressionist body through the work of Mueller in relation to his depictions in 
art of the gypsy people. Although no evidence exists that Mueller studied Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, the chapter interpreted and resolved its findings through the latter’s moral 
philosophy. 
                                                                
1413 I am grateful to Michael Cowan for sharing his thoughts with me on this through an email conversation of 
07.11.2015. 
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  By following this procedure, the treatment of the gypsy people was juxtaposed 
in relation to Muller’s depictions of them. This treatment was set within the context of the 
Entartete Kunst exhibition of 1937 and an examination of the concept of ‘degeneracy’. 
This chapter was valuable since it showed how C1 possessed a strongly prophetic quality, 
testified to by the impact of the Nazis’ political will. Out of this impact arose a renewed 
significance for Expressionist art in relation to moral theory, where as we saw, for Nazi 
officials such as Rosenberg, justice arose through Nordic art due to its manufacture by 
‘different race souls’, the most virtuous race souls being the Nordic peoples who allegedly 
revealed the most salient moral values for art. Yet, I argued that this was at the core of an 
egoism, which resulted in hatred, injustice and malice.1414 Through Schopenhauer, I 
therefore showed that acts of genuine moral worth are those which benefit others as if they 
were acts of kindness towards oneself.1415  
 Through the knowledge that we are all born of the same will, it was proposed 
that compassion is “the real basis of all voluntary justice and genuine loving-kindness.”1416 
This is of import because to date no scholarship has approached the problems of the 
‘Degenerate Art’ exhibition through a specific moral doctrine as executed in this thesis. 
This approach implies that both the monism of the ‘fool’ and the dualist interpretations of 
the ‘knave’ can be satisfied, since it is plain that the gypsy people suffered and Mueller’s 
depictions of them remind us of this fact. Consequently, by reaching below the surface of 
these facts it was argued that compassion ought to be the foundation for moral judgement. 
 If we are prepared to apply Schopenhauer’s moral judgements, then there are 
further possibilities for interpreting Expressionist art through them. One possibility is the 
                                                                
1414 Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.210. 
1415 Ibid., p.143. 
1416 Ibid., p.144. 
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link between portraiture and Schopenhauer’s work on physiognomy, which feeds into the 
harsh reality that if an individual’s face, quite literally, did not ‘fit’ during Nazism, then 
that individual would often find themselves in a world of pain. In fact, well before the 
advent of Nazism, it is probable that Expressionist artists were aware of physiognomic 
theories, although physiognomy is perhaps more prominent in the photography of the 
period, as in August Sander’s project for cataloguing the physiognomies of different 
classes of people.1417 Such links ought to resonate therefore with Richard T. Gray’s book 
About Face: German Physiognomic Thought from Lavater to Auschwitz.1418  
The problem of Expressionist physiognomy, as a cultural sign for belonging or not 
belonging under Nazism, relates to my work on Nolde in Chapter 6. The methodological 
approach behind Chapter 6 arguably placed an emphasis upon the theoretical as opposed 
to the practical order to question the possibility of free will for Nolde according to an 
application of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Despite any potential controversy which this 
chapter may have raised, the problem of free will for German citizens of whatever creed 
or ethnic origin, has never been raised by previous scholars. Its ‘pioneering’ theoretical 
emphasis was therefore a major contribution towards a dearth of scholarship on this issue 
and we might conclude therefore became a compelling vindication of C1. 
In spite of the above, it may be the case that this chapter falls into a trap, and  by 
“‘fixing tropes and allegories to the letter’ is what makes credulity foolish, just as ‘refining 
what is literal into figure and mystery’ […] makes for hermeneutic knavery.”1419 As a 
result, as Weisheimer argues, on this basis “the fool understands everything as plain, the 
                                                                
1417 Photography is also important for Cesare Lombroso's theories and runs deep into criminology of the period and in 
Expressionist film as well. I am grateful to Richard T. Gray for his input on the above through an email conversation 
dated 15.04.2016. 
1418 Gray, R. T., About Face: German Physiognomic Thought from Lavater to Auschwitz (Wayne State University Press, 
2004). 
1419 Weinsheimer.,p.2-3. 
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knave as dark and deep.”1420 Yet, if the chapter of this thesis is adjudged to have ‘fixed 
tropes to the letter’ or refined ‘what is literal into figure and mystery’ with regards to 
Nolde’s case, then at least this chapter has taken a new look at the artist in relation to the 
problems of free will.  
That new look investigated the extent to which Nolde possessed free will whilst 
living under National Socialism, by using Schopenhauer’s doctrine on freedom of the will. 
This doctrine was applied to Nolde’s membership of the Nazi Party, his later victimisation 
by them, and the problem of certain anti-Semitic remarks made by him. This was felt to 
be important since most Nolde scholarship, particularly that of Fulda and Soika, simply 
engages in epideictic oratory over his anti-Semitic remarks and his membership of the 
Nazi Party. By contrast, I argue that this is an hermeneutic of the ‘fool’, for whom “truth 
is open to common understanding, as well as common sense, because what is most 
certainly true is that which is patent, obvious to everyone.”1421 My argument, conceivably 
knavish, problematised this belief, advocating that human behaviour is more complex, 
more ambiguous and more perplexing than such historians would have us believe. Even 
so, some may object that my approach to Nolde’s situation means that “not the surface, 
then, but the very attempt to penetrate and interpret it constitutes the deception: in a 
monistic world, it is the knave who is the fool.”1422 
The possibility that my approach to Nolde’s free will is one of self-deception, of a 
‘knave who is the fool’, is noteworthy because John Berger once said that “to look is an 
act of choice.”1423 But this is surely an hermeneutical folly because there is a sense in 
which all art, and viewings of it by the public and art establishment, is made according to 
                                                                
1420 Ibid.,p.3. 
1421 Ibid. p.4-5. 
1422 Ibid., p.4. 
1423 Berger, J., Ways of Seeing (London: Penguin Books, 2008). p.8. 
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strict laws of causality. I therefore argue, that Nolde’s freedom of will must be 
disentangled from his freedom of action – that is to say the capacity to perform a particular 
deed if he willed to perform that particular deed. Thus, according to Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, Nolde possessed freedom of will only if he enjoyed the absence of causal 
necessity. This postulation entailed a consideration of Nolde’s physical freedom under 
Nazism from the standpoint of Schopenhauer’s determinism. This led us to conclude 
that he lacked freedom of the will in a physical sense, and it was therefore anticipated 
that political freedom was to be classed under physical freedom. 
During the entire consideration of Nolde’s freedom I applied a research 
question originally set by the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences in 1837, one which 
had formed the basis of Schopenhauer’s essay on free will. This question asked, “Can the 
freedom of the human will be demonstrated from self-consciousness?”1424 
Schopenhauer’s answer to the Society’s question was then adapted and applied to a study 
of Nolde’s life under Nazism. Subsequently, it was stated that Nolde’s self-consciousness 
could not provide an answer to the Society’s question - as to whether his acts of will were 
necessitated by grounds which determined them. I also compared the doctrine of 
determinism with that of indeterminism and explained the difference between the two as 
it applied to Nolde. In doing so, it was argued that any objective account of Nolde’s acts 
of will, whether under the duress of Nazism or not, had to be grounded in a nexus of causes 
which necessitated them. Therefore, according to my application of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, it was concluded that there could have been no freedom of will for Nolde in 
this sense. That was so because no acts of his will could have been without a ground which 
necessitated them.  
                                                                
1424 Zöller. p.3 
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Yet, I appear to contradict myself, since I have implied that determinism is all there 
is to the matter. Thus, it seems as if I have practiced the wisdom of the ‘fool’ who feels 
in“ his knowledge that in a world without mystery or mystification, without ‘secret 
wheels’ and ‘hidden springs’, hermeneutic exposé actually covers the truth it pretends to 
discover.”1425 As a result, I could have conceded that either there was no problem of free 
will for Nolde, or that there was a genuine mystery to the problem of free will for him - as 
there is with every individual. However, perhaps that would be a ‘fool’s’ interpretation, 
since it would suggest that the distinction between these two choices was obvious. 
Nevertheless, this did not preclude the feeling that most of us have that Nolde must have 
been somehow plainly responsible for his actions. 
Through Schopenhauer’s doctrine this problem was tackled by displacing the 
notion of his responsibility away from his personal acts on to his character. Thus, by 
applying Schopenhauer’s doctrine to Nolde, it was found that his empirical character was 
said to be a mere appearance which manifested “his intelligible character, i.e. his will as 
thing in itself.”1426 Since Schopenhauer pursues the determinist path we subsequently 
found that he was attempting to uphold the notion of moral responsibility in the same way. 
By agreeing with Janaway, it was suggested that any sense of free will which we might 
have attributed to Nolde meant that Schopenhauer’s sense of free will reaches an absurd 
limit, as one removed from the objective world without the possibility of interacting with 
it.1427 However, despite these limitations it was found that Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
helped us interpret Nolde’s life under Nazism and his anti-Semitic remarks in a new light. 
Ultimately, since we have thought about Marc’s claims on Schopenhauer’s terms, we must 
                                                                
1425 Weinsheimer. p.6-7. 
1426 Janaway. p.243. 
1427 Ibid., p.245. 
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conclude that on those terms the will alone “is free; it is almighty,”1428 which in turn 
confirms C1. 
We can also confirm that one of the primary findings of the thesis was that specific 
Expressionist artists studied Schopenhauer’s work - sometimes in considerable depth. It 
was therefore, argued that the latter’s philosophy provides a basis for artistic interpretation 
and that in some cases, as with Marc, Kandinsky, Beckmann and Macke, that they may 
have been influenced by Schopenhauer. It was also an important finding that we could 
sustain a rigorous investigation of C1 and C2 through Schopenhauer’s philosophy, since 
it provided us with a basis for artistic interpretation - irrespective of whether the artist in 
question was influenced by or acquainted with that philosophy. However, as part of our 
concluding remarks, we must briefly reflect upon the idea of influence per se which may 
have run the risk of forming questionable conclusions.  
The spectre of questionable conclusions based upon theories of influence has been 
addressed by Philip P. Weiner, who acknowledges that the problem of ‘influences’ in the 
history of ideas is a perennial one. He states that: “It will not do to say ‘X influenced Y 
because what is true of X is true of Y, and X preceded Y’. The fallacy of post hoc, ergo 
propter hoc and the possibility that X and Y have a common source in Z or derive from a 
common tradition must not be forgotten.”1429 In that case, the intellectual historian is 
perhaps better equipped to assess a thinker’s influence upon subsequent periods in history 
compared to that thinkers autobiographical declarations – as Wiener says, “Ipse dixit is 
not an indubitable criterion of truth in intellectual autobiography.”1430 
Since we have explored C1 and C2 in great detail in this thesis, and secured some 
important findings in the process, it comes as a surprise to learn that Schopenhauer placed 
                                                                
1428 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.351 
1429 Wiener, P. P., "Some Problems and Methods in the History of Ideas," in: Journal of the History of Ideas  Vol. 22, 
no. 4 (1961).p.537. Cf. Boucher..p195-96. 
1430 Wiener.,p.539. 
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great faith in autobiographical testimonies – doubly surprising given his renowned 
pessimism and his stringent demand that scholars should think for themselves. He 
proposes that we can get to know an author as an individual “most easily” from their 
books, and how “in an autobiography it is so difficult to dissimulate, that there is perhaps 
not a single one that is not on the whole truer than any history ever written.”1431 For 
Schopenhauer, the author who writes an autobiographical work sits at  the confessional, 
of their own free will, where “… the spirit of lying does not seize him so readily, for there 
is to be found in every man an inclination to truth which has first to be overcome in the 
case.”1432  
Had we therefore assessed C1 and C2, and any findings arising from this with 
Schopenhauer’s unguarded naïveté, then they may have possessed less credibility. On the 
other hand, a safer methodological option might have been to dispense with any notion of 
Schopenhauer’s influence upon Expressionist artists altogether and dismissed such ideas 
from our research vocabulary altogether. There might have been a point to this, and one 
which Skinner could agree with, since historians may erroneously assume that it was the 
intention of a later writer or artist to refer to an earlier writer or artist, and thereby 
speciously cite the influence of that earlier individual’s work.  
That said, if the concept of influence, has been applied at all in a direct manner in 
this thesis, at least as an ‘explanatory’ instrument, then it was perhaps not entirely a 
vacuous exercise - despite its oft times highly tenuous grip. Yet, as Skinner remarks, the 
danger of the influence model is “that it is so easy to use the concept in an apparently 
explanatory way without any consideration of whether the conditions sufficient, or at least 
necessary, for the proper application of the concept have been met.”1433 If this is so, then 
                                                                
1431 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.1, p.248. 
1432 Ibid. Vol.1, p.248. 
1433 Skinner, Q. and ProQuest, Regarding Method (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002).p.75. 
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arguably, when I have found parallels between Kandinsky’s study of Schopenhauer, or 
highlighted the fact that Macke used the latter’s philosophy in order to learn how to think, 
then my correlations may signal a form of parochialism, whereby I have misused  my 
“vantage-point” when describing “the apparent reference of some statement in a classic 
text,”1434 such as Schopenhauer’s or an Expressionist’s. As a consequence, by speciously 
brooding upon my presumption, this thesis may at times have given the impression that it 
was the intention of Kandinsky for example, to ‘insinuate’ Schopenhauer into his own 
creative thinking. 
That said, the intention of this thesis was to echo the “unfolding of a single 
thought”1435which pervades Schopenhauer’s major work The World as Will and 
Representation, however neither Schopenhauer nor myself have been able to render 
explicit what this ‘single thought’ is. Even so, it might be interpreted as being how “the 
double-sided world is the striving of the will to become fully conscious of itself so that, 
recoiling in horror at its inner, self-divisive nature, it may annul itself and thereby its self-
affirmation, and then reach salvation.”1436 In essence, the unifying thought behind this 
thesis explored the extent to which the will is almighty (allmächtig) and predominant in 
the life and art of Expressionism.1437 
Despite this conclusion, for ‘knave’ and ‘fool’ alike, C1 may be viewed as either 
a mere platitude or one pregnant with significance. Indeed for ‘knave’ and ‘fool’, the 
Expressionist Body, in conjunction with the philosophy of Schopenhauer, might only be 
remembered as a clever snare which is “like coins in the devil’s purse: when you open it 
                                                                
1434 Ibid. 
1435 Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.286. See also ibid., Vol. 1.p.xiii. 
1436 Atwell. p.31. Atwell adds that: “In several places Schopenhauer does use der einzige Gedanke (the single thought), 
der eine Gedanke (the one thought), and mein Hauptgedanke (my main thought), and he frequently states what may be 
considered the single thought; but he never puts the two together in an explicit fashion, that is, he never says, ‘See, here 
is the single thought, and it goes thus and so’ ” ibid., p.188. fn,1. See also: Taylor. p.43-53. 
1437 There are many instances where Schopenhauer takes the view that the will is allmächtig as in: Schopenhauer and 
Hübscher. Vol.3. 
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you find only dead leaves.”1438 Moreover, the flaws of this thesis inevitably reveal that, I 
as an interpreter, along with every man, “takes the limits of his own field of vision for the 
limits of the world.”1439 Given this hermeneutical confession, a ‘knavish’ interpretation of 
Marc’s claims has perhaps put me at a disadvantage, since some metaphysical 
explanations can never achieve the status of apodictic certainty. On the other hand, where 
the ‘fool’s’ interpretation of Marc’s claims appear evident in this thesis, then this has the 
advantage of apparent clarity and plainness. However, a lack of hermeneutical consensus 
is perhaps a virtue of this thesis, since I did not aspire to “the advent of a hermeneutic 
dictator powerful or persuasive enough to ‘reduce the notions of all mankind exactly to 
the same length and breadth and height of his own’.”1440 
Not wishing to reduce the notions of mankind to the same length and breadth as 
my own, let us conclude our explorations and assert that Marc’s claims were astute, 
prophetic and expressive of his generation’s Weltgefühl.1441 Despite their partial validity, 
these claims had their gaze directed towards eternity and foreshadowed developments 
across Europe which will continue to haunt us in the future. Therefore, if the ‘triumph of 
the will’ is real, and takes precedence over the world as representation, then for the life 
cycle of the individual and mankind alike, it must be the case that: 
In early youth, as we contemplate our coming life, we are like children in a theatre 
before the curtain is raised, sitting there in high spirits and eagerly waiting for the 
play to begin. It is a blessing that we do not know what is really going to happen. 
Could we foresee it, there are times when children might seem like innocent 
prisoners, condemned, not to death, but to life, and as yet all unconscious of what 
their sentence means.1442 
 
 
                                                                
1438 Sartre, J.-P. and Alexander, L., Nausea ([New York]: New Directions Pub. Corp, 1969). p.52. 
1439 Schopenhauer, A. and Saunders, T. B., Studies in Pessimism: A Series of Essays (S. Sonnenschein, 1891). p.69. 
1440 Weinsheimer. p.11. 
1441 Trans. ‘World-feeling’. 
1442 Schopenhauer, A., Collected Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer (Start Publishing LLC, 2012). 
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Appendix A: Period Media Titles 
 
Der dramatische Wille, (The Dramatic Will), 1919-23. 
Deutscher Wille, (German Will), 1921-1935.  
Deutscher Wille / Jugendbuch, (German Will/Youth Magazine), 1935-41. 
Deutscher Wille: Schriften für die deutsche Jugend, (German Will: Writings for German 
Youth), 1933. 
Entscheidung: proletarischer Wille und soziale Zukunft, (Decision: Proletarian Will and 
Social Future), 1929-33. 
Hitler Jugend marschiert: Wille und Tat, (Hitler Youth on the March: Will and Deed), 
1938-39. 
Der jüdische Wille: Zeitschrift der Kartells jüdischer Verbindungen, (Jewish Will: 
Newspaper for the Cartel of Jewish Connections), 1918-1937. 
Junger Wille, (Young Will), 1933-42. 
Nationaler Wille, (National Will), 1929-33. 
Tat und Wille: Blätter der Gegenwart, (Deed and Will: Magazine of the Present) 1927. 
Unser Wille und Weg, (Our Will and Way), 1931-1941. 
Werk und Wille: Zeitschrift zur Bücherei und Kulturarbeit, (Work and Will: Magazine for 
Libraries and Cultural Work), 1934-38. 
Der Wille: Blätter für das deutsche Volk, (The Will: Magazine for the German People), 
1932. 
Wille und Macht: Führerorgan der nationalsozialistischen Jugend, (Will and Power: The 
Führer’s Magazine for Nazi Youth), 1933-44. 
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Appendix B: Walden, Der Sturm and Schopenhauer  
If German Expressionism could ever be accused of entertaining its own 
mythology, then it might be seen through the growth of specialist art journals. From the 
turn of the century until the outbreak of the First World War over fifty were in circulation. 
The journal Der Sturm, founded by Herwarth Walden in 1910, was a major promoter of 
German Expressionist art becoming the first to proselytise works by both Der Blaue Reiter 
and Die Brücke. 
By 1912, Der Sturm had established its own art gallery bringing in works of art 
from the Italian Futurists and French Fauves, amongst others. As Irene Chytraeus-
Auerbach has shown, the editorial staff of the Italian magazine La Voce maintained mutual 
relations with Walden and Der Sturm from late 1912 and early 1913. Whilst, some of 
Walden’s associates in Florence disapproved of Der Sturm’s artistic evolution, others such 
as the painter Ardengo Soffici exhibited his French Cubist style works in Der Sturm’s 
Berlin gallery from 30.01.913, alongside the work of Robert Delaunay and Julie Baum.1443 
Four years later in 1917, Der Sturm founded an independent art school with Walden 
himself acting as agent for Lyonel Feininger, Marc Chagall, Fernand Léger, and Hans 
Arp.  Together with many other activities, Der Sturm was an influential publishing house 
which organised travelling exhibitions to in an attempt to promote international 
modernism throughout Germany. 
Schopenhauer’s name rarely appears in Der Sturm, yet there is one direct link 
between Walden and the philosopher in an article by Max Steiner, called ‘Schopenhauer 
                                                                
1443 See: Irene Chytraeus-Auerbach ‘German Expressionism in Italy: Herwarth Walden’s Der Sturm, the Berlin 
Novembergruppe, and the Modernist Circles of Florence, Turin, and Rome’ in: Wünsche, Isabel (ed.), The Routledge 
Companion to Expressionism in a Transnational Context, London/New York: Routledge, 2018 (forthcoming). Cf.  Der 
Sturm. Wochenschrift für Kultur und die Künste, ed., Zwölfte Ausstellung: Robert Delaunay, Julie Baum, 
Gedächtnisausstellung, Ardengo Soffici [Twelfth exhibition: Robert Delaunay, Julie Baum, commemorative exhibition, 
Ardengo Soffici], (Berlin: Der Sturm, 1913; exh. cat.).  
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und die Politik’. In this 1911 article for Der Sturm, Sterner argued that Schopenhauer did 
not simply view the world from his study window. Instead, he used the experience of life 
as the basis of all his doctrines. Furthermore, Sterner suggested that no-one criticised 
democracy more sharply than did Schopenhauer. The philosopher it is true had lived 
through the 1848 revolutions and gave a description of them in a letter which reduced the 
glorious heroes, as the democrats saw themselves, to ‘the pack behind the barricades’. In 
fact, Sterner told his Der Sturm readers how Schopenhauer had considered the republican 
system to be an unnatural one. Whilst acknowledging the sovereignty of the people in 
some respects, he (Schopenhauer) also believed that the people could easily become the 
plaything of demagogues. The philosopher’s low opinion of the people’s political 
understanding also made him an opponent of press freedom. Indeed, Schopenhauer did 
not wish to replicate the British parliamentary system in Germany, and Sterner understood 
Schopenhauer to be a staunch monarchist whose greatest wish was for German unity.  
Consequently, Sterner argued that for Schopenhauer an Emperor who would preserve the 
nation’s peace internally and represent the unity of the empire externally.1444  
Another rare instance where the philosopher’s name occurs is in a 1920 edition, in 
the form of an article written by Otto Nebel and titled ‘Was Schopenhauer von Servaes 
Weiss’.1445 The article is difficult to translate, since it is written in a satirical idiolect where 
only one mention of Schopenhauer is made. In fact, the rest of the text is given over to 
criticising a journalist by the name of Franz Servaes. In the only mention of the 
philosopher, Nebel tells his Der Sturm audience that Schopenhauer considered journalists 
                                                                
1444 Steiner, M. ‘Schopenhauer und die Politik’ in: Walden., Jg. II, Nr. 82, October 1911, p.652-653. 
1445 Nebel, O.  ‘Was Schopenhauer von Servaes Weiss’ in: ibid., Jg.11, Heft 2, May 1920, p.22. In addition, there are 
some short references to Schopenhauer in the following literature on Walden and Der Sturm: Maurice Godé: “Poetik 
und Politik im literarischen Expressionismus,” in: Bermbach, Udo / Vaget, Hans Rudolf (Hg.) Getauf auf Musik. 
Festschrift fuer Dieter Borchmeyer, Wuerzburg: Koenigshausen & Neumann, p.86. Hodonyi, Robert: Herwarth 
Waldens ‘Sturm’ und die Architektur, eine Analyse zur Konvergenz der Kuenste in der Berliner Moderne, 
Bielefeld:  Aisthesis. 2010, p.116, 262, 268, 355.  
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to be untalented personalities who have vulgar mouths. Servaes by contrast is given 
priority over Schopenhauer, and Der Sturm readers learned that Servaes attended the 
Gymnasium in Cologne and studied art and German at the universities of Leipzig, 
Strasbourg, and Bonn from 1881. After receiving his doctorate in 1887, he lived in Berlin 
publishing his first essays and art reviews there. The first performance of his drama “Zu 
Haus,” which had remained unpublished up until then, took place on 7.04.1895 whih 
received negative reviews from the press. Then a short time later, another drama entitled 
“Stickluft” appeared, and by 1899 Servaes had published in various weekly and monthly 
magazines. He also worked temporarily as the theatre critic for the “Vossische Zeitung.” 
In the same year, he worked as a cultural correspondent and feuilletonist for the Neue freie 
Presse in Vienna, and by 1904 he had taken over as editor succeeding Theodor Herzl upon 
the latter’s death. 
Until now, no book length study of Der Sturm has appeared, and it is only recently 
that has such an endeavour has come to fruition in the form of Jenny Anger’s Four 
Metaphors of Modernism: From Der Sturm to the Société Anonyme.1446 In her study, 
Anger begins by arguing that Walden implies that genuine art is directly accessible to the 
senses as in his statement: “He who has eyes to hear, feels.” She explores her claims by 
exploring links between Der Sturm and the Société Anonyme through four metaphorical 
chapters called’ Piano, Water, Glass and Home’. The Société Anonyme (arguably the first 
museum of modern art) was founded in 1920, by Man Ray, Marcel Duchamp and 
Katherine Dreier.1447  Functioning in a similar to Der Sturm, and perhaps inspired by Dada, 
the Société Anonyme exhibited art at the International Exhibition of Modern Art at the 
Brooklyn Museum, New York during the 1920s.  
                                                                
1446 Anger, J., Four Metaphors of Modernism: From Der Sturm to the Société Anonyme (2018). 
1447 anonyme, S., Société Anonyme (the First Museum of Modern Art, 1920-1944): Monographs (Arno Press, 1972). 
Appendix C: Sample annotations from Max Beckmann’s signed copy of 
Arthur Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation. Volume 1

In these samples, Beckmann uses a 1902 edition of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.1 
He also had a 1921 edition of the Sämtliche Werke, but the annotations we see below are all 
from the 1902 edition. All English translations of Schopenhauer’s German text as seen in the 
below can be found in: Arthur, and Payne, E. F. J. The World as Will and Representation. New 
York: Dover Publications, (1969).2 I have reproduced the German text verbatim in this 
Appendix as it is found in: Beckmann, Peter, and Schaffer, Joachim. Die Bibliothek Max 
Beckmanns: Unterstreichungen, Kommentare, Notizen und Skizzen in seinen Büchern Worms 
am Rhein: Wernersche Verlagsgesellschaft, (1992). It is in this book that Beckmann’s 
annotations of Schopenhauer have been collated in the first instance.  
When reading this Appendix, there are two important orientation devices to be aware 
of. Firstly, as will become apparent, one set of footnotes corresponds to Payne’s English 
translation of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, whilst another set displays a conferatur (Cf.) 
page number which relates to Beckmann’s annotations of Schopenhauer’s German text as it 










                                                 
1 Schopenhauer, A. and Köhler, M., Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Bd 1 Bd 1 (Berlin: A. Wrichert, 1902). 




What might otherwise be called the finest part of life, its purest joy, just because it lifts us out 
of real existence, and transforms us into disinterested spectators of it, is pure knowledge which 
remains foreign to all willing, pleasure in the beautiful, genuine delight in art. But because this 
requires rare talents, it is granted only to extremely few, and even to those only as a fleeting 
dream.3 
 
1 Beckmann has underlined the text segment beginning from: “…is pure knowledge which 




Moreover, it makes them feel lonely among beings that are noticeably different from them, and 
in this way also matters are made even. But purely intellectual pleasures are not accessible to 
the vast majority of men. They are almost wholly incapable of the pleasure to be found in pure 
knowledge; they are entirely given over to willing. Therefore, if anything is to win their 
sympathy, to be interesting to them, it must (and this is to be found already in the meaning of 
the word) in some way excite their will, even if it be only through a remote relation to it which 
is merely within the bounds of possibility. The will must never be left entirely out of question, 
since their existence lies far more in willing than in knowing; action and reaction are their only 
element. The naïve expressions of this quality can be seen in trifles and everyday phenomena; 
thus, for example, they write their names up at places worth seeing which they visit, in order 
                                                 
3 Ibid. Vol.1. p.314. 
4 Cf. Beckmann, P. and Schaffer, J., Die Bibliothek Max Beckmanns: Unterstreichungen, Kommentare, Notizen 
und Skizzen in seinen Büchern (Worms am Rhein: Wernersche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992).p.85. 
thus to react on, to affect the place, since it does not affect them. Further, they cannot easily 
just contemplate a rare and strange animal, but must excite it, tease it, play with it, just to 
experience action and reaction. But this need for exciting the will shows itself particularly in 
the invention and maintenance of card-playing, which is in the truest sense an expression of 
the wretched side of humanity. But whatever nature and good fortune may have done, whoever 
a person may be and whatever he may possess, the pain essential to life cannot be thrown off.5 
 
1 Beckmann has marked the following text segment in the margin from: “…noticeably different 
from them …” until the phrase beginning with “… lies far more in willing than in knowing; 
action and….”6  
2 Beckmann has marked the following text segment in the margin with four strokes the text 
segment starting from: “…exciting the will shows itself particularly…” until the end of the 




If, which is very difficult, we have succeeded in removing pain in this form, it at once appears 
on the scene in a thousand others, varying according to age and circumstances, such as sexual 
impulse, passionate love, jealousy, envy, hatred, anxiety, ambition, avarice, sickness, and so 
on. Finally, if it cannot find entry in any other shape, it comes in the sad, grey garment of 
weariness, satiety, and boredom, against which many different attempts are made.  Even if we 
ultimately succeed in driving these away, it will hardly be done without letting pain in again in 
one of the previous forms, and thus starting the dance once more at the beginning; for every 
                                                 
5 Schopenhauer and Payne.,p.314. 
6 Cf. Beckmann and Schaffer.,p.86. 
7 Ibid.,p.86. 
human life is tossed backwards and forwards between pain and boredom. Depressing as this 
discussion is, I will, however, draw attention in passing to one aspect of it from which a 
consolation can be derived, and perhaps even a stoical indifference to our own present ills may 
be attained. For our impatience at these arises for the most part from the fact that we recognize 
them as accidental, as brought about by a chain of causes that might easily be different. We are 
not usually distressed at evils that are inescapably necessary and quite universal, for example, 
the necessity of old age and death, and of many daily inconveniences. It is rather a consideration 
of the accidental nature of the circumstances that have brought suffering precisely on us which 
gives this suffering its sting. Now we have recognized that pain as such is inevitable and 
essential to life; that nothing but the mere form in which it manifests itself depends on chance; 
that therefore our present suffering fills a place which without it would be at once occupied by 
some other suffering which the one now present excludes; and that, accordingly, fate can affect 
us little in what is essential. If such a reflection were to become a living conviction, it might 
produce a considerable degree of stoical equanimity, and greatly reduce our anxious concern 
about our own welfare. But such a powerful control of the faculty of reason over directly felt 
suffering is seldom or never found in fact. 8 
 
1 Beckmann has underlined the following text segment from: “…which is very difficult…”, 
then from “…it comes in the sad, grey garment of weariness …” until the close of the sentence 
“… many different attempts are made.”9  
2 Beckmann has marked in the margin with an exclamation mark the following text segment 
from: “…it manifests itself depends on chance … a living conviction, it might produce…”.10  
 
                                                 
8 Schopenhauer and Payne.,p.315. 




Conversely, experience also teaches us that after the appearance of a long-desired happiness, 
we do not feel ourselves on the whole and permanently much better off or more comfortable 
than before. Only the moment of appearance of these changes moves us with unusual strength, 
as deep distress or shouts of joy; but both of these soon disappear, because they rested on 
illusion. For they do not spring from the immediately present pleasure or pain, but only from 
the opening up of a new future that is anticipated in them. Only by pain or pleasure borrowing 
from the future could they be heightened so abnormally, and consequently not for any length 
of time. The following remarks may be put in evidence in support of the hypothesis we 
advanced, by which, in knowing as well as in feeling suffering or well-being, a very large part 
would be subjective and determined a priori. Human cheerfulness or dejection is obviously not 
determined by external circumstances, by wealth or position, for we come across at least as 
many cheerful faces among the poor as among the rich. Further, the motives that induce suicide 
are so very different, that we cannot mention any misfortune which would be great enough to 
bring it about in any character with a high degree of probability, and few that would be so small 
that those like them would not at some time have caused it.11 
 
1 Beckmann has underlined the following text segment from: “…after the appearance of a long-
desired happiness” until the end of the sentence “… much better off or more comfortable than 
before,” breaking off and then underlining the sentence segment “…strength as deep distress 
or shouts of joy.” 12 
                                                 
11 Schopenhauer and Payne.,p.316. 
12 Cf. Beckmann and Schaffer.p.86. 
2 Beckmann has marked in margin with exclamation mark the text segment from: “…the 





In keeping with this is also the observation that, if a great and pressing care is finally lifted 
from our breast by a fortunate issue, another immediately takes its place. The whole material 
of this already existed previously, yet it could not enter consciousness as care, because the 
consciousness had no capacity left for it. This material for care, therefore, remained merely as 
a dark and unobserved misty form on the extreme horizon of consciousness. But now, as there 
is room, this ready material at once comes forward and occupies the throne of the reigning care 
of the day [Greek text here in Schopenhauer- my words]. If so far as its matter is concerned it 
is very much lighter than the material of the care that has vanished, it knows how to blow itself 
out, so that it apparently equals it in size, and thus, as the chief care of the day, completely fills 
the throne.14 
 
1 Beckmann has marked in margin the text segment from: “…pressing care is lifted …” until 





                                                 
13Cf.  Ibid.,p.86. 
14 Schopenhauer and Payne.p.317. 
15 Cf. Beckmann and Schaffer.p.86. 
Sample vi) 
 
From each particular delusion of this kind we must inevitably later be brought back; and then, 
when it vanishes, we must pay for it with pains just as bitter as the joy caused by its entry was 
keen.16 
 
1 Beckmann has underlined the following text segment from “…must pay for it with pains” 




Thus, it goes on either ad infinitum, or, what is rarer and already presupposes a certain strength 
of character, till we come to a wish that is not fulfilled, and yet cannot be given up. We then 
have, so to speak, what we were looking for, namely something that we can denounce at any 
moment, instead of our own inner nature, as the source of our sufferings. Thus, although at 
variance with our fate, we become reconciled to our existence in return for this, since the 
knowledge that suffering is essential to this existence itself and that true satisfaction is 
impossible, is again withdrawn from us. The consequence of this last kind of development is a 
somewhat melancholy disposition, the constant bearing of a single, great pain, and the resultant 
disdain for all lesser joys and sorrows. This is in consequence a worthier phenomenon than the 
constant hunting for ever different deceptive forms which is much more usual.18 
 
                                                 
16 Schopenhauer and Payne.p.318. 
17 Cf. Beckmann and Schaffer.,p.87. 
18 Schopenhauer and Payne.,p.319. 
1 Beckmann has marked in the margin the text segment from: “....is rarer and already…” until 
the end of the whole section which ends in “... in deceptive forms which is much more usual."19  
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Schopenhauer - Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung - 1902 
<S.118/S.119) Ich hätte noch manches hinzuzufügen über die Art, wie Musik percipiert 
wird, nämlich einzig und allein in und durch die Zeit, mit gänzlicher Ausschließung des 
Raumes, auch ohne Einnuß der Erkenntnis der Kausalität, also des Verstandes: denn die 
Töne machen schon als Wirkung und ohne daß wir auf ihre Ursache, wie bei der Ansehau-
s ung, zurückgingen, den ästhetischen Eindruck.- Ich will indessen diese Betrachtungen nicht 
noch mehr verlängern, da ich vielleicht schon so in diesem dritten Buche manchem zu aus-
führlich gewesen bin, oder mich zu sehr auf das Einzelne eingelassen habe. Mein Zweck 
machte es jedoch nötig, und man wird es um so weniger mißbilligen, wenn man die selten 
genug- (/) sam erkannte Wichtigkeit und den hohen Wert der Kunst sich vergegenwärtigt, 
10 erwägend, daß, wenn, nach unserer Ansicht, die gesamte sichtbare Welt nur die 
Objektivation. der Spiegel des Willens ist. zu seiner Selbsterkenntnis, ja, wie wir bald sehen 
werden, zur Möglichkeit seiner Erlösung, ihn begleitend; und zugleich, daß die Welt als 
Vorstellung. wenn man sie abgesondert betrachtet, indem man vom Wollen losgerissen, nur 
sie allein das Bewußtsein einnehmen läßt. die erfreulichste und die allein unschuldige Seite 
15 des Lebens ist; - wir die Kunst als die höhere Steigerung , die vollkommenere Entwickelung 
von allen diesem anzusehen haben, da sie wesentlich eben dasselbe, nur konzentrierter. 
vollendeter. mit Absicht und Besonnenheit, leistet, was die sichtbare Welt selbst, und sie 
daher, im vollen Sinne des Wortes. die Blüte des Lebens genannt werden mag. Ist die ganze 
Welt als Vorstellung nur die Sichtbarkeit des Willens, so ist die Kunst die Verdeutlichung 
<:0 dieser Sichtbarkeit, die Camera obscura, welche die Gegenstände reiner zeigt und besser 
übersehen und zusammenfassen läßt, das Schauspiel im Schauspiel. die Bühne auf der 
BUhne im >Hamlet<. 
Der Genuß alles Schönen. der Trost. den die Kunst gewährt, der Enthusiasmus des Künst-
lers, welcher ihn die Mühen des Lebens vergessen läßt . dieser eine Vorzug des Genius vor 
:'5 den anderen, der ihn für das mit der Klarheit des Bewußtseins in gleichem Maße gesteigerte 
Leiden und für die öde Einsamkeit unter einem heterogenen Geschlechte allein entschädigt, 
- dieses alles beruht darauf. daß. wie sich uns weiterhin zeigen wird, das Ansich des Le-
bens, der Wille, das Dasein selbst, ein stetes Leiden und teils jämmerlich. teils schrecklich 
ist; dasselbe hingegen als Vorstellung allein, rein angeschaut, oder durch die Kunst 
lO wiederholt, frei von Qual, ein bedeutsames Schauspiel gewährt. Diese rein erkennbare Sei-
te der Weit und die Wiederholung derselben in irgend einer Kunst ist das Element des 
Künstlers. 
<S.119/S.120) Jene reine, wahre und tiefe Erkenntnis des Wesens der Welt wird ihm nun 
Zweck an sich: er bleibt bei ihr stehen. Daher wird sie ihm nicht, (/) wie wir es im folgen-
) 5 den Buche bei dem zur Resignation gelangten Heiligen sehen werden, Quietiv des Willens, 
erlöst ihn nicht auf immer, sondern nur auf Augenblicke vom Leben, und ist ihm so noch 
nicht der Weg aus demselben, sondern nur einstweilen ein Trost in demselben; bis seine 
dadurch gesteigerte Kraft, endlich des Spieles müde, den Ernst ergreift. Als Sinnbild dieses 
Ueberganges kann man die heilige Cäcilie von Raffael betrachten. Zum Ernst also wollen 
"-0 nun auch wir uns im folgenden Buche wenden. 
Viertes Buch. 
Der Welt als Wille zweite Betrachtung: Bei erreichter Selbsterkenntnis Bejahung und 
Verneinung des Willens zum leben. (5.121-5.285) 
§55. (5.140- 5.165) 
115 <S.159) Hieraus eben erklärt sich die Befriedigung, oder die Seelenangst, mit der wir auf 
den zurückgelegten Lebensweg zurücksehen: beide kommen nicht daher, daß jene vergan-
geneo Thaten noch ein Dasein hätten: sie sind vergangen, gewesen und jetzt nichts mehr; 
aber ihre große Wichtigkeit für uns kommt aus ihrer Bedeutung, kommt daher, daß diese 
Thaten der Ausdruck des Charakters, der Spiegel des Willens sind, in welchen schauend 
50 wir unser innerstes Selbst, den Kern unseres Willens erkennen. Weil wir dies also nicht 
vorher, sondern erst nachher erfahren, kommt es uns zu, in der Zeit zu streben und zu 
kämpfen, eben damit das Bild, welches wir durch unsere Thaten wirken, so ausfalle, daß 
sein Anblick uns möglichst beruhige. nicht beängstige. Oie Bedeutung aber solcher 
Beruhigung, oder Seelenangst, wird, wie gesagt. weiter unten untersucht werden. 
'>5 §57. (5.168-5.178) 
<S.171) Die Langeweile aber ist nichts weniger, als ein gering zu achtendes Uebel: sie malt 
zuletzt wahre Verzweinung auf das Gesicht. Sie macht, das Wesen, welche einander so 
wenig lieben, wie die Menschen, doch so sehr einander suchen, und wird dadurch die Quelle 
der Geselligkeit. 
60 (S.172/S.173) Denn das, was man sonst den schönsten Teil, die reinsten Freuden des Le-
bens nennen möchte, eben auch nur, weil es uns aus dem realen Dasein heraushebt und uns 
in anteilslose Zuschauer desselben verwandelt, also das reine Erkennen, dem alles Wollen 
fremd bleibt, der GenuS des Schönen, die echte Freude an der Kunst, dies ist, weil es schon 
seltene Anlagen erfordert, nur höchst wenigen und auch diesen nur als ein vorübergehender 
65 Traum vergönnt: und dann macht eben diese wenigen die höhere intellektuelle Kraft für viel 
gröBere Leiden empfänglich, als die Stumpferen je empfinden können, und stellt sie 
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überdies einsam unter merklich von ihnen verschiedene Wesen : wodurch sich denn auch 
dieses ausgleicht. Dem bei weitem größten Teile der Menschen aber sind die rein 
intellektuellen Genüsse nicht zugänglich; der Freude, die im reinen Erkennen liegt, sind sie 
fast ganz unfähig: sie sind gänzlich auf das Wollen verwiesen. Wenn daher irgend etwas 
5 ihnen Anteil abgewinnen, ihnen interessant sein soll, so muß es (dies liegt auch schon in 
der Wortbedeutungl irgendwie ihren Willen anregen, sei es auch nur durch eine ferne und 
nur in der Möglichkeit liegende Beziehung auf ihn; er darf aber nie ganz aus dem Spiele blei-
ben, weil ihr Dasein bei weitem mehr im Wollen als im Erkennen liegt: Aktion und Reaktion 
ist ihr einziges Element. Die naiven Aeußerungen (/) dieser Beschaffenheit kann man aus 
10 Kleinigkeiten und alltäglichen Erscheinungen abnehmen: so z.B. schreiben sie an 
sehenswerten Orten, die sie besuchen, ihre Namen hin, um so zu reagieren, um auf den Ort 
zu wirken , da er nicht auf sie wirkte: ferner können sie nicht leicht ein fremdes, seltenes 
Tier bloß betrachten, sondern müssen es reizen, necken, mit ihm spielen, um nur Aktion 
und Reaktion zu empfinden; ganz besonders aber zeigt jenes Bedürfnis der Willensanregung 
15 sich an der Erfindung und Erhaltung des Kartenspieles, welches recht eigentlich der 
Ausdruck der kläglichen Seite der Menschheit ist. <...> 
Oie unaufhörlichen Bemühungen, das Leiden zu verbannen, leisten nichts weiter. als daß es 
seine Gestalt verändert. Diese ist ursprünglich Mangel, Not, Sorge um die Erhaltung des 
Lebens. Ist es , was sehr schwer hält, geglUckt, den Schmerz in dieser Gestalt zu verdrän-
2 0 gen, so stellt er sogleich sich in tausend anderen ein, abwechselnd nach Alter und 
Umständen, als Geschlechtstrieb, leidenschaftliche Liebe, Eifersucht, Neid, HaB, Angst, 
Ehrgeiz, Geldgeiz, Krankheit u.s.w. u.s.w. Kann er endlich in keiner andern Gestalt Eingang 
finden, so kommt er im traurigen. grauen Gewand des Ueberdrusses und der Langeweile, 
gegen welche dann mancherlei versucht wird. Gelingt es endlich diese zu verscheuchen, so 
:~5 wird es schwerlich geschehen, ohne dabei den Schmer z in einer der vorigen Gestalten 
wieder eiRzulassen und so den Tanz von vorne zu beginnen; denn zwischen Schmerz und 
Langerweile wird jedes Menschenleben hin und her geworfen. 
(S.174) Wenn wir nun aber erkannt haben, daß der Schmerz als solcher dem Leben we-
sentlich und unausweichbar ist, und nichts weiter als seine bloße Gestalt, die Form unter 
.30 der er sich darstellt. vom Zufall abhängt, daß also unser gegenwärtiges Leiden eine Stelle 
ausfüllt, in welche, ohne dasselbe, sogleich ein anderes träte, das jetzt von jenem 
ausgeschlossen wird, daß demnach, im wesentlichen, das Schicksal uns wenig anhaben 
kann; so könnte eine solche Reflexion, wenn sie zur lebendigen Ueberzeugung würde, einen 
bedeutenden Grad stoischen Gleichmuts herbeiführen und die ängstliche Besorgnis um das 
J5 eigene Wohl sehr vermindern. 
<S .175) Für diese Hypothese spricht nicht nur die bekannte Erfahrung, daß große Leiden 
alle kleineren gänzlich unfühlbar machen, und umgekehrt, bei Abwesenheit großer Leiden, 
selbst die kleinsten Unannehmlichkeiten uns quälen und verstimmen; sondern die Erfahrung 
lehrt auch, daß, wenn ein großes Unglück, bei dessen bloßen Gedanken wir schauderten, 
40 nun wirklich eingetreten ist, dennoch unsere Stimmung, sobald wir den ersten Schmerz 
überstanden haben, im ganzen ziemlich unverändert dasteht; und auch umgekehrt, daß nach 
dem Eintritt eines langersehnten Glückes, wir uns im ganzen und anhaltend nicht merklich 
wohler und behaglicher flihlen als vorher. Bloß der Augenblick des Eintritts jener 
Veränderungen bewegt uns ungewöhnlich stark als tiefer Jammer, oder lauter Jubel; aber 
45 beide verschwinden bald, weil sie auf Täuschung beruhten. < ... ) - Für die aufgestellte 
Hypothese, der zufolge, wie im Erkennen , so auch im Gefühl des Leidei)S oder Wohlseins ein 
sehr großer Teil subjektiv und a priori bestimmt wäre, können noch als Belege die 
Bemerkungen angeführt werden, daß der menschliche Frohsinn, oder Trübsinn, augen-
scheinlich nicht durch äußere Umstände, durch Reichtum oder Stand, bestimmt wird; da wir 
50 wenigstens ebensoviele frohe Gesichter unter den Armen. als unter den Reichen antreffen: 
ferner, daß die Motive, auf welche der Selbstmord erfolgt, so höchst verschieden sind; in-
dem wir kein Unglück angeben können, das groß genug wäre, um ihn nur mit vieler 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, bei jedem Charakter, herbeizuführen, und wenige, die so klein wären, 
daß nicht ihnen gleichwiegende ihn schon veranlaßt hätten. 
ss <S.176) Oiesem entspricht auch die Beobachtung, daS, wenn eine große, uns beklemmende 
Besorgnis endlich, durch den glücklichen Ausgang, uns von der Brust gehoben wird, alsbald 
an ihre Stelle eine andere tritt, deren ganzer Stoff schon vorher da war, jedoch nicht als 
Sorge ins Bewußtsein kommen konnte, weil dieses keine Kapazität dafür übrig hatte, 
weshalb dieser Sorgestoff bloß als dunkle unbemerkte Nebelgestalt an dessen Horizonts 
öO äußerstem Ende stehen blieb. Jetzt aber, da Platz geworden, tritt sogleich dieser fertige 
Stoff heran und nimmt den Thron der herrschenden (7tputaveuouood Besorgnis des Tages 
ein: wenn er nun auch, der Materie nach, sehr viel leichter ist, als der Stoff jener 
verschwundenen Besorgnis; so weiß er doch sich so aufzublähen, daß er ihr an scheinbarer 
Größe gleichkommt und so als Hauptbesorgnis des Tages den Thron vollkommen ausfüllt. 
6 5 (S.1n> Jeder unmäßige Jubel (exultatio, isolens laetitia) beruht immer auf dem Wahn, et-
was im Leben gefunden zu haben, was gar nicht darin anzutreffen ist, nämlich dauernde 
Befriedigung der quälenden, sich stets neu gebärenden Wünsche, oder Sorgen. Von jedem 
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einzelnen Wahn dieser Art muß man später unausbleiblich zurückgebracht werden und ihn 
dann, wann er verschwindet, mit ebenso bitlern Schmerzen bezahlen, als sein Eintritt 
Freude verursachte. 
(S.178) So geht es denn entweder ins Unendliche, oder, was seltener ist und schon eine 
5 gewisse Kraft des Charakters voraussetzt, bis wir auf einen Wunsch treffen, der nicht er-
füllt und doch nicht aufgegeben werden kann: dann haben wir gleichsam was wir suchten, 
nämlich etwas, das wir jeden Augenblick, statt unseres eigenen Wesens, als die Quelle 
unserer Leiden anklagen können, und wodurch wir nun mit unserm Schicksal entzweit, 
dafür aber mit unserer Existenz versöhnt werden, indem die Erkenntnis sich wieder 
10 entfernt, daß dieser Existenz selbst das Leiden wesentlich und wahre Befriedigung 
unmöglich sei. Oie Folge dieser letzten Entwickelungsart ist eine etwas melancholische 
Stimmung, das beständige Tragen eines einzigen, großen Schmerzes und daraus 
entstehende Geringschätzung aller kleineren Leiden oder Freuden; folglich eine schon wür-
digere Erscheinung, als das stete Haschen nach immer anderen Truggestalten, welches viel 
15 gewöhnlicher ist. 
§ 58. (S.178-S.183) 
(S.179) Daher kommt es, daß wir der GUter und Vorteile, die w ir wirklich besitzen, gar 
nicht recht inne werden, noch sie schätzen, sondern nicht anders meinen, als eben es müs-
se so sein: denn sie beglücken immer nur negativ, Leiden abhaltend. Erst nachdem wir sie 
20 verloren haben, wird uns ihr Wert fühlbar: denn der Mangel, das Entbehren, das Leiden ist 
das Positive, sich unmittelbar Ankündigende. Daher auch freut uns die Erinnerung 
überstandener Not, Krankheit, Mangel u. dgl., weil solche das einzige Mittel die 
gegenwärtigen Güter zu genießen ist. 
<S.179/S.180) Jede epische, oder dramatische Dichtung nämlich kann immer nur ein Rin-
25 gen, Streben und Kämpfen um Glück, nie aber das bleibende und vollendete Glück selbst 
darstellen. Sie führt ihren Helden durch tausend Schwierigkeiten und Gefahren bis zum 
Ziel: sobald es er- (/) reicht ist, läßt sie schnell den Vorhang fallen. Denn es bliebe ihr 
jetzt nichts übrig, als zu zeigen, daß das glänzende Ziel, in welchem der Held das Glück zu 
finden wähnte, auch ihn nur geneckt hatte, und er nach dessen Erreichung nicht besser 
30 daran war, als zuvor. Weil ein echtes, bleibendes Glück nicht möglich ist, kann es kein 
Gegenstand der Kunst sein. 
<S.181) Es ist wirklich unglaublich, wie nichtssagend und bedeutungsleer, von außen gese-
hen, und wie dumpf und besinnungslos, von innen empfunden, das Leben der allermeisten 
Menschen dahinfließt. Es ist ein mattes Sehnen und Quälen, ein träumerisches Taumeln 
35 durch die vier Lebensalter hindurch zum Tode, unter Begleitung einer Reihe trivialer 
Gedanken. Sie gleichen Uhrwerken, welche aufgezogen werden und gehen, ohne zu wissen 
warum; und jedesmal, daB ein Mensch gezeugt und geboren worden. ist die Uhr des 
Menschenlebens aufs neue aufgezogen, um jetzt ihr schon zahllose Male abgespieltes 
LeierstUck abermals zu wiederholen, Satz vor Satz und Takt vor Takt, mit unbedeutenden 
40 Variationen. -
<S.182/S.183) Dämonen, Götter und Heilige schafft sich der Mensch nach seinem eigenen 
Bilde; diesen müssen dann unablässig Opfer, Gebete, Tempelverzierungen, Gelübde und 
deren Lösung, Wallfahrten, Begrüßungen, Schmückung der Bilder u.s.w. (/) dargebracht 
werden. Ihr Dienst verwebt sich überall mit der Wirklichkeit, ja verdunkelt diese: jedes 
45 Ereignis des Lebens wird dann als Gegenwirkung jener Wesen aufgenommen: der Umgang 
mit ihnen füllt die halbe Zeit des Lebens aus, unterhält beständig die Hoffnung und wird, 
durch den Reiz der Täuschung, oft interessanter, als der mit wirklichen Wesen. Er ist der 
Ausdruck und das Symptom der doppelten Bedürftigkeit des Menschen, teils nach Hilfe und 
Beistand, und teils nach Beschäftigung und Kurzweil: und wenn er auch dem erstern 
so Bedürfnis oft gerade entgegenarbeitet, indem, bei vorkommenden Unfällen und Gefahren, 
kostbare Zeit und Kräfte, statt auf deren Abwendung, auf Gebete und Opfer unnütz 
verwendet werden; so dient er dem zweiten Bedürfnis dafür desto besser. durch jene 
phantastische Unterhaltung mit einer erträumten Geisterwelt: und dies ist der gar nicht zu 
verachtende Gewinn aller Superstitionen. 
55 § 59 . (S.183- S.186) 
(S.184) Jeder, welcher aus den ersten Jugendträumen erwacht ist, eigene und fremde Er-
fahrung beachtet, sich Im Leben, in der Geschichte der Vergangenheit und des eigenen Zeit-
alters, endlich in den Werken der großen Dichter umgesehen hat, wird, wenn nicht irgend 
ein unauslöschlich eingeprägtes Vorurteil seine Urteilskraft lähmt, wohl das Resultat 
60 erkennen, daS diese Menschenweit das Reich des Zufalls und des Irrtums ist, die 
unbarmherzig darin schalten, im groBen, wie im kleinen, neben welchen aber noch Thorheit 
und Bosheit die GeiBei schwingen: daher es kommt, daß jedes Bessere nur mühsam sich 
durchdrängt, das Edle und Weise sehr selten zur Erscheinung gelangt und Wirksamkeit 
87 
2-3 ebenso bitternisein ... verursachte. unterstri-
chen: Bleistift. 
4-15 ist ... ist. aiR Randstrich: Bleistift. 
t9-22 nur ... über-[standener arR Rands trlch: Blei-
stift. 
27-31 er-]reicht ... Kunst aiR Randstr!ch: Bleistift. 
Darüber aoR das isl ein bischen besser geworden : 
Bleistift. 
33-37 und wie ... geboren arR Randstrich: Bleistift. 
54 Ausgangzelle. darunter du kannal auch nichl wissen, 
ob diese Göiierwell. wahr isl oder nichi - . :Bleistift. 
auch unterstrichen: Bleistift. 
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A. Barth,  1897. 
Lloyd, Jill. German Expressionism: Primitivism and Modernity [in English]. New Haven, 
Conn. ; London: Yale University Press,  1991. 
Lombroso, Cesare. Genio e degenerazione. Nuovi studi e nuove battaglie [in Italian]. 
Palermo: Sandron,  1897. 
Long, R.C.W., Rigby, I.K., and Barron, S. German Expressionism: Documents from the 
End of the Wilhelmine Empire to the Rise of National Socialism. University of 
California Press,  1995. 
Long, Rose-Carol Washton, Rigby, Ida Katherine, Barron, Stephanie, and Roth, Nancy. 
German Expressionism : Documents from the End of the Wilhelmine Empire to the 
Rise of National Socialism [in English ; German (translation)]. Berkeley: 
University of California Press,  1993. 
Long, Rose Carol Washton. "Kandinsky's Abstract Style: The Veiling of Apocalyptic Folk 
Imagery."  Art Journal Vol. 34, no. 3 (1975): 217-28. 
Lovejoy, A. The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea. Taylor & 
Francis,  2017. 
Luft, David S. "Schopenhauer, Austria, and the Generation of 1905."  Central European 
History Vol. 16, no. 1 (1983): 53-75. 
Lukács, György. The Destruction of Reason [in English]. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: 
Humanities Press,  1981. 
Lukács, György, Livingstone, Rodney, and Fernbach, David. Essays on Realism [in 
English ; German]. [English-language ed.] ed. London: Lawrence and Wishart,  
1980. 
- 407 - 
 
Lundman, B., and Swan, D.A. The Races and Peoples of Europe. IAAEE,  1977. 
Lunn, Felicity, McKeever, Ian, and Whitechapel Art Gallery. Emil Nolde [Whitechapel 
Art Gallery, London 8 December 1995 - 25 February 1996, Museum of Modern 
Art, Copenhagen 15 March - 10 May 1996] [in English]. London: Whitechapel 
Art Gallery,  1996. 
Lüttichau, Mario-Andreas von, Pirsig, Tanja, and Mueller, Otto.  Otto Mueller CD-ROM, 
München, 2003. 
Macke, August. August Macke, Franz Marc, Briefwechsel : August Macke - Franz Marc, 
Lisbeth Macke - Maria Marc 1910 bis 1914 ; Franz Marc - Lisbeth Macke 
3.8.1914 bis 5.2.1916 ; Lisbeth Macke - Maria Marc 6.8.1914 bis 14.3.1916 [in 
German]. Köln: DuMont Schauberg,  1964. 
Macke, August, Frese, Werner, and Güse, Ernst-Gerhard. Briefe an Elisabeth und die 
Freunde [in German]. München: Bruckmann,  1987. 
Magee, Bryan. The Philosophy of Schopenhauer [in English]. Rev. and enl. ed. ed. 
Oxford: Clarendon,  1997. 
Magee, G. A. "Quietism in German Mysticism and Philosophy." [In English] Common 
Knowledge Vol. 16, no. 3 (2010): 457-73. 
Malter, Rudolf. Der eine Gedanke: Hinführung zur Philosophie Arthur Schopenhauers 
[in German]. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,  1988. 
Mander, W. J. Idealist Ethics [in English]. First edition. ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press,  2016. 
Marc, F., von Holst, C., von Maur, K., Stuttgart, Staatsgalerie, and Museum, Busch-
Reisinger. Franz Marc, Horses. Hatje Cantz,  2000. 
Marc, Franz. Briefe aus dem Feld: mit 32 Bildern des Verfassers [in German]. Berlin: 
Rembrandt-Verlag,  1940. 
- 408 - 
 
———. Briefe, Schriften und Aufzeichnungen [in German]. Leipzig: Gustav Kiepenheuer,  
1989. 
———. "Das geheime Europa." [In German] Das Forum  (March 1915). 
———. "Die Konstruktiven Ideen der Neuen Malerei " [In German] Pan Vol. 2, no. 18 
(21.03.1912). 
———. "Die Neue Malerei " [In German] Pan Vol. 2, no. 16 (07.03.1912). 
Marc, Franz, and Lankheit, Klaus. Schriften [in German]. Köln: DuMont,  1978. 
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Dresdner Künstlergruppe 'Brücke' der Jahre 1905 bis 1908. Berlin: Brücke-
Museum,  1977. 
———. Die frühe "Brücke": Beiträge zur Geschichte und zum Werk der Dresdner 
Künstlergruppe "Brücke" der Jahre 1905 bis 1908 [in German]. Berlin: Brüder 
Hartmann,  1978. 
Reuther, Manfred, Fluck, Andreas, Garbrecht, Jörg S., and Ada und Emil Nolde Stiftung 
Seebüll. Nolde in Berlin: Tanz, Theater, Cabaret (Dance, Theatre, Cabaret) [in 
English ; German]. Köln, Seebüll: DuMont,  2007. 
- 415 - 
 
Rigby, Ida Katherine. "German Expressionist Political Posters 1918-1919: Art and 
Politics, a Failed Alliance."  Art Journal Vol. 44, no. 1 (1984): 33-39. 
Ringbom, Sixten. "Art in 'The Epoch of the Great Spiritual': Occult Elements in the Early 
Theory of Abstract Painting."  Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 
Vol. 29 (1966): 386-418. 
Roessler, Arthur. "Das Abstrakte Ornament mit gleichzeitiger Verwendung simultaner 
Farbenkontraste." [In German] Wiener Abendpost  (1863). 
Roethel, Hans K., and Benjamin, Jean K. "A New Light on Kandinsky's First Abstract 
Painting."  The Burlington Magazine Vol. 119, no. 896 (1977): 772-70. 
Roethel, Hans K., Benjamin, Jean K., and Kandinsky, Wassily. Kandinsky: Catalogue 
Raisonné of the Oil Paintings. Vol. 1, 1900-1915 [in English]. London: Sotheby,  
1982. 
Roh, Franz. Nach-Expressionismus; Magischer Realismus, Probleme der Neuesten 
Europäischen Malerei [in German]. Leipzig: Klinkhardt & Biermann,  1925. 
Rooker, M., and Cole, D.R. Leviticus: An Exegetical and Theological Exposition of Holy 
Scripture. B&H Publishing Group,  2000. 
Rosenberg, Alfred. The Myth of The Twentieth Century: An Evaluation of the Spiritual-
Intellectual Confrontations of Our Age [in English]. Sussex: Historical Review 
Press,  2004. 
Ross, C. Naked Germany: Health, Race and the Nation. Berg,  2005. 
Rüger, Jan, and Wachsmann, Nikolaus. Rewriting German History: New Perspectives on 
Modern Germany [in English]. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England; 
New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan,  2015. 
- 416 - 
 
Rumold, Rainer, and Werckmeister, O. K. The Ideological Crisis of Expressionism: The 
Literary and Artistic German War Colony in Belgium 1914-1918 [in English]. 
Columbia, S.C.: Camden House,  1990. 
Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy : Bertrand Russell [in English]. London: 
Oxford University Press,  1959. 
Ryback, Timothy W. Hitler's Private Library: The Books that Shaped his Life [in English]. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf,  2008. 
Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind [in English]. Taylor & Francis,  2009. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul, and Alexander, Lloyd. Nausea [in English ; French (translation)]. [New 
York]: New Directions Pub. Corp,  1969. 
Scheffler, Karl. "Max Pechstein." [In English] Kunst und Künstler / Illustrierte 
Monatsschrift für bildende Kunst und Kunstgewerbe Vol. 16, no. 1 (1918). 
Schiebinger, Londa. "The Anatomy of Difference: Race and Sex in Eighteenth-Century 
Science."  Eighteenth-Century Studies Vol. 23, no. 4 (1990): 387-405. 
Schiefler, Gustav. Die Graphik Ernst Ludwig Kirchners [in German]. Berlin-
Charlottenburg: Euphorion Verlag,  1931. 
Schmidt, Diether. In letzter Stunde, 1933-1945: Schriften deutscher Künstler des 
zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts [in German]. Dresden: Verlag der Kunst,  1964. 
Schneider, Sascha. Mein Gestalten und Bilden [in German]. Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel,  
1916. 
Schönemann, Friedrich "Zurück zur Natur!" [In German] Kraft und Schönheit Vol. 6 
(1901). 
Schopenhauer, A. Collected Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer. Start Publishing LLC,  2012. 
Schopenhauer, A., and Kolenda, K. Essay on the Freedom of the Will. Dover Publications,  
2012. 
- 417 - 
 
Schopenhauer, A., Payne, E.F.J., and Cartwright, D.E. On the Basis of Morality. Berghahn 
Books,  1995. 
Schopenhauer, A., Runge, P.O., and Stahl, G. On Vision and Colors; Color Sphere. 
Princeton Architectural Press,  2012. 
Schopenhauer, A., and Saunders, T.B. Studies in Pessimism: A Series of Essays. S. 
Sonnenschein,  1891. 
Schopenhauer, Adele, Schopenhauer, Arthur, Schopenhauer, Johanna, Schopenhauer, 
Heinrich Floris, and Lütkehaus, Ludger. Die Schopenhauers : der 
Familienbriefwechsel von Adele, Arthur, Heinrich Floris und Johanna 
Schopenhauer [in German]. Zürich: Haffmans,  1991. 
Schopenhauer, Arthur. Arthur Schopenhauers Sämmtliche Werke 6, 6 [in German]. 
Leipzig: Reclam,  1854. 
———. Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, behandelt in zwei akademischen 
Preisschriften. I.  Über die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens ... II. Über das 
Fundament der Moral, etc. Frankfurt am Main: Hermannsche Buchhandlung, 
1841. 
———. Farbenlehre: 1. Ueber das sehn und die farben. 2. Theoria colorum physiologica 
[in German]. Leipzig: P. Reclam,  1854. 
———. Schopenhauer-Bibliothek. Originalhandschriften Schopenhauers, 166 Bände aus 
seiner Privatbibliothek, seine Schriften, Briefe und Gespräche, Literatur über ihn. 
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